ECLI:EU:T:2026:276

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JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, sitting with five Judges)

22 April 2026 (*)

( Competition – Agreements, decisions and concerted practices – Abuse of dominant position – Energy drinks sector – Inspection ordered by the Commission – Article 20(4) Regulation No 1/2003 – Inspection continued at the Commission’s premises – Commission refusal to reimburse part of the costs resulting from that inspection – Concept of ‘additional costs incurred solely as a result of the continuation of an inspection at the Commission’s premises’ )

In Case T‑682/24,

Red Bull GmbH, established in Fuschl am See (Austria),

Red Bull France SASU, established in Paris (France),

Red Bull Nederland BV, established in Soesterberg (Netherlands),

represented by H. Wollmann, F. Urlesberger, J. Schindler, F. Dethmers and A. Visontai-Knor, lawyers,

applicants,

European Commission, represented by T. Franchoo, M. Jakobs and I. Naglis, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, sitting with five Judges),

composed of E. Buttigieg, President, J. Schwarcz, M. Kancheva (Rapporteur), E. Tichy-Fisslberger and F. Bestagno, Judges,

Registrar: S. Jund, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 20 January 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By their action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicants, Red Bull GmbH and its subsidiaries Red Bull France SASU and Red Bull Nederland BV, seek annulment of the decision of the European Commission of 23 October 2024 (Case AT.40819), by which the Commission refused in part to reimburse the additional costs which the applicants claim to have incurred as a result of an inspection ordered on the basis of Article 20(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1) being continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels (Belgium) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 Red Bull France SASU and Red Bull Nederland BV are subsidiaries of Red Bull GmbH. Those three companies form part of the Red Bull group (‘Red Bull’) and operate in the sector of the production of energy drinks, which they market in the European Union and the European Economic Area (EEA), in particular under the trade mark of the same name as that group.

The inspection at issue

3 By decision of 8 March 2023, the Commission ordered, on the basis of Article 20(4) of Regulation No 1/2003, an inspection which took place from 20 to 24 March 2023 at the applicants’ premises in Fuschl am See (Austria), Paris (France) and Amsterdam (Netherlands).

4 At the meeting closing the inspection at the applicants’ premises, which was held on 24 March 2023 in Fuschl am See, the Commission informed Red Bull’s representatives that the inspection would be continued at its premises in Brussels, in order to examine the documents copied and the additional data to be provided subsequently by the applicants.

5 The inspection continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels from 14 to 20 June 2023 and from 29 August to 29 September 2023.

Correspondence between the parties prior to the adoption of the contested decision

6 By letter of 25 January 2024, the Commission informed the applicants of the possibility of submitting a reasoned request for reimbursement of the additional costs incurred by the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels. A document entitled ‘Reimbursement of additional costs in case of a continued inspection at the Commission’s premises’ was annexed to that letter.

7 On 25 April 2024, the applicants submitted to the Commission a request for reimbursement of the additional costs resulting from the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels. By that request, the applicants claimed reimbursement of the travel and accommodation expenses of their employees and their lawyers who were present in Brussels, daily subsistence allowances paid to those employees, as well as the entirety of their lawyers’ fees, including those invoiced by a second law firm, which was instructed in addition to the Austrian law firm which generally represented them.

8 Significant correspondence was then exchanged between the applicants and the Commission until the contested decision was adopted.

Contested decision

9 On 23 October 2024, the Commission adopted the contested decision.

10 In the contested decision, the Commission first of all reiterated its position, referring to some of its earlier letters, namely that it was required to reimburse only the additional costs borne by the inspected undertaking solely as a result of an inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises, therefore excluding costs which would have been incurred in any event if the inspection had continued at that undertaking’s premises, such as lawyers’ fees. The Commission added that that position followed the approach in the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571, paragraph 90).

11 As regards, more specifically, lawyers’ fees, the Commission pointed out, referring to some of its earlier letters, that, during the March 2023 inspection at its premises, Red Bull had continually called on lawyers to assist it, such that the lawyers’ fees incurred in connection with the inspection being continued in Brussels were not to be regarded as additional costs which could be reimbursed. The Commission also stated that the applicants had, in some of their letters, themselves acknowledged that if the inspection had continued at their premises, they would have called upon lawyers. Therefore, the Commission decided not to reimburse the lawyers’ fees claimed by Red Bull.

12 Lastly, as regards the other costs, the Commission stated that it agreed to reimburse all the costs claimed based on the amounts set out by Red Bull in the Excel table annexed to one of its earlier letters.

Forms of order sought

13 The applicants claim that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision;

– order the Commission to reimburse in full the costs claimed;

– order the Commission to pay the costs.

14 The Commission contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the application;

– order the applicants to pay the costs.

Law

15 It is appropriate to examine, first of all, the second head of claim, seeking to have the Court order the Commission to reimburse in full the costs claimed by the applicants, and then the first head of claim, seeking the annulment of the contested decision.

The second head of claim, seeking to have the Commission be ordered to reimburse in full the costs claimed by the applicants

16 By their second head of claim, the applicants are requesting the Court to order the Commission to reimburse in full the costs which they are claiming.

17 Clearly such a request is, in essence, seeking to have the Court issue a direction to the Commission requiring it to reimburse to the applicants the entirety of the costs claimed by them.

18 In that regard, it is sufficient to recall that, when exercising judicial review of legality under Article 263 TFEU, the EU Courts have no jurisdiction to issue directions to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (see judgment of 14 March 2024, D & A Pharma v Commission and EMA, C‑291/22 P, EU:C:2024:228, paragraph 160 and the case-law cited).

19 Therefore, the second head of claim must be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The first head of claim, seeking the annulment of the contested decision

20 In support of the application for annulment of the contested decision, the applicants raise four pleas in law, alleging (i) that the Commission’s refusal to reimburse in full the costs claimed by the applicants on account of the continued inspection at the Commission’s premises in Brussels allegedly being disproportionate is unlawful, (ii) a failure to state reasons, (iii) an error of law in the interpretation of the concept of ‘additional costs’ arising from the continuation of the inspection at the Commission’s premises in Brussels, as referred to in the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571), and an error in the assessment of the facts which resulted in the refusal to provide reimbursement in full of lawyers’ fees, and (iv) an infringement of their rights of defence.

21 As a preliminary point, it must be stated that, in the contested decision, while the Commission refused to reimburse to the applicants the lawyers’ fees claimed, it nevertheless agreed to pay all the other expenses for which reimbursement was requested in the Excel table submitted by Red Bull, namely the travel and accommodation expenses of the employees and lawyers who were present in Brussels, as well as the daily subsistence allowances which the Red Bull group had to pay to those employees (see paragraph 12 above). It follows that the contested decision is, at least in part, favourable to the applicants.

22 In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far as that person has an interest in the annulment of the contested act. Such an interest presupposes that the annulment of the act is likely, in itself, to have legal consequences and that the action may thus, by its result, procure a benefit for the party that brought it. The interest in bringing proceedings is an essential and fundamental prerequisite for any legal proceedings (see judgment of 15 June 2023, Shindler and Others v Council, C‑501/21 P, EU:C:2023:480, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

23 When questioned at the hearing as to their interest in bringing proceedings in relation to the first head of claim, the applicants first asserted, in essence, that that head of claim was to be interpreted as the applicants seeking annulment of the contested decision only in so far as the Commission had refused to reimburse to them the lawyers’ fees claimed before correcting that assertion, stating that they were, on the contrary, seeking annulment of the contested decision in its entirety, including in so far as the Commission had agreed to reimburse them the costs other than lawyers’ fees.

24 Having regard to the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that it must raise of its own motion the question whether the applicants have an interest in bringing proceedings in relation to their application for annulment of the contested decision in its entirety. Clearly the annulment of the contested decision, in so far as the Commission agreed to reimburse the applicants in respect of the costs other than lawyers’ fees (see paragraph 21 above) cannot procure for them a benefit likely to provide a basis for an interest in bringing proceedings as referred to in the case-law cited in paragraph 22 above.

25 It follows that the action must be dismissed as being inadmissible in part to the extent that it is seeking the annulment of the contested decision in so far as the Commission agreed to reimburse the applicants for costs other than lawyers’ fees.

26 As regards the remainder of the first head of claim, the Court will examine, first of all, the fourth plea relied on by the applicants, followed by the second plea and, lastly, the first and third pleas.

The fourth plea: breach of the rights of the defence

27 The applicants raise three complaints in support of the fourth plea.

28 In the first place, the applicants submit that an undertaking is free to organise its defence itself. They state that it is apparent from Article 6(3)(c) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her own choosing. From that, the applicants infer that it is not for the Commission to decide what an undertaking needs or does not need for its defence. They claim that that they were forced to instruct a second law firm because of the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels. According to the applicants, by adopting a restrictive approach to its obligation to reimburse additional costs, the Commission determined the nature and extent of the means of defence which it is for the undertaking concerned to choose. By refusing to reimburse to them the lawyers’ fees incurred because of the inspection having continued in Brussels, the Commission therefore restricted their freedom to choose the means of defence which they regard as necessary and appropriate.

29 In the second place, the applicants maintain that ‘EU budgetary law’ is not applicable to them, with the result that the Commission could not refer to that law in order to determine whether the defence costs for which they claimed reimbursement were reasonable.

30 In the third place, the applicants complain that the Commission applied allegedly disproportionate requirements to the taking of evidence in relation to the determination of the additional costs incurred because of the inspection having continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels. In order to prove that four Red Bull employees who were present in Brussels at the time of the continuation of the inspection, but who did not go to the Commission’s premises, had actually taken part in the inspection, the Commission required to be provided with sworn statements in which those persons had to confirm that they had taken part in the inspection. Having regard to the potential criminal implications of untruthful declarations, the applicants criticise the Commission for having required such a high standard of proof.

31 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments and maintains that the first complaint is unfounded, the second complaint is ineffective and the third complaint is ineffective and inadmissible.

32 As regards, in the first place, the alleged infringement of the applicants’ freedom to choose their means of defence, it must be stated that the applicants were in no way prevented, in practice, from freely organising their defence when the inspection was continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels.

33 It is apparent from the documents adduced by the applicants in the present proceedings that they chose to obtain assistance, in Brussels, from (i) a lawyer from the Austrian law firm which generally assisted them, who was already present at the time of the inspection at the applicants’ premises in Fuschl am See, (ii) one or more lawyers from a second law firm, depending on the period in question, and (iii) on certain days, a number of their employees. Furthermore, it must be stated that, contrary to the applicants’ allegations, they were in no way obliged to instruct a second law firm to represent them when the inspection continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels. It was the applicants themselves who decided to instruct that firm, for their own specific reasons.

34 It follows from the foregoing that, contrary to the applicants’ allegations, the applicants were able freely to organise their defence without the Commission interfering in such organisation, which is sufficient to reject the first complaint of the fourth plea as being unfounded.

35 As regards, in the second place, the Commission allegedly having applied ‘EU budgetary law’ to the applicants, it should be noted at the outset that, even though the applicants refer in their application to the ‘defence costs’ which they incurred, that complaint does not in fact relate to the lawyers’ fees in respect of which reimbursement was refused in the contested decision. It is apparent from the correspondence between the parties before the contested decision was adopted, which the applicants adduced in the present proceedings, that, while the Commission referred to ‘EU budgetary law’ or even applied it, reimbursement was accepted only in relation to travel expenses, accommodation expenses and flat-rate allowances, but not in relation to lawyers’ fees.

36 It follows that the present complaint is, in essence, directed against the contested decision in so far as it agrees to reimburse the applicants for costs other than lawyers’ fees, with the result that it is inadmissible, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 21 to 25 above.

37 As regards, in the third place, the Commission allegedly having imposed on the applicants disproportionate requirements for the taking of evidence in relation to the determination of the costs incurred, it should be stated at the outset that that complaint also does not relate to lawyers’ fees, in respect of which reimbursement was refused in the contested decision. The sworn statements allegedly required by the Commission were adduced in order to prove that four Red Bull employees who were not present at the Commission’s premises were in Brussels for the purposes of taking part in the continuation of the inspection and, consequently, were adduced in order that the travel, accommodation and flat-rate allowances incurred by the applicants in that respect could be reimbursed.

38 It follows that the present complaint is directed against the contested decision in so far as it is agreed in that decision to reimburse the applicants for costs other than lawyers’ fees, with the result that it is inadmissible, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 21 to 25 above.

39 In any event, it is clear from the documents adduced by the applicants in the present proceedings that the applicant themselves suggested that the Commission adduce the statements at issue. Therefore, the applicants cannot criticise the Commission for having imposed disproportionate requirements on them for the taking of evidence. Moreover, the fact that the Commission refused to reimburse the travel and accommodation expenses of the four Red Bull employees who were not at its premises simply on the basis of invoices, and the fact that the Commission required additional evidence that their presence in Brussels was in fact due to the inspection being continued is also not open to criticism and does not constitute a disproportionate requirement to adduce proof, contrary to the applicants’ assertions. It follows that the present complaint is, in any event, unfounded.

40 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as being unfounded in part and inadmissible in part.

Second plea: infringement of the obligation to state reasons

41 In support of their second plea, which alleges that the Commission infringed its obligation to state reasons, the applicants rely, in essence, on two complaints.

42 In the first place, the applicants criticise the Commission for having referred, in the contested decision, to the correspondence with them before the decision was adopted. According to the applicants, all the considerations which led the Commission to reject in part their request for reimbursement ought to have been set out clearly in the actual text of the contested decision, in order to enable them to understand the reasons supporting the Commission’s conclusions and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review. Since, in their view, that did not occur, the applicants maintain that the Commission infringed the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU.

43 In the second place, the applicants submit that the counter-scenario used by the Commission as a comparison to calculate the additional costs which could be reimbursed, in which the Commission proceeded on the assumption that the applicants would have relied on lawyers continuously if the inspection had continued at their premises rather than at the Commission’s premises in Brussels, is incomprehensible and does not constitute a sufficient statement of reasons. In order to establish that counter-scenario, the Commission relied on a sentence chosen selectively from a letter from the applicants, in which the applicants indicated that if the inspection had continued at their premises, they would have relied on lawyers only from time to time.

44 The applicants add that the counter-scenario used by the Commission is imprecise. The Commission did not explain why it chose that counter-scenario from the multiple possible counter-scenarios, and also did not define it sufficiently. The Commission also did not clarify the detailed rules for the continuation of such an inspection, namely its duration, the number of staff assigned or the working hours. In the absence of such indications, the Commission could not be certain that it had used the ‘fair’ counter-scenario to calculate the additional costs which could be reimbursed and could not challenge the counter-scenario chosen by the applicants to determine the costs they had incurred. In any event, according to the applicants, the counter-scenario used by the Commission is only hypothetical. The applicants also argue that the Commission chose the counter-scenario most advantageous to it.

45 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments.

46 In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required by the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the measure at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measures in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court having jurisdiction to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to specify all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 23 January 2025, Neos v Ryanair and Commission, C‑490/23 P, EU:C:2025:32, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

47 It should also be recalled that the obligation to give reasons for decisions is an essential procedural requirement which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well-founded, which is concerned with the substantive legality of the contested measure (judgments of 2 April 1998, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, C‑367/95 P, EU:C:1998:154, paragraph 67, and of 7 March 2002, Italy v Commission, C‑310/99, EU:C:2002:143, paragraph 48). The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, the latter will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect (judgment of 10 July 2008, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, C‑413/06 P, EU:C:2008:392, paragraph 181).

48 In the present case, it is apparent from the contested decision that, by means of that document, the Commission ruled on the applicants’ request for reimbursement of the additional costs they had incurred by the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels.

49 More specifically, it should be observed that, in the introductory part of the contested decision, the Commission recalls its practice whereby, as it had already stated in its earlier correspondence with the applicants, it reimburses the additional costs for the inspected undertaking incurred solely as a result of the continuation of the inspection at its premises. The Commission also explains in that part of the decision that it therefore does not reimburse the costs which such an undertaking would have incurred in any event if the inspection had continued at its own premises and states that it believes that was so for lawyers’ fees.

50 Applying those principles to the applicants’ request for reimbursement, the Commission then explains, in paragraph 1 of the contested decision entitled ‘Lawyer’s fees’, that it decided not to reimburse the lawyers’ fees in respect of which Red Bull claimed reimbursement in full for the following two reasons: in the first place, because Red Bull was continuously assisted by lawyers during the inspection carried out at its premises in March 2023, with the result that the lawyers’ fees were not additional costs attributable to the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels and, in the second place, because Red Bull had admitted, in its earlier correspondence, that, if the inspection had continued at its premises, it would have called upon lawyers.

51 As regards the other costs, the Commission indicates, in paragraph 2 of the contested decision entitled ‘Other costs’, that it agrees to reimburse the costs claimed by the applicants, as agreed in the correspondence with the applicants.

52 Lastly, the contested decision includes, in paragraph 3 entitled ‘Summary’, a table summarising the various costs for which reimbursement was claimed by the applicants, indicating next to each of the four types of expense, namely travel costs, accommodation expenses, daily subsistence allowances and lawyers’ fees, the amount which the Commission agrees to reimburse.

53 It follows that the contested decision discloses in a clear, detailed and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the Commission in such a way as to enable the applicants to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its power of review within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 46 above, with the result that it is sufficiently reasoned and therefore complies with the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

54 In addition, it must be stated that it follows from the present action that the applicants were able to challenge the merits of the contested decision, and more particularly the refusal to reimburse to them the entirety of the lawyers’ fees claimed, which demonstrates that, even if they do not agree with them, they were able to understand the reasons underlying the Commission’s conclusions adopted in the contested decision.

55 No other argument put forward by the applicants is capable of calling into question the adequacy of the statement of reasons for the contested decision.

56 As regards, in the first place, the complaint based on the references made by the Commission in the contested decision to correspondence before the decision was adopted, it must be stated that, contrary to the applicants’ allegations, all the considerations which led the Commission to reject in part their request for reimbursement are set out clearly in the actual text of the contested decision, as is apparent from paragraphs 49 and 50 above.

57 In addition, the correspondence with the applicants prior to the adoption of the contested decision constitutes the context of that decision. In accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 46 above, the correspondence may be taken into account in order to determine whether the Commission complied, in the present case, with its obligation to state reasons.

58 Therefore, the applicants cannot criticise the Commission for having referred, in the contested decision, to the earlier correspondence with them.

59 As regards, in the second place, the complaint alleging that the counter-scenario used by the Commission as a comparison in order to calculate the additional costs which could be reimbursed was incomprehensible and insufficiently reasoned, it must be stated that it is apparent from the contested decision that that counter-scenario is described as corresponding to the hypothesis that the inspection continued at the applicants’ premises.

60 In the contested decision, the Commission explains that it decided to reimburse to the applicants the costs incurred solely as a result of the continuation of the inspection at its premises in Brussels, but not the costs which they would have incurred in any event if the inspection had continued at their own premises. As regards the lawyers’ fees, the Commission states that those fees do not constitute such additional costs, since they would, in any event, have been incurred if the inspection had continued at the applicants’ premises.

61 It follows that, contrary to the applicants’ allegations, the description of that counter-scenario in the contested decision is sufficiently comprehensible and reasoned.

62 In that regard, it is also important to note that such a counter-scenario is, by definition, hypothetical, which the applicants themselves acknowledge, since, in fact, the inspection continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels. Therefore, the Commission cannot be required to define the ‘fair’ counter-scenario or to provide more concrete details regarding that scenario in the contested decision.

63 Lastly, it must be stated that the question of what the most plausible or ‘fair’ counter-scenario would be forms part of the merits of the contested decision and is therefore irrelevant in the context of a plea alleging a failure to state reasons, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 47 above. Therefore, the applicants’ arguments seeking to demonstrate that they could have comprehensively overseen the inspection internally if it had continued at their premises or that the counter-scenario used by the Commission was incorrect or was the most advantageous counter-scenario for that institution are, since they concern the merits of the contested decision, and not its statement of reasons, ineffective in the context of the present plea.

64 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the second plea must be rejected, there being no need to adopt the measure of organisation of procedure under Article 89(3)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court requested by the applicants.

The first plea: the refusal to reimburse the additional costs was unlawful because the continuation of the inspection at the Commission’s premises in Brussels was disproportionate

65 The applicants submit that, by deciding to continue the inspection at its premises in Brussels, the Commission infringed the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 5(4) TEU. According to the applicants, continuing the inspection in Brussels neither contributed to the effectiveness of the inspection nor prevented excessive interference with the operations of Red Bull. Moreover, such continuation was prolonged excessively and was made necessary only by the fact that the Commission requested data en masse, without any prior examination of its relevance or prior sorting, of a total, and disproportionate, volume of 16.6 terabytes. According to the applicants, the continuation of the inspection at the Commission’s premises in Brussels was disproportionate in itself and gave rise to the high costs for which they claim reimbursement. From that, the applicants infer that the Commission’s refusal to reimburse the entirety of the costs claimed is therefore unlawful.

66 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments and contends that the first ground of appeal is inadmissible.

67 In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the principle of proportionality requires that acts of EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary to attain the end in view; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (judgments of 8 March 2007, France Télécom v Commission, T‑339/04, EU:T:2007:80, paragraph 117, and of 25 November 2014, Orange v Commission, T‑402/13, EU:T:2014:991, paragraph 22).

68 In the present case, it must be stated that the arguments put forward by the applicants in support of their first plea are directed against the Commission’s decision to continue the inspection at its premises, and not against the contested decision in the present proceedings.

69 Therefore, while the applicants complain that the continuation of the inspection at the Commission’s premises in Brussels was, in their view, disproportionate, in no way do they explain how the contested decision itself is disproportionate. In other words, even though the first plea is based on an alleged infringement of the principle of proportionality, the arguments put forward in that regard by the applicants do not seek to demonstrate that the contested decision exceeds the limits of what was appropriate and necessary to attain the objective pursued by its adoption, namely to determine the additional costs incurred solely as a result of the continuation of the inspection at the Commission’s premises in Brussels, reimbursement of which by the Commission would therefore justified.

70 Therefore, the first plea must be rejected as being ineffective, there being no need to rule on whether it is admissible, which the Commission disputes, or to adopt, under Article 89(3)(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the measure of organisation of procedure requested by the applicants.

The third ground of appeal: an error of law in the interpretation of the concept of ‘additional costs’ within the meaning of the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P), and an error of assessment

71 The third ground of appeal alleges, in essence, that the Commission erred in law in its interpretation of the concept of ‘additional costs’ within the meaning of paragraph 90 of the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571), and made an error of assessment which resulted in the Commission refusing to reimburse in full the lawyers’ fees claimed by the applicants.

72 As regards the alleged error of law, the applicants submit that the Commission’s position – that lawyers’ fees do not, in principle, constitute ‘additional costs’ within the meaning of paragraph 90 of the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571), on the ground that they would also have been incurred if the inspection had continued at the applicants’ premises – is unfounded. In the applicants’ view, such an interpretation of the concept of ‘additional costs’ is too restrictive and is at odds with the judgment referred to above.

73 As regards the alleged error of assessment, the applicants explain that continuing the inspection at the Commission’s premises caused them considerable difficulties, since they do not have a place of business in Brussels and they were unable to send their key staff there for a long period. Given those difficulties, the applicants were forced to instruct an additional law firm which had offices there, in addition to the Austrian law firm which generally assists them. Using those additional lawyers resulted in additional costs which could have been avoided if the inspection had continued at the applicants’ premises, since, in that case, such an inspection would not have lasted for so long. According to the applicants, the fees charged by those lawyers therefore constitute, in their entirety, ‘additional costs’.

74 Indeed, the applicants argue that if the inspection had continued at their premises, they would have had at their disposal the necessary multilingual staff with sufficient legal training in order to oversee it, who they were unable to call upon in Brussels. Those members of staff could have been assigned to the inspection on a rota basis, such that the applicants would have been able to have full internal oversight of the inspection and they would have needed to call on lawyers only on an ad hoc basis.

75 The applicants add lastly, in the alternative, that if their line of argument is not successful, it will in any event be necessary to find that the costs incurred in instructing the second law firm constitute ‘additional costs’, since the second law firm would not have been instructed if the inspection had continued at their premises.

76 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments.

77 In that regard, it is apparent from the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571) that the possibility for the Commission to continue its examination of the books and other records related to the business of an undertaking pursuant to Article 20(2)(b) of Regulation No 1/2003 at its premises in Brussels is subject to such continuation not giving rise to any infringement of the rights of the defence and not constituting an additional encroachment on the rights of the undertakings concerned compared with that inherent in an inspection at their premises. Such an encroachment would have to be found if the continuation of that examination at the Commission’s premises in Brussels gave rise to additional costs for the undertaking under inspection solely as a result of that continuation. It follows that, where that continuation is capable of giving rise to such additional costs, the Commission may undertake that continuation only where it agrees to reimburse those costs when the undertaking concerned presents to it a duly reasoned request to that effect.

78 In the present case, the question which arises is whether, by refusing to reimburse to the applicants the entirety of the lawyers’ fees incurred by them for the services carried out in connection with the inspection carried out at the Commission’s premises in Brussels, the Commission made an error of law or an error of assessment, as the applicants maintain.

79 As regards the alleged error of law, it must be recalled that, in the contested decision, read in the light of the earlier correspondence with the applicants, the Commission interpreted the concept of ‘additional costs’ within the meaning of paragraph 90 of the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571), as not including, in principle, lawyers’ fees related to the continuation of the inspection at its premises, since, in its view, they are costs which the undertaking concerned would have incurred in any event if the inspection had continued at its premises.

80 In that regard, it is apparent from paragraph 90 of the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571) (see paragraph 77 above), that two criteria must be met in order for certain costs to be able to be classified as ‘additional costs incurred solely as a result of [the continuation of an inspection at the Commission’s premises in Brussels]’.

81 First, it is necessary to ascertain whether the costs for which reimbursement is claimed by the applicants may be classified as ‘additional’ in the light of that case-law.

82 It must be inferred from the use of the adjective ‘additional’ that the costs referred to are those additional to the earlier detailed and factual costs incurred in respect of the inspection at the premises of the undertaking concerned. Those costs referred to must therefore be costs which are additional to the costs incurred in a situation where an inspection takes place at the premises of the undertaking concerned.

83 In addition, contrary to the applicants’ assertions, if the Court of Justice intended to refer to the Commission being required to reimburse the entirety of the costs incurred by the undertaking as a result of the decision to continue the inspection at its premises, it would not have used, in paragraph 90 of the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571), the adjective ‘additional’, which presupposes that what is involved are costs other than the costs which the undertaking would have incurred had the inspection continued at its premises.

84 It should also be noted that the adjective ‘additional’ used by the Court does not require proof that the costs incurred are disproportionate or excessive, but solely that such costs are additional to the costs which would have been incurred if the inspection had continued at the premises of the undertaking concerned.

85 Second, it is necessary to ascertain whether the costs for which the applicants claim reimbursement may be classified as ‘arising solely from’ the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises, once again in the light of the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571).

86 It must be inferred from the use of the expression ‘solely as a result of’ in paragraph 90 of the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571), that an exclusive causal link is required between (i) the costs referred to and (ii) the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises, which, moreover, the applicants acknowledge in the reply.

87 It follows that the costs referred to are those which are incurred solely because of the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises, with the result that the costs which would in any event have been incurred had the inspection continued at the premises of the undertaking concerned are excluded.

88 As regards, more specifically, lawyers’ fees, it follows from the foregoing that only ‘additional’ fees, which were not incurred in a situation where an inspection takes place at the premises of the undertaking concerned and which are exclusively related to the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises may be classified as ‘additional costs’ within the meaning of paragraph 90 of the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571).

89 In that regard, it must be held that the choice of calling upon lawyers during an inspection carried out by the Commission under Article 20(4) of Regulation No 1/2003 forms part of the defence strategy of the undertaking concerned, since that provision does not require it to be assisted by lawyers (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 September 2012, Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission, T‑357/06, EU:T:2012:488, paragraph 226). It follows that if the undertaking concerned decides to instruct lawyers to assist it during such an inspection, the fact that the inspection continues at the Commission’s premises does not alter the costs relating to lawyers’ fees. For such an undertaking which had decided to be assisted by lawyers during such an inspection, if the Commission decides to continue that inspection at its premises, the lawyers’ fees associated with such continuation do not generally constitute additional costs, since the services to be provided by the lawyers are, in principle, the same, regardless of where the inspection takes place. Since those services would also have been provided if the inspection had continued at the premises of the undertaking concerned, there is, in principle, no exclusive causal link between the lawyers’ fees relating to that inspection at the undertaking’s premises and the continuation of that inspection at the Commission’s premises.

90 In the present case, since the applicants chose to be assisted by lawyers during the inspection carried out at their premises, it has not been established that there is an exclusive causal link between the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises in Brussels and the fees of the lawyers who assisted them during that inspection.

91 Therefore, in the light of the defence strategy put in place by the applicants, the Commission’s interpretation of the concept of ‘additional costs’ – as, in principle, excluding lawyers’ fees charged for services carried out in connection with an inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises, since those fees would also have been incurred if the inspection had continued at the applicants’ premises – is neither unfounded nor contrary to the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571), contrary to the applicants’ allegations.

92 Furthermore, it must be stated that, contrary to the applicants’ assertions, the Commission’s interpretation of the concept of ‘additional costs’ is also not restrictive, in particular in the light of the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571).

93 It is apparent from the contested decision, read in the light of the correspondence exchanged with the applicants, that the Commission does not categorically rule out the possibility that certain lawyers’ fees could be regarded as ‘additional costs’. The Commission merely requires the undertaking concerned to demonstrate that the lawyers’ services covered by the fees for which it seeks reimbursement would not have been provided if the inspection had continued at the premises of that undertaking, which is not unreasonable. It is apparent from paragraph 90 of the judgment of 16 July 2020, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission (C‑606/18 P, EU:C:2020:571), that the Commission is to reimburse the additional costs where the undertaking concerned makes a ‘duly reasoned’ request to that effect.

94 It follows from the foregoing that the applicants have failed to demonstrate that the Commission’s interpretation, in the contested decision, of the concept of ‘additional costs’ constituted an error of law.

95 As regards the alleged error of assessment, it should be noted at the outset that the applicants requested the Commission, during the procedure which preceded the adoption of the contested decision, only to reimburse in full the lawyers’ fees incurred in connection with the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises, relying on the scenario of full internal oversight of the inspection if that inspection had continued at their premises by their multilingual staff who were sufficiently legally trained. Since, according to the applicants, no lawyers’ fees would have been incurred in that scenario as a result of that full in-house oversight, they maintain that the lawyers’ fees relating to the continuation of the inspection at the Commission’s premises in Brussels constitute, in their entirety, ‘additional costs’, which the Commission must reimburse.

96 In that regard, first of all, it must be stated that the scenario of full internal oversight of the inspection is not how the inspection at the applicants’ premises, to which the applicants were subject in March 2023, unfolded, where they were continuously assisted by lawyers in Fuschl am See, Amsterdam and Paris. In that context, as the Commission correctly points out, the applicants have not validly demonstrated that, having been assisted by lawyers throughout the duration of the inspection at their premises, they would have been in a position to organise themselves so as to be able to ensure complete internal oversight of the inspection if it had continued at their premises.

97 Next, while the applicants maintain that their employees would have been able independently to oversee the inspection if it had continued at their premises, they provide no explanation whatsoever for why they did not rely on those employees actually to oversee the inspection at the Commission’s premises in Brussels, whether in person or remotely, in particular on the basis of a rota. It must be stated that, although some of the applicants’ employees were present in Brussels, they did not even go to the Commission’s premises. That fact tends to confirm the Commission’s position that full internal oversight of the inspection was implausible, such that the applicants would have requested lawyers to be present if that inspection had continued at their premises.

98 Lastly, it should also be noted that the applicants themselves admitted on a number of occasions, both in the correspondence with the Commission prior to the adoption of the contested decision and in the context of the present proceedings, that they would have called upon lawyers, at least from time to time, if the inspection had continued at their premises. The applicants cannot therefore, without contradicting themselves, claim that they would have ensured full oversight of the inspection, completely doing without the assistance of lawyers, if that inspection had continued at their premises.

99 Therefore, the Commission made no error of assessment when it concluded in the contested decision, read in the light of the earlier correspondence with the applicants, that the premiss of full internal oversight of the inspection if the inspection had continued at the applicants’ premises, on which the applicants rely in order to claim reimbursement in full of the lawyers’ fees related to the inspection being continued at the Commission’s premises, was implausible and rejected it. It should also be observed that the Commission has never claimed that the lawyers would have provided the same degree of assistance throughout the inspection if it had continued at the applicants’ premises. The Commission merely concluded, correctly, that, in such a situation, the applicants would have continued, at least to some extent, to be assisted by lawyers.

100 Finally, as regards the argument put forward in the alternative by the applicants that the costs incurred as a result of instructing the second law firm ought, at the very least, to be regarded as ‘additional costs’, it must be stated that, during the procedure which preceded the adoption of the contested decision, the applicants never attempted to demonstrate that only certain lawyers’ fees could be reimbursed and never claimed reimbursement in part of such fees. That was so, even though the Commission had expressly asked them by letter, in order to assess whether the lawyers’ fees for which reimbursement was claimed could in part be regarded as ‘additional costs’, to provide ‘a full description of the lawyers’ fees, including the names of the lawyers, the hours worked, the hourly rate applicable, a description of the advice provided and a statement of reasons why such advice was provided solely for the purpose of continuing the inspection and not for each on-site inspection’. The applicants, which have always maintained their position seeking solely reimbursement in full of the lawyers’ fees claimed, have never provided the Commission with such a description.

101 In those circumstances, the Commission cannot be criticised for having failed to grant the applicants, in the contested decision, reimbursement in part of their lawyers’ fees, such as those incurred to instruct a second law firm based in Brussels.

102 It should also be noted that, during the present proceedings, in response to both written and oral questions from the Court, the applicants expressly confirmed that they were seeking solely reimbursement in full of the lawyers’ fees claimed from the Commission and could not be satisfied with reimbursement of those fees in part.

103 It follows from the foregoing that the argument put forward in the alternative by the applicants, whereby they claim that some of the lawyers’ fees which they incurred ought, at the very least, to be regarded as ‘additional costs’, must be held to be unfounded and must be rejected, there being no need to rule on whether that argument is admissible, which the Commission disputes.

104 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the third plea must be rejected and the action in its entirety must be dismissed.

Costs

105 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. As the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.

On those grounds,

LE TRIBUNAL (First Chamber, sitting with five Judges)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders Red Bull GmbH, Red Bull France SASU and Red Bull Nederland BV to pay the costs.

Buttigieg

Schwarcz

Kancheva

Tichy-Fisslberger

Bestagno

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 22 April 2026.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: German.

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