ECLI:EU:C:2026:541

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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

KOKOTT

delivered on 2 July 2026 (1)

Case C‑383/25

Keritaly

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per la Lombardia (Regional Administrative Court, Lombardia, Italy))

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Directive 2010/75/EU – Industrial emissions – Integrated prevention and reduction of pollution – Substantial change to an installation – Permit requirement – Communication of intent to make a non-substantial change to an installation – Failure of the competent authority to respond within the intended time limit – Legal consequences – Tacit authorisation – Inadmissibility )

I. Introduction

1. The European Union intends to increase its use of tacit authorisation, which is deemed to have been granted where an authority has not responded to an application with a specified time limit, as a means of speeding up procedures in environmental law as elsewhere. (2) However, are the Member States permitted to provide for tacit authorisation in respect of measures which, under EU law – specifically, under the Industrial Emissions Directive (3) – expressly require written authorisation? That question arises in the present case and is gaining in significance as a result of the abovementioned development in EU law.

II. Legal framework

A. European Union law

2. Article 3(7) and (9) of the Industrial Emissions Directive defines the terms ‘permit’ and ‘substantial change’ to an installation as follows:

‘For the purposes of this Directive the following definitions shall apply:

…

(7) “permit” means a written authorisation to operate all or part of an installation or combustion plant, waste incineration plant or waste co-incineration plant;

…

(9) “substantial change” means a change in the nature or functioning, or an extension, of an installation or combustion plant, waste incineration plant or waste co-incineration plant which may have significant negative effects on human health or the environment’.

3. Article 4 (‘Obligation to hold a permit’) of the Industrial Emissions Directive provides as follows, in paragraph 1 thereof:

‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no installation or combustion plant, waste incineration plant or waste co-incineration plant is operated without a permit.

…’

4. Article 20 of the Industrial Emissions Directive governs changes to installations:

‘1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the operator informs the competent authority of any planned change in the nature or functioning, or an extension of the installation which may have consequences for the environment. Where appropriate, the competent authority shall update the permit.

2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no substantial change planned by the operator is made without a permit granted in accordance with this Directive.

The application for a permit and the decision by the competent authority shall cover those parts of the installation and those details listed in Article 12 which may be affected by the substantial change.

3. Any change in the nature or functioning or an extension of an installation shall be deemed to be substantial if the change or extension in itself reaches the capacity thresholds set out in Annex I.’

B. Italian law

5. Article 29-nonies of Decreto legislativo n. 152/2006 (Legislative Decree No 152/2006) on environmental rules governs the notification of changes to an installation:

‘1. The operator shall notify the competent authority of planned changes to the installation, as defined in Article 5(1)(l). If the competent authority considers it necessary, it shall update the integrated environmental permit or its conditions, or, if it finds that the planned changes are substantial within the meaning of Article 5(1)(l-bis), it shall inform the operator accordingly within 60 days of receipt of the notification for the purposes of fulfilling the obligations under paragraph 2 of this article. After that period has elapsed, the operator may make the changes notified.

2. Where, according to the operator or following the notification referred to in paragraph 1, the planned changes appear to be substantial, the operator shall submit a new application for a permit to the competent authority, together with a report containing an update concerning the information referred to in Article 29-ter(1) and (2). …’

III. Facts and request for a preliminary ruling

6. Keritaly SpA reopened a factory for the production of ceramic tiles located in Gonzaga, in the provincia di Mantova (Province of Mantova, Italy; ‘the Province’). Under point 3.5 of Annex VIII to Legislative Decree No 152/2006, that activity is subject to the Italian transposition of the Industrial Emissions Directive.

7. In 2018, the Province made the project subject to an environmental impact assessment (EIA) on the ground of possible effects on air quality and, consequently, on human health. In response, Keritaly proposed a reduction in the emission limits and applied for review of that EIA requirement.

8. On 6 February 2019, the Province waived the requirement for an environmental impact assessment, subject to compliance with certain conditions and, in particular, an emission limit of 20 mg/Nm³ for volatile organic compounds. By act of 12 June 2019, the Province granted the integrated environmental permit for carrying out the activity. It incorporated the emission limit for volatile organic compounds of 20 mg/Nm³ into that permit.

9. On 27 February 2023, the competent regional agency for environmental protection carried out an inspection to verify compliance with the permit conditions for the environmental medium of air, and, on 12 June 2023, detected emissions of volatile organic compounds of 65.12 mg/Nm³, which exceeded the prescribed limit.

10. The Province objected to that infringement by way of a letter of formal notice dated 1 August 2023 and served on 3 August 2023. It ordered Keritaly to explain the reasons for exceeding the limit, indicating the procedures implemented to ensure compliance with that limit. It also reminded Keritaly that any changes in the characteristics of the emissions or in the abatement systems installed would require the submission of a notification for the purpose of amending the permit.

11. On 4 August 2023, Keritaly submitted a notification of a non-substantial change, pursuant to Article 29-nonies of Legislative Decree No 152/2006, regarding an increase from 20 to 50 mg/Nm³ in the emission limit for volatile organic compounds. Immediately after the 60-day period within which, under that article, the Province should have verified whether that increase constituted a substantial change, Keritaly, on 4 October 2023, informed the Province that, in view of the lack of response on the part of the Province, it considered that it was authorised to make the change notified.

12. It was only at that stage that, in a letter dated 12 October 2023, the Province stated that the emission limit for volatile organic compounds could not be increased. In particular, the Province asserted that the increase in the emission limit for volatile organic compounds may lead to a potential increase in the mass flow of volatile organic compounds equal to 9 119 tonnes per year and, for that reason, may have significant negative effects on the environment. Accordingly, it found that the increase could not be authorised without a preliminary procedure to verify the need for an EIA.

13. On 2 November 2023, Keritaly asked the Province to review that decision, claiming in particular that tacit authorisation was given once 60 days had elapsed since it had issued the notification of the non-substantial change. The Province, in a letter dated 23 November 2023, denied that tacit authorisation had been given.

14. Keritaly challenged the letters of 12 October 2023 and 23 November 2023 by its action brought before the referring court, the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per la Lombardia (Regional Administrative Court, Lombardia, Italy).

15. The review procedure then continued, and the Agenzia di Tutela della Salute Val Padana (Health Protection Agency Val Padana, Italy), by letter of 12 December 2023, stated, in the first place, that, in the Province, there had been an excess number of miscarriages and an increase in the incidence of leukaemia, which may have been caused by environmental risk factors; in the second place, that the volatile organic compounds emitted by Keritaly could include carcinogens; and, in the third place, that the fallout model submitted by Keritaly in 2018 was not such as to enable a comparison with the reference values in the literature for the population in general. The Health Protection Agency therefore considered it necessary to carry out a new study.

16. On the same date, the Agenzia Regionale Protezione Ambiente (Regional Agency for Environmental Protection, Italy) asserted that the increase in emissions of volatile organic compounds would probably lead to an increase in emissions fallout, that there were at least two installations of the same type in the area at issue which were affected by the increase in the emission limit for volatile organic compounds, and that new production lines had been established in Keritaly’s installations since 2018. It also found that Keritaly had voluntarily reduced emissions in order to exempt the procedures at issue for amending the permit from the need for an EIA.

17. In the light of those opinions, the Province, on 14 February 2024, confirmed the previous decision of 12 October 2023. Keritaly modified its action accordingly.

18. The request for a preliminary ruling states that Italy’s administrative case-law to date relating to the final sentence of Article 29-nonies(1) of Legislative Decree No 152/2006 has held that the competent authority’s failure to reply, throughout the 60-day period, does not amount to authorisation of the change. Article 29-nonies does allow the operator to make the changes after that period expires – but only until the authority decides otherwise. In particular, that decision may establish that a permit procedure must be followed.

19. The referring court, on the contrary, understands the sentence in question to mean that the operator ‘is permitted’ to make the changes. It considers that, if an activity is subject to authorisation, then either there is a permit or there is no permit. It sees no third possibility and, in particular, no situation in which the activity could be permitted provisionally but prohibited at a later date.

20. It further argues that the interpretation provided in the case-law referred to above exposes the operator which makes the planned changes after 60 days have elapsed without a response following the notification, incurring the corresponding costs, to significant risk. After all, the authority could classify them as substantial changes even after a considerable period of time, and practically indefinitely.

21. On the other hand, in the referring court’s view, if Article 29-nonies(1) is interpreted in terms of tacit authorisation, the operator is implicitly authorised to make the changes after 60 days have elapsed without a response from the authority. Where that authority belatedly considers them to be substantial changes, it may prohibit them by revoking the tacit authorisation, by way of a review of the measures it has adopted – but only within a reasonable period of time and, in any event, not after more than one year, in accordance with Article 21-nonies of Law No 241/1990. Furthermore, in order to proceed with the annulment, the authority must assess the vested and current public interest, the legitimate expectations of the operator and the interests of any other parties to the proceedings. However, where the operator’s notification includes a misrepresentation of the facts, the competent authority may proceed with the annulment even after the one-year time limit has passed (Article 21-nonies(2-bis) of Law No 241/1990).

22. The referring court therefore addresses the following question to the Court:

Must Article 20(2) of [the Industrial Emissions Directive] be interpreted as precluding a national rule (such as that in force in Italy pursuant to Article 29-[nonies](1) of [D]ecreto legislativo n. 152/2006 (Legislative Decree No 152/2006)), which provides that, following the communication by which the operator informs the competent authority of a planned change to its installation – which it classifies as non-substantial – where the competent authority has not responded after a period of 60 days has elapsed the change is, in any event, tacitly authorised, even if it subsequently appears to be a substantial change?

23. The environmental organisation Legambiente Lombardia Onlus, the Province, the Italian Republic and the European Commission have submitted written observations. The hearing on 24 April 2026 was attended by those interested parties and by Keritaly SpA.

IV. Legal assessment

24. In the case in the main proceedings, Keritaly notified the Province of an increase in an emission limit for volatile organic compounds from 20 mg/Nm³ to 50 mg/Nm³ as a non-substantial change to its installation for the production of ceramic tiles. The Province rejected that application only after the 60-day period prescribed by Italian law had elapsed. It considers that the change is a substantial one which cannot simply be authorised. Keritaly maintains in response that the Province has already tacitly authorised the change by missing the time limit.

25. The request for a preliminary ruling is therefore intended to establish whether Article 20(2) of the Industrial Emissions Directive precludes national legislation which provides for tacit authorisation of a change to an installation which the operator has described as non-substantial in the event that the change subsequently proves to be substantial.

26. I will therefore begin by demonstrating, on the basis of the wording of the relevant provisions of the Industrial Emissions Directive, their schematic relationships and the objectives of the legislation, that tacit authorisation of a substantial change is precluded. I will then discuss the wider context of the question by means of comparison with tacit decisions governed by EU law and, lastly, examine the interests of operators and of Keritaly in particular.

A. Wording

27. The first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the Industrial Emissions Directive requires Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that no installation within the meaning of Article 3(3) of that directive and Annex I thereto is operated without a permit. Accordingly, the Province granted a permit for the factory at issue as an installation for the manufacture of ceramic products by firing, as referred to in point 3.5 of Annex I to that directive, in 2019.

28. Under the first subparagraph of Article 20(2) of the Industrial Emissions Directive, the Member States are also to take the necessary measures to ensure that no substantial change (to such an installation) planned by the operator is made without a permit granted in accordance with that directive. In respect of any other changes, by contrast, Article 20 simply requires operators to inform the competent authority. (4)

29. Under the definition set out in Article 3(7) of the Industrial Emissions Directive, authorisation is granted in writing. Since tacit authorisation, by its nature, cannot be granted in writing, it is already precluded in the case of a substantial change by the wording of the first subparagraph of Article 20(2) and Article 3(7) of the Industrial Emissions Directive.

30. The second and third subparagraphs of Article 4(1) of the Industrial Emissions Directive do provide for a derogation from the permit requirement. However, as the Commission points out, that is not applicable in the present case.

31. The derogation applies to installations covered only by Chapter V of the Industrial Emissions Directive – that is to say, certain installations and activities in which, or in the course of which, organic solvents are used. These are listed in Part 1 of Annex VII to that directive. Member States may set a registration procedure for those installations. Such a procedure need only involve a notification to the competent authority by the operator of the intention to operate an installation. Substantial changes to such installations are subject to special rules under Article 63 of the Industrial Emissions Directive and do not necessarily require authorisation.

32. It is true that the limit in question concerns volatile organic compounds, which also include solvents. However, the installation at issue, a factory for the production of ceramic tiles, is not covered only by Chapter V of the Industrial Emissions Directive and, consequently, is also not listed in Part 1 of Annex VII to that directive.

B. Schematic relationship with public participation and effective legal protection for members of the public concerned

33. The need for a written authorisation is also closely connected to public participation and effective legal protection for third parties as provided for in the Industrial Emissions Directive.

34. Article 24(1)(b) of the Industrial Emissions Directive provides that the public participation procedure set out in Annex IV to that directive must be followed in respect of the granting of a permit for any substantial change. That procedure involves providing the public with certain information and the opportunity to comment on the decision.

35. Under Article 25 of the Industrial Emissions Directive, moreover, decisions, acts and omissions subject to Article 24 thereof are open to judicial review at the initiative of members of the public concerned. In particular, environmental associations may bring actions under that provision. (5)

36. By contrast, accepting the existence of tacit authorisation would rule out any public participation and, at the very least, make judicial review considerably more difficult. After all, the very nature of such a situation casts doubt on the availability of information to the public.

37. The effective legal protection of members of the public could, moreover, give rise to serious risks for the operator of the installation. In the absence of an announcement, tacit authorisation is unlikely to trigger the start of a limitation period, (6) with the result that potential actions could still be brought after a considerable length of time. What is more, tacit authorisation is not backed by a statement of reasons – on that basis alone, a potential action would therefore have a good chance of success.

38. Accepting that tacit authorisation may be granted in respect of substantial changes would therefore be incompatible with public participation and the effective legal protection for members of the public concerned as provided for in the Industrial Emissions Directive.

C. Objectives of the legislation

39. Precluding tacit authorisation of substantial changes is also consistent with the objectives of the Industrial Emissions Directive and the European Union’s environment policy.

40. As set out in the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Industrial Emissions Directive, the objective of that directive is the integrated prevention and control of pollution arising from industrial activities. In accordance with the second paragraph of Article 1 of that directive, read in the light of recital 12 thereof, it also aims to prevent or, where that is not practicable, to reduce emissions into air, water and land and to prevent the generation of waste, in order to achieve a high level of protection of the environment taken ‘as a whole.’ (7) Recital 18 thereof establishes that substantial changes to installations which may have significant negative effects on human health or the environment should not be made without a permit granted in accordance with that directive.

41. Those objectives give concrete expression to the general objectives of the European Union.

42. The European Union adopted the Industrial Emissions Directive on the basis of Article 192(1) TFEU, which concerns the action it takes in the environmental field in order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 191 TFEU. The latter article provides, in the first and second indents of paragraph 1 thereof, that EU policy on the environment is to contribute to pursuit of the objectives of preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment and protecting human health. Under Article 191(2) TFEU, EU policy on the environment is to aim at a high level of protection. (8)

43. Additionally, Article 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 9 TFEU provide that a high level of human health protection is to be ensured in the definition and implementation of all the European Union’s policies and activities. At the same time, in accordance with Article 37 of the Charter and Article 3 TEU, a high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the European Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development. (9)

44. The requirement of written authorisation for the operation of and substantial changes to installations contributes significantly to the achievement of those objectives. It forces the installation operator and the permit-issuing authority to verify and demonstrate that the conditions laid down in the Industrial Emissions Directive for the operation of an installation are satisfied.

45. Explicit verification of compliance with the applicable provisions of the Industrial Emissions Directive makes sense, in particular, in the event of a substantial change to an installation. Under Article 3(9) of that directive, this means a change in the nature or functioning, or an extension, of an installation which may have significant negative effects on human health or the environment. The application of the Industrial Emissions Directive is intended to prevent such effects or at least reduce them to a minimum.

46. It is clear that the change in question, namely a 150% increase to a limit for volatile organic compounds, may have significant negative effects on human health or the environment. Those compounds are defined in Article 3(45) of the Industrial Emissions Directive, are the subject of specific provisions laid down in Chapter V thereof and, under Annex II to that directive, are air polluting substances for which limit values must be set pursuant to Article 14(1)(a) thereof.

47. If Keritaly’s installation was an installation governed by Chapter V of the Industrial Emissions Directive, an increase in emissions of volatile organic compounds of only 10% would suffice to constitute a substantial change under Article 63(1)(b) of that directive.

48. Furthermore, since Article 14(1)(a) of the Industrial Emissions Directive requires emission limit values for volatile organic compounds, a change to such a limit must be considered a change in the functioning of an installation. (10)

49. The subject matter of the notification by Keritaly at issue is therefore a substantial change to the installation it operates which requires a written authorisation in accordance with the spirit and purpose of the Industrial Emissions Directive.

D. Broader context: tacit decisions in other areas of EU law

50. The concept of a tacit decision upon expiry of a time limit is not alien to EU law. However, the European Union’s regulatory practice shows that precluding the tacit authorisation of substantial changes, in the context of interpreting Article 20(2) of the Industrial Emissions Directive, is a requirement of legal certainty. Rather, where tacit decisions are provided for, they and the legal consequences associated with them are precisely regulated.

51. It is true that, in the field of State aid law, in view of the Member States’ legitimate interests, the Court has imposed on the Commission a time limit of two months following notification of a State aid scheme to comment on its compatibility with EU law, by analogy with the limitation periods for bringing an action before the EU Courts. If the Commission missed that unwritten time limit, the prohibition on putting the aid into effect, which is now laid down in the third sentence of Article 108(3) TFEU, would cease to apply. Notably, that legal consequence was not final, as the Commission remained able to raise any objections to the measure by way of the procedure for reviewing existing aid. (11)

52. The interpretation of the Industrial Emissions Directive sought by the referring court would have a similar quality in that that directive does not provide for tacit authorisation of a substantial change. However, since it is intended to result in an authorisation, it would have a more far-reaching effect than the judgment of the Court referred to above, which only resulted in the prohibition ceasing to apply.

53. The limitation period which the Court developed by analogy in the field of State aid law is now explicitly laid down in Article 4(6) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589. (12) By that provision, the legislature went a step further and provided for tacit authorisation of aid. Similarly, the effect of Article 10(6) of the Merger Regulation (13) is that a notified concentration is deemed to be authorised if the Commission does not take a decision within a relatively short time limit. Both those instances of tacit authorisation are based on the interests of the economic players concerned.

54. Article 13(4) of the Services Directive, (14) which is cited by the Commission, provides for tacit authorisation of access to or exercise of a service activity. That provision serves to give substance to legal positions already derived from the fundamental freedoms and simply specifies the limits on Member States’ restriction of those freedoms.

55. By contrast, in EU civil service law (15) and in the field of access to EU documents, (16) it is expressly stipulated that an application is deemed to have been rejected by implied decision if the competent body does not issue a decision within certain periods. Tacit authorisation does not create a legal position but rather gives the applicant the opportunity to seek judicial redress. (17)

56. In environmental law, there is an additional consideration. The fundamental objective is to protect the environment and/or health from the negative effects of certain activities. Consequently, where provision is made for tacit decisions in EU environmental law, there are usually safeguards in place to ensure compliance with the relevant requirements.

57. For example, the second subparagraph of Article 9(1) of the Waste Shipment Regulation (18) provides for tacit consent by the competent authority of transit in the context of shipments of waste within the European Union, and other provisions allow tacit consent to be deemed to have been given in respect of the competent authorities of third countries of transit. By contrast, the competent authorities of destination and dispatch must decide in writing, stating their reasons and with due consideration of the applicable rules.

58. Recently, in order to promote the use of renewable energy, the European Union introduced tacit approval for intermediary administrative steps in permit-granting procedures in Article 16a(6) of Directive 2018/2001. (19) By its proposal for a regulation on speeding-up environmental assessments, the Commission seeks to expand that regulatory model to other strategic projects. (20) It must be pointed out that that regulatory model still requires the final decision on the outcome of a permit-granting procedure to be made explicitly. The intention is to ensure compliance with the relevant safeguards.

59. The interpretation of Italian law being considered by the referring court would entail an absence of such safeguards. That is another reason why the Industrial Emissions Directive should not be interpreted as permitting tacit authorisation of substantial changes to installations.

60. It should also be noted that there is another case pending before the Court in which it is considering the question of whether the relevant provisions of EU law permit tacit authorisation even though they do not expressly provide for it. That case concerns the control of goods from third countries for reasons of public health. (21)

61. It must therefore be concluded that a time limit for a decision on a substantial change the elapsing of which would effect tacit authorisation would require an express provision in the Industrial Emissions Directive which, ideally, would also establish a mechanism to guarantee compliance with that directive’s safeguards and, in particular, an appropriate relationship with meaningful public participation and effective legal protection.

E. Legitimate interests of the operator

62. The installation operator’s interest in obtaining a decision on its application within the prescribed time limit, which the referring court highlights, does not justify the interpretation of the Industrial Emissions Directive sought by the referring court. When the abovementioned risk of judicial proceedings is taken into account, (22) there is even cause for concern that such an interpretation would undermine that very interest. If suitable remedies are available under national law, such as actions for failure to act or entitlement to damages, the operator must use them instead.

63. That being said, it appears doubtful in the present case whether such remedies would be successful, as the notification by Keritaly at issue – subject to a more detailed assessment by the referring court – appears to constitute an abuse of rights.

64. While the request for a preliminary ruling does not expressly characterise Keritaly’s conduct as an abuse of rights, it does submit that, in its view, notifying a substantial change as a non-substantial change in bad faith could also result in tacit authorisation.

65. In fact, Keritaly must have known that the limit value at issue could not simply be increased and could not be accepted as a non-substantial change. The request for a preliminary ruling states that the undertaking itself proposed lowering the limit to the established value during the original permit procedure in order to circumvent the need for an environmental impact assessment. It therefore knew that the Province considered the higher limit value to be associated with a risk of significant negative effects on the environment.

66. In that situation, submitting an application for an increase in the limit value in the form of a notification of a non-substantial change already seems to constitute abuse (venire contra factum proprium).

67. That impression is heightened by the fact that, from the readings taken on 27 February 2023 and the application to increase the limit value, it appears that the installation is not designed to be able to operate in compliance with the established limit value. In that situation, Keritaly would have been required under Article 8(2)(b) of the Industrial Emissions Directive and the transposition thereof in Article 29-decies of Decreto legislativo n. 152/2006 (Legislative Decree No 152/2006) to restore compliance with the limit value within the shortest possible time. (23) What is more, in the event that exceeding the limit value posed an immediate danger to human health or threatened to cause an immediate significant adverse effect upon the environment, the operation of the installation would have had to be suspended. (24)

V. Conclusion

68. I therefore propose that the Court of Justice answer the question referred for a preliminary ruling as follows:

Article 20(2) of Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) must be interpreted as precluding the tacit authorisation of a substantial change to an installation which requires a permit under that directive.

1 Original language: German.

2 Article 16a(6) of Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (OJ 2018 L 328, p. 82) as amended by Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 (OJ L, 2023/2413) and section II of the Annex to the Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on speeding-up environmental assessments (COM(2025) 984 final).

3 Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ 2010 L 334, p. 17).

4 See judgment of 2 June 2022, FCC Česká republika (C‑43/21, EU:C:2022:425, paragraph 44).

5 On the similarly worded Article 10a of Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 1985 L 175, p. 40), as amended by Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 (OJ 2003 L 156, p. 17), see judgment of 12 May 2011, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen (C‑115/09, EU:C:2011:289, paragraph 42).

6 See judgments of 7 November 2019, Flausch and Others (C‑280/18, EU:C:2019:928, paragraphs 54 to 59), and of 16 April 2026, Drumakilla and Others (C‑58/24, EU:C:2026:300, paragraphs 45 and 46), as well as the findings and recommendations of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee of 22 September 2021, Breakell v. United Kingdom (Nelson Hospital Site) (ACCC/C/2015/131 (Nr. 129).

7 Judgment of 25 June 2024, Ilva and Others (C‑626/22, EU:C:2024:542, paragraph 69).

8 Judgment of 25 June 2024, Ilva and Others (C‑626/22, EU:C:2024:542, paragraph 67).

9 Judgment of 25 June 2024, Ilva and Others (C‑626/22, EU:C:2024:542, paragraph 71).

10 See, to that effect, judgment of 2 June 2022, FCC Česká republika (C‑43/21, EU:C:2022:425, paragraphs 40 and 41).

11 Judgment of 11 December 1973, Lorenz (120/73, EU:C:1973:152, paragraphs 4 and 5).

12 Council Regulation of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9).

13 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1).

14 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36).

15 Article 90 of Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ 1962 P 045, p. 1385), as amended by the Update of the Remuneration and Pensions of the Officials and Other Servants of the European Union which came into force on 1 July 2025 (OJ 2025, C/2025/6569).

16 Article 7(4) and Article 8(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).

17 See my Opinion in Housieaux (C‑186/04, EU:C:2005:70, points 31 to 37).

18 Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of waste (OJ 2006 L 190, p. 1).

19 Cited in footnote 2.

20 Cited in footnote 2.

21 Case C‑596/25, Sonifer.

22 See point 37 above.

23 Judgment of 25 June 2024, Ilva and Others (C‑626/22, EU:C:2024:542, paragraph 127).

24 Judgment of 25 June 2024, Ilva and Others (C‑626/22, EU:C:2024:542, paragraph 128).

Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 2 July 2026.###

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