ECLI:EU:C:2026:76

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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

RANTOS

delivered on 5 February 2026 (1)

Case C‑232/25 [Idziski] (i)

Z.R.,

Ś.

U.,

Z.,

other party:

Prokurator Regionalny w Krakowie

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland))

( Request for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 – Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters – Article 5(3) – Special jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict – Place where the harmful event occurred or may occur – Natural person and legal person alleging infringement of their personality rights resulting from the broadcasting of a series on television and its dissemination on the internet – International jurisdiction of courts of a Member State other than the Member State where that series was produced – Place where the damage occurred – Centre of interests of those persons – Identification as an individual – Applications for compensation for the entirety of the non-material damage suffered – Applications for an order to display an appropriate statement prior to any broadcast of that series )

I. Introduction

1. Z.R., a natural person, and Ś., an association (‘the applicants’), both established in Poland, brought an action before the Polish courts against U. and Z. (‘the defendants’), established in Germany, alleging an injury to their personality rights resulting from the broadcasting on television in Poland and in other Member States, as well as on the internet, of a series which was coproduced by the defendants. The applicants seek, first, compensation for the non-material harm suffered as a result of the broadcasting of this series in all of those Member States and, second, an order that the defendants apologise on all television channels and websites concerned and to display a corresponding statement prior to any broadcast of the series, regardless of the location of where it is broadcast.

2. Does Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, (2) which establishes special jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, confer international jurisdiction to Polish courts to hear the action in its entirety, beyond just the infringement of personality rights which has taken place in Poland? That is, essentially, the main question posed by the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland), the referring Court.

3. In the present case, the Court is called upon to clarify the scope of the judgments in Shevill (3) and in eDate (4) as regards the broadcasting, on television and on the internet, of content infringing personality rights in the historical context of the Second World War, and relations between Poland and Germany. Those judgments led to much discussion within the Court (5) and in the literature. (6)

II. Legal framework

A. European Union law

1. Regulation No 44/2001

4. Recitals 2, 11, 12 and 15 of Regulation No 44/2001 read as follows:

‘(2) Certain differences between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments hamper the sound operation of the internal market. Provisions to unify the rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and to simplify the formalities with a view to rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of judgments from Member States bound by this regulation are essential.

…

(11) The rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile and jurisdiction must always be available on this ground save in a few well-defined situations in which the subject matter of the litigation or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different linking factor. The domicile of a legal person must be defined autonomously so as to make the common rules more transparent and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction.

(12) In addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should be alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close link between the court and the action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice.

…

(15) In the interests of the harmonious administration of justice it is necessary to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in two Member States. There must be a clear and effective mechanism for resolving cases of lis pendens and related actions and for obviating problems flowing from national differences as to the determination of the time when a case is regarded as pending. For the purposes of this regulation that time should be defined autonomously.’

5. In Chapter I of that regulation, entitled ‘Scope’, Article 1(1) provided as follows:

‘This regulation shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters.’

6. Chapter II of the regulation, entitled ‘Jurisdiction’, contained, inter alia, a Section 1 entitled ‘General provisions’ and a Section 2 entitled ‘Special jurisdiction’.

7. Article 2(1) of the regulation, in Section 1 of Chapter II thereof, provided as follows:

‘Subject to this regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.’

8. Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, in Section 2 of Chapter II thereof, provided as follows:

‘A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued:

…

3. in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’.

2. Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012

9. Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, (7) which appears in Chapter II of that regulation, entitled ‘Jurisdiction’, and in Section 2 of that chapter, entitled ‘Special jurisdiction’, is worded as follows:

‘A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State:

…

(2) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur’.

10. Article 66 of that regulation, which appears in Chapter VI thereof, entitled ‘Transitional provisions’, provides, in paragraph 2 thereof:

‘Notwithstanding Article 80, [Regulation No 44/2001] shall continue to apply to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted, to authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settlements approved or concluded before 10 January 2015 which fall within the scope of that regulation.’

11. In Chapter VIII of Regulation No 1215/2012, entitled ‘Final provisions’, Article 80 provides that Regulation No 44/2001 is repealed.

B. Polish law

1. The Civil Code

12. Article 23 of the Ustawa – Kodeks cywilny (Law establishing the Civil Code) of 23 April 1964, (8) in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the Civil Code’), provides:

‘An individual’s personality rights, in particular those relating to health, freedom, dignity, freedom of conscience, name or pseudonym, image, confidentiality of correspondence, inviolability of the home, scientific and artistic creations, inventions and improvements, shall be protected by civil law, independently of any other protection afforded by other laws.’

13. Article 24(1) and (2) of the Civil Code is drafted as follows:

‘1. An individual whose personality rights are threatened by another’s actions may demand that such actions be ceased, unless they are not unlawful. In the event that an individual’s personality rights are infringed, he or she may also demand that the party committing the infringement take the necessary steps to remedy its consequences and, in particular, make a statement that is appropriate in content and form. In accordance with the rules set out in this code, the holder of personality rights may also claim monetary compensation or the payment of an appropriate sum of money for a particular social cause.

2. Where the infringement of a personality right has caused financial loss, the injured party may demand compensation, in accordance with general principles.’

14. In accordance with Article 43 of the Civil Code:

‘The rules relating to the protection of the personality rights of natural persons shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to legal persons.’

2. The Code of Civil Procedure

15. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 398¹³of the Ustawa – Kodeks postępowania cywilnego (Law establishing the Code of Civil Procedure) of 17 November 1964, (9) in the version applicable to the case in the main proceedings (‘the Code of Civil Procedure’), provide:

‘1. The Supreme Court shall examine an appeal on a point of law within the limits of the form of order sought and the grounds of the appeal; within the limits of the form of order sought it shall nevertheless consider of its own motion whether the proceedings are invalid.

2. In an appeal on a point of law, no new facts or evidence may be put forward and the Supreme Court shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the judgment under appeal is based.’

16. Article 1099 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

‘1. The court shall, of its own motion, consider whether there is a lack of international jurisdiction, at any stage of the proceedings. If it is found that the national courts do not have international jurisdiction, the court shall dismiss the action or application …

2. The lack of international jurisdiction shall render the proceedings invalid.’

III. The dispute in the main proceedings, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and the proceedings before the Court

17. Z.R., who resides in Poland, was a captain in the Polish army. At the age of 16 he was sent to the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp, then he was an active member of the Związek Walki Zbrojnej (the Union of Armed Struggle) and served as a soldier in the [X] military unit (‘the X military unit’). Z.R. took part in operations to rescue and hide individuals belonging to the Jewish community and fought in the Warsaw Uprising. After the Second World War ended he was arrested by the Urząd Bezpieczeństwa (Security and Intelligence Agency) and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for having harboured a member of the Polish special forces. Z.R. never personally encountered any antisemitic conduct on the part of soldiers in the X military unit. He is committed to passing on the memory of the soldiers of this unit as well as commemorating the contribution of Poles to the rescue of the Jewish community.

18. Ś., established in Poland, is an association with legal personality that brings together former soldiers of the X military unit. According to its statutes, its purpose is, inter alia, to defend the honour, reputation and memory of that military unit and its soldiers. Ś. currently has approximately 5 000 members.

19. On 19 November 2013, (10) the applicants brought an action before the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Regional Court, Kraków, Poland) against the defendants, alleging an infringement of their personality rights resulting from certain scenes in a television series (‘the television series’) co-produced by the defendants. In support of their action, the applicants stated that the series was broadcast on Polish television and then later on the other television channels mentioned in their application. They maintained that the television series was available, in full or as excerpts, online. According to the applicants, the series depicts the soldiers of the X military unit as antisemitic and nationalistic and as having collaborated with the Germans in the Holocaust. That is an infringement of their personality rights, including the right to national pride, the right to cultivate a national identity, the right to undistorted history, the right to dignity and reputation and the right to the sign represented by the symbol X.

20. In their action, the applicants sought a form of order, first, requiring the defendants to broadcast an appropriate statement (an apology) on a specified Polish television channel, with the text of the apology to be read out on air; secondly, authorising them, in accordance with the Civil Code, to publish the apology themselves if it were not broadcast within the prescribed period; thirdly, requiring the defendants to publish an appropriate statement (an apology) in German on the two websites concerned; fourthly, requiring the defendants to have an appropriate statement (an apology) published via the other television channels on which the television series had been broadcast, namely the German, Irish, Spanish, Netherlands, Austrian and Norwegian television channels specified, in the language of the country concerned; fifth, requiring the defendants to cease showing the symbol X (a banner containing a graphic element with the national colours arranged horizontally in the centre) in that television series; sixth, requiring the defendants to cease infringing their personality rights, by displaying a specified introductory text before any broadcast of that television series, regardless of the location from which it is broadcast, and, seventh, requiring the defendants jointly and severally to pay Z.R. the sum of 25 000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately EUR 5 750) by way of compensation for the harm caused by the infringement of his personality rights.

21. Before the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Regional Court, Kraków), the defendants raised an objection that the Polish courts lacked jurisdiction, arguing that the German courts had international jurisdiction to rule on the applicants’ claims. By order of 18 July 2016, that court dismissed the objection that the Polish courts lacked jurisdiction. By order of 16 May 2017, the Sąd Apelacyjny w Krakowie (Court of Appeal, Kraków, Poland) dismissed the appeal brought against that order.

22. As to the substance, by judgment of 28 December 2018, the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Regional Court, Kraków), after hearing the evidence, upheld the majority of the applicants’ action, granting both their pecuniary and non-pecuniary claims. Following the appeals brought by both parties to the dispute, by judgment of 23 March 2021, the Sąd Apelacyjny w Krakowie (Court of Appeal, Kraków) varied that judgment and ruled as follows. First, it ordered the defendants to issue an apology the content of which was specified in the operative part of the judgment, requiring the full text thereof to be read out in Polish on the specified Polish television channel and in German on the three German television channels specified, and stipulating the technical conditions applicable to that statement. Secondly, it authorised Ś., in the event that the apology was not published within the prescribed period and in accordance with the abovementioned conditions, to publish the apology itself on the Polish television channel specified. Thirdly, it ordered the defendants to post the abovementioned statement in German on their website, stipulating the technical details of that publication. The court dismissed the remainder of the appeal brought by Ś. and dismissed the appeal brought by Z.R. in its entirety. It also dismissed the appeal brought by the defendants.

23. The appellate court found that the plot of the television series did infringe Z.R.’s personality rights, in particular with regard to his national identity. However, that infringement was not unlawful, having regard to Article 24 of the Civil Code, given the current state of historical knowledge, which was such that the defendants were entitled to deal with the contentious themes of that series in the manner in which they had. The content of that series was therefore within the limits of freedom of artistic expression. By contrast, no harm had been done to Z.R.’s honour, because he had not been individually identified as the person to whom the defamatory scenes of the television series referred. With regard to Ś., the Sąd Apelacyjny w Krakowie (Court of Appeal, Kraków) held that there had been an infringement of its personality rights in so far as concerned its reputation and that of the former members of the X military unit affiliated to that organisation. The court highlighted that the television series ascribed to the members of the military unit explicitly antisemitic traits that were not justified by current historical knowledge, and that this therefore went beyond the limits of freedom of artistic expression.

24. The applicants and the defendants brought appeals on a point of law against the judgment of the Sąd Apelacyjny w Krakowie (Court of Appeal, Kraków), before the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court), the referring court. The defendants, in addition to the other grounds in their appeal on a point of law, argued that the proceedings were invalid on the ground that the case had been heard even though the Polish courts lacked international jurisdiction to hear it, pursuant to Article 1099(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, read in conjunction, inter alia, with Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001.

25. The referring court observes that the present case raises doubts about the interpretation of the concept of ‘the place where the harmful event occurred’, within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001. Indeed, the question arises of whether the case-law established by the Court of Justice in the judgment in eDate (11) can be transposed to a situation in which a potential infringement of personality rights results not from the placing of certain content online, but from the production of a television series that is broadcast on television in a number of Member States. The answer to that question cannot yet, it says, be established, since the Court’s case-law on infringements of personality rights relates solely to content either published in the written press or disseminated on the internet.

26. In that regard, while a cinematographic work broadcast on traditional media, such as television or the cinema, does differ from an online dissemination in that it does not, a priori, presume such universal access to the disseminated content, first of all, the development of streaming technology and of on-demand audio-visual media services militates against any distinction being drawn between the forms of dissemination for the purposes of determining the international jurisdiction of the courts. Indeed, such a work would be available simultaneously, or after a certain lapse of time, also on the internet. Moreover, the broadcasting of a film through traditional channels will often be preceded or accompanied by a publicity and informational campaign conducted on the internet. On the other hand, at present, the localisation of a work on the internet does not completely remove control from the party disseminating that work, given that, thanks to technologies such as geo-blocking and geo-localisation, first, the dissemination can be restricted to a specific territory and, secondly, the content of the work can vary depending on the place from which it is viewed. Furthermore, to accept that an action for damages for the entirety of the harm caused could be brought in the Member State in which the applicant has his or her centre of interests solely in relation to the placing of a television series online would, where there is simultaneous online and offline dissemination, lead to fragmentation of the dispute that would be difficult to reconcile with the requirements of the sound administration of justice.

27. That being so, any distinction based on whether a film has been disseminated by traditional broadcasting means, depriving the courts of a Member State of international jurisdiction to hear an action for damages for the entirety of the harm caused, even though they would have had such jurisdiction if the film had been made available online in that Member State, would not be convincing, and the criterion of the technical form of the dissemination serving as the basis of that distinction would appear to be lacking in relevance and reliability. In this connection, the referring court points out that the solution adopted in the judgment in Shevill, the so-called ‘mosaic’ approach, (12) was arrived at in the specific context of the print media of more than twenty years ago, at a time when the technical possibilities for remote broadcasting and dissemination were fundamentally different from those available today.

28. The referring court states that, if it is, in principle, possible to recognise the full international jurisdiction of the Polish courts in such a context, it would remain necessary to verify whether, in the present case, the conditions established in the judgment in Mittelbayerischer Verlag (13) are satisfied. If, in light of that ruling, it is necessary for the identification of the injured party to be ‘as an individual’, the plot of the television series does not enable either of the applicants to be identified, because it is a work of fiction that makes no direct or indirect reference to real figures contemporary or historical. Still less does the television series make it possible to identify Ś. individually, since it is an association that was formed decades after the Second World War ended. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that the centres of interests of the individuals belonging to a group such as the former soldiers of the X military unit could be located in any Member State of the European Union. Equally, the head office of an association pursuing the same or a similar aim to that of the applicant association could be located in any of those Member States. Nevertheless, by contrast with the facts giving rise to the judgment in Mittelbayerischer Verlag, the television series is based on the conduct of a smaller and more closed group of individuals, namely the soldiers of the X unit, and identifies that unit unequivocally and unambiguously, and Z.R. is one of the surviving members of that group. At present, the group’s members could, in large number, be identified individually, in particular given that they are becoming fewer with the passage of time.

29. An interpretation according to which the individual identification of specific people is necessary in order to be able to bring an action for damages for the entirety of the harm caused would unjustly favour the authors of hurtful, unfairly generalising and stigmatising messages about a group. Indeed, it would be possible to sue such persons for damages for the entirety of the harm caused solely in the place where the harmful event occurred, which is generally the same as the place of residence of the person causing the harm. Such an interpretation would deprive the principle of forum delicti commissi of its value as a real alternative to the general international jurisdiction resulting from Article 2(1) of Regulation No 44/2001.

30. Moreover, following the ‘mosaic’ approach would create a systemic risk of multiple sets of legal proceedings between the same parties in several Member States, and thus increase the risk of divergent judicial decisions, in disregard of recital 15 of regulation No 44/2001. That risk is, according to the referring court, all the more pronounced in the case of infringements of personality rights, on account of the absence of harmonised conflict-of-law rules in this field (14) and given the need to strike a balance between conflicting fundamental values, such as honour and reputation, privacy and freedom of expression, a balance that is liable to vary significantly depending on the applicable substantive law and the sensitivities of the courts in the various Member States.

31. The referring court also observes that any requirement for at least indirect individual identification of an applicant poses a structural weakness, inasmuch as that is frequently a difficult finding to make and, above all, one that is closely connected with the examination of the merits of the case. The referring court states that, at this stage of the proceedings, it cannot examine further the substantive issues relating to the possibility for the applicants to assert their personality rights, and in particular the right to ‘national identity’, the existence of which is still widely debated in Polish civil-law legal theory and has not yet been enshrined in Polish case-law.

32. According to the referring court, in the absence of any individual identification of specific persons, it would be appropriate to consider as an indication of the foreseeability of international jurisdiction not only the location of the centre of interests of the persons concerned, but also the importance of the content of the message that potentially infringes personality rights and the point from which such a message takes on ‘objectively considerable importance’. Accordingly, an overall assessment should be made in order to determine the place where the message targeting a specific group, having regard to the relevant geographic, historical, cultural and social contexts, amongst other things, first, is objectively of considerable importance, second, is likely to provoke the sharpest reactions, including negative reactions, and third, is extremely sensitive and is most likely to be taken up in public debate. The intention of the alleged tortfeasor is not decisive in that regard; what is relevant is whether, in light of the objective evidence drawn from those various contexts, the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that an action for damages for the entirety of the harm potentially caused by the message at issue would be brought in a particular place.

33. The referring court emphasises that, taking into account the factual situation – about which there is a historical consensus – at the beginning of the Second World War, the German occupation of Poland, its course and nature, the number of Polish victims of that war and the tragic demographic, social and political consequences it had for Poland and its people, there would appear to be no doubt that the plot that unfolds in the television series, and the Polish thread thereof in particular, is, given the German perspective adopted and the retrospective nature of the series, objectively of considerable importance in Poland and for the Polish public. That being so, the international jurisdiction of the Polish courts would, because of the fact that the series ascribes certain conduct and characteristics to the soldiers of the X military unit, appear to be consistent with the principle of foreseeability and would satisfy the criterion of a link between the court and the action.

34. The referring court adds that it wonders whether some of the applicants’ non-pecuniary claims might fall within the international jurisdiction of the Polish courts under the ‘mosaic’ approach. Indeed, the applicants in this case are not seeking to have the television series removed from the internet or to prevent it from being broadcast on television; instead, they seek, first, to prevent further infringement of their personality rights, by means of specific information having to be given prior to any broadcast of the series and, secondly, to remedy the consequences of the infringement committed, by means of the making of an appropriate statement not only on the websites concerned, but also on the Polish and German television channels on which the series was broadcast. While an order requiring the defendants to post a statement offering an apology on the websites concerned, regardless of their content, or requiring that certain information be given prior to any broadcast of the television series, regardless of where it is broadcast, might exceed the limits of the jurisdiction of the Polish courts as defined by the ‘mosaic’ approach, the same would not necessarily be true of, for example, an application to secure the issue of an apology on the television channel of a Polish public broadcaster, or that certain information be given prior to any broadcast of the series, provided that it is in Poland.

35. In addition, the referring court considers that, according to an independent interpretation, the harmful event, in the situation under consideration, is not only the production of the television series, but also the broadcasting of that series in a particular Member State. In such circumstances, the courts of the Member State in which the series was broadcast might have international jurisdiction based, primarily, on the finding that the harmful event occurred in that Member State and, merely secondarily, on the fact that the damage occurred in that Member State. Nevertheless, doubts as to whether that reasoning applies in the present case may be explained by the fact that that television series was produced in Germany and the only defendants in the proceedings before the Polish courts are the producers of that series, even though the series was broadcast in Poland by a Polish public broadcaster, which is not a party to the main proceedings.

36. Furthermore, in the present case, the question arises of whether the fact that the defendants granted a third party a full licence to distribute the rights to exploit the television series, thus implicitly agreeing that it could also be broadcast in other Member States, including Poland, could warrant their conduct being treated as action on their part in any Member State in which the series is broadcast with their consent. If that were the case, it would be necessary to consider whether the international jurisdiction of the Polish court that would flow from that could extend to the damage caused by the broadcasting of the series in other Member States.

37. In those circumstances, the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Must Article 5(3) in conjunction with recitals 11 and 12 of Regulation [No 44/2001], be interpreted as meaning that, in a case concerning the infringement of personality rights on the grounds of the content of a cinematographic work, the courts in a Member State in which the film was broadcast, which is different from the Member State in which the film was produced, have international jurisdiction to decide an action seeking:

(a) non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of the infringement of personality rights, including an order for a statement containing an apology to be issued by the television channels that broadcast the film, regardless of the location from which it was broadcast, and also to be displayed on websites, as well as an order to display a similar statement prior to any broadcast of the film, regardless of the location from which it is broadcast, or

(b) pecuniary performance (compensation) aimed at making good the entirety of the damage suffered in connection with the infringement of personality rights, inter alia in connection with the dissemination (broadcasting) of the film in other Member States,

having regard to the fact that:

– the applicants have their centre of interests and place of residence (head office) in that Member State [in which the film was broadcast],

– the applicants assert that their personality rights have been infringed as a result of the way in which the film portrays the soldiers [belonging to the X military unit] from that Member State, whereby one of the applicants is a former soldier of that military unit, and the other is an association of former soldiers of that military unit, the particular aim of which, according to its articles of association, is to defend the memory, historical truth and honour of that unit;

– given the historical, cultural and social context, the content of the film, including the way in which the soldiers of the [X] military unit are portrayed, is objectively of considerable importance for the territory of that Member State [in which the film was broadcast]?

(2) In the event that the first question is answered in the negative, should Article 5(3) in conjunction with recitals 11 and 12 of Regulation [No 44/2001] be interpreted as meaning that, in a case concerning the infringement of personality rights on the grounds of the content of a cinematographic work, the courts in a Member State in which the film was broadcast, which is different from the Member State in which the film was produced, have international jurisdiction to decide an action seeking:

(a) non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of the infringement of personality rights that occurred in connection with the broadcasting of the film in the Member State where the action was brought, including an order for an apology to be issued in this Member State, and also an order to display a corresponding statement prior to any broadcast of the film in that Member State, or

(b) pecuniary performance (compensation) aimed at making good the damage suffered in connection with the infringement of personality rights as a result of the dissemination (broadcasting) of the film in the Member State where the action was brought

having regard, where necessary, to the circumstances referred to in [the first, second and third indents of question 1]?’

38. The referring court requested that the present case be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. By decision of 10 April 2025, the Second Chamber of the Court, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decided not to grant that request.

39. The referring court also requested that the Court determine the present case under the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. By order of the President of the Court of 22 May 2025, (15) that request was rejected. By the same decision, in light of the nature of the case and of the significance of the questions which it raises, the President of the Court decided that the case would be heard as a matter of priority, pursuant to Article 53(3) of the Rules of Procedure.

40. Written observations were submitted to the Court by Z.R. and Ś., U. and Z., the Polish Government and the European Commission.

IV. Analysis

A. The first question referred

41. By its first question, the referring court asks, essentially, whether Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 is to be interpreted as meaning that the Courts of a Member State in which a television series infringing the personality rights of a natural or legal person broadcast on television and disseminated on the internet, which is different from the Member State in which the series was produced, have international jurisdiction to decide on the entirety of an action seeking, first, non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of the infringement of personality rights, including an order requiring a statement containing an apology to be issued via the television channels that broadcast that series in the different Member States concerned and also disseminated on the websites mentioned, and requiring an appropriate statement to be made prior to any broadcast of the series, regardless of where it is broadcast and, secondly, pecuniary performance aimed at making good the damage resulting from the infringement of personality rights, including as a result of broadcasting the film in other Member States.

42. As a preliminary point, I would observe that the applicants brought their action before the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Regional Court, Kraków) on 19 November 2013. Consequently, as the referring court noted, Regulation No 44/2001 remains applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings. Indeed, although Regulation No 44/2001 was repealed by Regulation No 1215/2012 in accordance with Article 80 of the latter, Article 66(2) thereof states that Regulation No 44/2001 continues to apply, inter alia, to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted before 10 January 2015 which fall within the scope of that regulation.

43. In this connection, according to the Court’s consistent case-law, it is apparent from recitals 2 and 11 of Regulation No 44/2001 that that regulation seeks to unify the rules on conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters by way of rules of jurisdiction which are highly predictable. Regulation No 44/2001 thus pursues an objective of legal certainty which consists in strengthening the legal protection of persons established in the European Union, by enabling the applicant easily to identify the court in which he or she may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee before which court he or she may be sued. (16)

44. To that end, the system of common rules on jurisdiction laid down in Chapter II of Regulation No 44/2001 is based on the general rule, set out in Article 2(1), that persons domiciled in a Member State are to be sued in the courts of that State, irrespective of the nationality of the parties. It is only by way of derogation from the general rule attributing jurisdiction to the courts of the defendant’s domicile that Section 2 of Chapter II of that regulation makes provision for certain special jurisdictional rules, such as that laid down in Article 5(3) of the regulation. (17) In accordance with that provision, a person domiciled in a Member State may, in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, be sued in another Member State, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.

45. Moreover, it is clear from recital 34 (18) of Regulation No 1215/2012 that, in so far as that regulation repealed and replaced Regulation No 44/2001, which itself replaced the Brussels Convention, the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of one of those legal instruments also applies to the provisions of the other instruments, whenever those provisions may be regarded as ‘equivalent’. There is such equivalence between Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention, Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 and Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012. (19) Therefore, the Court’s case-law regarding any one of those provisions applies in the same manner to the other provisions.

1. The Court’s case-law on the interpretation of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001

46. It is clear from the Court’s consistent case-law that the rule of special jurisdiction provided for in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted independently and strictly. That rule of special jurisdiction is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred, which justifies conferring jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings. (20) Moreover, the requirement of such a connection should ensure legal certainty and avoid the possibility of the defendant being sued in a court of a Member State which he or she could not reasonably have foreseen, which is important, in particular, in disputes concerning non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation. (21) In matters of tort, delict or quasi-delict, the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur are usually the most appropriate for deciding the case, in particular on grounds of proximity of the dispute and ease of taking evidence. (22)

47. Furthermore, the concept of ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ is intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it, meaning that the defendant may be sued, according to the applicant’s choice, in the courts for either of those places. Those two places could constitute a significant connecting factor from the point of view of jurisdiction, since each of them could, depending on the circumstances, be particularly helpful in relation to the evidence and the conduct of the proceedings. (23)

48. At issue in particular in the present case are the rules relating to personality rights that were initially established in the judgment in Shevill and subsequently adapted to the specific case of the internet in the judgment in eDate, before being further specified in later judgments.

49. In the judgment in Shevill, the Court held that, in the case of a libel by a newspaper article distributed in several Member States, the place of the event giving rise to the damage can only be the place where the publisher of the newspaper in question was established, since that was the place where the harmful event originated, and that the court of that place of establishment must therefore have jurisdiction to hear an action for damages for all the harm caused by the unlawful act. (24) In addition, the plaintiff must have the option of bringing proceedings in the place where the damage occurred. (25) Accordingly, in the case of an international libel through the press, the injury caused to the honour, reputation and good name of a natural or legal person occurs in the places where the publication is distributed, when the victim is known in those places, and it follows that the courts of each Member State in which the defamatory publication was distributed and in which the victim claims to have suffered injury to his or her reputation have jurisdiction to rule on the injury caused in that State. (26) The Court clarified in this connection that, although there are admittedly disadvantages in having different courts ruling on various aspects of the same dispute, the plaintiff always has the option of bringing his or her entire claim before the courts either of the defendant’s domicile or of the place where the publisher of the defamatory publication is established. (27) While, first, the Court held that it is essential to avoid the multiplication of courts having jurisdiction which would heighten the risk of irreconcilable decisions, (28) it then, second, adapted its case-law in the judgment in Shevill in view of the logic of Regulation No 44/2001 (29).

50. Subsequently, the judgment in eDate confirmed the Shevill case-law, holding that the considerations set out in the earlier judgment, mentioned in the preceding point of this Opinion may also be applied to other media and means of communication and may cover a wide range of infringements of personality rights recognised in various legal systems. (30) Notably, the Court added that the placing online of content on a website must be distinguished from the regional distribution of media such as printed matter in that it is intended, in principle, to ensure the ubiquity of that content, which may be consulted instantly by an unlimited number of internet users throughout the world, irrespective of any intention on the part of the person who placed it online in regard to its consultation beyond that person’s Member State of establishment and outside of that person’s control and that, therefore, the connecting criteria must be adapted in such a way that a person who has suffered an infringement of a personality right by means of the internet may bring an action in one forum in respect of all of the damage caused, depending on the place in which the damage caused in the European Union by that infringement occurred. Given that the impact which material placed online is liable to have on an individual’s personality rights might best be assessed by the court of the place where the alleged victim has his or her centre of interests, the attribution of jurisdiction to that court corresponds to the objective of the sound administration of justice. (31) The place where a person has his or her centre of interests corresponds in general to his or her habitual residence. (32) It thus follows from this judgment that a person who considers that his or her rights have been infringed has the option of bringing an action for liability, in respect of all the damage caused, either before the courts of the Member State in which the publisher of that content is established or before the courts of the Member State in which the centre of his or her interests is based. That person may also bring an action before the courts of each Member State in the territory of which content placed online is or has been accessible, those courts having jurisdiction only in respect of the damage caused in the territory of the Member State of the court seised. (33)

2. The principles drawn from the Court’s case-law in the context of the case in the main proceedings

51. By its first question, the referring court, asks, in the first place, whether the eDate case-law, falling within the context of the internet and based on the centre of interests of the person in question, may be transposed to a situation in which a possible infringement of personality rights results from the production of a television series and its broadcast in several Member States. The referring court thus asks whether the case in the main proceedings must be examined solely in the light of the eDate case-law or also in the light of the Shevill case-law.

52. The referring court puts forward a number of arguments in support of the view that only the eDate case-law is applicable and that, following that precedent, international jurisdiction lies with the Polish courts to hear the applicant’s action for damages, in respect of all the harm caused. It points out that the solution adopted in the judgment in Shevill, concerning the interpretation of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, was arrived at in the context of the print media of more than twenty years ago, at a time when the technical possibilities for remote broadcasting and dissemination were fundamentally different from those currently available, and that the development of streaming technology and of on-demand audio-visual media services militate against any distinction being drawn between forms of dissemination for the purposes of determining the international jurisdiction of the courts. Moreover, thanks to technologies such as geo-blocking and geo-localisation, one the one hand, the dissemination can be restricted to a specific territory and, on the other hand, the content of the work can vary depending on the place from which it is viewed. Furthermore, to limit an action for damages for the entirety of the harm caused in the Member State in which the applicant has his or her centre of interests solely in relation to the placing of a film online, where there is simultaneous online and offline dissemination of the content at issue, would lead to unreasonable fragmentation of the dispute.

53. In this connection, I would point out that the Shevill case-law has been consistently confirmed by the Court, including in recent judgments. (34) That case-law should therefore be taken into account, and not solely the eDate case-law, in order to determine whether, in so far as the case in the main proceedings is concerned, the Polish courts have international jurisdiction to adjudicate on the entirety of the damage caused. Moreover, the Court’s interpretation of EU law must relate to the time of the facts in the main proceedings, which is to say, prior to 2015. Any subsequent technological developments do not, therefore, appear relevant to the present case.

54. As is clear from the judgment in eDate, the placing online of content on a website must be distinguished from the regional distribution of media because it is intended, in principle, to ensure the ubiquity of that content, which can be consulted anywhere in the world, outside of the control of the person who placed it online. (35) I observe that the broadcasting of a series on television (36) fulfils neither of those conditions. First, such broadcasting, whatever the means used, such as digital terrestrial television (DTT), cable or satellite, is in principle regional, meaning that it is restricted to the geographic zone of television signal reception, primarily meaning a national zone (local, regional, or national television channel). In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the television series was broadcast in a number of countries by ‘national’ television channels, namely Polish, German, Irish, Spanish, Netherlands, Austrian and Norwegian television channels. Secondly, such broadcasting is not outside of the control of the copyright holders themselves, which is to say the producers, which are able to define the framework, in particular the geographical framework, for the broadcasting of their work. In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the defendants are the exclusive holders of the copyright in the television series and that they partially transferred to B. the right to exploit the series in certain countries and also granted B. an exclusive twelve-year licence to distribute the rights to exploit the series in other countries.

55. Consequently, the broadcasting of a series on television cannot be subject solely to the eDate case-law. To that effect, the Court held in the judgment in eDate that the considerations set out in the judgment in Shevill, in relation to a press article, may also be applied to other media and means of communication. (37) In paragraph 44 of the judgment in eDate, the Court referred, in this connection, to the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, (38) who considered that the Shevill case-law had a wide scope and was not confined exclusively to the print media, its scope also encompassing other means of communication such as information broadcast via television or radio.

56. The mere fact that a series is simultaneously broadcast on a television channel and disseminated on the internet does not alter that interpretation. Indeed, according to the Court’s case-law, the rule of special jurisdiction laid down in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted independently and strictly. (39) Since dissemination on the internet is significantly different from television broadcasting, there is no reason to extend to television the solution adopted in relation to the internet where the conditions established in the judgment in eDate are not fulfilled. Furthermore, such an approach would lead to uncertainty, since it cannot be assumed that all content broadcast on television will necessarily be accompanied by accessibility on the internet, that being a matter for the producers to decide, which would lead to a case-by-case analysis to verify the broadcasting conditions of that content, which could also evolve over time.

57. As regards geo-blocking and geo-localisation in the context of dissemination on the internet, those technologies might lead to the view that the condition of the ubiquitous nature of the content established in the judgment in eDate is not fulfilled, with the consequence that it is necessary to apply the Shevill case-law in such a situation, not that the Shevill case-law does not apply to a television series.

58. As for fragmentation of the dispute, that argument was taken into account in the judgment in Shevill. Indeed, the Court held that, while there were admittedly disadvantages in having different courts ruling on various aspects of the same dispute, the plaintiff always had the option of bringing his entire claim before the courts either of the defendant’s domicile or of the place where the publisher of the defamatory publication was established. (40) I recall in this connection that, according to the general rule set out in Article 2(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, persons domiciled in a Member State are to be sued in the courts of that Member State. The rule of special jurisdiction, laid down in Article 5(3) of that regulation, is purely a derogation, one that cannot become a general rule, except to challenge rules of jurisdiction defined by that regulation.

59. Consequently, in the context of the case in the main proceedings, a distinction should be drawn between the broadcasting of the series on television, which is subject to the Shevill case-law, and its dissemination on the internet, which is covered by the eDate case-law, which permits the person concerned to bring an action for liability, in respect of the entirety of the harm caused, before the courts of the Member State in which his or her centre of interests is located.

60. In the second place, as regards the eDate case-law, the referring court wonders whether, in this instance, the conditions laid down in the judgment in Mittelbayerischer Verlag (41) are fulfilled. In that judgment, the Court held that the mere fact that a person belongs to a vast identifiable group is not such as to enable the objectives of foreseeability of the rules of jurisdiction and legal certainty to be achieved, since the centres of interests of the members of such a group may potentially be located in any Member State of the European Union. (42)

61. In the present case, the referring court points out, in particular, that the plot of the television series does not enable either of the applicants to be identified, because it is a work of fiction that makes no direct or indirect reference to real figures contemporary or historical. Still less does the television series make it possible to identify Ś. individually, since it is an association that was formed decades after the Second World War ended. Nevertheless, the referring court considers that the television series recounts the conduct of a smaller, closed group of individuals, namely the soldiers of the X unit, and identifies that unit unequivocally and unambiguously, and that Z.R. is one of the surviving members of that group.

62. However, like the Commission, I consider that, as regards Z.R., the criterion of indirect identification ‘as an individual’ means that the individual can be recognised by reason of certain particular characteristics that clearly belong to a specific individual. (43) Moreover, that interpretation echoes the Shevill case-law, according to which it is necessary that the victim be known. (44) Accordingly, the Court acknowledged the existence of individual identification in situations in which the persons whose personality rights were allegedly infringed were directly referred to in content placed online on the internet, being mentioned by name. (45) In the present case, however, the characters in the television series are fictional, which means that Z.R. is not identified as an individual, even indirectly. Moreover, as is clear from the order for reference, Ś. currently has approximately 5 000 members, which, to my mind, is a vast group, and consequently the mere fact that a person belongs to that group is not such as to enable the objectives of foreseeability of the rules of jurisdiction and legal certainty to be achieved. (46) In any event, I would repeat that the Court’s assessment must relate to the time of the facts of the main proceedings, when the survivors of the X military formation were perhaps more numerous than they currently are.

63. More generally, if the criterion of individual identification were interpreted broadly, a person who disseminates a message injurious to personality rights would not be in a position to know the centres of interests of the persons who are the subject of that message, which could be located in various Member States. (47) Moreover, that interpretation would be likely to lead to contradictory judgments from the courts seised in various Member States. That interpretation would thus excite the same criticisms that the referring court levels at the ‘mosaic’ approach, in that it would create a systemic risk of multiple sets of legal proceedings between the same parties in several Member States.

64. According to the referring court, in the absence of individual identification, the forum delicti commissi is deprived of its value as a real alternative to the general international jurisdiction resulting from Article 2(1) of Regulation No 44/2001. The referring court therefore seems to adopt the premiss that the rules of international jurisdiction should be favourable to the applicant. However, first, according to the Court’s case-law, the option for a person to bring an action for damages, in respect of all the harm caused, before the courts of the Member State in which the centre of interests is based is justified in the interests of the sound administration of justice and not specifically for the purposes of protecting the applicant. (48) Secondly, following the Shevill case-law, the applicant always has the option of bringing his or her entire claim before one jurisdiction, namely the courts of the place where the producers of the television series are established, which is to say in Germany.

65. As regards Ś., it is clear from the Court’s case-law that the matter of whether the applicant is a natural or legal person is not conclusive. (49) Consequently, a legal person that claims that its personality rights have been infringed by the posting of incorrect information concerning it on the internet and by a failure to remove comments concerning it can bring an action for rectification of that information, removal of those comments and compensation in respect of all the damage sustained before the courts of the Member State in which its centre of interests is located. (50) However, in the present case, as is clear from the order for reference, since the association Ś. was formed decades after the Second World War ended, the television series contains no information relating to it and does not enable it to be identified, directly or indirectly. The mere fact that the association’s purpose is, inter alia, to defend the honour, reputation and memory of that military unit and its soldiers cannot suffice to identify it individually, for the purposes of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001. (51) Moreover, as was noted by the referring court, the headquarters of an association pursuing the same or a similar aim to that of Ś. may be found in any Member State of the European Union, which poses the same disadvantages as those resulting from the Shevill case-law.

66. In the third place, the referring court observes that any requirement for at least indirect individual identification of the applicant poses a structural weakness, inasmuch as that is frequently a difficult finding to make and, above all, one that is closely connected with the examination of the merits of the case. However, the Court has held that, at the stage at which jurisdiction is determined, the court seised does not examine either the admissibility or the substance of the application in the light of national law, but identifies only those points of connection with the State in which that court is sitting that support its claim to jurisdiction under that provision. Although the aim of legal certainty requires the national court seised to be able readily to decide whether it has jurisdiction, without having to rule on the substance of the case, a requirement to conduct, already at that stage of the proceedings, a comprehensive taking of evidence in relation to the facts relevant both to the question of jurisdiction and to the substance, risks prejudicing the assessment of the substance. The Court has also pointed out that both the objective of the sound administration of justice and respect for the independence of the national court in the exercise of its functions require the national court seised to be able to examine its international jurisdiction in the light of all of the information available to it, including, where appropriate, that provided by the defendant. (52)

67. Consequently, it is for the referring court to give a decision on the basis of the evidence which it has. In the case that it is not apparent from that evidence that the applicants can be identified ‘as individuals’, that court cannot rule on the entirety of the damage coming from the broadcasting of the television series on the internet. In the present case, in light of the information provided by that court, it follows from the Court’s case-law that the television series does not enable the applicants to be identified, either directly or indirectly. Moreover, as regards the referring court’s view that the rules of international jurisdiction cannot anticipate the future decision on the substance of the case, assessing whether it is possible to identify the applicants individually in no way requires a decision to be given on the substance of the case, which involves determining whether an infringement of personality rights has been committed.

68. In the fourth place, according to the referring court, where the content that potentially infringes personality rights does not make it possible to identify specific persons individually, it is appropriate to consider as an indication of the foreseeability of international jurisdiction not only the location of the centres of interests of the persons concerned, but also the content of the message that potentially infringes personality rights and the point from which such a message, in its historic, cultural and social context, takes on ‘objectively considerable importance’ in the territory of the Member State where it was broadcast. That court takes the view that such an approach, which attaches importance to the subject matter of the dispute and its importance in a particular place, rather than to the persons who might take legal action and the place where those persons have their centre of interests, seems consistent with a proper understanding of the principle of the foreseeability of international jurisdiction.

69. Nevertheless, according to the Court’s case-law, although the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 may refer to the place where the damage occurred, that concept can be understood only as indicating the place where the event giving rise to the damage, and entailing tortious, delictual or quasi-delictual liability, directly produced its harmful effects upon the person who is the immediate victim of that event. (53) Consequently, in the present case, the international jurisdiction of a Court involves assessing the place where the damage took place, specifically as concerns the applicant, a natural or legal person, whose personality rights have allegedly been infringed. Retaining the approach argued for by the referring court would be tantamount to creating a new ground of jurisdiction for national courts, detached from the alleged victim and which could be unfavourable to him or her. As the Commission argued, following that approach could lead to a former soldier with his or her centre of interests in Poland being able to take an action before Polish courts for the entirety of the damage suffered, taking into account the objectively considerable significance of the television series in Poland, whereas a former soldier with his or her centre of interests in a different Member State would not be able to do that in that State. (54)

70. Having regard to all of the foregoing, I suggest that the answer to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling should be that Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 is to be interpreted as meaning that the courts of a Member State in which a series infringing a natural or legal person’s personality rights was broadcast on television and on the internet, which is different from the Member State in which that series was produced, do not have, as regards the television, international jurisdiction to decide on the entirety of an action seeking, first, non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of the infringement of personality rights, including an order requiring a statement containing an apology to be issued via the television channels that broadcast that series in the different Member States concerned, and requiring an appropriate statement to be made prior to any broadcast of that series, regardless of the location from which it is broadcast, and, secondly, pecuniary performance aimed at making good the damage resulting from the infringement of personality rights, including as a result of the broadcasting of the series in other Member States. As regards the internet, the courts of the Member State in which the centre of interests of the natural or legal person is located have jurisdiction to hear such a case, in its entirety, only if that contested content contains objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, that person as an individual.

B. The second question referred for a preliminary ruling

71. By its second question, the referring court asks, essentially, whether, in the event that the first question is answered in the negative, Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 is to be interpreted as meaning that the courts of a Member State in which a series infringing personality rights was broadcast on television, which is different from the Member State in which that series was produced, have international jurisdiction to decide an action against the producer seeking, first, non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of the infringement of personality rights, including an order for an apology to be issued via the television channels on which that series was broadcast, and also to make an appropriate statement prior to any broadcast of that series in that Member State, or, secondly, pecuniary performance to make good the damage suffered resulting from the broadcasting of the television series in that Member State.

72. It is clear from the Court’s case-law referred to by the referring court that, in the light of the ubiquitous nature of the information and content placed online on a website and the fact that the scope of their distribution is, in principle, universal, an application for the rectification or removal of content placed on the internet is a single and indivisible application and can, consequently, only be made before a court with jurisdiction to rule on the entirety of an application for compensation for damage, and not before a court that does not have jurisdiction to do so. (55)

73. The referring court points out that the applicants are not seeking to have the television series removed from the internet or to prevent it from being broadcast on television, but wish, first, to prevent further infringements of personality rights, by means of specific information having to be given prior to any broadcast of the series and, secondly, to remedy the consequences of the infringement committed, by means of the publication of an appropriate statement not only on the websites concerned, but also on the Polish and German television channels on which the series was broadcast. However, according to that court, an application for the removal of certain content from the internet would be indivisible if the applicants were seeking the complete removal of the content infringing personality rights.

74. As I pointed out in response to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling, the eDate case-law, which is included in the case-law cited in paragraph 72 of the present opinion, does not apply to content broadcast on television, which is covered by the Shevill case-law. It flows from the latter case-law that, in accordance with the ‘mosaic’ approach, the court of a Member State in which the infringement of personality rights was committed has the jurisdiction to rule on the harm caused in that State. If national law permits it, that court is able to make an order to the defendant that specific information be given prior to the broadcast of a series, so long as that that publication takes place only on national territory. In the present case, the referring court highlights that, in accordance with Article 24 of the Civil Code, non-pecuniary claims can be structured in such a way that their assessment comes under the jurisdiction of a court which is limited to assessing the consequences of the infringement which took place on the territory of the State in which that court is sitting.

75. As regards dissemination on the internet, I agree with the line of argument of the referring court that, if that broadcast follows the Shevill case-law, in the absence of individual identification of the applicants, the seised court, in so far as national legislation permits, can order that specific information relating to the contested content be published in another medium of which the zone of influence is limited to the territory of the Member State concerned, such as written press or national television, or that that information only relate to the effects of the infringement of personality rights on the territory of that State.

76. Moreover, the referring court considers that the harmful event is not only limited to the production of the television series, but also includes the broadcasting of that series in a particular Member State. That approach could mean that the courts of the Member State in which the series was broadcast could have international jurisdiction primarily because of the occurrence of the harmful event on its territory, and, only on a secondary basis, because of the materialisation of damage in that State. However, I note that in the judgment in Shevill, the Court held that, in the case of a libel by a newspaper article distributed in several Member States, the place of the event giving rise to the damage can only be the place where the publisher of the newspaper in question was established, since that was the place where the harmful event originated. (56)

77. In the present case, the referring court states that the television series was produced in Germany and that the only defendants before the Polish court were the producers of that series, which had been broadcast in Poland by a Polish public broadcaster which was not a party to the proceedings. In those circumstances, the place where the producers of the series were established must be considered as being the place where the harmful event originated. Furthermore, as mentioned by that court, according to the case-law of the Court, in circumstances in which only one of several supposed perpetrators of alleged damage is sued in a court within whose jurisdiction he or she has not acted, it cannot be considered that the causal event occurred within the jurisdiction of that court for the purposes of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001. (57)

78. Furthermore, it is apparent from the order for reference that the defendants are the exclusive owners of the copyright on the television series, that they partially transferred the distribution rights to B. to exploit the series in certain territories and have granted it an exclusive licence to distribute the exploitation rights in that series in other territories. (58) Such a contract, for which the order for reference does not indicate that it was concluded in Poland, cannot modify the place where the damage originated in that it cannot be equated with an action of the defendants in any country in which that series was broadcast with their consent. Therefore, in accordance with Article 5(3), the Polish courts do not have international jurisdiction to rule on the entirety of the request presented by the applicants solely on the ground of the broadcasting of that series in Poland.

79. That being so, I suggest that the answer to the second question should be that Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 is to be interpreted as meaning that the courts of a Member State in which a series infringing personality rights was broadcast on television, which is different from the Member State in which that series was produced, have international jurisdiction to decide an action against the producer seeking, first, non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of the infringement of personality rights, including an order for an apology to be issued on the television channels on which that series was broadcast and also to make an appropriate statement prior to any broadcast of the series in that Member State, in so far as national law permits it, and, second, pecuniary performance to make good the damage resulting from the dissemination of the television series in that Member State.

80. I should add that, like the referring court, I consider that the ‘mosaic’ approach creates difficulties for legal or natural persons alleging an infringement of their personality rights. (59) In that respect, the referring court’s arguments concerning the risk of fragmentation of the dispute, such as might lead to contradictory judgments from the courts seised in various Member States, are far from irrelevant. Nevertheless, the Court’s current case-law is well settled and a broad interpretation of a derogating provision, Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 in this case, could create more problems than it solves. Accordingly, I take the view that, in the context of the present case, there is no reason to call that case-law into question.

V. Conclusion

81. In light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice answer the questions referred by the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) for a preliminary ruling as follows:

(1) Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters

is to be interpreted as meaning that the courts of a Member State in which a series infringing the personality rights of a natural or legal person was broadcast on television and online, which is different from the Member State in which the series was produced, do not have, in relation to television, international jurisdiction to decide on the entirety of an action seeking, first, non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the consequences of the infringement of personality rights, including an order requiring a statement containing an apology to be issued via the television channels that broadcast the series in other Member States concerned, and requiring an appropriate statement to be made prior to any broadcast of that series, regardless of the location from which it is broadcast, and, secondly, pecuniary performance aimed at making good all of the harm resulting from the infringement of personality rights, including as a result of the broadcasting of the series in other Member States. As regards the internet, the courts of the Member State in which is located the centre of interests of the natural or legal person have jurisdiction to hear, in its entirety, such an action only if the content at issue contains objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, that person as an individual.

(2) Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001

is to be interpreted as meaning that, the courts of a Member State in which a series infringing personality rights was broadcast on television, which is different from the Member State in which that series was produced, have international jurisdiction to decide an action brought against the producer seeking, first, non-pecuniary performance aimed at remedying the effects of the infringement of personality rights, including an order for an apology to be issued via the television channels on which the series was broadcast, and also to make an appropriate statement prior to any broadcast of the television series in that Member State, in so far as national law permits it, and, second, pecuniary performance to make good the non-material harm resulting from the broadcast of the television series in that Member State.

1 Original language: French.

i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.

2 Council Regulation of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).

3 Judgment of 7 March 1995, Shevill and Others (C‑68/93, ‘the judgment in Shevill’ or ‘the Shevill case-law’, EU:C:1995:61).

4 Judgment of 25 October 2011, eDate Advertising and Others (C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, ‘the judgment in eDate’ or ‘the eDate case-law’, EU:C:2011:685).

5 See, in favour of maintaining the Shevill case-law, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Joined Cases eDate Advertising and Others (C‑509/09 and C‑161, EU:C:2011:192, paragraphs 33 to 41) and Opinion of Advocate General Hogan in Gtflix Tv (C‑251/20/20, EU:C:2021:745, paragraphs 42 to 94). See, by contrast, Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan, C‑194/16, EU:C:2017:554, paragraphs 73 to 90).

6 See, in particular, Lutzi, T., ‘Shevill is dead, long live Shevill!’, Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 134, Sweet & Maxwell, 2018, pp. 208 to 213.

7 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).

8 Dz. U. of 1964, No 16, item 93.

9 Dz. U. of 1964, No 43, item 296.

10 While the order for reference gives this date as 19 November 2023, it is clear from the case file submitted to the Court that the action was in fact brought on 19 November 2013.

11 According to this case-law, where there is an alleged infringement of personality rights by content published online on a website, the person who considers themself wronged is able to refer an action for damages, for all harm caused, to the courts of the Member State where they have their centre of interests.

12 According to that approach, the courts of each Member State in which a defamatory publication was distributed and in which the victim claims to have suffered injury to his or her reputation has jurisdiction to rule on the harm caused in that Member State. See, more specifically, point 49 of this Opinion.

13 Judgment of 17 June 2021 (C‑800/19, ‘the judgment in ‘Mittelbayerischer Verlag’, EU:C:2021:489, paragraph 46), in which the Court that ruled courts of the place in which the centre of interests of a person claiming that his or her personality rights have been infringed by content published online on a website is situated have jurisdiction to hear, in respect of the entirety of the alleged damage, an action for damages brought by that person only if that content contains objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, that person as an individual.

14 The referring court refers in this connection to Article 1(2)(g) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 40).

15 Order in Idziski (C‑232/25, EU:C:2025:389).

16 Judgment of 9 December 2021, HRVATSKE ŠUME (C‑242/20, EU:C:2021:985, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

17 See judgment of 14 July 2016, Granarolo (C‑196/15, EU:C:2016:559, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).

18 That recital states that ‘continuity between the Convention [of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36); “the Brussels Convention”], [Regulation No 44/2001] and this regulation should be ensured, and transitional provisions should be laid down to that end. The same need for continuity applies as regards the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union of the Brussels Convention and of the regulations replacing it.’

19 See, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, ÖFAB (C‑147/12, EU:C:2013:490, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited), and of 10 July 2025, Chmieka (C‑99/24, EU:C:2025:563, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

20 See, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 2025, Stichting Right to Consumer Justice and Stichting App Stores Claims (C‑34/24, ‘the judgment in Stichting Right to Consumer Justice’, EU:C:2025:93, paragraphs 44 and 45 and the case-law cited).

21 See, to that effect, the judgment of 21 December 2021, Gtflix Tv (C‑251/20, ‘the judgment in Gtflix), EU:C:2021:1036, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

22 See, to that effect, the judgment in Stichting Right to Consumer Justice (paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

23 See, to that effect, the judgment in Stichting Right to Consumer Justice (paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

24 See the judgment in Shevill (paragraphs 24 and 25).

25 See the judgment in Shevill (paragraph 27).

26 See the judgment in Shevill (paragraphs 29 and 30).

27 See the judgment in Shevill (paragraph 32).

28 See judgment of 11 January 1990, Dumez France and Tracoba (C‑220/88, EU:C:1990:8, paragraph 18)

29 In his Opinion in Joined Cases eDate Advertising and Others (C‑509/09 and C0161/10, EU:C:2011:192, paragraph 38), Advocate General Cruz Villalón highlighted that the solution derived from the judgment in Shevill prevents the special jurisdiction in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 from becoming equivalent to general jurisdiction, which takes precedence over the jurisdiction of the defendant’s domicile and also avoids the forum actoris.

30 See the judgment in eDate (paragraph 44).

31 See the judgment in eDate (paragraphs 45 and 48).

32 See the judgment in eDate (paragraph 49).

33 See the judgment in eDate (paragraph 52).

34 See, inter alia, the judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of 17 October 2017, Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan (C‑194/16, ‘the judgment in Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan’, EU:C:2017:766, paragraph 31), and the judgment in Gtflix (paragraph 29).

35 See point 50 of this Opinion.

36 In the words of Article 1(1)(e) of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (OJ 2010 L 95, p. 1), ‘for the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply: “television broadcasting” or “television broadcast” (i.e. a linear audiovisual media service) means an audiovisual media service provided by a media service provider for simultaneous viewing of programmes on the basis of a programme schedule’

37 See point 50 of this Opinion.

38 Opinion in Joined Cases eDate Advertising and Others (C‑509/09 and C‑161/10, EU:C:2011:192, point 39).

39 See point 46 of this Opinion

40 See point 49 of this Opinion.

41 See, in relation to those conditions, point 28 of this Opinion.

42 See judgment in Mittelbayerischer Verlag (paragraph 43).

43 In his Opinion in Mittelbayerischer Verlag (C‑800/19, EU:C:2021:124, points 51 to 57) Advocate General Bobek had suggested that the Court adopt a broader approach, which was not, however, adopted in the judgment in that case.

44 Judgment in Shevill (paragraph 29).

45 See judgment in Mittelbayerischer Verlag (paragraph 35).

46 See case-law cited in point 60 of this Opinion.

47 See, to that effect, judgment in Mittelbayerischer Verlag (paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

48 See, to that effect, judgment in Mittelbayerischer Verlag (paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

49 See judgment in Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan (paragraph 38).

50 See, to that effect, judgment in Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan (paragraph 44).

51 It flows from the strict requirement of individual identification of the person alleging an infringement of their personality rights that case-law relating to competition law, according to which an association which is responsible for protecting the collective interests of certain undertakings is, as a rule, entitled to bring an action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU only if the undertakings which it represents or some of those undertakings themselves have locus standi (see judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited), cannot be transposed by analogy.

52 See, to that effect, judgment of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken (C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85, paragraphs 41 to 34 and the case-law cited).

53 See, to that effect, judgment of 11 January 1990, Dumez France and Tracoba (C‑220/88, EU:C:1990:8, paragraph 20).

54 I add that the circumstances giving rise to the judgment in Mittelbayerischer Verlag concerned the use of the expression ‘Polish extermination camp of Treblinka’ which, in the historic, cultural and social context of Poland, has an objectively considerable significance. However, the Court ruled that the applicant had to be individually identified, which was not the case. Consequently, the objectively considerable significance of a case in a given Member State is not sufficient to affirm international jurisdiction to the courts of that Member State in relation to all of the harm caused.

55 See judgments in Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan (paragraph 48) and in Gtflix (paragraph 32).

56 See point 49 of this Opinion.

57 See judgment of 3 April 2014, Hi Hotel HCF (C‑387/12, EU:C:2014:215, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

58 See point 54 of this Opinion

59 See, as concerns those difficulties, Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan (C‑194/16, EU:C:2017:554).

Opinion of Advocate General Rantos delivered on 5 February 2026.###

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