ECLI:EU:C:2026:701

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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

KOKOTT

delivered on 3 September 2026 (1)

Case C‑285/25 [Lurdos] (i)

F-I. and Others

A-I. and Others

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gyulai törvényszék (Gyula High Court, Hungary))

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Competition – Actions for damages under national law for infringements of competition law provisions – Limitation period – ‘Follow-on actions’ brought further to a decision of the European Commission – Limitation period of one year after publication of the summary of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union – Directive 2014/104 – Applicability – No contra legem interpretation of national law – Principle of effectiveness – Interpretation by the highest national court binding on national courts – Primacy of EU law )

I. Introduction

1. Private enforcement of competition law through actions seeking compensation for harm caused by infringements of competition law is becoming increasingly important as a ‘second pillar’ of enforcement of competition law alongside public enforcement by the authorities.

2. In that context, parties bringing ‘follow-on actions’ further to decisions of competition authorities have an advantage over parties bringing ‘stand-alone actions’ (independent of such a decision) in so far as the former are able to rely on findings made by the authorities in order to establish the essential elements of the infringement. Accordingly, it is crucial to the effectiveness of such ‘follow-on actions’ that limitation periods continue to run for a sufficiently long time after the decisions taken by the authorities to enable the injured parties subsequently to bring their actions.

3. Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (2) makes detailed provision in relation to the rules on limitation for such actions. With regard to actions to which the directive is not (yet) relevant, fundamental requirements pertaining to national rules on limitation nevertheless follow from Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, in order to ensure that such rules do not make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to enforce the right to damages enjoyed by everyone.

4. A situation in which Directive 2014/104 is already temporally applicable but is ultimately not yet relevant on account of the prohibition against contra legem interpretation of national law forms the basis for the present request for a preliminary ruling from the Gyulai törvényszék (Gyula High Court, Hungary). It raises the question whether, in actions for damages under competition law, a limitation period of one year from publication of the summary of the decision of the European Commission finding the infringement in question in the Official Journal of the European Union satisfies the requirement of effective enforcement of Article 101 TFEU.

5. In order to answer that question, the Court is able to have recourse to its abundant existing case-law on limitation in the case of actions for damages under competition law, in particular to the judgments of 28 March 2019, Cogeco Communications, (3) of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks, (4) and of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services). (5)

II. Legal context

A. European Union law

6. Article 10, the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 21(1) and Article 22 of Directive 2014/104 provide as follows:

‘Article 10 – Limitation periods

1. Member States shall, in accordance with this Article, lay down rules applicable to limitation periods for bringing actions for damages. Those rules shall determine when the limitation period begins to run, the duration thereof and the circumstances under which it is interrupted or suspended.

2. Limitation periods shall not begin to run before the infringement of competition law has ceased and the claimant knows, or can reasonably be expected to know:

(a) of the behaviour and the fact that it constitutes an infringement of competition law;

(b) of the fact that the infringement of competition law caused harm to it; and

3. Member States shall ensure that the limitation periods for bringing actions for damages are at least five years.

4. Member States shall ensure that a limitation period is suspended or, depending on national law, interrupted, if a competition authority takes action for the purpose of the investigation or its proceedings in respect of an infringement of competition law to which the action for damages relates. The suspension shall end at the earliest one year after the infringement decision has become final or after the proceedings are otherwise terminated.

…

Article 21 – Transposition

1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 27 December 2016. …

Article 22 – Temporal application

1. Member States shall ensure that the national measures adopted pursuant to Article 21 in order to comply with substantive provisions of this Directive do not apply retroactively.

2. Member States shall ensure that any national measures adopted pursuant to Article 21, other than those referred to in paragraph 1, do not apply to actions for damages of which a national court was [seised] prior to 26 December 2014.’

B. Hungarian law

7. Under Paragraph 324(1) of Polgári Törvénykönyvről szóló 1959. évi IV. törvény (Law No IV of 1959 approving the Civil Code; ‘the former Civil Code’), claims become time-barred within five years, unless otherwise prescribed by law.

8. Paragraph 326(1) of the former Civil Code provides that limitation is to be calculated from the date when the claim became due. Under Paragraph 360(1), compensation for harm becomes due immediately upon the occurrence of the harm. In accordance with Paragraph 326(2), however, if the obligee is unable to assert the claim for an excusable reason, he or she may assert that claim within one year from the time when the obstacle is removed, even if the limitation period has already expired or less than one year of the period remains.

9. Paragraph 326(1) and (2) of the former Civil Code reads as follows:

‘(1) The limitation period shall begin on the date when the claim becomes due.

(2) If the obligee is unable to assert that claim for an excusable reason, the claim shall remain enforceable within one year from the time when the obstacle is removed or within three months in respect of a limitation period of one year or less, even if the limitation period has already expired or less than one year or three months of the period remains. This provision shall apply even if the obligee has granted the obligor a respite for performance after expiry.’

10. Paragraph 88/T of tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról szóló 1996. évi LVII. törvény (Law No LVII of 1996 on the prohibition of unfair market practices and the restriction of competition; ‘the Law on competition’), which was inserted by Law No CLXI of 2016 and has been in force since 15 January 2017, provides:

‘(1) The limitation period for claims for damages arising from an infringement of competition law shall begin when the anti-competitive behaviour has ceased and the injured party knows or, through the exercise of due diligence, could have known:

(a) of the unlawful behaviour and the fact that it constitutes an infringement of competition law;

(b) of the harm caused by the infringement;

(2) If a [European] Union competition authority brings proceedings in connection with the unlawful behaviour, the limitation period shall be suspended from the date when the proceedings were brought until one year after the adoption of the final decision of the competition authority or – if the decision of the competition authority has been challenged before a court – until one year after the adoption of the final court decision.

(3) If the parties have recourse to an alternative dispute resolution procedure in order to settle their legal dispute regarding a claim for damages arising from an infringement of competition law, the limitation period shall be suspended in respect of the undertaking participating in the alternative dispute resolution procedure until the procedure has been concluded.’

11. Under Paragraph 95/E(4), Paragraph 88/T of the Law on competition is applicable only in the event of harmful behaviour caused by an infringement of competition law committed after the entry into force of Law No CLXI of 2016, that is to say, after 15 January 2017.

III. Facts

12. On 19 July 2016, the Commission adopted Decision C(2016) 4673 final relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39824 – Trucks) (‘the 2016 decision’). In that decision, it found that various producers of trucks had participated in a concerted practice concerning prices of trucks between 17 January 1997 and 18 January 2011, thereby infringing Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

13. On 19 July 2016, the Commission also published a press release in English on its website concerning the 2016 decision. (6) A summary of that decision was published in Hungarian in the Official Journal of the European Union on 6 April 2017. (7)

14. Directive 2014/104 should have been transposed by Member States no later than 27 December 2016. The Hungarian legislature incorporated the rule on limitation laid down in Paragraph 88/T into the Law on competition with effect from 15 January 2017. However, that provision applies only to harm caused by infringements of competition law committed after 15 January 2017.

15. The parties to the main proceedings are undertakings operating in the freight transport sector (‘the purchasers’) and undertakings engaged in the manufacture and sale of trucks (‘the sellers’).

16. The purchasers had entered into a series of sales contracts for trucks affected by the infringement of competition law found in the 2016 decision. In their view, they suffered harm as a result of that infringement.

17. On 6 April 2018, the purchasers brought an action for damages before the Gyulai törvényszék (Gyula High Court), the referring court, in the form of a ‘follow-on action’ against the sellers (‘the proceedings at first instance’). They based their action on the 2016 decision, Article 101 TFEU, the Law on competition and the former Civil Code. On 15 June 2018, one of them (applicant III in the proceedings at first instance) increased the amount of the claim in its application.

18. The sellers contended in the defence that the action should be dismissed. They argued primarily that the claims made by the purchasers – and in any event the claim made by applicant III in the proceedings at first instance – were time-barred. As a result of the publication of the press release, the essential circumstances necessary for bringing the action had already been made known.

19. By judgment of 7 May 2021 (‘the judgment at first instance’), the referring court ruled that the sellers are jointly and severally liable for damages.

20. It found that the claims for damages made by the purchasers were governed by the provisions of the former Civil Code. Under those provisions, the limitation period for such claims was five years. That period began to run on the date when the harm occurred, irrespective of the date when the injured party knew of the harm and the identity of the person liable to pay compensation and irrespective of the date when the unlawful behaviour ceased.

21. Under Paragraph 326(2) of the former Civil Code, however, if the obligee was unable to assert the claim for an excusable reason, the claim remained enforceable within one year from the time when the obstacle was removed, even if the limitation period had already expired or less than one year of the period remained.

22. In the view of the referring court, in the present case, the obstacle to the assertion of the claim could have been removed at the earliest one year after the date when the 2016 decision had become final. The purchasers would have had one further year thereafter to bring their actions.

23. The court of second instance took a different view. However, its judgment was set aside by the Kúria (Supreme Court, Hungary) on 15 May 2024 in a decision on an appeal on a point of law (‘the judgment on the appeal on a point of law’). In that judgment, the Kúria (Supreme Court) confirmed the interpretation given by the referring court in the judgment at first instance.

24. The sellers lodged a complaint for the preservation of the uniformity of the law against the judgment on the appeal on a point of law. The Kúria (Supreme Court) ruled on that complaint by decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law of 14 October 2024 (‘the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law’). In that decision, it explained how Paragraph 326(2) of the former Civil Code is to be interpreted with regard to the limitation period for ‘follow-on actions’ under competition law.

25. According to that interpretation, the injured party is unable to assert its claim for an excusable reason until it knows of all the relevant circumstances of the infringement of competition law. The date when it becomes aware is the date of publication of the decision finding the infringement, or at least a summary of that decision, in the Official Journal of the European Union. An action for damages for infringement of competition law may be brought within one year of such publication even if the original limitation period has already expired or less than one year of the period remains. In the case at issue, the original limitation period of five years from the occurrence of the harm (infringement between 17 January 1997 and 18 January 2011) had already expired at the time of publication on 6 April 2017. Nevertheless, the injured parties still had one year from that date to bring their actions. Therefore, all the actions brought in the proceedings at first instance on 6 April 2018 were not time-barred. The only claim which was time-barred was the claim made on 15 June 2018 by applicant III in the proceedings at first instance (see point 17 of this Opinion).

26. According to the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law, on the other hand, the view taken in the judgment at first instance and in the judgment on the appeal on a point of law that the obstacle to the bringing of an action is not removed until one year after the decision of the Commission has become final and, accordingly, injured parties have one further year thereafter to bring their action for damages constitutes a contra legem interpretation of Paragraph 326(2) of the former Civil Code. In particular, it is inconsistent with its wording ‘within one year from the time when the obstacle is removed’.

27. That interpretation of the law by the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law is binding on Hungarian courts.

28. In the main proceedings, the referring court is hearing the proceedings which were reopened following the judgment on the appeal on a point of law.

29. In the light of the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law, however, that court has doubts as to the correct interpretation of the provisions of EU law relevant to the present case.

IV. Procedure before the Court and questions referred for a preliminary ruling

30. Under those circumstances, the Gyulai törvényszék (Gyula High Court), by decision of 10 April 2025, received on 15 April 2025, decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

(1) Must Article 10 of Directive 2014/104, Article 101 TFEU and the principle of effectiveness be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State that, in actions for damages for infringement of EU competition rules, establishes a limitation period of five years that starts to run from the date on which the damage occurred, irrespective of whether the injured party is aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable to pay compensation and whether that person was aware that the conduct in question constitutes an infringement of competition law, and without it being necessary for that infringement to have ceased, which limitation period is, according to a legal interpretation that is binding on the courts, suspended in the case of follow-on actions for damages, owing to the existence of an obstacle to bringing an action, until the injured party becomes aware of all the relevant circumstances relating to the infringement of competition law, such that the obstacle to bringing an action continues to exist until the date of publication in the Official Journal of the European Union of the decision declaring the existence of the infringement (or, at least, of the summary of that decision), and the action for damages for infringement of competition law may be brought within one year of that date, even if the limitation period has already expired or less than one year remains before its expiry?

(2) Must Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 be interpreted as precluding national legislation in so far as that legislation does not, in the case of an action for damages relating to an infringement of competition law that ended before the directive entered into force and that was brought after the provisions transposing that directive into national law entered into force, establish that the limitation period is to be suspended for at least one year from the date on which the decision establishing that that infringement was committed becomes final, if the limitation period applicable to such an action under the earlier legislation had not expired before the expiry of the period for transposition of the directive?

(3) Having regard also to Article 267 TFEU, does EU law preclude a provision of a Member State – and can it therefore be disapplied – under which a court is bound by a decision intended to ensure the consistent interpretation of law delivered by the highest court, even if it considers that the assessment of the merits contained in that decision does not, in the light of the interpretation of the Court of Justice, guarantee the effectiveness of EU law or the protection of the rights conferred on individuals?

31. The referring court also requested that the Court determine the present case under the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. That request was rejected by order of 2 September 2025. (8)

32. In the proceedings before the Court, written observations were submitted by the European Commission, the Bulgarian Government and defendants A-I to A-III and defendants A-IX to A-XII in the main proceedings. The Court decided not to hold a hearing in accordance with Article 76(2) of its Rules of Procedure.

V. Assessment

A. The first two questions referred for a preliminary ruling

33. The first two questions referred for a preliminary ruling concern the period for bringing a ‘follow-on action for damages’ further to the finding by the Commission of an infringement of EU competition rules. The referring court thus wishes to ascertain whether Article 10 of Directive 2014/104, Article 101 TFEU and the principle of effectiveness must be interpreted as precluding a rule on limitation such as that in Paragraph 326 of the former Civil Code, as interpreted by the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law.

34. Before I address those questions (2.), two preliminary remarks should be made regarding the temporal applicability of Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 and the interpretation of the Hungarian legislation (1.).

1. Preliminary remarks

(a) Temporal applicability of Article 10 of Directive 2014/104

35. Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 contains detailed provisions governing the limitation period for actions for damages under competition law. Under that provision, the limitation period of at least five years does not begin to run before the infringement of competition law has ceased and the claimant knows, or can reasonably be expected to know, of the behaviour and the fact that it constitutes an infringement of competition law, the harm and the identity of the infringer. Furthermore, the limitation period must be suspended or interrupted during action taken or proceedings brought in respect of the infringement in question until at the earliest one year after the relevant decision has become final or after the proceedings are otherwise terminated.

36. Under Article 22(1) of Directive 2014/104, Member States must ensure that the national measures adopted in order to comply with substantive provisions of that directive do not apply retroactively.

37. The Court has found, first, that Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 is a substantive provision for the purposes of Article 22(1). An action for damages which, although relating to an infringement of competition law which ceased before the entry into force of the directive, was brought after the expiry of the time limit for transposition and possibly after the entry into force of the provisions transposing it into national law falls within the temporal scope of Article 10, in so far as the limitation period for bringing that action under the old rules had not elapsed before the date of expiry of the time limit for the transposition of the directive. (9)

38. Second, according to the Court, Article 101 TFEU, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, requires, regardless of the applicability of Article 10 of Directive 2014/104, that the limitation periods for actions for damages in competition law cannot begin to run before the infringement has ceased and the injured party can reasonably be expected to know of the harm suffered as a result of that infringement and the perpetrator of the infringement. That is the case for ‘follow-on actions’ brought further to decisions of the Commission, in general, where the summary of the decision finding the infringement is published in the Official Journal of the European Union. (10)

39. In the present case, the infringement ceased on 18 January 2011, according to the 2016 decision, and the action at first instance before the referring court was brought on 6 April 2018. There was an obstacle preventing the injured parties bringing their actions in accordance with Paragraph 326(2) of the former Civil Code, as interpreted by the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law, until the date of publication of the summary of the 2016 decision in the Official Journal of the European Union on 6 April 2017. After that date, there was still one year remaining for them to do so. Accordingly, the limitation period necessarily ended in concreto after the expiry of the time limit for the transposition of Directive 2014/104 on 27 December 2016 and after the entry into force of Paragraph 88/T of the Law on competition, which transposed Article 10 thereof into Hungarian law, on 15 January 2017.

40. Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 is therefore temporally applicable in the main proceedings, as the referring court correctly found.

41. Regardless of whether the interpretation of Paragraph 326(2) of the former Civil Code by the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law is consistent with EU law, Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 would be temporally applicable a fortiori if the interpretation by the referring court were to be adopted. On that interpretation, the obstacle to bringing an action was removed at the earliest one year after the date when the 2016 decision became final and the purchasers had one further year thereafter to bring their actions. The 2016 decision was a ‘settlement decision’ in which the addressees reached a settlement with the Commission and which they did not challenge. That decision, adopted on 19 July 2016, thus became final upon the expiry of the time limit for bringing an action of two months and 10 days, on 29 September 2016. In the view of the referring court, the limitation period therefore ended on 29 September 2018.

(b) Interpretation and assessment of the Hungarian legislation

42. It is apparent from the case-law of the Court that, in a dispute between individuals, the national court is required to interpret national law in accordance with the directive, as soon as the time limit for the transposition of an untransposed directive expires, without, however, interpreting national law contra legem. (11) That also applies to (possibly subsequently adopted) national legislation which infringes a directive, and thus in the case of incorrect transposition. (12)

43. As the referring court asserts, the claims at issue in the main proceedings fall within the temporal scope of Article 10 of Directive 2014/104, but not within that of Paragraph 88/T of the Law on competition, which was adopted by Hungary to transpose that provision. The national provision is applicable only to harmful behaviour caused by an infringement of competition law committed after 15 January 2017 (see point 11 of this Opinion). The harm claimed in the present case, however, arose from an infringement of competition law which took place from 17 January 1997 to 18 January 2011 (see point 12 of this Opinion).

44. In view of the Court’s findings regarding the temporal applicability of Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 reproduced in point 37 of this Opinion, it would appear doubtful that the abovementioned provision is consistent with EU law since, according to those findings, all harm, including harm caused previously, falls within the scope of the directive if the relevant national limitation period had not yet expired upon the expiry of the time limit for transposition of the directive. In the context of the preliminary ruling procedure, however, it is not for the Court to rule in that regard. (13) Rather, its task is to give the referring court all the guidance on the interpretation of EU law which it needs in order to arrive at a decision on the main proceedings on the basis of the applicable national provisions which is as consistent as possible with EU law. (14)

45. The referring court proceeds from the assumption that, on account of the restriction of the temporal scope of Paragraph 88/T of the Law on competition, in the main proceedings, the general rule on limitation in Paragraph 326 of the former Civil Code is applicable. Under subparagraph 2 of that provision, the claim remains enforceable within one year from the time when the obstacle is removed, even if the limitation period has already expired or less than one year of the period remains, if the claimant was previously unable to assert the claim for an excusable reason.

46. The Hungarian courts, and in particular the referring court and the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law, disagree on how that provision should be interpreted in the case of ‘follow-on actions for damages’ brought further to decisions of the Commission and on what is meant by a contra legem interpretation in that context.

47. Because the interpretation of Member States’ law is the task of the national courts, it is not for the Court to assess the divergent positions of the Hungarian courts. (15) Rather, it must give the referring court the guidance on the interpretation of EU law which it needs in order to interpret national law as far as possible in accordance with EU law in resolving the dispute.

2. The first two questions referred for a preliminary ruling

(a) Preliminary remarks

(1) First question

48. By its first question, the referring court wishes to know whether Article 10 of Directive 2014/104, Article 101 TFEU and the principle of effectiveness must be interpreted as precluding legislation such as Paragraph 326 of the former Civil Code, as interpreted by the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law. In essence, the question is therefore whether a rule on limitation under which, in the case of ‘follow-on actions for damages’ brought further to Commission decisions, the injured party has one further year after publication of the summary of the decision finding the infringement in the Official Journal of the European Union to bring his or her action is compatible with those provisions.

49. As was explained in point 35 of this Opinion, Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 provides for a limitation period of at least five years which does not begin to run unless the injured party knows, or can reasonably be expected to know, the essential circumstances of the infringement. As was mentioned in point 38 of this Opinion, that is the case for ‘follow-on actions’ brought further to decisions of the Commission, in principle, on the date of publication of the summary of the decision finding the infringement in the Official Journal of the European Union. (16)

50. Because, however, Paragraph 326 of the former Civil Code only provides, according to its wording and as interpreted by the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law, that the period continues to run for one further year after that date, that provision clearly cannot be interpreted in accordance with the directive without making a contra legem interpretation.

51. I will therefore examine hereinafter only whether Article 101 TFEU, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, precludes the contested legislation and interpretation.

52. Furthermore, as far as can be seen, that question is also (at least partly) relevant to the decision in the main proceedings. Thus, the original actions at first instance, which are now once again being heard by the referring court following the judgment on the appeal on a point of law, were brought on 6 April 2018. Those original actions are evidently not time-barred, regardless of whether the interpretation of Paragraph 326(2) of the former Civil Code by the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law (limitation period until 6 April 2018 (17)) or the interpretation by the referring court (limitation period until 29 September 2018 (18)) is applied. The divergence in interpretation between the two courts does, however, make a difference with regard to the limitation of the claims made by applicant III in the proceedings at first instance. Thus, subject to verification by the referring court, its claim made on 15 June 2018 would, on the interpretation by the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law, be likely to be time-barred. (19)

(2) Second question

53. By its second question, the referring court would like to ascertain specifically whether Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 precludes the contested legislation, as interpreted by the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law, in so far as that legislation does not establish that the limitation period is to be suspended for at least one year from the date on which the decision establishing that that infringement was committed becomes final and continues to run only after that date. Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 provides for such suspension or interruption (see point 35 of this Opinion).

54. As was mentioned in point 26 of this Opinion, the Kúria (Supreme Court), in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law, rejected as contra legem the interpretation of Paragraph 326 of the former Civil Code to the effect that the obstacle to asserting the claim for damages is removed only one year after the decision finding the infringement becomes final and the period continues to run for one further year thereafter and it is not for the Court to call that position into question. EU law does not require such contra legem interpretation (see point 42 of this Opinion). The second question referred for a preliminary ruling, as formulated by the referring court, is therefore unnecessary.

55. In order to provide it with a useful answer, however, reference is made to the finding already made by the Court regarding Article 102 TFEU, which can be transferred to Article 101 TFEU, according to which those provisions, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, do not require the suspension of the limitation period until the moment a Commission decision finding an infringement becomes final. Both the injured party and national courts may rely on the findings made in a decision of the Commission which has not yet become final. Furthermore, although national courts have the power to stay the proceedings on account of the circumstances of the case until the Commission’s decision becomes final, they are in no way required to do so, in principle, provided that they do not depart from that decision. (20)

56. The situation may possibly be different for decisions of national competition authorities, which are not at issue here. The limitation period for such decisions may, at least, begin to run only once the decision has become final and the corresponding judgment has been published, if the court hearing an action for damages is not bound by the finding of the existence of the infringement in question unless the decision of the national competition authority has become final. (21)

(b) Does a limitation period of one year from publication of the summary of the Commission decision satisfy the principle of effectiveness?

57. It follows from the above that, as far as the first two questions referred for a preliminary ruling are concerned, it remains to be considered only whether a limitation period which, in the case of ‘follow-on actions for damages’ under competition law brought further to decisions of the Commission, continues to run for one further year from publication of the summary of the decision concerned in the Official Journal of the European Union is compatible with Article 101 TFEU, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness. On the other hand, the question addressed as an ancillary point by the referring court of the limitation period for ‘stand-alone actions for damages’, which are not preceded by a decision of the Commission, does not arise in the present case.

58. In the absence of EU rules governing the matter until the date of expiry of the time limit for transposition of Directive 2014/104, it was, up to then, for the legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed rules governing the exercise of the right to claim compensation for the harm resulting from an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, including those on limitation periods, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness were observed. That latter principle requires that the rules applicable to actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of EU law do not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law. (22)

59. It must be stated, first of all, that the period in question should not be considered unreasonable solely because it is shorter than the period now provided for in Article 10 of Directive 2014/104. As I have already explained in my Opinion in Cogeco Communications, those provisions of the directive in particular are not merely a codification of that which already resulted implicitly from primary law. It was the aim of the authors of the directive to standardise and strengthen the enforcement of the right to damages for anticompetitive conduct. That does not mean that less extensive rules frustrate that right, provided they do not make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to enforce. (23)

60. National legislation laying down the date on which the limitation period starts to run, the duration of that period and the rules for its suspension or interruption must be adapted to the specificities of competition law and the objectives of the implementation of the rules of that law by the persons concerned, so as not to undermine completely the full effectiveness of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. (24)

61. As is stressed by the referring court itself, with regard to the question whether a national limitation period satisfies the requirement of the effectiveness of EU competition rules, it is necessary to take all elements of those rules on limitation into consideration. (25)

62. The limitation periods concerned have the function, in particular, of ensuring protection of the rights of the injured party to the effect that he or she must have sufficient time in which to gather the appropriate information with a view to a possible action. (26)

63. In that regard, the existence of an infringement of competition law, the existence of harm, the causal link between that harm and that infringement and the identity of the infringer form part of the necessary information which the injured party must have in order to bring an action for damages. (27)

64. Furthermore, the Court has found that the bringing of actions for damages on account of infringements of EU competition law requires, in principle, a complex factual and economic analysis. (28)

65. That analysis is made more difficult because disputes concerning infringements of competition law are characterised, in principle, by information asymmetry to the detriment of the injured party. It is more difficult for that person to obtain the information necessary to bring an action for damages than for the competition authorities to obtain the information necessary for exercising their powers to apply competition law. (29)

66. As a result, it is necessary that the limitation period does not begin to run before the infringement concerned has ceased. Only in that way can the injured party identify and prove the existence, scope and duration of that infringement, the extent of the harm caused by the infringement and the causal link between that harm and that infringement. (30) That condition is met in the case of the legislation at issue in the present case.

67. In the case of ‘follow-on actions for damages’ like the one at issue here, which are based on and relate to the decision of a competition authority, the essential elements of the infringement are, moreover, already contained in that decision. (31) For precisely that reason, it is crucial that the limitation period for such actions does not end before that decision is adopted. That principle, which is now laid down in detail in Article 10 of Directive 2014/104, was previously derived, in its main features, from Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness. (32) That condition is also met in the case of the legislation at issue in the main proceedings.

68. Accordingly, that leaves only the question whether the period at issue of one year from publication of the summary of the Commission decision in the Official Journal of the European Union makes it in practice impossible or excessively difficult for claimants to gather the remaining information which they need in order to assert a claim of harm. In addition to the essential elements of the infringement contained in the Commission decision, that information includes the specific individual harm and the causal link between that harm and the infringement.

69. Since, in general, antitrust-related harm constitutes economic harm, it should, unlike personal harm where it exists, usually be quantifiable as soon as it has occurred or materialised. In the case of harm materialising as a result of a continuous infringement over a longer period, an additional factor is that the limitation period cannot begin to run until that infringement has ceased in its entirety. (33)

70. It is true that the specific quantification of such harm may prove to be quite complex and require economic studies. Furthermore, quantification of economic, competition-related harm is based not only on data concerning the business activities and finances of the injured parties, which are thus held by them, but also, where appropriate, on data held by the injuring parties, which must first be inspected and evaluated. (34)

71. Nevertheless, there is no indication that a one-year period which, as in this case, begins to run after publication of the summary of the Commission decision containing the essential elements of the infringement and after that infringement has ceased would make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to inspect the necessary data in good time and to produce the appropriate studies in order effectively to claim the harm arising. (35)

72. Accordingly, subject to verification by the court having jurisdiction, Paragraph 326(2) of the former Civil Code, as interpreted by the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law, would appear to be compatible with Article 101 TFEU and the principle of effectiveness.

73. It is for the referring court to examine, in the light of all the relevant circumstances, whether in the specific case at issue there are elements which call that finding into question. In doing so, it must have regard to the national body of rules as a whole and also examine, for example, whether the relevant procedural rules allow claimants, where appropriate, subsequently to submit specific quantifications of harm after the action has been brought. Such a possibility does not appear – subject to verification by the referring court – to be refuted by the example of applicant III in the proceedings at first instance. According to the submissions of defendants A-IX to A-XII in the main proceedings, that applicant evidently did not specify its original claim through its subsequent modification of the action, but rather made a new claim. (36)

74. All things considered, the answer to the first question is therefore that Article 101 TFEU, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, does not preclude national legislation under which the limitation period for actions for damages brought further to a decision by which the European Commission finds an infringement of EU competition law is one year from publication of the summary of that decision in the Official Journal of the European Union. A different conclusion could apply only if that legislation, read in conjunction with the other relevant national provisions, in particular procedural provisions, makes it in practice impossible or excessively difficult, on account of the particular circumstances of the case, to exercise the right under Article 101 TFEU to compensation for harm caused by an infringement of that provision. It is for the court having jurisdiction to make that assessment.

B. The third question referred for a preliminary ruling

75. By its third question, the referring court wishes to know whether EU law is infringed by a provision of a Member State under which it is bound by a decision intended to ensure the consistent interpretation of law delivered by the highest court, even if it considers that that interpretation is contrary to EU law.

76. In the event that the Court concurs with my assessment of the first two questions referred for a preliminary ruling, the third question is unnecessary because, as has just been explained, I do not consider the interpretation by the Kúria (Supreme Court) in the decision for the preservation of the uniformity of the law to be contrary to EU law. I will therefore answer the third question only in the alternative.

77. The Court has already ruled that EU law does not, in principle, preclude national rules under which the courts of a Member State are bound by a decision of a higher court of that Member State. (37) The primacy of EU law does, however, prohibit a national court from being bound, in accordance with national procedural law, by the legal rulings of a higher court, where those assessments are not compatible with EU law. (38)

78. A national court which is called upon to apply provisions of EU law and is unable to interpret national legislation in compliance with the requirements of EU law is therefore under a duty to give full effect to the requirements of EU law in the dispute brought before it. It must therefore be able, if necessary, to disapply any national rule or practice that is contrary to a provision of EU law with direct effect, without it having to request or await the prior setting aside of that national rule or practice by legislative or other constitutional means. (39)

79. Similarly, a court hearing a case governed by EU law may not be deterred by national legislation from exercising the right conferred on it by Article 267 TFEU to refer questions to the Court in order to enable it to decide whether or not Member State legislation is compatible with EU law. (40)

80. The third question asked by the referring court should therefore be answered in the alternative to the effect that EU law precludes national legislation under which it is bound by a decision intended to ensure the consistent interpretation of law delivered by the highest court, even if it considers that that interpretation is contrary to EU law.

VI. Conclusion

81. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the request for a preliminary ruling from the Gyulai törvényszék (Gyula High Court, Hungary) as follows:

Article 101 TFEU, read in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which the limitation period for actions for damages brought further to a decision by which the European Commission finds an infringement of EU competition law is one year from publication of the summary of that decision in the Official Journal of the European Union. A different conclusion could apply only if that legislation, read in conjunction with the other relevant national provisions, in particular procedural provisions, makes it in practice impossible or excessively difficult, on account of the particular circumstances of the case, to exercise the right under Article 101 TFEU to compensation for harm caused by an infringement of that provision. It is for the court having jurisdiction to make that assessment.

1 Original language: German.

i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.

2 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 (OJ 2014 L 349, p. 1).

3 C‑637/17, EU:C:2019:263.

4 C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494.

5 C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324.

6 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_16_2582.

7 OJ 2017 C 108, p. 6.

8 Order of the President of the Court of Justice of 2 September 2025, Lurdos (C‑285/25, EU:C:2025:720).

9 Judgments of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraphs 48, 49, 73 to 75 and 79), and of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraphs 49 and 50).

10 See, to that effect, judgments of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraphs 61 and 71), and of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraphs 55 and 67).

11 See, to that effect, judgment of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).

12 See, to that effect, judgments of 18 January 2022, Thelen Technopark Berlin (C‑261/20, EU:C:2022:33, paragraphs 30 to 33); of 20 February 2024, X (Lack of reasons for termination) (C‑715/20, EU:C:2024:139, paragraphs 75 and 76); and of 10 July 2025, DADA Music and UPFR (C‑37/24, EU:C:2025:551, paragraphs 80 to 83).

13 See judgment of 9 April 2024, Profi Credit Polska (Reopening of proceedings concluded with a final judicial decision) (C‑582/21, EU:C:2024:282, paragraphs 31 and 55 and the case-law cited).

14 See, to that effect, judgment of 26 January 2010, Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (C‑118/08, EU:C:2010:39, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

15 See judgments of 15 December 1993, Hünermund and Others (C‑292/92, EU:C:1993:932, paragraph 8); of 19 March 2015, OTP Bank (C‑672/13, EU:C:2015:185, paragraph 29); and of 15 September 2022, Fossil (Gibraltar) (C‑705/20, EU:C:2022:680, paragraph 56).

16 See, to that effect, judgments of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraphs 61 and 71), and of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraphs 55 and 67).

17 See point 39 of this Opinion.

18 See point 41 of this Opinion.

19 See points 17 and 23 of this Opinion. Defendants A-IX to A-XII in the main proceedings claim in that regard that applicant III in the proceedings at first instance did not increase its original claim by its application of 15 June 2018, but made a new claim in respect of two trucks which were not the subject of its original action of 6 April 2018.

20 See judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraphs 72 to 80), and my Opinion in Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2023:695, points 50 to 70).

21 See, to that effect, judgment of 4 September 2025, Nissan Iberia (C‑21/24, EU:C:2025:659, paragraphs 63 to 67, 74, 75 and 82); see also Opinion of Advocate General Medina in Nissan Iberia (C‑21/24, EU:C:2025:248, point 50 et seq.).

22 Judgments of 28 March 2019, Cogeco Communications (C‑637/17, EU:C:2019:263, paragraphs 42 and 43); of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraph 50); of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 51); and of 4 September 2025, Nissan Iberia (C‑21/24, EU:C:2025:659, paragraph 48).

23 See, to that effect, my Opinion in Cogeco Communications (C‑637/17, EU:C:2019:32, points 79, 80 and 95).

24 Judgments of 28 March 2019, Cogeco Communications (C‑637/17, EU:C:2019:263, paragraph 47); of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraph 53); of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 52); and of 4 September 2025, Nissan Iberia (C‑21/24, EU:C:2025:659, paragraph 49).

25 Judgment of 28 March 2019, Cogeco Communications (C‑637/17, EU:C:2019:263, paragraph 45); see also my Opinion in Cogeco Communications (C‑637/17, EU:C:2019:32, point 81).

26 Judgments of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraph 45), and of 4 September 2025, Nissan Iberia (C‑21/24, EU:C:2025:659, paragraph 55).

27 Judgments of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraph 60); of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 64); and of 4 September 2025, Nissan Iberia (C‑21/24, EU:C:2025:659, paragraph 58).

28 Judgments of 28 March 2019, Cogeco Communications (C‑637/17, EU:C:2019:263, paragraph 46); of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraph 54); of 20 April 2023, Repsol Comercial de Productos Petroliferos (C‑25/21, EU:C:2023:298, paragraph 60); and of 28 January 2025, ASG 2 (C‑253/23, EU:C:2025:40, paragraph 74).

29 Judgment of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraph 55), and order of 6 March 2023, Deutsche Bank (Cartel – Euro interest rate derivatives) (C‑198/22 and C‑199/22, EU:C:2023:166, paragraph 35).

30 See, to that effect, judgments of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraphs 56 and 61), and of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 59).

31 Opinion of Advocate General Medina in Nissan Iberia (C‑21/24, EU:C:2025:248, points 46 and 47); see also, conversely, judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 62 in fine).

32 Judgment of 28 March 2019, Cogeco Communications (C‑637/17, EU:C:2019:263, paragraphs 51 to 53 and 55).

33 See, to that effect, judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services) (C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 62).

34 See, in that regard, judgment of 16 February 2023, Tráficos Manuel Ferrer (C‑312/21, EU:C:2023:99, paragraph 50 et seq.).

35 In the judgments of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks (C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraph 51), and of 4 September 2025, Nissan Iberia (C‑21/24, EU:C:2025:659, paragraph 40), the Court did not object to a one-year limitation period in either case, but it did not explicitly address the duration of the period; see Opinion of Advocate General Rantos in Volvo and DAF TRUCKS (C‑267/20, EU:C:2021:884, points 99 to 102).

36 See footnote 19 to this Opinion.

37 See, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2021, Euro Box Promotion and Others (C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19 and C‑840/19, EU:C:2021:1034, paragraph 230), and of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court) (C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraphs 44 and 45).

38 Judgments of 9 September 2021, Dopravní podnik hl. m. Prahy (C‑107/19, EU:C:2021:722, paragraph 49), and of 12 March 2026, Shipova (C‑43/24, EU:C:2026:183, paragraphs 58 to 62).

39 Judgments of 5 October 2010, Elchinov (C‑173/09, EU:C:2010:581, paragraph 31), and of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court) (C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 53). See also, to that effect, judgments of 21 December 2021, Euro Box Promotion and Others (C‑357/19, C‑379/19, C‑547/19, C‑811/19 and C‑840/19, EU:C:2021:1034, paragraph 258), and of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court) (C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 63).

40 See judgment of 5 October 2010, Elchinov (C‑173/09, EU:C:2010:581, paragraphs 25 to 27 and the case-law cited).

Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 3 September 2026.###

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