ECLI:EU:C:2026:313•Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered on 16 April 2026.#Minister van Asiel en Migratie v UB.#Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State.#Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Asylum policy – Directive 2001/55/EC – Minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof – Article 17(2) – Directive 2013/32/EU – Common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection – Granting of international protection to a person enjoying temporary protection under Directive 2001/55 – Article 31 – National administrative practice of suspending, during the temporary protection period, the running of the time limit for taking a decision on an application for international protection.#Case C-249/25.
Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered on 16 April 2026.#Minister van Asiel en Migratie v UB.#Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State.#Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Asylum policy – Directive 2001/55/EC – Minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof – Article 17(2) – Directive 2013/32/EU – Common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection – Granting of international protection to a person enjoying temporary protection under Directive 2001/55 – Article 31 – National administrative practice of suspending, during the temporary protection period, the running of the time limit for taking a decision on an application for international protection.#Case C-249/25.
ECLI:EU:C:2026:313Eu CjeuApr 16, 2026
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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
CAMPOS SÁNCHEZ-BORDONA
delivered on 16 April 2026 (1)
Case C‑249/25 [Jilin] (i)
Minister van Asiel en Migratie
v
UB
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands))
( Preliminary ruling proceedings – Asylum policy – Temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons – Directive 2001/55/EC – Article 17(2) – International protection – Directive 2013/32/EU – Article 31 – Suspension of the examination of an application for international protection of a person enjoying temporary protection – Limits )
1. The dispute in the proceedings giving rise to this reference for a preliminary ruling concerns whether, where a displaced person has obtained temporary protection in a Member State under Directive 2001/55/EC (2) and has applied for international protection status in that State under Directive 2011/95/EU (3) and Directive 2013/32/EU, (4) the national authorities may suspend the examination of that person’s application for as long as the temporary protection status exists.
2. The Netherlands authorities declared admissible an application for international protection lodged by a third-country national who, having been displaced from Ukraine following the 2022 invasion, had obtained temporary protection in the Netherlands under Directive 2001/55. However, the minister responsible (5) considers that he is not required to decide whether to grant international protection status while the applicant benefits from temporary protection.
3. The referring court is uncertain whether those national arrangements are compatible with the provisions of EU law.
I. Legal framework
A. European Union law
1. Directive 2001/55
4. Article 1 provides:
‘The purpose of this Directive is to establish minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin and to promote a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving such persons.’
5. Article 2 provides:
‘For the purposes of this Directive:
(a) “temporary protection” means a procedure of exceptional character to provide, in the event of a mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin, immediate and temporary protection to such persons, in particular if there is also a risk that the asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation, in the interests of the persons concerned and other persons requesting protection;
…
(e) “refugees” means third-country nationals or stateless persons within the meaning of Article 1A of the Geneva Convention [of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967];
…’
6. Article 3 provides:
‘1. Temporary protection shall not prejudge recognition of refugee status under the Geneva Convention.
…
5. This Directive shall not affect the prerogative of the Member States to adopt or retain more favourable conditions for persons covered by temporary protection.’
7. In accordance with Article 5:
‘1. The existence of a mass influx of displaced persons shall be established by a Council Decision adopted by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, which shall also examine any request by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council.
…’
8. Pursuant to Article 17:
‘1. Persons enjoying temporary protection must be able to lodge an application for asylum at any time.
2. The examination of any asylum application not processed before the end of the period of temporary protection shall be completed after the end of that period.’
9. Article 19 reads:
‘1. The Member States may provide that temporary protection may not be enjoyed concurrently with the status of asylum seeker while applications are under consideration.
2. Where, after an asylum application has been examined, refugee status or, where applicable, other kind of protection is not granted to a person eligible for or enjoying temporary protection, the Member States shall, without prejudice to Article 28, provide for that person to enjoy or to continue to enjoy temporary protection for the remainder of the period of protection.’
2. Directive 2013/32
10. Article 1 (‘Purpose’) provides:
‘The purpose of this Directive is to establish common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection pursuant to Directive 2011/95/EU.’
11. Article 2 (‘Definitions’) states:
‘For the purposes of this Directive:
…
(b) “application for international protection” or “application” means a request made by a third-country national or a stateless person for protection from a Member State, who can be understood to seek refugee status or subsidiary protection status, and who does not explicitly request another kind of protection outside the scope of Directive 2011/95/EU, that can be applied for separately;
…
(g) “refugee” means a third-country national or a stateless person who fulfils the requirements of Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU;
(h) “person eligible for subsidiary protection” means a third-country national or a stateless person who fulfils the requirements of Article 2(f) of Directive 2011/95/EU;
(i) “international protection” means refugee status and subsidiary protection status as defined in points (j) and (k);
(j) “refugee status” means the recognition by a Member State of a third-country national or a stateless person as a refugee;
(k) “subsidiary protection status” means the recognition by a Member State of a third-country national or a stateless person as a person eligible for subsidiary protection;
…’
12. Article 10 (‘Requirements for the examination of applications’) provides:
‘…
2. When examining applications for international protection, the determining authority shall first determine whether the applicants qualify as refugees and, if not, determine whether the applicants are eligible for subsidiary protection.
…’
13. Article 31 (‘Examination procedure’) provides:
‘1. Member States shall process applications for international protection in an examination procedure in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II.
2. Member States shall ensure that the examination procedure is concluded as soon as possible, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination.
3. Member States shall ensure that the examination procedure is concluded within six months of the lodging of the application.
…
Member States may extend the time limit of six months set out in this paragraph for a period not exceeding a further nine months, where:
…
(b) a large number of third-country nationals or stateless persons simultaneously apply for international protection, making it very difficult in practice to conclude the procedure within the six-month time limit;
…
By way of exception, Member States may, in duly justified circumstances, exceed the time limits laid down in this paragraph by a maximum of three months where necessary in order to ensure an adequate and complete examination of the application for international protection.
4. Without prejudice to Articles 13 and 18 of Directive 2011/95/EU, Member States may postpone concluding the examination procedure where the determining authority cannot reasonably be expected to decide within the time limits laid down in paragraph 3 due to an uncertain situation in the country of origin which is expected to be temporary. In such a case, Member States shall:
(a) conduct reviews of the situation in that country of origin at least every six months;
(b) inform the applicants concerned within a reasonable time of the reasons for the postponement;
(c) inform the Commission within a reasonable time of the postponement of procedures for that country of origin.
5. In any event, Member States shall conclude the examination procedure within a maximum time limit of 21 months from the lodging of the application.
…
9. …
Without prejudice to paragraphs 3 to 5, Member States may exceed those time limits where necessary in order to ensure an adequate and complete examination of the application for international protection.’
3. Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 (6)
14. In accordance with Article 1 (‘Subject matter’):
‘The existence of a mass influx into the Union of displaced persons who have had to leave Ukraine as a consequence of an armed conflict is hereby established.’
B. Netherlands law
1. Vreemdelingenwet 2000 (7)
15. Article 1 defines ‘temporary protection’ as legal residence, within the meaning of Article 8(f) or (h), of a foreign national who, in accordance with Directive 2001/55, is not deported by virtue of an application made under Article 28.
16. Pursuant to Article 8, foreign nationals are entitled to reside legally in the Netherlands only:
‘…
(f) if, pending the decision on an application for a residence permit, as referred to in Articles 14 and 28, the present law or a provision adopted on the basis thereof or a judgment stipulates that the applicant is not to be deported until such time as a decision has been taken on the application;
…
(h) if, pending the decision on a complaint or an appeal, where, pursuant to this Law or a provision adopted on the basis thereof or a judgment, the applicant is not to be deported until such time as the complaint or appeal has been resolved’.
17. In accordance with Article 28, the Minister has the power to accept, reject, dismiss without examination or declare inadmissible an application for a temporary residence permit, and may also decide not to proceed with examination of the application.
18. Article 42(1) provides that a decision on an application for a temporary residence permit under Article 28 is to be adopted within six months of receipt of the application. Pursuant to paragraph 4, the time limit laid down in paragraph 1 may be extended for an additional period of nine months. Under paragraph 5, after the extension provided for in paragraph 4, where necessary for the purposes of an exhaustive and proper examination of the application, the period may be extended for a maximum of three months.
19. In accordance with Article 43(1), by decision of the Minister, in the case of certain categories of foreign national who have submitted an application for a temporary residence permit under Article 28, the period laid down in Article 42(1) may be extended for a maximum of 21 months where, in all likelihood, for a short period of time, there is uncertainty about the situation in the country of origin and, for that reason, it is not reasonably possible to decide whether the application may be allowed on one of the grounds referred to in Article 29.
20. In accordance with Article 43a, by way of derogation from Article 42(1), with regard to foreign nationals who enjoy temporary protection, a decision on an application for a temporary residence permit under Article 28 is to be adopted at a time between receipt of the application and six months after the expiry of temporary protection.
2. Besluit van 23 november 2000 tot uitvoering van de Vreemdelingenwet (Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000) (8)
21. In accordance with Article 3.1a(1), the lodging of an application for a temporary asylum residence permit means that deportation will not happen while a decision as referred to in Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/55 is in force, provided that the foreign national concerned:
(a) belongs to a specific group of foreign nationals defined in a decision of the Council of the European Union as referred to in Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/55;
(b) is the spouse of the foreign national referred to under (a), or the partner with whom that foreign national is in a stable relationship, and was living with that foreign national at the time of the events which led to the decision referred to in Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/55;
(c) is the minor unmarried child, whether adopted or not, of the foreign national referred to under (a) or (b).
3. Voorschrift Vreemdelingen 2000 (9)
22. Article 3.9.a(1) defines as foreign nationals, for the purposes of Article 3.1.a(1)(e) of the Royal Decree on foreign nationals 2000, persons who: (a) are of Ukrainian nationality and fled Ukraine after 26 November 2021 or entered the territory of the European Union during the period from 27 November 2021 to 23 February 2022; (b) are of Ukrainian nationality and can demonstrate that they were already actually residing in the Netherlands before 27 November 2021; or (c) hold a permanent Ukrainian residence permit valid as at 23 February 2022, who: (1) probably left Ukraine after 26 November 2021; and (2) are not recorded as having returned to their country of origin after 23 February 2022.
23. Article 3.9.a(2) provides that Article 3.1.a(1)(b) to (d), of the Royal Decree on foreign nationals 2000 is to apply mutatis mutandis to the family members of foreign nationals referred to in paragraph 1.
II. Facts, dispute and questions referred for a preliminary ruling
24. The account of the facts contained in the order for reference is as follows:
– ‘The foreign national has Chinese nationality. He stated that he lived in Ukraine from 2009 to 2014, and from 2018 until his departure in February 2022. He married a Ukrainian woman on 5 May 2012 and they have a son. The foreign national entered the Netherlands with his wife and child on 7 March 2022 and lodged an asylum application … on 13 April 2022. His wife and child are not part of this procedure. The parties [to the proceedings] agree that the foreign national qualifies for temporary protection under Directive [2001/55] because he was resident in Ukraine before 24 February 2024 with his Ukrainian wife and son. He is a family member of a Ukrainian national as referred to in Article 2(1)(c) of Implementing Decision [2022/382]’. (10)
– ‘The Minister initially started examining the asylum application … . Later, he found out that the foreign national was eligible for temporary protection under Directive [2001/55]. The foreign national’s personal interview regarding his asylum application took place on 19 September 2023. On the same day, the Minister informed him that his asylum application would not be examined further because he was a beneficiary of temporary protection under Directive [2001/55].’ (11)
25. As regards the conduct of the procedure, the order for reference states:
– ‘By letter of 16 January 2024, the foreign national put the Minister on notice for failing to take a timely decision on his asylum application of 13 April 2022. As the Minister subsequently failed to take a decision within two weeks, the foreign national lodged an appeal with the rechtbank [Den Haag (District Court, The Hague, Netherlands)], requesting it to order the Minister to take a decision within two weeks and to penalise him with a fine of EUR 100 per day [of delay].’ (12)
– At first instance, the rechtbank held that, in all cases, the 21-month time limit set out in Article 31(5) of Directive [2013/32] began to run at the time of the asylum application … Therefore, in the case on which it was required to adjudicate, that meant … that the Minister should have adopted a decision on the foreign national’s asylum application in January 2024. Since this had not happened, the rechtbank took the view that the Minister had failed to take a timely decision on the asylum application. Accordingly, the rechtbank ordered the Minister to notify a decision within eight weeks from the date of notification of the judgment …’ (13)
– ‘On appeal [to the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands)], the Minister argues that the rechtbank interpreted the relationship between Directive [2001/55] and Directive [2013/32] incorrectly. He points to the independent basis and exceptional nature of Directive [2001/55] and to the fact that this directive is at the service of the Common European Asylum System …, in the sense that it is a tool to ensure that, in the event of a mass influx, [that system] functions properly and does not collapse. In the Minister’s submission, it does not follow from either the wording of the time limits for adopting a decision laid down in Directive [2013/32] or the rationale behind that directive that the rules on the time limits for adopting a decision also apply to the exceptional situation governed by Directive [2001/55]. In addition, the Minister argues that the rechtbank incorrectly interpreted Article 17(2) of Directive [2001/55] and its implementation in the Netherlands by means of Article 43a of [Vw 2000]. The Minister maintains that it is apparent from the wording of Article 17(2) of Directive [2001/55] that the examination of an asylum application can be completed after the temporary protection has ended. In the Minister’s submission, this is in line with the objective of Directive [2001/55]’. (14)
26. Against that background, the Raad van State (Council of State) has referred the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Must Article 17(2) of Directive [2001/55] be interpreted as conferring on Member States the power to suspend the examination of an application for international protection of a person enjoying temporary protection, during the period of temporary protection?
(2) Must the decision time limits in Article 31 of Directive [2013/32] be interpreted as meaning that, where an application for international protection was made before or during the period of temporary protection by a beneficiary of Directive [2001/55], those time limits only start running or only resume running at the end of the period of temporary protection?’
III. Procedure before the Court of Justice
27. The request for a preliminary ruling was received at the Registry of the Court on 2 April 2025.
28. Written observations were lodged by UB, the German, Belgian, Netherlands and Polish Governments, and the European Commission.
29. The Court decided that it was not necessary to hold a hearing.
IV. Assessment
A. Preliminary observation
30. The Court recently gave a ruling in the judgment in Framholm on the coexistence of the temporary protection and international protection regimes applicable to displaced persons from Ukraine. (15)
31. When I delivered the Opinion in that case, (16) after setting out a number of conceptual and terminological clarifications concerning the different categories of protection (temporary, subsidiary and international), I examined the system of temporary protection under Directive 2001/55 in relation to persons displaced following the invasion of Ukraine. (17)
32. In the judgment in Framholm, the Court held that Articles 3, 17 and 19 of Directive 2001/55, read in the light of Directive 2011/95 and Directive 2013/32, ‘… [do] not [authorise] a Member State to reject an application for international protection, in so far as it seeks to obtain subsidiary protection status, on the sole ground that the applicant enjoys temporary protection under Directive 2001/55.’ (18)
B. Law and practice of the Netherlands with regard to temporary protection
33. The referring court supplies the following information about the application of Directive 2001/55 in the Netherlands:
– In order to qualify for temporary protection under Directive 2001/55, a displaced person must lodge an application for temporary protection. (19)
– The displaced person must present him or herself at a municipal council where he or she will be entered on the register of inhabitants. Presentation at a municipal council is deemed to be an expression of that person’s wish to obtain international protection. From that time, the person concerned is legally resident under Vw 2000.
– A person who is entered in the register of inhabitants may make an appointment with the Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Netherlands), which assesses, on the basis of the available documents, whether that person is actually covered by Directive 2001/55. During that process, the displaced person officially lodges an application for international protection and signs a form. The displaced person is then given a certificate confirming that he or she is a person entitled to international protection.
– The time limit for adoption of a decision on the application for international protection is suspended during the period of temporary protection. The Minister argues, therefore, that he (the Minister) is not required to make a decision on the application for international protection until such time as the temporary protection ends. (20)
34. Although, in view of the circumstances, that procedure was not followed in the case of UB, as he lodged his application from a reception centre, the Minister submits that that fact is irrelevant and that ‘[the Minister] is not required, under any circumstances, during the period of temporary protection, to give a decision on asylum applications lodged by persons who, it has been decided, qualify for temporary protection’. (21)
C. The questions referred
35. In its order for reference, the national court takes the view, provisionally, (22) that Article 17(2) of Directive 2001/55 may be interpreted as meaning that it grants Member States the right to disregard the periods for adopting a decision laid down in Article 31 of Directive 2013/32 where a beneficiary of temporary protection has lodged an application for international protection.
36. However, the national court is uncertain whether that interpretation of EU law is correct and has therefore referred the two questions transcribed above, which may be answered together, to the Court for a preliminary ruling.
37. The question which the national court essentially asks is whether Member States may, for as long as the period of temporary protection granted to a displaced person lasts, suspend the examination of an application for international protection submitted by that person, so that the time limit for deciding on the application for international protection does not start to run (or does not continue to run) until the end of the period of temporary protection.
1. The effect of the judgment in Framholm
38. The starting point for the reply to those questions must be the following statements from the judgment in Framholm:
– ‘Directive 2001/55 is intended, inter alia, to ensure that third-country nationals and stateless persons enjoying temporary protection continue to have a real opportunity to obtain international protection once their individual situation has been examined appropriately, while at the same time immediately ensuring that they enjoy protection on a lesser scale’. (23)
– ‘Such an objective supports an interpretation of Articles 3, 17 and 19 of Directive 2001/55, according to which those articles prevent Member States from considering that a person enjoying temporary protection may not, for as long as that protection lasts, seek to enjoy [international] protection.’ (24)
– ‘Where a person meets the minimum standards set by EU law to qualify for one of those statuses … Member States are required, subject to the grounds for exclusion provided for by that directive and to the grounds of inadmissibility provided for by Directive 2013/32, to grant the international protection status sought, since those Member States have no discretion in that respect’. (25)
– ‘No provision of Directive 2011/95 provides that persons enjoying temporary protection may not be granted [international] protection …’. (26)
– ‘Article 10(2) of [Directive 2013/32] provides that, when examining applications for international protection, it is for the competent national authority first to determine whether the applicants qualify as refugees and, if not, determine whether the applicants are eligible for subsidiary protection. It follows that … an application for international protection may be rejected as unfounded only if the competent authority has reached the conclusion that neither refugee status nor subsidiary protection status could be granted to the applicant.’ (27)
2. Suspension of the examination of applications for international protection
39. Unlike the situation in the judgment in Framholm, the Netherlands authorities do not refuse to examine applications for international protection from beneficiaries of temporary protection; rather, they suspend the processing of those applications until such time as the temporary protection ends.
40. I believe, however, that that difference is more theoretical than real. Automatic suspension for the entire period of temporary protection is, substantively and for practical purposes, equivalent to a refusal to examine an application for international protection submitted by a displaced person from Ukraine.
41. Directive 2001/55 contains no provision permitting (much less, requiring) indefinite suspension of the examination of applications for international protection lodged by persons enjoying temporary protection.
42. In the preparatory documents for Directive 2001/55, Article 16 of the Commission’s original proposal permitted ‘consideration of the application [to be] suspended’. (28) However, the definitive text of Article 17 of Directive 2001/55 deleted that wording on the grounds, inter alia, that it did not comply with the 1951 Geneva Convention and because leaving the possibility of suspending consideration of applications to the discretion of the Member States would affect the uniform application of the directive. (29)
43. The governments which have participated in the proceedings argue that the deletion of those words changed nothing and Member States have the power to suspend applications for international protection for the duration of temporary protection.
44. However, the Commission argues that the preparatory documents make clear that the Member States did not reach an agreement ‘… either about the explicit possibility of a suspension or about the explicit prohibition of that possibility. A political compromise in favour of the functional ambiguity of Article 17(2) of Directive [2001/55] was therefore reached…’ (30)
45. Although the reference to the preparatory documents for Directive 2001/55 is not decisive, (31) the removal of the right to suspend the consideration of applications for international protection from the final text is an indication that the EU legislature did not eventually adopt that principle. With a view to affording legal certainty to a system that is uniform throughout the European Union, the silence (or ambiguity) concerning the possibility of an indefinite suspension of applications for international protection appears to point to the prohibition of such a suspension. That is especially so since, as I have already noted, that possibility was removed for reasons of compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention.
46. The rationale of Directive 2001/55 is that, faced with a mass influx of displaced persons, the Member States are to process applications for international protection in line with the existing state of the flow of applications and their decision-making capacity. Directive 2001/55, on the other hand, does not permit the draconian indefinite suspension of all international protection procedures commenced following applications lodged by persons who enjoy temporary protection.
47. In the Opinion in Framholm, I addressed the need for the activation of the temporary protection tool not to bring national asylum systems to a standstill. I did so in the following terms:
– ‘… Directive 2001/55 grants Member States certain powers to limit access to international protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons. It takes into account for those purposes the impact that such a phenomenon might have on the national asylum system. When defining temporary protection, Article 2(a) thereof mentions the possibility that the influx of displaced persons may bring with it “… a risk that the asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation …”.’ (32)
– ‘The concern not to bring national asylum systems to a standstill when laying down rules governing temporary protection for persons displaced by the invasion of Ukraine was highlighted in Implementing Decision 2022/382 and in its subsequent extensions. It is reflected in recital 16 of Implementing Decision 2022/382, (33) recital 7 of Implementing Decision 2023/2409 (34) and recitals 7 and 8 of Implementing Decision 2024/1836.’ (35) Recitals 9 and 10 of Implementing Decision 2025/1460 must now be added to those.
– ‘Member States therefore have some discretion in calibrating the pace of processing applications for international protection so as to ensure that their national asylum systems do not reach saturation point.’ (36)
– ‘By decision of the EU legislature, that risk of saturation may justify temporary limitations on the right of access to international protection enjoyed by beneficiaries of temporary protection. In such circumstances, the response must be tailored to the actual capacity to deal with an exceptional situation brought about by the mass exodus of displaced persons.’ (37)
– ‘Directive 2001/55 thus forms part of the common system for the examination of applications for international protection, which already provides for the possibility of postponing the decision on such an application where “a large number of third-country nationals or stateless persons simultaneously apply for international protection, making it very difficult in practice to conclude the procedure within the six-month time limit” …’. (38)
– ‘To my mind, however, … [t]he common system of international protection does not allow a national provision to make it a general rule that all applications for [international] protection made by persons enjoying temporary protection must be declared inadmissible.’ (39)
48. I believe that those considerations may be applied to the present case. As I have explained, the practice in the Netherlands creates a situation similar to that examined in the judgment in Framholm: even though the Netherlands authorities do not decide that applications for international protection lodged by persons benefiting for temporary protection are inadmissible, they subject those applications to a system of automatic indefinite suspension which deprives applicants of any possibility of obtaining international protection for what may be a very lengthy period. (40)
49. In my view, that indefinite suspension, which is not subject to any time limit and is detached from any specific impact which it may have on the operation of the asylum system in each Member State, is not compatible with Directive 2001/55.
50. Admittedly, it cannot be discounted that Member States may suspend the process of examining some applications for international protection where, as indicated above, the examination of those applications would bring national asylum systems to a standstill. That is the underlying premiss of Directive 2001/55. However, the automatic, general and indefinite suspension of all applications, whether or not they have the effect of bringing the system to a standstill, is incompatible with that premiss. That is the case where, because temporary protection exists, international protection procedures are simply suspended.
51. Moreover, the Netherlands Government does not link suspension of the examination of applications for international protection to the risk that the system will come to a standstill. The Netherlands Government states that its legislation allows it to take a decision on such applications during the period of temporary protection and, therefore, it is possible to process some applications in that period. (41)
52. The ‘staggered processing’ of applications for international protection, to which the Netherlands Government refers, means that the pace at which those applications are processed can be tailored to the actual capacity of the system, while respecting the right of displaced persons to have their situation assessed, where appropriate.
53. Indefinite, automatic suspension does not meet the criterion underpinning Directive 2013/32 either.
54. Article 31(3)(b) of Directive 2013/32 provides for the examination of applications for international protection to be postponed in the event of simultaneous applications from ‘a large number of third-country nationals …, making it very difficult in practice to conclude the procedure within the six-month time limit’. However, under Article 31(5) of Directive 2013/32, ‘in any event, Member States shall conclude the examination procedure within a maximum time limit of 21 months from the lodging of the application.’
55. The system of international protection in the European Union therefore gives Member States discretion to extend the time limit for examination by up to 21 months but, under no circumstances, to suspend the processing of applications indefinitely.
56. In support of the possibility of suspending freely the examination of applications for international protection, the Polish Government (42) relies on Article 3(3) of Directive 2013/33/EU, (43) which excludes from its scope situations in which the provisions of Directive 2001/55 have been applied.
57. I had occasion to address that argument in the Opinion in Framholm, explaining that ‘that exclusion is open to the interpretation, by converse inference, that the absence of such a provision in Directive 2013/32 means that that directive applies in cases of temporary protection under Directive 2001/55.’ (44)
58. In the same Opinion, I stated that ‘an analysis of the material fields covered by Directive 2001/55 and Directive 2013/33 with respect to the reception of applicants for international protection confirms [that]:
– Directive 2013/33, which supplements Directive 2011/95 and Directive 2013/32, deals with the individual situations of applicants for international protection by providing them with “reception conditions” [defined in Article 2(f) of Directive 2013/33] while their applications are being processed. Directive 2001/55, on the other hand, deals with situations involving the mass influx of displaced persons.
– The difference in the designation of the beneficiary does not preclude the possibility of overlaps: someone caught up in a mass displacement as result of a war may meet the conditions of eligibility for one of the forms of international protection.
– What matters is that the equivalence between the content and scope of the protection provided for in Directive 2001/55 and the reception conditions under Directive 2013/33 makes it logical that the latter should provide for its non-applicability in cases where another support system is already in place.’ (45)
59. The same logic explains why Article 19(1) of Directive 2001/55 authorises the Member States to provide that temporary protection may not be enjoyed concurrently with the status of asylum seeker while an application is under consideration.
60. Furthermore, in the exceptional situations referred to in Article 78(3) TFEU, which were addressed in Decision (EU) 2015/1523 (46) and Decision (EU) 2015/1601, (47) the guarantees laid down in Directive 2013/32 remained in force. (48) I can find no reasons which would justify, in an equally exceptional situation like that resulting from the displacements caused by the war in Ukraine, the different treatment of applicants for international protection.
61. Lastly, it must be recalled that Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) elevates the right of asylum to the rank of a fundamental right. That provision guarantees the ‘effective enjoyment of [the] right … to seek asylum’ in the Member States. (49)
62. As the Court pointed out, ‘… while the making and the lodging of an application for international protection are two separate, successive steps … there is nevertheless a close connection between those acts, inasmuch as they are meant to ensure effective access to the procedure in which applications for international protection are examined and to ensure the effectiveness of Article 18 of the Charter.’ (50)
63. The effectiveness of the right to apply for asylum is completely at odds with the indefinite suspension of the consideration of asylum applications. That defect is not rectified by the fact that the Minister may decide on such applications at a later stage, (51) if the examination of those applications takes place years after the displaced person applied for international protection status . In those circumstances, it must be stressed, the effectiveness of the fundamental right to apply for asylum is not safeguarded.
64. Article 17(1) of Directive 2001/55 provides that persons enjoying temporary protection may lodge ‘an application for asylum at any time.’ In order to respect the exercise of a fundamental right, that provision implicitly requires that an application must undergo an examination by the competent authority, which assesses the displaced person’s circumstances. (52) Where recognition of the right to lodge an application is then followed by a delay of several years before the application is examined, that is incompatible with the provision and, a fortiori, with the essence of the fundamental right recognised in Article 18 of the Charter.
65. In accordance with Article 52(1) of the Charter, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.’
66. The order for reference suggests that the automatic suspension of the examination of applications for international protection in such cases is, in actual fact, the result not of a legislative decision but rather of a ministerial practice. If that is the case, the requirement that limitations of fundamental rights must be provided for by law would not be satisfied.
67. In that connection, I am not persuaded by the argument that, in accordance with Article 19(2) of Directive 2001/55, a displaced person enjoys temporary protection even if he or she is not granted international protection. (53) As the Court held in paragraph 82 of the judgment in Kaduna, (54) temporary protection confers on its beneficiaries more limited rights than those conferred by the granting of international protection.
68. On the other hand, an interpretation consistent with the importance of the fundamental right to asylum inclines me to the view that beneficiaries of temporary protection are entitled to have their applications for international protection examined during the period when temporary protection is in force, even if that is at a pace determined by the limitations inherent in the system.
V. Conclusion
69. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the reply to the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands) should be:
Article 17(2) of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof and Article 31 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection
must be interpreted as meaning that they do not empower a Member State to suspend automatically and indefinitely the examination of an application for international protection submitted by a person enjoying temporary protection during the period in which that protection lasts, such that the time limit for adopting a decision on the application for international protection does not start to run or does not continue to run until the end of the period of temporary protection.
1 Original language: Spanish.
i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.
2 Council Directive of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ 2001 L 212, p. 12).
3 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9).
4 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).
5 The Minister van Asiel en Migratie (Minister for Asylum and Immigration, Netherlands; ‘the Minister’).
6 Council Implementing Decision of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection (OJ 2022 L 71, p. 1). Implementing Decision 2022/382 applied for an initial period of one year until 4 March 2023 and was subsequently extended until 4 March 2024. The Council decided to extend the temporary protection period until 4 March 2025 by means of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2409 of 19 October 2023 extending temporary protection as introduced by Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 (OJ L, 2023/2409). That period was extended again, until 4 March 2026, by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1836 of 25 June 2024 extending temporary protection as introduced by Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 (OJ L, 2024/1836). Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1460 of 15 July 2025 extending the temporary protection introduced by Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 provides for a further extension until 4 March 2027 (OJ L, 2025/1460).
7 Law on foreign nationals 2000 of 23 November 2000 (Stb. 2000, No 495; ‘Vw 2000’).
8 Royal Decree of 23 November 2000 implementing Vw 2000 (Stb. 2000, No 497; ‘the 2000 Royal Decree on foreign nationals’).
9 Regulation on foreign nationals 2000 of 18 December 2000 (Stcrt. 2001, No 10).
10 Paragraph 2.1 of the order for reference.
11 Paragraph 2.2 of the order for reference.
12 Paragraph 3.1 of the order for reference.
13 Paragraph 3.2 of the order for reference.
14 Paragraph 3.3 of the order for reference.
15 Judgment of 20 November 2025 (C‑195/25, EU:C:2025:904; ‘the judgment in Framholm’).
16 EU:C:2025:700; ‘the Opinion in Framholm’.
17 Points 29 to 38 of the Opinion in Framholm. I refer to the contents of that judgment without it being necessary to transcribe them here.
18 Judgment in Framholm, operative part, point 1.
19 Paragraph 4.3 of the order for reference, referring to a communication from the Minister of 30 March 2022 sent to the President of the Netherlands Chamber of Representatives, containing additional explanations concerning the interpretation of the implementing law. The Netherlands Government states (paragraph 11 of its written observations) that the Netherlands legislature chose to make the grant of temporary protection subject to the requirement that an application for international protection has been made.
20 Paragraph 4.3 of the order for reference.
21 Paragraph 4.4 of the order for reference.
22 Paragraph 12.1 of the order for reference.
23 The judgment in Framholm, paragraph 48. Emphasis added.
24 Ibid., paragraph 49.
25 Ibid., paragraph 54. Emphasis added.
26 Ibid., paragraph 55.
27 Ibid., paragraph 57.
28 COM/2000/0303 final (OJ 2000 C 311 E, p. 251.
29 That point was made in the document adopted by the Working Party on Asylum on 2 October 2000, available at https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST‑11650-2000-INIT/en/pdf. Footnote 1 to paragraph 2 describes the discussion relating to the possibility of suspending the consideration of asylum applications.
30 Paragraph 27 of the Commission’s written observations.
31 In the order for reference (paragraph 11.7.4), the national court states that the preparatory documents for Directive 2001/55 do not enable it to conclude with certainty whether the Member States officially wished to include or exclude the right of suspension.
32 The Opinion in Framholm, point 73.
33 ‘Introducing temporary protection is also expected to benefit the Member States, as the rights accompanying temporary protection limit the need for displaced persons to immediately seek international protection and thus the risk of overwhelming their asylum systems’. Emphasis added.
34 ‘Extending temporary protection will also help to ensure that the asylum systems of the Member States are not overwhelmed by a significant increase in the number of applications for international protection that could be lodged by persons that benefit from temporary protection until 4 March 2024, if temporary protection were to cease by then or by persons fleeing the war in Ukraine that arrive in the Union after that date and before 4 March 2025’.
35 The Opinion in Framholm, point 74.
36 Ibid., point 75.
37 Ibid., point 76.
38 Ibid., point 77, citing the judgment of 8 May 2025, Zimir (C‑662/23, EU:C:2025:326, paragraph 32).
39 Ibid., point 78. In points 79 and 80 of the Opinion in Framholm, I recalled how Article 33 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013, L 180, p. 31), in relation to situations characterised by the arrival of an unusually high number of third-country nationals seeking international protection, establishes ‘a mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management designed to implement preventive action plans in order, inter alia, to prevent the application of that regulation being jeopardised due to a substantiated risk of particular pressure being placed on a Member State’s asylum system’ (point 79 of the Opinion in Framholm). ‘In those cases too, however, the EU legislature did not authorise Member States to decide on their own initiative that applications for international protection are to be declared automatically inadmissible’ (point 80 of the Opinion in Framholm).
40 The referring court describes (paragraph 11.4.1 of the order for reference) how, as a result of the successive implementing decisions adopted by the Council, that period may last as long as four years, until 4 March 2026. The additional year laid down, until 4 March 2027, by Implementing Decision 2025/1460 (the adoption of which post-dated the order for reference) must be added to that calculation.
41 Paragraph 15 of the Netherlands Government’s written observations.
42 The Polish Government’s written observations, paragraph 14.
43 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 96). In accordance with Article 3(3) of that directive, ‘this Directive shall not apply when the provisions of … Directive 2001/55 … are applied.’ The same wording was used in Article 3(3) of its predecessor, Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (OJ 2003 L 31, p. 18).
44 The Opinion in Framholm, point 67.
45 Ibid., point 68.
46 Council Decision of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece (OJ 2015 L 239, p. 146).
47 Council Decision of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 80).
48 Recitals 31 and 36, respectively.
49 Judgment of 22 June 2023, Commission v Hungary (Declaration of intent prior to an asylum application) (C‑823/21, EU:C:2023:504, paragraph 52), emphasis added. The judgment in Framholm draws attention to the effectiveness of the right and the corresponding duty of the Member States: ‘where a person meets the minimum standards set by EU law to qualify for one of those statuses … Member States are required, subject to the grounds for exclusion provided for by [Directive 2002/55] and to the grounds of inadmissibility provided for by Directive 2013/32, to grant the international protection status sought, since those Member States have no discretion in that respect’ (paragraph 54).
50 Judgment of 30 June 2022, Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba and Others (C‑72/22 PPU, EU:C:2022:505, paragraph 62), citing the judgment of 25 June 2020, Ministerio Fiscal (Authority likely to receive an application for international protection) (C‑36/20 PPU, EU:C:2020:495, paragraph 93).
51 Paragraph 12.1 of the order for reference.
52 See, in that connection, paragraph 11.4.2 of the order for reference.
53 Paragraph 17 of the German Government’s written observations.
54 Judgment of 19 December 2024 (C-244/24 and C-290/24, EU:C:2024:1038). The national court refers to that judgment in paragraphs 11.3, 11.4.6, 11.5 and 11.6 of the order for reference.
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