Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 16 April 2026.#Constantin Mincu Pătrașcu Brâncuși v European Public Prosecutor’s Office.#Appeal – Institutional law – Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 – European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) – Article 42(1) – Procedural acts of the EPPO intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties – Judicial review carried out by the national courts – Plea of illegality – Admissibility – Exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union to review the legality of EU acts – Article 86(2) and (3) TFEU – Exercise of the functions of prosecutor in the national courts – Power of the EU legislature to determine the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural acts of the EPPO – Derogation not authorised in Article 263 TFEU – None – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right to effective judicial protection – Infringement – None – Lack of jurisdiction of the General Court.#Case C-328/24 P.

Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber)

16 April 2026 (*)

( Appeal – Institutional law – Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 – European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) – Article 42(1) – Procedural acts of the EPPO intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties – Judicial review carried out by the national courts – Plea of illegality – Admissibility – Exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union to review the legality of EU acts – Article 86(2) and (3) TFEU – Exercise of the functions of prosecutor in the national courts – Power of the EU legislature to determine the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural acts of the EPPO – Derogation not authorised in Article 263 TFEU – None – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right to effective judicial protection – Infringement – None – Lack of jurisdiction of the General Court )

In Case C‑328/24 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 30 April 2024,

Constantin Mincu Pătrașcu Brâncuși, residing in Bucharest (Romania), represented by A. Şandru, avocat,

appellant,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

European Public Prosecutor’s Office, represented by L. De Matteis, E. Farhat and F.-R. Radu, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

supported by:

European Parliament, represented by K. Cieslar and C. Ionescu Dima, acting as Agents,

intervener in the appeal,

THE COURT (Fifth Chamber),

composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún, President of the Chamber, J. Passer, E. Regan, D. Gratsias (Rapporteur) and B. Smulders, Judges,

Advocate General: L. Medina,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By his appeal, Mr Constantin Mincu Pătrașcu Brâncuși seeks to have set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 28 February 2024, Mincu Pătrașcu Brâncuși v EPPO (T‑385/23, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2024:143), by which the General Court dismissed his action seeking annulment of the decision of Permanent Chamber 10 of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) of 8 December 2022, bringing the case concerning him to judgment (‘the decision at issue’), and of the subsequent acts, and a declaration that the provisions of the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO which are contrary to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ 2017 L 283, p. 1) are inapplicable.

 Legal context

2        Recitals 30, 31, 36, 83 and 85 to 89 of Regulation 2017/1939 state:

‘(30)      The investigations of the EPPO should as a rule be carried out by European Delegated Prosecutors in the Member States. They should do so in accordance with this Regulation and, as regards matters not covered by this Regulation, in accordance with national law. …

(31)      The functions of prosecutor in competent courts apply until the conclusion of the proceedings, which is understood to mean the final determination of the question whether the suspect or accused person has committed the offence, including, where applicable, sentencing and the resolution of any legal action or remedies available until that decision has become definitive.

…

(36)      The Permanent Chambers should exercise their decision-making power at specific steps of the proceedings of the EPPO with a view to ensuring a common investigation and prosecution policy. They should adopt decisions on the basis of a draft decision proposed by the handling European Delegated Prosecutor. …

…

(83)      This Regulation requires the EPPO to respect, in particular, the right to a fair trial, the rights of the defence and the presumption of innocence, as enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”)]. …

…

(85)      The rights of defence provided for in the relevant Union law … should apply to the activities of the EPPO. Any suspect or accused person in respect of whom the EPPO initiates an investigation should benefit from those rights, as well as from the rights provided for in national law to request that experts are appointed or that witnesses are heard, or that evidence on behalf of the defence is otherwise produced by the EPPO.

(86)      Article 86(3) TFEU allows the Union legislator to determine the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures taken by the EPPO in the performance of its functions. That competence granted to the Union legislator reflects the specific nature of the tasks and structure of the EPPO, which is different from that of all other bodies and agencies of the Union and requires special rules regarding judicial review.

(87)      According to Article 86(2) TFEU, the EPPO exercises its functions of prosecutor before the competent courts of the Member States. Acts undertaken by the EPPO in the course of its investigations are closely related to the prosecution which may result therefrom, and thus have effects in the legal order of the Member States. In many cases the acts will be carried out by national law enforcement authorities acting under the instructions of the EPPO, in some cases after having obtained the authorisation of a national court.

It is therefore appropriate to consider that procedural acts of the EPPO that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties should be subject to review by the competent national courts in accordance with the requirements and procedures laid down by national law. This should ensure that the procedural acts of the EPPO that are adopted before the indictment and intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties (a category which includes the suspect, the victim, and other interested persons whose rights may be adversely affected by such acts) are subject to judicial review by national courts. Procedural acts that relate to the choice of the Member State whose courts will be competent to hear the prosecution, which is to be determined on the basis of the criteria laid down in this Regulation, are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties and should therefore be subject to judicial review by national courts, at the latest at the trial stage.

…

(88)      The legality of procedural acts of the EPPO that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties should be subject to judicial review before national courts. In that regard, effective remedies should be ensured in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. …

When national courts review the legality of such acts, they may do so on the basis of Union law, including this Regulation, and also on the basis of national law, which applies to the extent that a matter is not dealt with by this Regulation. …

…

(89)      The provision of this Regulation on judicial review does not alter the powers of the Court of Justice to review the EPPO administrative decisions, which are intended to have legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, namely decisions that are not taken in the performance of its functions of investigating, prosecuting or bringing to judgement. This Regulation is also without prejudice to the possibility for a Member State of the European Union, the European Parliament, the Council [of the European Union] or the [European] Commission to bring actions for annulment in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and to the first paragraph of Article 265 TFEU, and to infringement proceedings under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU.’

3        Article 4 of that regulation, entitled ‘Tasks’, is worded as follows:

‘The EPPO shall be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment the perpetrators of, and accomplices to, criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union … In that respect the EPPO shall undertake investigations, and carry out acts of prosecution and exercise the functions of prosecutor in the competent courts of the Member States, until the case has been finally disposed of.’

4        Under Article 8 of that regulation, entitled ‘Structure of the EPPO’:

‘1.      The EPPO shall be an indivisible Union body operating as one single Office with a decentralised structure.

2.      The EPPO shall be organised at a central level and at a decentralised level.

3.      The central level shall consist of a Central Office at the seat of the EPPO. The Central Office shall consist of the College, the Permanent Chambers, the European Chief Prosecutor, the Deputy European Chief Prosecutors, the European Prosecutors and the Administrative Director.

4.      The decentralised level shall consist of European Delegated Prosecutors who shall be located in the Member States.

…’

5        Article 10 of that regulation, entitled ‘The Permanent Chambers’, provides, in paragraphs (1) to (3):

‘1.      The Permanent Chambers shall be chaired by the European Chief Prosecutor or one of the Deputy European Chief Prosecutors, or a European Prosecutor appointed as Chair in accordance with the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO. In addition to the Chair, the Permanent Chambers shall have two permanent Members. The number of Permanent Chambers, and their composition, as well as the division of competences between the Chambers, shall take due account of the functional needs of the EPPO and be determined in accordance with the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO.

…

2.      The Permanent Chambers shall monitor and direct the investigations and prosecutions conducted by the European Delegated Prosecutors in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. …

3.      In accordance with the conditions and procedures set out by this Regulation, where applicable after reviewing a draft decision proposed by the handling European Delegated Prosecutor, the Permanent Chambers shall decide on the following issues:

(a)      to bring a case to judgment …;

(b)      to dismiss a case …;

…’

6        Article 13 of Regulation 2017/1939, entitled ‘The European Delegated Prosecutors’, is worded as follows, in paragraph 1:

‘The European Delegated Prosecutors shall act on behalf of the EPPO in their respective Member States and shall have the same powers as national prosecutors in respect of investigations, prosecutions and bringing cases to judgment, in addition and subject to the specific powers and status conferred on them, and under the conditions set out in this Regulation.

The European Delegated Prosecutors shall be responsible for those investigations and prosecutions that they have initiated, that have been allocated to them or that they have taken over using their right of evocation. The European Delegated Prosecutors shall follow the direction and instructions of the Permanent Chamber in charge of a case as well as the instructions from the supervising European Prosecutor.

The European Delegated Prosecutors shall also be responsible for bringing a case to judgment, in particular have the power to present trial pleas, participate in taking evidence and exercise the available remedies in accordance with national law.’

7        Article 28 of that regulation, entitled ‘Conducting the investigation’, provides in paragraph 1:

‘The European Delegated Prosecutor handling a case may, in accordance with this Regulation and with national law, either undertake the investigation measures and other measures on his/her own or instruct the competent authorities in his/her Member State. Those authorities shall, in accordance with national law, ensure that all instructions are followed and undertake the measures assigned to them. …’

8        Article 30 of that regulation, entitled ‘Investigation measures and other measures’, states, in paragraph 5, that the procedures and modalities for taking the measures referred to in that article are to be governed by the applicable national law.

9        Article 31 of that regulation, entitled ‘Cross-border investigations’, provides in paragraph 3:

‘If judicial authorisation for the measure is required under the law of the Member State of the assisting European Delegated Prosecutor, the assisting European Delegated Prosecutor shall obtain that authorisation in accordance with the law of that Member State.

…’

10      Article 36 of Regulation 2017/1939, entitled ‘Prosecution before national courts’, sets out the arrangements under which the Permanent Chamber, on the basis of a draft decision submitted by the European Delegated Prosecutor, decides to bring a case to judgment. In accordance with paragraph 5 of that article, once a decision on the Member State in which the prosecution is to be brought has been taken, the competent national court within that Member State is to be determined on the basis of national law.

11      Article 37 of that regulation, entitled ‘Evidence’, provides in paragraph 2:

‘The power of the trial court to freely assess the evidence presented by the defendant or the prosecutors of the EPPO shall not be affected by this Regulation.’

12      Article 41 of the regulation, entitled ‘Scope of the rights of the suspects and accused persons’, provides:

‘1.      The activities of the EPPO shall be carried out in full compliance with the rights of suspects and accused persons enshrined in the Charter, including the right to a fair trial and the rights of defence.

2.      Any suspected or accused person in the criminal proceedings of the EPPO shall, at a minimum, have the procedural rights provided for in Union law …

…

3.      Without prejudice to the rights provided in this Chapter, suspects and accused persons as well as other persons involved in the proceedings of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office shall have all the procedural rights available to them under the applicable national law …’

13      Article 42 of that regulation, entitled ‘Judicial review’, provides:

‘1.      Procedural acts of the EPPO that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties shall be subject to review by the competent national courts in accordance with the requirements and procedures laid down by national law. The same applies to failures of the EPPO to adopt procedural acts which are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties and which it was legally required to adopt under this Regulation.

2.      The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, to give preliminary rulings concerning:

(a)      the validity of procedural acts of the EPPO, in so far as such a question of validity is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State directly on the basis of Union law;

(b)      the interpretation or the validity of provisions of Union law, including this Regulation;

(c)      the interpretation of Articles 22 and 25 of this Regulation in relation to any conflict of competence between the EPPO and the competent national authorities.

3.      By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of this Article, the decisions of the EPPO to dismiss a case, in so far as they are contested directly on the basis of Union law, shall be subject to review before the Court of Justice in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

4.      The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in accordance with Article 268 TFEU in any dispute relating to compensation for damage caused by the EPPO.

5.      The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in accordance with Article 272 TFEU in any dispute concerning arbitration clauses contained in contracts concluded by the EPPO.

6.      The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in accordance with Article 270 TFEU in any dispute concerning staff-related matters.

7.      The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction on the dismissal of the European Chief Prosecutor or European Prosecutors, …

8.      This Article is without prejudice to judicial review by the Court of Justice in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU of decisions of the EPPO that affect the data subjects’ rights under Chapter VIII and of decisions of the EPPO which are not procedural acts, such as decisions of the EPPO concerning the right of public access to documents, or decisions dismissing European Delegated Prosecutors adopted pursuant to Article 17(3) of this Regulation, or any other administrative decisions.’

 Background to the dispute

14      The background to the dispute, which is set out in paragraphs 2 to 4 of the order under appeal, may be summarised as follows.

15      By a decision of 6 July 2021, the EPPO ordered the initiation of an investigation, in the context of which the appellant, Mr Mincu Pătrașcu Brâncuși, acquired the status of defendant on 25 May 2022.

16      By the decision at issue, Permanent Chamber 10 of the EPPO ordered, first, that the appellant and other defendants be brought before the Tribunalul Bucureşti (Regional Court, Bucharest, Romania) and, secondly, that the case be dismissed as regards certain suspects, in the absence of relevant evidence.

17      By indictment of 19 December 2022, the appellant was brought before a trial court for the offence of establishing a criminal organised group, provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 367 of the Romanian Criminal Code, and for complicity in the offence of using or presenting false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents, which resulted in unlawful acquiring or retention of funds or assets from the EU budget, in accordance with Article 48 of that code, read in conjunction with paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 18a of legea nr. 78/2000 pentru prevenirea, descoperirea și sancționarea faptelor de corupție (Law No 78/2000 on the prevention, detection and punishment of acts of corruption) of 8 May 2000 (Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 219, of 18 May 2000), pursuant to Article 35(1) and Article 38(1) of that code.

 The action before the General Court and the order under appeal

18      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 7 July 2023, the appellant brought, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, an action by which he requested the General Court, first, to annul the decision at issue and the subsequent acts and, secondly, on the basis of Article 277 TFEU, to declare inapplicable the provisions of the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO which are contrary to Regulation 2017/1939.

19      By a separate document lodged at the General Court Registry on 28 September 2023, the EPPO raised, pursuant to Article 130 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, an objection of inadmissibility by which it asked the General Court to dismiss the action as inadmissible and order the appellant to pay the costs.

20      As is apparent from paragraph 8 of the order under appeal, the General Court, pursuant to Article 130(1) and (7) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to rule on that objection of inadmissibility without taking further steps in the proceedings.

21      In paragraph 9 of that order, the General Court stated that the EPPO had raised, in the context of that objection of inadmissibility, three pleas of inadmissibility. First, it had argued that the General Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the claims for annulment directed against the decision at issue on the ground that Article 263 TFEU does not apply to its procedural acts. Secondly, it had contended that the appellant did not have standing to bring proceedings. Thirdly, it had maintained that, in so far as the main action was inadmissible, the plea of illegality raised by the appellant, in accordance with Article 277 TFEU, must be rejected as inadmissible.

22      In paragraphs 10 to 15 of that order, the General Court set out the arguments relied on by the EPPO in support of its first plea of inadmissibility. In essence, by those arguments, the EPPO maintained that the decision at issue was a procedural act, within the meaning of Article 42(1) of Regulation 2017/1939, to which Article 263 TFEU is not applicable and the judicial review of which falls within the jurisdiction of the national courts and not that of the General Court.

23      In paragraphs 16 to 20 of the same order, the General Court summarised the arguments put forward by the appellant in the context of his observations on the EPPO’s objection of inadmissibility. According to the appellant, inasmuch as it derogates from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to review EU acts, Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 does not meet the requirements of the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, laid down in Article 47 of the Charter, and undermines the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, governed by Article 19 TEU, to ensure that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the EU Treaties and that the autonomy of the EU legal system is respected. Article 42 should therefore be interpreted in the light of the other EU rules and principles in judicial matters which took into account the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, as meaning that its action was admissible.

24      As set out in paragraph 21 of the order under appeal, the General Court considered that the mechanism provided for by the EU legislature to ensure the review of procedural acts of the EPPO was a sui generis mechanism.

25      In that regard, it observed, in paragraph 22 of that order, that Article 42(1) of Regulation 2017/1939 provided, inter alia, that procedural acts of the EPPO that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties were subject to review by the competent national courts in accordance with the requirements and procedures laid down by national law.

26      In addition, in paragraph 23 of that order, it noted that that article expressly provided, in paragraphs 3 and 8 thereof, for the jurisdiction of the EU Courts, under Article 263 TFEU, only for (i) decisions of the EPPO to dismiss a case, in so far as they are contested directly on the basis of EU law, (ii) decisions of the EPPO which affect the data subjects’ rights under Chapter VIII of Regulation 2017/1939, (iii) decisions of the EPPO which are not procedural acts, such as decisions concerning the right of public access to documents, (iv) decisions dismissing European Delegated Prosecutors adopted pursuant to Article 17(3) of that regulation, or (v) any other administrative decision.

27      In paragraph 24 of that order, the General Court found that the decision at issue, in so far as it concerned the appellant, constituted a procedural act of the EPPO which did not fall within the scope of the decisions referred to in Article 42(3) and (8) of that regulation, given that, by that decision, the EPPO had brought the case to judgment.

28      As regards the appellant’s argument that the General Court should declare that it had jurisdiction on the basis of an interpretation of that article in order to comply with the requirements, in particular, of the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, and not to undermine the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the General Court stated, in paragraph 26 of the order under appeal, that, according to settled case-law, recourse to a broad interpretation was possible only in so far as it was compatible with the wording of the provision in question and that the very principle of interpretation in conformity with a rule of superior binding force could not serve as the basis for an interpretation that is contra legem.

29      In the present case, in paragraph 27 of that order, the General Court held that it was absolutely clear from the wording of Article 42(1) and (2) of Regulation 2017/1939 that that provision confers on national courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine procedural acts of the EPPO which are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, apart from the exceptions provided for in paragraph 3 of that article and the treatment of certain decisions of the EPPO referred to in paragraph 8 of that article, and that the Court of Justice may hear and determine, by means of a preliminary ruling, the validity of those acts in the light of provisions of EU law and the interpretation and validity of the provisions of that regulation. In paragraph 28 of that order, the General Court concluded that the appellant was suggesting an interpretation contra legem of Article 42, which could not therefore be accepted.

30      In addition, in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, the General Court noted that, even if the appellant had also intended to challenge the decision at issue by contesting, by way of the plea of illegality, the validity of Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939, in the light of Article 19 TEU, such a challenge could not be accepted, on account of the General Court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear and determine the main action.

31      Lastly, in paragraphs 30 and 31 of that order, as regards the requirements relating to effective judicial protection, the General Court observed that, as is apparent from Article 42(2) of Regulation 2017/1939, the Court of Justice had jurisdiction, inter alia, under Article 267 TFEU, to hear and determine questions of interpretation and validity of procedural acts of the EPPO and of provisions of EU law, including of that regulation. Consequently, since the appellant may, in principle, challenge before the competent national courts procedural acts of the EPPO and, in that context, plead the illegality of that regulation, it would be for the Court of Justice, if the national court were to bring the matter before it, to rule on the validity of Article 42 of that regulation and, where appropriate, on the validity of the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO.

32      In the light of all those findings, the General Court, in paragraph 32 of the order under appeal, upheld the EPPO’s first plea of inadmissibility and, consequently, dismissed the action on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine it, taking the view that there was no need to rule, furthermore, on the claims relating to the provisions of the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO, which concerned the substance of the dispute.

 The procedure before the Court of Justice and the forms of order sought by the parties to the appeal

33      By decision of the President of the Court of 11 November 2024, the European Parliament was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the EPPO.

34      The appellant claims that the Court should:

–        declare his appeal admissible;

–        set aside the order under appeal; and

–        annul the decision at issue.

35      The EPPO, supported by the Parliament, contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the appeal in its entirety; and

–        order the appellant to pay the costs.

 The appeal

36      In support of his appeal, the appellant raises a ground of appeal alleging an error of law on the part of the General Court, in that the General Court dismissed his action without examining his line of argument by which he claimed that Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 did not satisfy the requirements of the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, laid down in Article 47 of the Charter, and undermined the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, governed by Article 19 TEU, read in conjunction with Article 86(3) TFEU and Article 263 TFEU. In the alternative, the appellant raises a ground of appeal concerning, in essence, the General Court’s refusal to reserve its decision on the admissibility of his action until it ruled on the substance of the case, in the light of the close link between the plea of inadmissibility raised by the EPPO and the resolution of the substance of that action.

 Admissibility

37      The EPPO, supported by the Parliament, claims that the appeal should be dismissed as inadmissible. It submits that the appellant does not put forward any specific arguments seeking to identify the error of law allegedly vitiating the order under appeal and that, without identifying the provisions allegedly infringed by the General Court, he merely criticises it for not having analysed the validity of Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 and reiterates the pleas in his action relating to the incompatibility of that article with primary EU law.

38      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with settled case-law, it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of that appeal, failing which the appeal or ground of appeal concerned will be inadmissible (judgment of 4 October 2024, Aeris Invest v Commission and SRB, C‑535/22 P, EU:C:2024:819, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited).

39      An appeal which, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment under appeal, merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court, including those based on facts expressly rejected by the General Court, does not satisfy the requirement to state reasons under those provisions. Such an appeal amounts in reality to no more than a request for re-examination of the application submitted to the General Court, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake (judgment of 4 October 2024, Aeris Invest v Commission and SRB, C‑535/22 P, EU:C:2024:819, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited).

40      However, provided that an appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. Indeed, if an appellant could not thus base his or her appeal on pleas in law and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgment of 4 October 2024, Aeris Invest v Commission and SRB, C‑535/22 P, EU:C:2024:819, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited).

41      In the present case, first, it should be noted that, contrary to the EPPO’s assertion, the appellant, in his appeal, identified, clearly and specifically, the alleged error of law vitiating the order under appeal in claiming that the General Court had failed to examine his arguments demonstrating, from his point of view, that Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 was contrary to primary EU law.

42      Secondly, since the General Court dismissed the action on the ground that Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 constituted an obstacle to the bringing of an action for annulment before it against a procedural act of the EPPO, the appellant may rely on the arguments which he put forward at first instance, referred to in paragraph 41 of the present judgment, in order to demonstrate that that finding is vitiated by an error of law.

43      The appeal is therefore admissible.

 The first ground of appeal

 Arguments of the parties

44      First of all, the appellant submits that, before the General Court, he argued that Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 did not satisfy the requirements of the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial laid down in Article 47 of the Charter and that it undermined the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union to ensure, in accordance with Article 19 TEU as interpreted by the Court of Justice in paragraph 282 of the judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi and El Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461), observance of the law in the interpretation and application of the EU Treaties and respect for the autonomy of the EU legal system.

45      First, he submits, in that regard, that the wording of Article 86(3) TFEU provides for the possibility, for Regulation 2017/1939, of laying down the ‘rules applicable to the judicial review’ of procedural measures taken by the EPPO, without expressly referring to the possibility of derogating from the rules on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union under Article 263 TFEU, unlike other provisions of the FEU Treaty, which expressly provide for a ‘derogation’ from Articles 258 and 259 TFEU. Thus, in the absence of such a legal basis, a lower-ranking measure, such as that regulation, cannot derogate from that jurisdiction, established by rules of primary EU law. The judgment of 19 December 2018, Berlusconi and Fininvest (C‑219/17, EU:C:2018:1023, paragraphs 48, 57 and 60), in so far as it relates to a situation similar to that at issue in the present case, is relevant in that regard. The appellant also refers to the judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea (C‑284/16, EU:C:2018:158), and to Opinion 1/20 (Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU (Modernised Energy Charter Treaty)) of 16 June 2022 (EU:C:2022:485).

46      Secondly, as regards the alleged infringement of Article 47 of the Charter, he submits that national courts do not have the expertise and jurisdiction to declare invalid EU acts, such as Regulation 2017/1939 or the internal rules of procedure of the EPPO, with the result that, where the procedural acts of that body are issued under EU law, judicial review of those acts should fall within the jurisdiction of the EU Courts. By contrast, the preliminary ruling mechanism does not make it possible to satisfy the requirements of an effective remedy. The obligation on national courts to make a reference to the Court of Justice is not enforceable, with the result that there is a high risk that EU law will not be applied or that it will be misapplied, particularly since the national courts concerned are not familiar with EU law.

47      In the order under appeal, the General Court dismissed the action for annulment on the basis that Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 was compatible with primary EU law without expressly stating reasons for that premiss and, in particular, without examining the arguments set out in paragraphs 44 to 46 of the present judgment, which call that premiss into question. It was therefore wrong to declare that it lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the action.

48      The EPPO, supported by the Parliament, submits, first, on the basis of paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, that, in view of the General Court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear and determine the action, the plea of illegality concerning Article 42 of that regulation could not be discussed. In addition, the General Court set out correctly and in detail the reasons why the interpretation and lawfulness of that article could not be analysed in the context of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, it being possible to examine the validity of Article 42 of that regulation only in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU.

49      Secondly, it submits that the interpretation of Article 42 of that regulation proposed by the appellant would lead to a blatant infringement of Article 86(2) and (3) TFEU, by creating a remedy before the EU Courts not provided for by the FEU Treaty and by transforming those courts into a court of ordinary judicial review in cases involving the EPPO, to the detriment of the jurisdiction of national courts.

50      Thirdly, it submits that Article 42 does not infringe any of the provisions of primary EU law relied on by the appellant and that, in accordance with Article 86(3) TFEU and as is apparent from recital 86 of Regulation 2017/1939, Article 42 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to Article 263 TFEU.

51      Fourthly, the EPPO claims that Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 is based on several legal pillars guaranteeing access to justice and the rights of the defence, and seeks to ensure that all aspects of the legality of the EPPO’s procedural acts are verified and offer an effective remedy in any situation where those acts are contrary to EU or national law. In particular, paragraph 1 of that article guarantees an effective remedy, in so far as the national courts are, on the one hand, best placed to exercise judicial review of those acts and, on the other, the only courts competent to apply both national law and EU law. In addition, if a procedural act of the EPPO appears to be contrary to EU law, Article 42(2)(a), in accordance with the rules set out in paragraph 15 of the judgment of 22 October 1987, Foto-Frost (314/85, EU:C:1987:452), requires national courts to make a request to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the validity of that act.

52      Fifthly, the fact that the procedural acts of the EPPO are subject to judicial review by the national courts is a direct consequence of the fact that, in accordance with Article 86 TFEU and Article 36 of Regulation 2017/1939, cases which are the subject of an investigation by the EPPO give rise to prosecution before the national courts. The case-law relied on by the appellant is not applicable, in that regard, given that the legal remedies are provided for, in the present case, by that regulation, on the basis of the FEU Treaty, and not by an international treaty.

 Findings of the Court

53      It is settled case-law that it is for the EU Courts to determine, including of their own motion, whether they have jurisdiction to hear and determine a dispute, since such a question is a matter of public policy (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 April 1986, Les Verts v Parliament, 294/83, EU:C:1986:166, paragraph 19, and of 6 October 2020, Bank Refah Kargaran v Council, C‑134/19 P, EU:C:2020:793, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

54      In the present case, as is apparent from paragraphs 25 to 32 of the order under appeal, the General Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the action, brought against a procedural act of the EPPO, within the meaning of Article 42(1) of Regulation 2017/1939, without examining the arguments which the appellant had submitted to it, seeking to demonstrate that, in so far as it derogated from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union to review EU acts, that article was contrary to primary EU law.

55      First, in paragraphs 25 to 28 of the order under appeal, the General Court took the view that the interpretation of Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 put forward by the appellant in his action, according to which the General Court should declare that it has jurisdiction, inter alia, in order to satisfy the requirements of the right to an effective remedy and not to undermine the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, constituted an interpretation contra legem of that article. In that regard, it observed that it was clear from the wording of paragraphs 1 and 2 of that article that that regulation confers on national courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine procedural acts of the EPPO that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, apart from the exceptions laid down in Article 42(3) and from the treatment of certain decisions of the EPPO referred to in paragraph 8 of that article, and that it was only by way of preliminary ruling that the Court of Justice could rule on (i) the validity of those acts in the light of provisions of EU law and (ii) the interpretation or validity of provisions of Regulation 2017/1939.

56      Secondly, in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, the General Court held that, even if the appellant intended to call into question, by means of the plea of illegality, the validity of Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 in the light of Article 19 TEU, such a challenge could not be accepted on account of its lack of jurisdiction to hear and determine the action in the main proceedings.

57      In addition, although, in paragraphs 30 and 31 of that order, the General Court, for the sake of completeness, suggested, in essence, that the requirements relating to effective judicial protection would be satisfied by the possibility, for the appellant, of raising a plea of illegality of Article 42(1) in the context of an action before the national courts having jurisdiction and, for the Court of Justice, to rule, inter alia, on the validity of that article, if brought before it by those courts on the basis of paragraph 2 of that article, it did not, however, adopt a position on the question of whether Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 complied with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union to review EU acts.

58      In that regard, it must be held that the General Court cannot declare that it has no jurisdiction to hear and determine an action without first examining the merits of all the arguments relied on before it, which seek specifically to establish its jurisdiction in that regard.

59      More specifically, as regards paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, it should be noted that the settled case-law according to which the inadmissibility of the main action leads to the inadmissibility of the plea of illegality raised in support of that action (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 March 2020, Credito Fondiario v SRB, C‑69/19 P, EU:C:2020:178, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited) cannot, by definition, authorise the General Court to declare that it has no jurisdiction to examine an argument seeking to call into question, in the light of primary EU law, the validity of a provision of secondary law, on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the main action, where, specifically, it relies on that provision in order to conclude that it lacks jurisdiction.

60      Thus, it follows from the case-law that, where a plea of illegality is raised before the General Court in respect of a provision of secondary law which removes from all judicial review the decision of an EU body challenged before it, on the ground that that provision is incompatible with Article 263 TFEU, it must ascertain whether that plea of illegality is well founded and, if appropriate, declare that it has jurisdiction to review the legality of that decision on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, in order to ensure effective judicial review of that decision (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 25 June 2020, SatCen v KF, C‑14/19 P, EU:C:2020:492, paragraphs 65, 72, 85 and 86).

61      It follows from the considerations referred to in paragraphs 55 to 60 above that the General Court erred in law in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the action, brought against a procedural act of the EPPO, within the meaning of Article 42(1) of Regulation 2017/1939, without examining whether primary EU law precluded such a finding.

62      However, according to settled case-law, if the grounds of a judgment or order of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but the operative part of that judgment is shown to be well founded for other legal reasons, the appeal must be dismissed (judgment of 28 October 2020, Associazione GranoSalus v Commission, C‑313/19 P, EU:C:2020:869, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

63      That is the case in this instance.

64      Further, as regards, in the first place, the appellant’s argument that Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 adversely affects the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union, provided for in Article 19 TEU and Article 263 TFEU, it must be borne in mind that, as is apparent from Article 19(1) TEU, the guardians of the legal order and the judicial system of the European Union are the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the Member States, it being understood that it is for the Court to ensure respect for the autonomy of the EU legal order thus created by the Treaties (Opinion 1/09 (Agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System) of 8 March 2011, EU:C:2011:123, paragraphs 66 and 67 and the case-law cited).

65      In that context, it is for the national courts and tribunals and for the Court of Justice to ensure the full application of EU law in all Member States and to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under that law. The national courts and tribunals, in collaboration with the Court of Justice, fulfil a duty entrusted to them both of ensuring that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed (see, to that effect, Opinion 1/09 (Agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System) of 8 March 2011, EU:C:2011:123, paragraphs 68 and 69 and the case-law cited).

66      Furthermore, in accordance with Article 19(3) TEU, the FEU Treaty has established, by Articles 263 and 277, on the one hand, and Article 267, on the other, a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of EU acts, and has entrusted such review to the Courts of the European Union (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited).

67      Accordingly, natural or legal persons who cannot, by reason of the conditions of admissibility stated in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, challenge directly EU acts of general application do have protection against the application to them of those acts. Where responsibility for the implementation of those acts lies with the EU institutions, those persons are entitled to bring a direct action before the Courts of the European Union against the implementing measures under the conditions stated in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, and to plead, pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, in support of that action, the illegality of the general act at issue. Where that implementation is a matter for the Member States, such persons may plead the invalidity of the EU act at issue before the national courts and tribunals and cause the latter to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).

68      However, it must be borne in mind that, in order to take account of the particular nature of the tasks and structure of the EPPO, which, as stated in recital 86 of Regulation 2017/1939, differs from that of all other bodies and agencies of the European Union, Article 86(3) TFEU permits the EU legislature to determine the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures taken by the EPPO in the performance of its functions (judgment of 8 April 2025, EPPO (Judicial review of procedural acts), C‑292/23, EU:C:2025:255, paragraph 48).

69      As the Court has already held, the EU legislature exercised that competence in adopting Article 42 of that regulation, paragraph 1 of which provides that procedural acts of the EPPO that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties are to be subject to review by the competent national courts in accordance with the requirements and procedures laid down by national law (judgment of 8 April 2025, EPPO (Judicial review of procedural acts), C‑292/23, EU:C:2025:255, paragraph 49).

70      The substantial level of integration of that EU body within the Member States’ systems of criminal procedure in the context within which they exercise their competences, as is clear from the first paragraph of recital 87 of the regulation, is the reason for the national courts having jurisdiction in respect of the procedural acts covered by Article 42(1) of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 April 2025, EPPO (Judicial review of procedural acts), C‑292/23, EU:C:2025:255, paragraph 74).

71      By contrast, paragraphs 2 to 8 of Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 list the cases in which judicial review of the activity of the EPPO falls within the jurisdiction of the EU Courts. In particular, in accordance with paragraph 2(a) and (b) of that article, it is for the Court to give a preliminary ruling on questions of validity of procedural acts of that body raised before a national court, directly on the basis of EU law, and on the interpretation and validity of ‘provisions of Union law, including this Regulation’. In addition, decisions of the EPPO to dismiss a case, in so far as they are challenged directly on the basis of EU law, referred to in paragraph 3 of that article, on the one hand, and decisions relating to the protection of personal data and ‘administrative decisions’ of the EPPO, within the meaning of paragraph 8 of that article, on the other, fall within the scope of Article 263 TFEU (see judgment of 8 April 2025, EPPO (Judicial review of procedural acts), C‑292/23, EU:C:2025:255, paragraphs 55 to 57).

72      It should be noted that, contrary to what the appellant claims, the division of jurisdiction between the national courts and the EU Courts in Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939 in no way constitutes an unauthorised derogation from the exclusive jurisdiction of the EU Courts to review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU.

73      In that regard, it should be noted that, by subjecting to judicial review by national courts only procedural acts of the EPPO intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, with the exception of decisions of the EPPO to dismiss a case, and by providing for the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union in other cases, in accordance with the provisions of the FEU Treaty which govern that competence and which are referred to in the relevant paragraphs of Article 42, the EU legislature did not exceed the limits of the power expressly conferred on it by Article 86(3) TFEU to lay down ‘the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures taken by [the EPPO] in the performance of its functions’.

74      More specifically, the absence of an express reference, in the wording of Article 86(3) TFEU, to a derogation from the rules on the jurisdiction of the EU Courts laid down in Article 263 TFEU, relied on by the appellant, does not mean that, as the appellant maintains, that wording merely empowers the EU legislature to establish specific conditions and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural and legal persons against procedural acts of the EPPO but not to remove those actions from the jurisdiction of those courts.

75      Thus, first, it is apparent from Article 86(2) TFEU that the EPPO is to be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment in the competent courts of the Member States the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences against the financial interests of the European Union and exercising the functions of prosecutor in relation to such offences. Secondly, under Article 86(1) and (3) TFEU, it is for the EU legislature not only to determine the rules applicable to the judicial review of the procedural measures of that body, but, more broadly, to establish and determine the general rules applicable to it, the conditions governing the performance of its functions and the rules of procedure applicable to its activities, as well as those governing the admissibility of evidence.

76      Consequently, having regard to the particular nature of the tasks conferred by the FEU Treaty on the EPPO, which relate to the conviction, by the competent national courts, of the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, the offences in respect of which it exercises the functions of prosecutor, and the scope of the powers conferred by that Treaty on the EU legislature to determine the institutional and procedural framework within which the EPPO performs those tasks, the expression ‘rules applicable to the judicial review of the procedural measures [of the EPPO]’, contained in Article 86(3) TFEU, must be interpreted as meaning that it may include not only the establishment of specific conditions and detailed rules governing actions against those procedural measures, but also, where appropriate, of specific rules of jurisdiction.

77      The question whether judicial review of procedural acts must fall within the jurisdiction of the EU Courts or that of the national courts is closely linked to the division of powers in the field in question between the EU authorities and the national authorities laid down by the secondary legislation determining, in accordance with Article 86(3) TFEU, the general rules applicable to the EPPO, the conditions governing the performance of its functions and the rules of procedure applicable to it (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 December 2018, Berlusconi and Fininvest, C‑219/17, EU:C:2018:1023, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

78      Within the institutional and procedural framework established by Regulation 2017/1939, as is, in essence, emphasised by the first paragraph of recital 87 thereof, the legal effects that procedural acts of the EPPO produce vis-à-vis third parties are, to a large extent, determined by the national law applicable to those acts, including as regards cross-border investigations governed by Articles 31 to 33 of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 December 2023, G.K. and Others (EPPO), C‑281/22, EU:C:2023:1018, paragraphs 47 to 54).

79      First, under Article 10(2) of that regulation, read in conjunction with Article 13(1), the European Delegated Prosecutors, under the supervision and direction of the Permanent Chambers, are to act on behalf of the EPPO in their respective Member States and are to have the same powers as national prosecutors in respect of investigations, prosecutions and bringing cases to judgment, subject to the specific powers and status conferred on them by that regulation.

80      Secondly, under Article 28(1) of Regulation 2017/1939, the European Delegated Prosecutor handling a case may, in accordance with that regulation and national law, either undertake the investigation measures and other measures on his or her own or instruct the competent authorities in his or her Member State with the procedures and modalities for taking all those measures being governed, pursuant to Article 30(5) of that regulation, by the applicable national law (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 April 2025, EPPO (Judicial review of procedural acts), C‑292/23, EU:C:2025:255, paragraph 47). In particular, as can be inferred from Article 31(3) of that regulation, read in the light of the first subparagraph of recital 87, the enforcement of those measures may, under that law, require authorisation from a national court.

81      Thirdly, in accordance with Article 86(2) TFEU and under the conditions laid down in Article 36 of Regulation 2017/1939, the Permanent Chamber is to conduct, if necessary, a prosecution before the national courts by adopting a decision to bring the case to judgment, such as the decision at issue, where appropriate, after having determined the competent national court in the Member State concerned on the basis of national law.

82      Fourthly, the Court has held that the assessment of the effects of a decision to summon a witness to appear on the rights of persons who are the subject of an investigation depends, to a certain extent, on national procedural rules and the specific context of the criminal investigation in the course of which the EPPO adopted that decision, with the result that national courts competent to carry out the judicial review provided for in Article 42(1) of Regulation 2017/1939 are best suited to carry it out. In addition, the Court also noted that that provision must be read in the light of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, without prejudice, however, to the procedural rules governing the judicial review carried out by the national courts, which may take the form of an incidental question, dealt with, in particular, by the criminal trial court, provided that those procedural rules guarantee a right to an effective remedy (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 April 2025, EPPO (Judicial review of procedural acts), C‑292/23, EU:C:2025:255, paragraph 73 and 80).

83      In addition, it should be pointed out that the procedural acts of the EPPO constitute a stage of criminal proceedings at the end of which the final decision-making power lies exclusively with the competent national court, which, in accordance with Article 37(2) of Regulation 2017/1939, has discretion to assess the evidence submitted, inter alia, by the EPPO on the basis of such acts.

84      It follows from all of the foregoing that the jurisdiction of national courts to carry out such a judicial review does not constitute an unauthorised derogation from Article 263 TFEU.

85      As argued, in essence, by the EPPO and the Parliament, those findings are corroborated by Article 42(2) to (8) of Regulation 2017/1939, under which judicial review of the activity of the EPPO, except in the cases provided for in paragraph 1 of that article, falls within the jurisdiction of the EU Courts.

86      In particular, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU and as provided for in Article 42(2) of Regulation 2017/1939, the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings, inter alia, on the validity of procedural acts of the EPPO, provided that such a question of validity is raised directly on the basis of EU law and concerning the interpretation or validity of provisions of EU law, including that regulation.

87      Similarly, pursuant to Article 42(8) TFEU and in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, the General Court is to exercise judicial review in respect of decisions of the EPPO which affect the rights of data subjects in relation to the protection of personal data, decisions which are not procedural acts or any other administrative decision.

88      Lastly, pursuant to Article 42(3) and by way of derogation from paragraph 1 thereof, the review of decisions of the EPPO to dismiss a case falls within the jurisdiction of the EU Courts, in so far as they are challenged directly on the basis of EU law.

89      As regards, in particular, Article 42(3) of Regulation 2017/1939, the exception to the jurisdiction of the national courts to review the procedural acts of the EPPO which it establishes confirms the fact that that article reflects the division of jurisdiction in the field in question between the national courts and the EU Courts.

90      In the event of a decision of the EPPO to dismiss the case, the national court having jurisdiction as to the substance will not rule, by definition, in the light of prosecution brought by the EPPO, which the latter has waived. Thus, in that situation, the final decision-making power lies not with that national court, but with an EU body, in the present case the EPPO. However, the EU Courts may rule on an action against such a decision only if that action is based directly on EU law, since those courts do not, in principle, have jurisdiction to examine and interpret national procedural law in the context of the review of the legality of EU acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, C‑50/00 P, EU:C:2002:462, paragraph 43).

91      It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that, by conferring on national courts the power to carry out judicial review of procedural acts of the EPPO intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, the EU legislature did not undermine the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union, provided for in Article 19 TEU and Article 263 TFEU.

92      That finding is not called into question by the judgments of 6 March 2018, Achmea (C‑284/16, EU:C:2018:158), and of 19 December 2018, Berlusconi and Fininvest (C‑219/17, EU:C:2018:1023, paragraphs 48, 57 and 60), and Opinion 1/20 (Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU (Modernised Energy Charter Treaty)) of 16 June 2022 (EU:C:2022:485), cited by the appellant in support of his arguments.

93      The situation referred to in paragraphs 48 and 57 of the judgment of 19 December 2018, Berlusconi and Fininvest (C‑219/17, EU:C:2018:1023), relates to the exclusive jurisdiction of the EU Courts to assess, in accordance with Article 263 TFEU and incidentally, whether the legality of a decision of the European Central Bank is affected by any defects vitiating the legality of acts preparatory to that decision adopted by a central bank of a Member State. That situation is therefore not comparable to that of the assessment of the legality of a procedural act of the EPPO constituting, as has been noted in paragraph 83 of the present judgment, a stage of criminal proceedings at the end of which the final decision-making power lies exclusively with the competent national court.

94      Moreover, the judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea (C‑284/16, EU:C:2018:158), and Opinion 1/20 (Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU (Modernised Energy Charter Treaty)) of 16 June 2022 (EU:C:2022:485) are, in the present case, manifestly irrelevant, since they relate to the submission of disputes liable to relate to the interpretation of EU law to a body which is not part of the EU judicial system, provided for by an agreement concluded by Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C‑284/16, EU:C:2018:158, paragraph 58), and to the admissibility of a request for an Opinion submitted on the basis of Article 218(11) TFEU (see, to that effect, Opinion 1/20 (Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU (Modernised Energy Charter Treaty)) of 16 June 2022, EU:C:2022:485, paragraph 48).

95      In the second place, as regards the appellant’s argument alleging breach of the right to effective judicial protection, that argument must be rejected, since, as stated in paragraph 91 of the present judgment, by attributing to the national courts jurisdiction to carry out judicial review of procedural acts of the EPPO intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, the EU legislature did not undermine the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union, provided for in Article 19 TEU and Article 263 TFEU.

96      According to the Court’s case-law, Article 47 of the Charter cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court, where the Treaties exclude it. Nor is that article intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by those provisions, and in particular the rules relating to the admissibility of direct actions brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2024, KS and Others v Council and Others, C‑29/22 P and C‑44/22 P, EU:C:2024:725, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).

97      In any event, it must be held that Article 42(1) of Regulation 2017/1939 respects the right to effective judicial protection, guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter.

98      First, as the Court has held, that provision, read in conjunction with Article 41 of that regulation and in the light of recitals 83 and 85 to 87, must be interpreted as meaning that the judicial review of procedural acts intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties makes it possible to ensure that the EPPO observes the fundamental rights of persons in respect of whom those procedural acts produce such effects and, inter alia, to verify the respect, by that body, of the right to procedural fairness and the rights of the defence of suspects and accused persons, in accordance with Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter. In addition, for the purposes of interpreting Article 42 of Regulation 2017/1939, account must be taken of recital 88 of that regulation, which states that, as regards the review of legality carried out by national courts in respect of those acts, effective remedies must be ensured by the Member States, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 April 2025, EPPO (Judicial review of procedural acts), C‑292/23, EU:C:2025:255, paragraphs 70 to 78).

99      Secondly, as the EPPO and the Parliament submit, in essence, and as has been set out in paragraphs 85 to 90 of the present judgment, Article 42(1) of Regulation 2017/1939 must be read in the light of the context of Article 42 as a whole, of which it forms part, and of the scheme of that article.

100    In that regard, it should be noted that Article 42(1) of Regulation 2017/1939 is fully consistent with the complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of EU acts, established by the FEU Treaty, given, inter alia, that it is linked to paragraph 2 of that article, under which the preliminary ruling mechanism is applicable to the judicial review of procedural acts of the EPPO, thereby ensuring that any question concerning the interpretation or validity of EU law, including procedural acts of the EPPO challenged before the competent national court and that regulation, may be examined by the Court, in accordance with the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on it in that regard by Article 267 TFEU.

101    It follows from all of the foregoing that the General Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the action against the decision at issue. It follows that the error of law found in paragraphs 58 and 61 of the present judgment has no bearing on the operative part of the order under appeal. Consequently, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as ineffective.

 The second ground of appeal

 Arguments of the parties

102    In the alternative, the appellant submits, in essence, that the General Court’s refusal to reserve its decision on the admissibility of the action until it rules on the substance of the case is vitiated by an error of law. In his view, first, the objection of inadmissibility is closely linked to the resolution of the substance of that action, since the General Court should first rule, on the substance, on the nature and effects of the decision at issue before determining whether that decision is an act which produces effects vis-à-vis the appellant, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Secondly, the question of the admissibility of that action is linked to a new and fundamental question concerning the EU legal order.

103    The EPPO, supported by the Parliament, disputes that line of argument.

 Findings of the Court

104    First, it should be noted that, as is apparent from paragraphs 22 to 32 of the present judgment, the General Court dismissed the action while examining only the first plea of inadmissibility raised by the EPPO, alleging that the General Court lacked jurisdiction to review the legality of the decision at issue.

105    In the light of the examination of the first ground of appeal carried out in paragraphs 53 to 101 of the present judgment, it must be held that the question of the jurisdiction of the General Court is not linked to the resolution of the substance of the action, since the only question which it was for the General Court to decide, in the light of the arguments put forward by the appellant against that plea of inadmissibility, was whether Article 42(1) of Regulation 2017/1939, in so far as it confers on the national courts exclusive jurisdiction to review procedural acts falling within that provision, is contrary to primary EU law. Thus, given that the General Court upheld that plea of inadmissibility, there was no need for it to address the question whether the decision at issue produced legal effects vis-à-vis the appellant, which, moreover, was not the case.

106    Secondly, the General Court cannot be required, under Article 130(7) of its Rules of Procedure, to reserve its decision on a plea of lack of jurisdiction or inadmissibility, submitted on the basis of Article 130(1) of those rules, for the final judgment on the ground that that plea raises a new and fundamental question concerning the EU legal order.

107    Accordingly, the second ground of appeal must be rejected and the appeal dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

108    In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where an appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to costs.

109    Article 138(1) of those rules, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) of that regulation, provides that the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

110    Since the EPPO has applied for Mr Mincu Pătrașcu Brâncuși to be ordered to pay the costs and he has been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the EPPO.

111    Article 140(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, which is applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1), provides that the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs.

112    In the present case, the Parliament must be ordered to bear its own costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby:

1.      Dismisses the appeal;

2.      Orders Mr Constantin Mincu Pătrașcu Brâncuși to pay, in addition to his own costs, the costs incurred by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office;

3.      Orders the European Parliament to bear its own costs.

[Signatures]

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*      Language of the case: Romanian.