ECLI:EU:C:2026:487

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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

NORKUS

delivered on 11 June 2026 (1)

Case C‑312/25 P

Court of Justice of the European Union

( Appeal – Civil service – Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union – Social security benefits – Article 72 – Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme (JSIS) of the European Union – Insurance against ‘sickness’ – Reimbursement of expenses for medically assisted reproduction whether related to a pathology or outside of the context of pathology – Salary statement – Official’s contribution to the JSIS – Rate of contribution unchanged – Plea of illegality – Admissibility – Rules on standing – Existence of an act adversely affecting an official )

I. Introduction

1. By the present appeal, EN (‘the appellant’) asks the Court of Justice to set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 13 February 2025, EN v Court of Justice of the European Union (2) (‘the order under appeal’). In that order, the General Court dismissed as inadmissible for lack of standing the appellant’s action based on Article 270 TFEU seeking the annulment of his salary statement for December 2023 and all subsequent monthly salary statements in so far as they relate to his contribution to the Joint Sickness Insurance Scheme (JSIS) of the European Union.

2. Officials of the EU institutions are insured against ‘sickness’ under the JSIS and are required to pay a contribution in respect of that insurance cover. In 2023, the JSIS was extended to cover part of the costs of medically assisted reproduction, whether related to a pathology or outside the context of pathology. (3) The appellant considers that given that the JSIS insures its members against ‘sickness’, a levy on his contribution to that scheme to finance elective treatments or procedures unrelated to a pathology is contrary, inter alia, to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’). (4) He therefore claims, inter alia, that his salary statement for December 2023 constitutes an act adversely affecting both his financial interests and his non-material interests as it reflects his obligation to contribute to the JSIS and thus to contribute to illegal reimbursements.

3. The General Court considered, inter alia, that the appellant’s action was not directed against an act adversely affecting his financial and non-material interests as the rate of his contribution to the JSIS remained unchanged despite the amendment introduced in 2023 extending cover under the scheme. Moreover, it distinguished the rules on the reimbursement of medical expenses from those setting the rate of officials’ contribution to the JSIS. The General Court also considered that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the extended cover threatened the financial balance of the JSIS.

4. The present appeal raises a novel question of law on standing in civil service cases, and more specifically on the existence of an act adversely affecting an official in the context of an amendment to the rules on reimbursements of medical expenses under the JSIS where the rate of an official’s contribution to that scheme remains unchanged and is thus not reflected in that official’s salary statement.

II. Legal context

5. Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations, which falls under Chapter 2 of Title V entitled ‘Social security benefits’, provides:

‘An official … [is] insured against sickness up to 80% of the expenditure incurred subject to rules drawn up by agreement between the appointing authorities of the institutions of the Union after consulting the Staff Regulations Committee. …

…

The appointing authorities of the institutions may, under the rules referred to in the first subparagraph, confer on one of their number the power to lay down the rules governing the reimbursement of expenses …

One-third of the contribution required to meet such insurance cover shall be charged to the official but so that the amount charged to him shall not exceed 2% of his basic salary.’

6. For the purposes of defining the conditions for the application of Article 72 of the Staff Regulations, the institutions adopted the Joint Rules on sickness insurance for officials of the European Communities (‘the Joint Rules’). (5)

7. Article 1 of the Joint Rules provides:

‘Under Article 72 of the Staff Regulations, a Sickness Insurance Scheme common to the institutions of the European Communities (JSIS) is hereby set up. Within the limits and on the conditions set forth in these Rules and under the general implementing provisions adopted on the basis of Article 52 thereof, the [JSIS] shall guarantee to the persons covered by it the reimbursement of expenses incurred as a result of illness, accident or confinement and the payment of an allowance towards funeral expenses.

The [JSIS] shall apply to its members and to persons covered under them.

…’

8. Article 2 of the Joint Rules, entitled ‘Membership’, provides that:

‘1. The following shall be members of [the JSIS]:

– permanent officials,

…’

9. Article 3 of the Joint Rules, entitled ‘Contribution’, states that:

‘1. The amount of the contribution to [the JSIS] shall be 5.1% of the basic salary … at the rate of one-third to be paid by members and two-thirds to be paid by the institutions or agencies concerned.

…’

10. Article 52(1) of the Joint Rules provides:

‘Under the third subparagraph of Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations, the institutions shall empower the [European] Commission to lay down, by general implementing provisions, the rules governing the reimbursement of costs with a view to protecting the financial balance of the [JSIS] and respecting the principle of social security cover forming the basis for the first subparagraph of Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations.’

11. On 2 July 2007, the Commission adopted Decision C(2007) 3195 laying down general implementing provisions for the reimbursement of medical expenses (‘the ‘GIP’). Chapter 7 of Title II of the GIP was entitled ‘Pregnancy, confinement and infertility’ and provided, in its point 3, inter alia, for the reimbursement of certain costs of treatment and services relating to infertility connected with a pathological condition of a member of the JSIS or his or her spouse or partner under certain specified conditions.

12. On 17 November 2023, the Commission adopted Decision 7673. Article 1 of that decision provides:

‘The Annex to [the GIP] is amended as follows:

(a) In Title II, Chapter 7 the title is replaced by the following:

“Chapter 7 – Pregnancy, confinement and fertility treatments (including [medically assisted] reproduction)”

(b) In Title II, Chapter 7, point 3 is replaced by the following:

“3. Reimbursable treatment and services relating to fertility treatments (including [medically assisted] reproduction)

The treatments and services in relation to fertility and medically assisted reproduction, whether related to a pathology or outside of the context of pathology, can be reimbursed under the conditions as laid down in this section and in so far as they are not linked to a voluntary sterilisation procedure which either of the prospective parents may have undergone in the past.

…[”]

…’

III. Background to the dispute and the procedure before the General Court

13. The appellant, EN, is an official of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the respondent’).

14. On 26 February 2024, the appellant lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations seeking the annulment of his salary statement for December 2023 and all subsequent monthly salary statements in so far as they relate to his contribution to the JSIS. In support of that complaint, the appellant raised a plea of illegality in respect of Decision 7673, in particular, Article 1(b) thereof and, to the extent necessary, the fourth subparagraph of Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations and the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the Joint Rules.

15. In his complaint, the appellant claimed that Article 1(b) of Decision 7673, which provides for the reimbursement of certain costs notwithstanding the absence of a pathological condition, infringes Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations and adversely affects his financial and non-material interests. The appellant submitted that, in accordance with Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations, the JSIS and the contributions which fund it are intended to provide insurance cover against ‘sickness’. In the alternative, the appellant contended that Article 1(b) of Decision 7673 gives rise to unequal treatment, is insufficiently reasoned, constitutes a manifest error and infringes Article 1, Article 2, Article 3(2)(b) and Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). Moreover, the appellant claimed that the Commission exceeded its powers.

16. On 19 April 2024, the Complaints Committee of the Court of Justice considered that the complaint was not directed at an act adversely affecting the appellant and thus rejected his complaint as inadmissible.

17. By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 17 July 2024, the appellant brought an action for annulment of the salary statements in question and the decision of the Complaints Committee of the Court of Justice rejecting his complaint.

18. In a separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 29 September 2024, the respondent raised an objection of inadmissibility based on two grounds. The respondent contended, first, that there was no act adversely affecting the appellant within the meaning of Article 90(2) and Article 91 of the Staff Regulations and, second, that the appellant had no legal interest in the proceedings.

19. By the order under appeal, the General Court dismissed the action brought by the appellant on the basis of the first ground of the objection of inadmissibility raised by the respondent. The General Court thus ruled that the appellant’s action was not brought against an act adversely affecting him.

20. On 30 April 2025, the appellant lodged the present appeal proceedings at the Registry of the Court of Justice.

IV. Forms of order sought

21. The appellant claims that the Court should:

– set aside the order under appeal;

– order the Court of Justice of the European Union to pay the costs.

22. The respondent contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the appeal as unfounded;

– order the appellant to pay the costs.

23. In support of his appeal, the appellant relies on a single ground of appeal. He argues that the General Court erred in law by ruling that his salary statement for December 2023 does not adversely affect him. (6)

24. The single ground of appeal is divided into a number of arguments. In the light of the request of the Court of Justice, I shall largely confine my Opinion in the present case to the principal argument of the single ground of appeal raised by the appellant which is directed at paragraphs 31 to 35, 38 and 41 of the order under appeal. For the sake of completeness, I shall briefly address the arguments raised by the appellant in respect of paragraph 42 of the order under appeal.

V. Assessment

A. Arguments of the parties

25. The appellant argues that the General Court erred in law by ruling that he lacked standing to bring an action challenging his salary statement for December 2023. According to the appellant, the ‘central thesis of the General Court’ in the order under appeal (7) is the following: given that the rate of his contribution to the JSIS remained unchanged and his salary statement for December 2023 did not reflect any evident change, that statement does not constitute an act adversely affecting him.

26. The appellant contends, inter alia, that the existence of case-law holding that an official has an interest in bringing proceedings where a measure is clearly apparent from the contents of a salary statement (8) cannot justify, by a contrario reasoning, the conclusion that he or she does not have standing to challenge an unlawful levy on contributions where the quantum of the latter remains unchanged.

27. The appellant considers that it follows from paragraph 41 of the order under appeal that as long as the rate of contribution to the JSIS remains unchanged, the Commission may adopt any decision regarding the scope of expenses eligible for reimbursement, including providing for the reimbursement of expenses for elective procedures, without any risk of legal action by contributors to the scheme. According to the appellant, the General Court’s central thesis is contrary to the Court’s settled case-law, (9) as it privileges form over substance and results in the partial deviation for elective procedures of contributions reserved for sickness.

28. The appellant contends that contrary to the reasoning of the General Court in paragraph 42 of the order under appeal, standing in the present case does not require him to prove that the financial balance of the JSIS is threatened by Decision 7673 or that that decision may have an impact on future contributions or on the reimbursement of other medical expenses. It is sufficient that he is required to finance illegal reimbursements through his contributions. In any event, extending cover under the JSIS to elective medical treatments will necessarily have a negative impact on the budget set aside for expenditure for sickness.

29. The respondent asserts that the General Court correctly held that there was no act adversely affecting the appellant, as the rate of contribution to the JSIS remained unchanged following the entry into force of Decision 7673. That decision did not entail any financial implications for the appellant which were reflected in his salary statement. According to the respondent, Decision 7673 does not affect the rate of contribution to the JSIS but rather amends the GIP which lays down general implementing provisions for the reimbursement of medical expenses. Decision 7673 thus did not produce binding legal effects capable of directly and immediately affecting the appellant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position reflected in his salary statement.

B. Analysis

30. In accordance with Article 270 TFEU, an EU official must bring a dispute between him or her and the Union before the Court of Justice of the European Union within the limits and under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regulations. As regards the rules on standing, Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations provides that any person to whom those regulations apply may submit to the appointing authority a complaint against an act affecting him or her adversely. Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations states that the Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction in any dispute between the European Union and any such person concerning the legality of an act adversely affecting that person within the meaning of that Article 90(2). According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, only acts or measures which produce binding legal effects capable of directly and immediately affecting the appellant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position are acts adversely affecting him or her within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. (10)

31. The concept of an ‘act affecting [an official] adversely’, within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, must be interpreted broadly and must be understood as any act capable of directly affecting a particular legal position. In order to determine whether an act produces such effects, it is necessary to examine the substance of that act and to assess its effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of that act, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the institution which adopted the act. (11)

32. Little, if any, emphasis is placed on the obligation to demonstrate a distinct change in an official’s legal position where he or she can demonstrate an interest in bringing an action. In that regard, provided there is a change in an official’s legal position, the gravity or quantum of that change is irrelevant. The legal maxim de minimis non curat lex does not apply in this context, and in that regard the legal burden in establishing standing is low.

33. On the specific matter of salary statements, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, a salary statement may constitute a measure adversely affecting an official within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, and may therefore be the subject of a complaint and possibly an action. (12) Individual and general measures adversely affecting an official may first become evident from the official’s salary statement following the implementation of those measures.

34. As regards general measures, officials often challenge their salary statement for a particular month and incidentally raise a plea of illegality pursuant to Article 277 TFEU in respect of such measures in order to ensure, inter alia, that the requisite time limits for bringing a complaint and legal proceedings (13) are respected. (14) In such cases, what is at issue is not the legality of the salary statement per se, but its legality in so far as it applies the measure of general application to the individual. (15) Therefore, for such an action to be admissible, the salary statement challenged must represent the appointing authority’s decision to apply the general measure to the official (16) for the first time. (17)

35. Under Article 277 TFEU, any party may, in proceedings in which an act of general application adopted by an institution, body, office or agency of the Union is at issue, plead the grounds specified in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU in order to invoke before the Court of Justice of the European Union the inapplicability of that act. Article 277 TFEU gives expression to a general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge incidentally, with a view to obtaining the annulment of a decision addressed to that party, the validity of acts of general application which form the legal basis of that decision. Since the purpose of Article 277 TFEU is not to allow a party to contest the applicability of any act of general application in support of any action whatsoever, the act the legality of which is called into question must be applicable, directly or indirectly, to the issue with which the action is concerned. Thus, in actions for annulment brought against individual decisions, the Court has accepted that the provisions of an act of general application that constitute the basis of those decisions or that have a direct legal connection with such decisions may legitimately form the subject matter of an objection of illegality. (18)

36. Given, however, the incidental nature of a plea of illegality on the basis of Article 277 TFEU, a finding that the underlying action is inadmissible, in this case the action based on Article 90(2) and Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations, entails the inadmissibility of the plea of illegality. (19) Therefore, the merits of a plea of illegality will not determine the admissibility of the action based on the Staff Regulations.

37. In the context of his action seeking the annulment, inter alia, of his salary statement for December 2023, the appellant raised a plea of illegality challenging Decision 7673, in particular, Article 1(b) thereof and, to the extent necessary, the fourth subparagraph of Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations and the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the Joint Rules. (20)

38. I shall now turn to the admissibility of the appellant’s action under Article 90(2) and Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations.

39. It is clear from paragraphs 31 to 35, 38 and 41 of the order under appeal and the case-law cited therein (21) that the General Court considered that the appellant lacked standing due, inter alia, to the absence of an act adversely affecting him, as Decision 7673 did not give rise to any change in the rate of his contribution to the JSIS which was reflected in his salary statement for December 2023. In its assessment, the General Court referred to case-law in which that court held that an official has standing to challenge his or her first salary statement following the entry into force of an act of general application altering the pecuniary rights of an abstract category of officials where that statement gives material form to the implementation of that act. According to that case-law, the salary statement in question necessarily represents, in regard to its addressee, the adoption of an administrative decision of individual application producing mandatory legal effects of such a kind as to have a direct and immediate effect on the interests of the official concerned. (22)

40. It must be underscored at the outset that the General Court did not rely on the case-law cited in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the order under appeal to automatically exclude the possibility of the existence of an act or measure which adversely affects an official’s financial interests, (23) even where the salary statement in question does not clearly disclose its existence for the first time. In referring to that case-law, the General Court merely recalled the ‘classic scenario’ on which standing may be based, where the effects of an act of general application are reflected in an official’s salary statement. (24) It is evident from paragraphs 34 and 35 of the order under appeal that the General Court considered that that factual scenario does not exist in the present case.

41. Moreover, contrary to the appellant’s argument outlined in points 25 to 27 of the present Opinion, the General Court did not base its assessment of lack of standing merely on the fact that the rate of (the appellant’s) contribution to the JSIS did not change following the entry into force of Decision 7673. (25)

42. It must be emphasised that while the General Court did not expand on this matter in any great detail, in paragraph 41 of the order under appeal that court nonetheless cogently explained the legal reasons why the absence of a change in the rate of contribution to the JSIS following the adoption of Decision 7673 was of particular relevance in the present case and to that court’s ruling on lack of standing.

43. The General Court attributed the absence of a change in the rate of contribution to the JSIS following the adoption of Decision 7673 to the legal provisions on which the JSIS is based and, in particular, the distinction between, on the one hand, the rules laid down in the fourth subparagraph of Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations and the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the Joint Rules relating to the rate of contribution to the JSIS, (26) and, on the other hand, the rules relating to the definition of the expenses eligible for reimbursement under the JSIS. It is clear from the distinction drawn by the General Court in respect of those different rules (27) that that court had regard, inter alia, to both the content of Decision 7673 and the legal context in which it was adopted. (28)

44. It follows from paragraph 41 of the order under appeal that the General Court considered that there is no direct legal correlation between the rate of an official’s contribution to the JSIS and the scope of reimbursements under the GIP. (29) In that regard, it is undisputed that the rate of contribution paid by the appellant to the JSIS remained unchanged after the adoption of Decision 7673. The current rate of contribution to the JSIS is fixed at 5.1% of an official’s basic salary, a third of which (1.7%) is paid by the official. While the rate of contribution under the fourth subparagraph of Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations charged to an official may not exceed 2%, it was set at 1.7% by the Joint Rules which entered into force on 1 December 2005 and has remained unchanged since.

45. Moreover, in accordance with the legal context in which the present case has arisen, an alteration of officials’ rate of contribution to the JSIS above the current rate of 1.7% and up to a maximum rate of 2% would require an amendment to the Joint Rules, and an alteration of the rate of contribution of officials to the scheme above the rate of 2% would require an amendment to the Staff Regulations. Such alterations cannot be brought about merely by amending, as Decision 7673 did, the rules on reimbursement under the GIP. Therefore, in the absence of any direct legal correlation between the rate of an official’s contribution to the JSIS and the scope of the right to reimbursement of medical expenses under the GIP, I consider that the General Court correctly held that the appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of an act adversely affecting him.

46. To put it simply, Decision 7673 was not capable of directly and immediately affecting the appellant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position. For such a change to occur, other measures amending the Joint Rules and/or the Staff Regulations would have to be adopted.

47. The effects of Decision 7673 on the appellant’s legal position, whether they be financial or non-material, are thus too remote or indirect to satisfy the rules on standing in Article 90(2) and Article 91(2) of the Staff Regulations. I therefore consider that the General Court did not err in law in paragraphs 31 to 35, 38 and 41 of the order under appeal in holding that Decision 7673 does not constitute an act adversely affecting the appellant.

48. I also consider that the General Court correctly rejected, in paragraph 42 of the order under appeal, the appellant’s contention (30) that he has standing due to the alleged negative future impact on the JSIS of the reimbursement of the medical treatment in question in the present case, as he failed to adduce any evidence in support of that contention but instead relied on mere supposition or hypothetical effects. In my view, the appellant cannot simply assert, without any proof whatsoever, that extending cover to that treatment necessarily operates to the detriment of the budget set aside for the treatment of sickness.

49. I would also add, for the sake of completeness, that, in recital 6 of Decision 7673, the Commission stated that the limited number of beneficiaries of the reimbursement of expenses for medically assisted reproduction outside of the context of pathology would not jeopardise the financial balance of the JSIS budget. In addition, in recital 5 of that decision, the Commission pointed to administrative savings that could be gained by including such reimbursements in the JSIS. (31) Those recitals clearly indicate that the Commission adopted a very cautious and measured approach in extending cover under the JSIS to medically assisted reproduction outside of the context of pathology, (32) and underscore the limited effective cost, if any, of such reimbursements. Moreover, contrary to the appellant’s arguments, there is no indication whatsoever that cover under the JSIS would be extended in the future, for example, to ‘elective cosmetic surgery’, or that costs related to medically assisted reproduction outside of the context of pathology would be reimbursed to the detriment of the reimbursement of other medical costs. There is thus no evidence that Decision 7673 would serve as some form of precedent for such extensions.

50. Furthermore, even if it cannot be excluded that an overall increase in medical expenses reimbursed under the JSIS might eventually provoke at some time in the future an amendment to the rules on the rate of contribution to that scheme, that eventuality is not of any direct or immediate relevance and does not currently establish legal standing for the appellant under Article 90(2) and Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations to challenge Decision 7673. (33) In addition, by relying on the alleged future impact on the JSIS of the reimbursement of costs related to medically assisted reproduction outside of the context of pathology, the appellant implicitly acknowledges that his interests are not directly and immediately affected.

51. The appellant also asserts, (34) in respect of paragraph 42 of the order under appeal, that given that he is required to finance illegal reimbursements, he does not have to prove that the financial balance of the JSIS is under threat (35) in order to establish standing.

52. It must be emphasised that throughout his pleadings the appellant takes issue with the fact that it follows from the order under appeal that unless the rate of his contribution to the JSIS increases, he cannot challenge an illegal levy on that contribution. (36) That general contention, and the more specific argument raised in respect of paragraph 42 of the order under appeal, clearly confuses the merits of an action with its admissibility. In the order under appeal, the General Court examined the admissibility of the appellant’s action in the wake of the objection to admissibility raised by the Court. In such instances, it is only if that action is deemed admissible that the merits thereof, and thus, in the present case, the question of the legality of Decision 7673, are addressed. (37)

53. Failure to overcome the initial hurdle of admissibility renders, in principle, the examination of the merits of an action redundant. The absence of such an examination is not an untoward by-product of the rules on standing or a denial of effective judicial protection, but is rather the result of a conscious choice by the EU legislature (38) to ensure sufficient proximity between a litigant and the matter being litigated, thereby avoiding court actions which serve no evident useful purpose for the protection of the litigant’s rights and interests. If the rules on standing advocated by the appellant (39) were applied to their logical conclusion, this could potentially open the door to public interest litigation or an actio popularis by every EU official who contributes to the EU budget by paying income tax or social security (40) and who wishes to challenge the legality of EU budgetary expenditure. Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations and the case-law thereon unequivocally exclude such a possibility. Moreover, while I do not accept the appellant’s contention that those rules on standing limit the right to effective legal protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, (41) I consider that they nonetheless comply with Article 52(1) thereof as they are provided by law, (42) and that they respect the essence of that right (43) as well as the principle of proportionality.

VI. Conclusion

54. In the light of the foregoing, I consider that the appellant’s arguments directed at paragraphs 31 to 35, 38, 41 and 42 of the order of the General Court of the European Union of 13 February 2025, EN v Court of Justice of the European Union (T‑366/24, EU:T:2025:164), should be rejected as unfounded.

1 Original language: English.

2 T‑366/24, EU:T:2025:164.

3 Commission Decision C(2023) 7673 final of 17 November 2023 amending Decision C(2007) 3195 laying down general implementing provisions for the reimbursement of medical expenses (‘Decision 7673’).

4 According to the appellant, Decision 7673 also ‘grants any fertile and healthy person the right to have the JSIS cover the costs of the collection and long-term storage of their gametes for the purpose of future medically assisted reproduction’.

5 The Joint Rules, which were signed on behalf of the Court of Justice of the European Union by the President and the Registrar thereof on 24 November 2005, entered into force on 1 December 2005.

6 In paragraphs 17 to 25 of the order under appeal, the General Court held, inter alia, that only the appellant’s salary statement for December 2023 was capable of forming the subject matter of the action before it. Moreover, that court held that the appellant’s subsequent salary statements were merely confirmatory acts and thus could not be the subject of an action for annulment. The General Court also held that the decision of 19 April 2024 of the Complaints Committee of the Court of Justice dismissing the appellant’s complaint does not constitute an act adversely affecting him. In the present appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court’s ruling on the inadmissibility of his action relating to his salary statements subsequent to December 2023. However, he acknowledges the General Court’s statement in paragraphs 18 to 20, 23 and 24 of the order under appeal that that court’s ruling on the inadmissibility of those salary statements does not affect his rights and interests. The appellant’s appeal is thus directed against paragraphs 28 to 51 of the order under appeal and relates to the General Court’s ruling on his salary statement for December 2023 alone.

7 See paragraphs 31 to 35 and 38 of the order under appeal.

8 See the case-law cited in paragraph 32 of the order under appeal.

9 Judgments of 15 December 2022, Picard v Commission (C‑366/21 P, EU:C:2022:984, paragraph 96 and the case-law cited), and of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA (C‑130/22 P, EU:C:2024:1018, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).

10 Judgment of 27 November 2025, Heßler v Commission (C‑137/24 P, EU:C:2025:918, paragraphs 30 and 31 and the case-law cited). A measure is classified as an ‘act adversely affecting’ an official not only where it infringes or affects an individual right conferred on that official but, more generally, where it brings about a distinct change in his or her legal position (judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v RQ, C‑831/18 P, EU:C:2020:481, paragraph 49). In that judgment the Court considered that a decision to waive an EU official’s immunity from prosecution in national criminal proceedings constituted an ‘act affecting him adversely’ for the purposes of the Staff Regulations. The Court held that the question whether a measure confers an individual right on the persons concerned was irrelevant to that classification.

11 Judgment of 12 December 2024, DD v FRA (C‑130/22 P, EU:C:2024:1018, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).

12 Judgments of 25 May 2000, Kögler v Court of Justice (C‑82/98 P, EU:C:2000:282, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited). See, also, judgment of 19 January 1984, Andersen and Others v Parliament (262/80, EU:C:1984:18, paragraph 4).

13 See Article 90(2) and Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations. See, also, judgment of 23 April 2008, Pickering v Commission (F‑103/05, EU:F:2008:45, paragraphs 75 and 76).

14 In judgment of 18 April 2024, Dumitrescu and Others v Commission and Court of Justice (C‑567/22 P to C‑570/22 P, EU:C:2024:336), the Court annulled, on the basis of a plea of illegality, decisions of EU institutions determining certain officials’ entitlement to a flat-rate payment of travel expenses pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 8(2) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations. The Court also annulled their salary statements for the months of June or July 2014, as the decisions in question were reflected in those salary statements for the first time. For further clarification, see judgment of 15 June 2022, Dumitrescu and Schwarz v Commission (T‑531/16, EU:T:2022:362, paragraphs 8, 21 and 25).

15 Judgment of 12 December 2019, Tàpias v Council (T‑527/16, EU:T:2019:856, paragraphs 35 and 36 and the case-law cited). See, also, judgment of 23 April 2008, Pickering v Commission (F‑103/05, EU:F:2008:45, paragraphs 72 to 76).

16 Judgment of 19 January 1984, Andersen and Others v Parliament (262/80, EU:C:1984:18, paragraph 4).

17 Judgment of 12 December 2019, Tàpias v Council (T‑527/16, EU:T:2019:856, paragraphs 37, 38 and 51 to 53 and the case-law cited).

18 Judgment of 27 April 2023, HC v Commission (C‑102/22 P, EU:C:2023:351, paragraphs 63 to 66 and the case-law cited). See, also, judgment of 16 March 2023, Commission v Calhau Correia de Paiva (C‑511/21 P, EU:C:2023:208, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). In the context of salary statements, see judgment of 4 October 2018, Tataram v Commission (T‑546/16, EU:T:2018:644, paragraph 49). That court rejected as inadmissible an action for the annulment of an official’s salary statement on the ground, inter alia, that the plea of illegality was raised in respect of an act that had no bearing on the resolution of the dispute and had no direct legal link to it.

19 Judgment of 12 December 2019, Tàpias v Council (T‑527/16, EU:T:2019:856, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). See, by analogy, judgment of 5 March 2020, Credito Fondiario v SRB (C‑69/19 P, EU:C:2020:178, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited), and order of 28 June 1993, Donatab and Others v Commission (C‑64/93, EU:C:1993:266, paragraphs 19 and 20 and the case-law cited).

20 In his reply in the present appeal proceedings, the appellant claimed that the respondent and the General Court misinterpreted the terms of his action. He stressed that his plea of illegality is aimed not merely at Decision 7673, but at the combination of that decision, the fourth subparagraph of Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations and the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the Joint Rules. It must be highlighted, however, that in his pleadings before the General Court, the appellant claimed that the alleged illegality resulted solely from Decision 7673 and not the Staff Regulations or the Joint Rules. In that regard, the appellant stated that he had extended the plea of illegality to include those measures merely ‘as a precaution’. In paragraph 49 of the order under appeal, the General Court considered that even if the extension of the plea of illegality to the fourth subparagraph of Article 72(1) of the Staff Regulations and the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the Joint Rules were admissible, that extension did not affect that court’s ruling in paragraphs 34, 35 and 41 of the order under appeal.

21 Order of 26 September 2022, OO v EIB (T‑134/22, EU:T:2022:616, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited); judgments of 12 December 2019, Tàpias v Council (T‑527/16, EU:T:2019:856, paragraph 37), and of 28 June 2006, Grünheid v Commission (F‑101/05, EU:F:2006:58, paragraph 43).

22 See, in particular, judgment of 12 December 2019, Tàpias v Council (T‑527/16, EU:T:2019:856, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

23 It is clear from paragraphs 36 and 37 of the order under appeal that the General Court’s reasoning on the appellant’s financial interests applies mutatis mutandis to his non-material interests. In his appeal, while the appellant considers that the General Court’s reasoning in those paragraphs is flawed, he does not raise any objection per se to the fact that that court treated both types of interest in a similar manner.

24 The existence of an act which adversely affects an individual cannot be excluded solely because the case-law cited in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the order under appeal is not applicable to the facts. See, in that regard, the appellant’s contention in point 26 of the present Opinion. It must be recalled that the overriding criteria for assessing standing in staff cases is whether the act or measure challenged produces binding legal effects capable of directly and immediately affecting an individual’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position.

25 And on the fact that the appellant’s salary statement thus did not reflect any evident change.

26 ‘… which may affect the breakdown of sums contained in the salary statement’, see paragraph 41 of the order under appeal.

27 Which were also referred to in paragraph 34 of the order under appeal.

28 Had the General Court based its reasoning on lack of standing solely on the absence of any evident change in the rate of contribution which was in turn reflected in the appellant’s salary statement, that court would, in my view, have failed to address the possibility that his financial and non-material interests could be affected directly and immediately in another manner through his participation in the JSIS. In a case such as the present one, what is of paramount importance to the question of standing is not merely the fact that the rate of contribution paid by an official to the JSIS did not change but, more fundamentally, why it did not change. This matter, which relates to the legal context in which Decision 7673 was adopted, was addressed by the General Court in paragraph 41 of the order under appeal.

29 See also paragraph 40 of the order under appeal.

30 See point 28 of the present Opinion.

31 That recital states that ‘the current rules need to be simplified by removing the prerequisite of pathology for access to [medically assisted] reproduction, in the cases where this is warranted, in order to limit related administrative difficulties and complaints regarding reimbursement. …’

32 In the light of ‘societal developments that favour broad access to parenthood’; see recital 3 of Decision 7673.

33 This would most likely occur in the context of an overall assessment of the financial viability of the JSIS.

34 See point 28 of the present Opinion.

35 Or that the rate of contribution or the reimbursement of medical expenses will be affected in the future.

36 See, in particular, paragraph 18 of the appeal.

37 Unless the admissibility of the action is joined to the substance. The EU judicature is also entitled to assess, according to the circumstances of each case, whether the proper administration of justice justifies dismissing the action on the merits without first ruling on its admissibility. See, to that effect, judgment of 26 February 2002, Council v Boehringer (C‑23/00 P, EU:C:2002:118, paragraphs 51and 52). Neither of those procedural steps was adopted in the present case by the General Court.

38 By adopting rules on standing for actions involving EU officials under the Staff Regulations.

39 The appellant, in essence, advocates rules on standing which would allow him to bring an action to verify the legality of each and every aspect of the manner in which his contributions to the JSIS are spent.

40 The amount of which is reflected in his or her salary statements.

41 It must be stressed that the appellant does not challenge the rules on admissibility laid down in the Staff Regulations per se, but rather their application in the case at hand.

42 Thereby ensuring legal certainty and equality before the law.

43 Due to their broad scope.

Opinion of Advocate General Norkus delivered on 11 June 2026.###

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