Order of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2026.##Article 155 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Failure to adjudicate – None.#Case C-111/24 P-OST.

Provisional text

ORDER OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)

6 October 2026 (*)

( Article 155 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Failure to adjudicate – None )

In Case C‑111/24 P‑OST,

APPLICATION under Article 155 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, made on 23 April 2026,

German Khan, residing in London (United Kingdom), represented by A. Bass and T. Marembert, avocats,

applicant,

the other party to the proceedings being:

Council of the European Union, represented by P. Pecheux and J. Rurarz, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

THE COURT (Grand Chamber)

composed of K. Lenaerts, President, C. Lycourgos, I. Jarukaitis, M.L. Arastey Sahún (Rapporteur), I. Ziemele, J. Passer, O. Spineanu-Matei, M. Condinanzi and F. Schalin, Presidents of Chambers, E. Regan, N. Piçarra, A. Kumin, B. Smulders, S. Gervasoni and N. Fenger, Judges,

Advocate General: L. Medina,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

after hearing the Advocate General,

makes the following

Order

1        By document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 23 April 2026, the applicant, under Article 155(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, applicable to appeal proceedings in accordance with Article 190(1) of those rules, filed an application seeking to have remedied two alleged failures by the Court to adjudicate in the judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245).

2        By that judgment, the Court of Justice dismissed, inter alia, the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 29 November 2023, Khan v Council (T‑333/22, ‘the judgment of the General Court’, EU:T:2023:758), by which the General Court had dismissed his action seeking, in essence, the annulment of several acts of the Council of the European Union which imposed and then maintained restrictive measures against him following the military aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

3        In support of that appeal, the applicant, as is apparent from paragraph 68 of the judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245), which is not contested in the present case, had submitted four heads of claim seeking that the Court of Justice, first, set aside the judgment of the General Court, second, dispose of the action on the merits and annul the abovementioned acts of the Council, third, in the alternative, set aside the judgment of the General Court and refer the case back to the General Court and, fourth, in any event, order the Council to pay the costs.

4        In support of those heads of claim, the applicant had put forward eight grounds of appeal, which were rejected in paragraphs 142, 202, 258, 277, 383, 409 and 441, respectively, of the judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245).

5        In support of his application based on Article 155 of the Rules of Procedure, the applicant submits, in the first place, that, by dealing, in paragraphs 187 to 192 of the judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245), with the first part of his fourth ground of appeal, alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty by the General Court, together with the complaints raised by another appellant in a separate appeal, and by failing, in that context, to respond to that part on the ground that the abovementioned paragraphs 187 to 192 responded only to the complaints of the other appellant, the Court of Justice failed to adjudicate on the head of claim seeking that it set aside the judgment of the General Court for infringement of the principle of legal certainty.

6        In the second place, the applicant submits that, in paragraphs 408 and 409 of the judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245), the Court of Justice failed to respond to the second part of his eighth ground of appeal, in accordance with which the General Court infringed the principle of equality of arms. Accordingly, the Court of Justice failed to adjudicate on the head of claim seeking to have the judgment of the General Court set aside for infringement of that principle.

7        Considering that the applicant’s request must be rejected as inadmissible on the ground that it criticises the Court of Justice for having failed to adjudicate not on a head of claim but on arguments raised in his appeal, the Council disputes the merits of the applicant’s arguments.

8        Article 155(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 190(1) of those rules, provides that, if the Court has failed to adjudicate on a specific head of claim or on costs, any party wishing to rely on that may, within a month after service of the decision in question, apply to the Court to supplement its decision.

9        It follows from that provision that a failure to adjudicate stems from the Court’s breach of its obligation to adjudicate on one or more heads of claim submitted to it, including those relating to costs. On the other hand, an application under that provision cannot be brought before the Court in order to allege that the Court failed to adjudicate on one or more arguments raised before it (see, to that effect, order of 19 March 2026, Giuliani v EUIPO, C‑365/25 P-OST, EU:C:2026:236, paragraph 5 and the case-law cited).

10      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, as is apparent from Article 168(1)(d) and (e) of the Rules of Procedure, the ‘form of order sought’, on the one hand, and the ‘pleas in law and legal arguments relied on’, on the other, are distinct elements of an appeal.

11      By virtue of Article 169(1) and Article 170(1) of those rules, an appeal is to seek to have set aside, in whole or in part, the decision of the General Court as set out in the operative part of that decision and, in the event that the appeal is declared well founded, to seek the same form of order, in whole or in part, as that sought at first instance, and is not to seek a different form of order. As regards the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on, they must, in accordance with Article 169(2) of those rules, identify precisely those points in the grounds of the decision of the General Court which are contested, as well as the errors of law allegedly vitiating the decision of the General Court which are the subject of the appeal and which justify upholding the heads of claim relying on those pleas and arguments (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 June 2015, Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraphs 56 and 57 and the case-law cited, and of 16 February 2017, Brandconcern v EUIPO and Scooters India, C‑577/14 P, EU:C:2017:122, paragraph 37).

12      Notwithstanding that distinction, it must be held that, if the effectiveness of Article 155(1) of the Rules of Procedure is not to be excessively limited, the Court of Justice fails to adjudicate on a head of claim seeking the annulment, in whole or in part, of the decision of the General Court, where the Court of Justice fails to adjudicate on a plea in law that, had it been upheld, would have made it possible to obtain such annulment.

13      As regards, in the first place, the complaint alleging failure to adjudicate on the part of the Court of Justice, as summarised in paragraph 5 of the present order, it must be understood that, by his arguments put forward in support of that complaint, the applicant complains that the Court of Justice failed to adjudicate on the head of claim seeking to have the judgment of the General Court set aside, on the ground that, in the judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245), the Court of Justice failed to adjudicate on the first part of the fourth ground of appeal, which, had it been upheld, would have enabled the judgment of the General Court to be set aside, with the result that, in the light of the criterion laid down in paragraph 12 of the present order, that complaint is admissible.

14      As to the substance, the single argument underlying the first part of the applicant’s fourth ground of appeal was summarised by the Court of Justice in paragraph 154 of the judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245), and the Court responded to it, in paragraph 202 of that judgment, by rejecting it, after having carried out, in paragraphs 190 to 192 of that judgment, an analysis, in the light of the principle of legal certainty, of paragraph 91 of the judgment of the General Court, criticised by the applicant in that first part.

15      In that regard, the fact that the Court of Justice, in the abovementioned paragraphs 190 to 192, also examined another judgment of the General Court concerning another appellant is irrelevant. Similarly, the fact that the applicant disputes the manner in which the Court of Justice responded to the first part of his fourth ground of appeal cannot be regarded as a failure to adjudicate on a specific head of claim, within the meaning of Article 155(1) of the Rules of Procedure.

16      Therefore, the Court of Justice did not fail to adjudicate on the head of claim seeking to have the judgment of the General Court set aside on the ground that the Court of Justice failed to adjudicate on the first part of the applicant’s fourth ground of appeal, alleging infringement of the principle of legal certainty. It follows that the first complaint concerning an alleged failure to adjudicate is unfounded.

17      As regards, in the second place, the complaint alleging a failure to adjudicate on the part of the Court of Justice, as summarised in paragraph 6 of the present order, it must be understood that, by his arguments put forward in support of that complaint, the applicant complains that, in the judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245), the Court of Justice failed to adjudicate on the second part of the eighth ground of appeal, alleging infringement of the principle of equality of arms which, had it been upheld, would have enabled the judgment of the General Court to be set aside. In the light of the criterion laid down in paragraph 12 of the present order, that complaint is admissible.

18      As regards the merits, that eighth ground of appeal, in so far as it relates to all the admissible arguments underlying it, was analysed in law in paragraph 408 of the judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245), before being rejected in paragraph 409 of that judgment. In that regard, it must be noted that the obligation to state reasons incumbent on the Court of Justice does not require the latter to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case, and the reasoning in question may be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons why the Court of Justice has not upheld their arguments (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council, C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245, paragraph 101). The response given to the eighth ground of appeal in paragraph 408 of that judgment enables the applicant to understand why all the admissible arguments underlying that ground of appeal, including those relating to the breach of the principle of equality of arms which forms the second part of the eighth ground of appeal, were rejected. It follows that the second complaint concerning an alleged failure to adjudicate is unfounded.

19      In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s request that a failure of the Court of Justice to adjudicate be remedied in the judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council (C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245), must be dismissed in its entirety as unfounded.

 Costs

20      Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Council has applied for costs and the applicant has been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to pay the costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby orders:

1.      The application under Article 155(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, made on 23 April 2026 by Mr German Khan, is dismissed.

2.      Mr German Khan shall pay the costs.

[Signatures]

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*      Language of the case: French.