ECLI:EU:C:2026:834

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OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

CAMPOS SÁNCHEZ-BORDONA

delivered on 8 October 2026 (1)

Case C‑893/24 P

Council of the European Union

( Appeal – Civil service – Disciplinary procedure – Disciplinary penalty – Proportionality – Effective remedy )

1. This appeal is part of a long and complex dispute between AL, a (former) official of the General Secretariat of the Council who is accused of the undue receipt of family allowances (allowances for a dependent child), and the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. (2)

2. In the judgment under appeal, (3) the General Court confirmed the Council’s decision imposing on AL the disciplinary penalty of removal from post. (4)

3. As directed by the Court of Justice, my Opinion will examine only the third ground of appeal. In that ground, AL alleges that the General Court wrongly found that the penalty was proportionate, contrary to Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union. (5)

4. The examination of the third ground of appeal will allow consideration of the scope of the review by the courts of a disciplinary penalty in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

I. Legislative framework

5. Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations provides:

‘The severity of the disciplinary penalties imposed shall be commensurate with the seriousness of the misconduct. To determine the seriousness of the misconduct and to decide upon the disciplinary penalty to be imposed, account shall be taken in particular of:

(a) the nature of the misconduct and the circumstances in which it occurred,

(b) the extent to which the misconduct adversely affects the integrity, reputation or interests of the institutions,

(d) the motives for the official’s misconduct,

(e) the official’s grade and seniority,

(f) the degree of the official’s personal responsibility,

(g) the level of the official’s duties and responsibilities,

(h) whether the misconduct involves repeated action or behaviour,

(i) the conduct of the official throughout the course of his career.’

II. Background to the dispute

6. The facts at issue may be summarised as follows:

– AL was appointed as an official on 1 December 2007 and was posted to the General Secretariat of the Council in Belgium.

– Between 2009 and 2019, AL applied for and was granted a number of family allowances, based on the treatment of his mother and four other persons as dependent children for the purposes of Article 2(4) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations.

– As a result of an investigation opened in 2016 following a communication from the appointing authority, (6) the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) identified a number of irregularities in relation to the receipt of those allowances. (7)

– OLAF recommended that the appropriate measures be taken for recovery of the amounts unduly paid (8) and that disciplinary proceedings be initiated against AL.

– On 10 February 2021, the appointing authority of the Council initiated disciplinary proceedings against AL.

– In the course of those proceedings, on 5 July 2021, the Disciplinary Board recommended the penalty of classification of AL in a lower function group with a reduction in grade. However, on 27 September 2021, the appointing authority imposed on AL the (more severe) penalty of removal from post.

– On 22 December 2021, AL lodged a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.

III. The proceedings before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

7. On 13 January 2022, AL brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the contested decision. (9)

8. In his action, AL relied on four pleas in law, (10) of which only the second is of relevance to the present Opinion. In that plea, AL alleged that the statement of reasons was insufficient and that Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations had been infringed, due to manifest errors of assessment by the Council when determining the seriousness of the misconduct and the disciplinary penalty, in the light of the criteria laid down in that article.

9. The Council rejected the plea after submitting that the judicial review of a disciplinary penalty must be limited to verification of the material accuracy of the alleged facts and the absence of a manifest error of assessment or abuse of power. (11)

10. In the judgment under appeal, (12) the General Court confirmed the Council’s decision. It pointed out, in particular, that the statement of reasons was sufficient and that there were no manifest errors of assessment. It found that the penalty was proportionate to the misconduct committed. (13)

IV. The procedure before the Court of Justice

11. In his appeal, lodged on 23 December 2024, AL requests the Court to:

– Set aside the judgment under appeal;

– Annul the contested decision, by which he was removed from his post;

– Allow him to raise new related pleas in law, if new matters of law or of fact come to light;

– Raise any motion of public interest, as it sees fit;

– Order the Council to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the appellant.

12. In its response, the Council requests the Court to:

– Dismiss the appeal in its entirety;

– Order the appellant to pay the costs.

13. The Court granted leave to lodge a reply and a rejoinder.

14. On 6 November 2025, the proceedings were stayed pending the judgment in Case C‑882/24 P, AL v Commission.

15. After judgment was given in that case on 23 April 2026, the Court invited the parties to submit observations on the consequences for the present appeal which could be drawn from that judgment, which they did by pleadings lodged on 20 May 2026.

V. Analysis

A. Preliminary points

16. In its third ground of appeal, AL claims that the General Court committed a number of errors of law when it assessed the proportionality of the penalty imposed. Further, with regard to a number of the criteria laid down in Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, the appellant claims that the judgment under appeal is not based on adequate reasoning and contains a manifest error of assessment.

17. The first sentence of Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations provides that disciplinary penalties must be commensurate with the seriousness of the misconduct. The second sentence adds that, ‘to determine the seriousness of the misconduct and to decide upon the disciplinary penalty to be imposed’, certain factors ‘in particular’ (not an exhaustive list) are to be taken into account.

18. The application of Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations therefore requires in each case a legal classification of the alleged acts, the seriousness of which must be assessed in the light, inter alia, of the criteria listed in that provision.

19. In relation to AL’s conduct regarding the receipt of allowances for dependent relatives, the Court held (in the judgment in AL v Commission) that:

– The General Court distorted the facts by failing to take into account the effects of a judgment of the Tribunalul București (Regional Court, Bucharest, Romania), which annulled with ex tunc effect a 2013 decision terminating the foster family placement of two children with AL.

– ‘The Commission was not justified in ordering the recovery of the family allowances paid to the appellant in respect of [dependent children A and B’s] care’, since, ‘pursuant to the judgment of the Regional Court, Bucharest, of 16 May 2022, [those] children … must be regarded as having remained in foster family care with the appellant after 30 January 2013’, that is to say, during the period in which the appellant received one of the allowances at issue in that case. (14)

20. Contrary to the Council’s contention in its pleading of 20 May 2026, (15) the judgment in AL v Commission alters ‘the truth of the allegations against the official’, directly affecting the disciplinary proceedings which concluded with his removal from post. Some of the alleged acts on which the appointing authority relied in order to apply Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and choose the most severe disciplinary penalty no longer exist (in law).

21. In accordance with the judgment in AL v Commission, some of the allowances received by AL in respect of children A and B throughout the period at issue were appropriate. That means that the contested decision took into account conduct which did not reflect that attributable to AL.

22. In short, there are sound reasons for recalibrating the assessment of proportionality of the disciplinary penalty in the light of the new ‘truth of the allegations’ against the official, as established following the judgment in AL v Commission. (16)

23. In the present Opinion, in addition to the consequences of the judgment of the Court in AL v Commission, I shall consider a twofold preliminary matter: (a) the scrutiny by the General Court of the appointing authority’s decisions on the imposition of penalties; and (b) the scope of the review by the Court of Justice, as an appeal court, of judgments given in actions for the annulment of those decisions.

B. Scope of the scrutiny, by the General Court, of a disciplinary penalty

24. In accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 22 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, the power to impose a disciplinary penalty rests with the appointing authority. If, after termination of the proceedings, it is found that professional misconduct has taken place, the appointing authority must apply and weigh up, inter alia, the criteria set out in Article 10 of that annex in order to select one of the penalties provided for in Article 9 thereof.

25. For those purposes, the appointing authority has a broad discretion: it is required to assess all the facts and the circumstances of each case, without being bound by the opinion of the Disciplinary Board.

26. Where the appointing authority’s decision is challenged on the grounds of the allegedly disproportionate nature of the penalty imposed, to what extent may the General Court exercise its power of judicial scrutiny over the logical process which led to the determination of that penalty? In particular, to what extent may the General Court review the appointing authority’s assessment of proportionality?

27. There is a certain tension in the case-law of the Court of Justice between two standards of judicial review which may be applied in order to answer those questions:

– the first, which is limited in nature, limits a review to a finding of a ‘manifest error of assessment’;

– the second, developed under Article 47 of the Charter and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), advocates in favour of a ‘full’ review of the determination of the disciplinary penalty which must be specific to the person concerned.

1. Limited review

28. The earliest case-law of the Court of Justice, established when it acted as a court of first (and sole) instance in proceedings relating to the regulations governing officials, (17) took what I shall call a ‘traditional’ approach to its powers of judicial review.

29. In accordance with that approach, the legal assessment of the allegations against an official, for the purposes of determining whether they fall within the scope of the disciplinary provision, comes within ‘the field of the “administrative discretion” attributed to the disciplinary authority, that is to say, a field where the review of legality by the Court is very restricted, and quite rightly so’. (18)

30. That method of review was governed by a striking deference towards the appointing authority in the exercise of its disciplinary powers. (19) The outcome was that, ‘once the truth of the allegations against the official has been established, it is for the appointing authority to choose the appropriate penalty’, and ‘the Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the appointing authority except in the case of a manifest error or misuse of powers.’ (20)

31. The prevailing, but not always settled, case-law at that time was that ‘an error may be classified as “manifest” only where it can be readily detected, in the light of the criteria to which the legislature intended the administration’s exercise of its discretion to be subject. Thus, a plea based on manifest error must be rejected if, despite the evidence produced by the applicant, the appraisal in question can still be regarded as justified and coherent.’ (21)

32. The ‘manifest error of assessment’ standard was applied, first, in order to verify the material accuracy of the facts and evidence relied on. Secondly, it was extended to cover complex technical assessments and the assessment of proportionality in the strict sense. Consequently, the EU judicature’s involvement was limited to establishing whether the disciplinary penalty concerned was manifestly wrong or unreasonable.

2. The effects of the Charter and the transition to a ‘full review’

33. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the question arose as to whether a limited review by the courts, in the terms I have just described, was consistent with the requirements of the right to an effective remedy.

34. Article 47 of the Charter binds the courts of the European Union in the performance of their duties, imposing on them the obligation to ensure full, effective judicial protection under the conditions laid down in that article. (22)

35. Although the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (23) is not a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated into EU law, Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that rights contained therein which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR must be given the same meaning and scope as those laid down by that convention.

36. Therefore, in order to define the criterion in accordance with which the EU Courts grant the right to an effective remedy, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 ECHR is relevant.

37. That court has noted that, even if they do not come within the scope of Article 6 ECHR under its criminal head, disciplinary penalties may entail serious consequences for the lives and careers of individuals. That is the case, in particular, where there are accusations that are liable to result in removal from office or suspension from duty, that is to say, in very serious penalties which carry a significant degree of stigma. (24)

38. According to the European Court of Human Rights, observance of the right to a fair trial requires that a decision of an administrative authority which does not comply with the requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR must be subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction. (25)

39. In accordance with the same case-law, the concept of ‘full jurisdiction’ is an autonomous concept. (26) When a court exercises such jurisdiction, it must, for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR, have the power to:

– remedy any structural or procedural shortcomings identified in the proceedings before an administrative authority; (27)

– examine individually, point by point and as regards the substance, all the pleas put forward by applicant, without having to decline jurisdiction to review the findings of fact and of law made by the administrative authorities; (28)

– re-examine independently the facts and evidence which were decisive for the form of order sought by the applicant, without being bound by the prior findings of an administrative body; (29)

– assess whether the penalty imposed is proportionate to the applicant’s alleged misconduct. (30)

40. With effect from the entry into force of the Charter, the standard of review developed by the European Court of Human Rights was incorporated into the case-law of the General Court on disciplinary penalties.

41. In the judgment in Andreasen v Commission, (31) the General Court observed that ‘the judicial review conducted by the [EU judicature at first instance] in the context of an action for annulment under Article [263 TFEU] or an action based on [Article 270 TFEU] offers a sufficient and effective remedy before an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR and the case-law of the [European Court of Human Rights]’. (32)

42. According to the General Court, ‘an action for annulment brought [under Article 270 TFEU] enables the correction of both factual and legal errors and a review of the proportionality between the alleged misconduct and the disputed penalty’. (33)

43. That line of case-law was clarified in later judgments of the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal, (34) from which it is apparent that:

– It falls to the General Court to carry out ‘a full review of the accuracy of the facts’, establishing in detail whether the evidence relied on by the administrative authority is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, including where the assessments concerned are complex or delicate. (35)

– The General Court conducts a full review of the proper application of the relevant rules of law. (36) It verifies, in particular, the classification of the facts in the light of the legal concepts used in Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. (37)

– The General Court may assess the proportionality between the misconduct and the penalty. (38) It ascertains, inter alia, whether the weight attached by the appointing authority to the aggravating and extenuating circumstances is proportionate. (39)

44. It is noticeable in those judgments that the traditional (limited) review of disciplinary penalties was exceeded. From both a terminological (40) and a conceptual perspective, (41) the reference to a ‘manifest error of assessment’ has become a ‘full review’ of all questions of law and of fact that are relevant to the dispute.

45. Admittedly, however, a number of the General Court’s judgments continue to present a degree of ambivalence: they include references to both a limited review (absence of a manifest error of assessment) and a full review of proportionality. (42) That is noticeable in the judgment under appeal. (43)

46. Such ambiguity appears to reflect a system of differing intensity: a full review concerns the proportionality of the penalty, whereas the remaining issues are subject to the manifest error of assessment rule. However, that distinction is not always perceptible and the General Court (for example, in the judgment in DI v ECB) does not accept it.

47. Unless I am mistaken, no ruling of the Court of Justice exists from which the solution to those two distinct approaches may be inferred with absolute clarity.

3. Assessment of the standard of review

48. The disciplinary penalties imposed on EU officials do not come within the sphere of criminal law in the strict sense, but, as I have already noted, they may have a serious impact on the personal life of the person concerned.

49. The rules governing those penalties must comply, mutatis mutandis, with the guarantees inherent in the law on penalties, regarded as a ‘genus’ which includes both the criminal law and certain serious expressions of an institution’s punitive powers.

50. That proposition having been established, the determination of the disciplinary penalty and ensuring that it is specific to the person concerned presupposes an intellectual process in which different types of assessment come together:

– On the one hand, assessments of an eminently factual nature: establishment of the facts and assessment of the evidence adduced to substantiate their existence.

– On the other hand, assessments of a legal nature: whether the established facts fall within the scope of the provision which creates the offence or defines the scope of the factors having a bearing on the penalty.

– Ensuring that the penalty is specific to the person concerned requires an assessment of proportionality, underpinned by an overall assessment and the weighting (44) of favourable and unfavourable factors relating to the person against whom the misconduct is alleged and the conditions in which that misconduct was committed.

51. As I have already observed, the Court’s earliest case-law made those assessments as a whole subject to the limited review criterion (‘manifest error of assessment’), which was developed primarily in fields of EU law characterised by complex technical assessments. With regard to assessments requiring specialist knowledge or the analysis of multiple factors of a technical nature, the competent institution is, in principle, considered to be better placed than the court to carry out such assessments. (45)

52. Even in fields of EU law characterised by their high degree of technicality (such as State aid), there is the risk of excessively widespread use of the limited judicial review standard. (46)

53. As regards officials, only a legal fiction enables the assertion that all assessments underpinning the determination of the disciplinary penalty and ensuring that it is specific to the person concerned involve, by their very nature, technical or particularly delicate appraisals to which the ‘manifest error of assessment’ standard must be applied.

54. The process of determining the disciplinary penalty and ensuring that it is specific to the person concerned may, in exceptional cases, require appraisals of that kind, such as those relating to the official’s professional performance or an appraisal of the carrying out of tasks of particular technical complexity.

55. Even then, the difficulties affecting the judicial scrutiny of those factors are no different from those which any court (administrative or criminal) faces when it examines complex conduct, for example in economic fields.

56. Usually, for an official’s conduct to come within any of the definitions of disciplinary offence, the EU judicature does not face any barriers to carrying out a full judicial review. Even where it allows the administrative authority a certain margin of discretion, that does not mean that an EU Court must refrain from reviewing the assessment made by that authority concerning the appropriateness of the penalty imposed.

57. In the judgment in Tetra Laval, the Court had occasion to explain that ‘not only must the [EU] Courts, inter alia, establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.’ (47)

58. In other words, the possible complex or delicate nature of an assessment does not exempt the EU judicature from rigorously examining the accuracy of the factual basis substantiating it or whether the administrative authority’s reasoning is well founded.

59. In that context, the standard of review applies to the established facts and to the classification of those facts, as well as to the proportionality of the disciplinary penalty imposed.

(a) The assessment of the facts and the evidence

60. The General Court, as the court adjudicating on the merits, ‘has exclusive jurisdiction’ to establish and assess the facts. (48) Article 263 TFEU, the provisions of which are essentially the same as those of Article 270 TFEU, ‘involves review by the European Union judicature, in respect of both the law and the facts, of … the contested decision [in the light of the arguments put forward by the applicant], which means that it has the power to assess the evidence [and] annul the decision …’ (49)

61. Having established that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts, limiting its task to the mere confirmation of a manifest error on the part of the administrative authority would amount to a restriction of the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter. An error which is not manifest but is of relevance to the final decision must be corrected during the court proceedings.

62. That is the underlying concern in the judgment in Tetra Laval, which stresses the General Court’s obligation to examine in detail the accuracy of the factual basis, even if that involves complex technical assessments.

63. It is, therefore, for the General Court to conduct a full review of the factual assessments carried out by the appointing authority when it decided on the disciplinary penalty. Even in the case of complex technical assessments, the General Court is not exempt from verifying the factual accuracy of the evidence relied on.

64. I believe that a full review is the most consistent with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights cited above. In the judgment in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho, that court:

– Noted that the judicial review of an administrative decision imposing a disciplinary penalty differs from that of an administrative decision that does not entail such a punitive element. (50) In particular, in the context of disciplinary proceedings, the issues of fact are just as crucial as the legal issues for the outcome of proceedings. (51)

– Observed that the intensity of the judicial review must be compatible with ‘the nature of the “civil rights and obligations” at stake and the nature of the policy objective pursued by the underlying domestic law … Whether the review carried out was sufficient will thus depend on the circumstances of a given case’. (52)

– Accepted, however, that a review that is limited to a manifest error of assessment could be considered to be compatible with Article 6 ECHR if the limitation of the power to examine the facts were to be confined to a specific issue (the appellant’s performance appraisal), after having confirmed the existence of other evidence substantiating the sufficiency of that form of review in the specific case. (53)

(b) The legal classification of the facts

65. The General Court has full jurisdiction to examine the legal classification which the appointing authority made of the alleged acts of the official. In my view, that proposition is so clear as to not require further demonstration: the assessment of the correct application of provisions of EU law is at the very heart of the review provided for in Article 270 TFEU and Article 91 of the Staff Regulations. It is a fundamental principle of the judicial review system.

66. Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations uses a number of legal concepts whose meaning and scope ‘must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation within the EU legal order, in order to ensure the equal treatment of officials when applying the provisions of the Staff Regulations’. (54)

67. The existence of a discretionary power of the administrative authority is not sufficient for the EU Courts simply to confirm the administrative decision without examining whether the exercise of that power complied with the rules and principles of EU law. (55)

68. The DI v ECB case-law and its subsequent development both confirm that the General Court is required to conduct a ‘full’ review of the proportionality of the penalty. The General Court must examine ‘in particular’ whether the weight attached by the appointing authority to the attending circumstances was proportionate.

69. There are two aspects to the examination of proportionality:

– First, the General Court must examine the accuracy of the findings of fact and of law made by the appointing authority when applying each of the criteria listed in Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations to the specific case.

– Secondly, it must scrutinise whether the weight attached as a whole to the different criteria was appropriate. For that purpose, it must examine those criteria from the point of view of their reciprocal relationships, by means of an overall assessment making it possible to reach a uniform, coherent view as to whether the penalty specific to the person concerned was determined correctly and whether it complies with the principle of proportionality.

70. Those two levels of analysis should not be confused. In particular, the legally correct examination of each of the criteria laid down in Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, taken in isolation, does not by itself guarantee an equally lawful overall balancing exercise.

71. Where the appointing authority has correctly classified certain circumstances as aggravating or mitigating, that does not necessarily mean that the penalty imposed on the basis of that classification is proportionate and immune to judicial review. The General Court must, in particular, weigh up all the criteria, thereby performing a review which differs from that relating to the individual application of each criterion.

72. When the General Court assesses the appropriateness of a penalty, the assessment of proportionality which it must perform cannot be limited to verification of whether that penalty is ‘manifestly disproportionate’, which was characteristic of the earlier case-law. There are several arguments in support of this:

– It follows from the right enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, in the light of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, that the examination of the proportionality of a penalty is an inherent feature of a review by a court having ‘full jurisdiction’. The General Court must reach its own finding with regard to whether the penalty imposed by the appointing authority is appropriate and proportionate. It is required to conduct its own examination of whether the appointing authority took into consideration all the relevant criteria for the determination of that penalty. (56)

– The application of the principle of proportionality to ensuring that penalties (or sentences) are specific to the person concerned does not involve a technical or specialised examination that is outside the jurisdiction of a court. Rather, it is a typically judicial function.

– Only a ‘full’ review, in the terms set out above, makes it possible to ensure a sufficiently uniform application of the criteria laid down in Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations and, therefore, the equal treatment of officials. (57)

C. Review by the Court of Justice in an appeal concerning disciplinary penalties

73. While it is accepted that the General Court’s review should not be limited to examining the appointing authority’s manifest error of assessment, the role of the Court of Justice in an appeal must also be governed by the general criteria laid down in Article 256 TFEU and the first subparagraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

74. Based on that proposition:

– An appeal must be limited to points of law and the Court of Justice must assess the facts only where a material inaccuracy is alleged in the findings of the General Court which is clear from the documents in the case file (distortion of the facts). (58)

– What the scope of the appointing authority’s discretion is and where, in that context, the boundaries of the Court’s review should be drawn are points of law on which the Court may adjudicate in an appeal.

– When the General Court has established the facts alleged against the official, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 256 TFEU to review the legal classification and the conclusions which the General Court has drawn from them. (59)

– The proportionality of a disciplinary penalty constitutes a point of law which is subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, (60) on the basis of (undistorted) facts established by the General Court.

– The Court of Justice must examine, in particular, whether the General Court’s interpretation and application of the legal concepts (including those set out in Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations) are correct and also whether the General Court complied with its obligation to conduct a full assessment, in accordance with the review standard set out above, of the appropriateness of the penalty after having weighed up all the circumstances of the case. (61)

VI. Application of those considerations to the present case

75. The considerations set out above make it possible to conduct an examination of the third ground of appeal as regards the intensity of the review carried out by the General Court in the judgment under appeal.

76. First, I stress that the judgment in AL v Commission has a decisive effect on the assessment of proportionality carried out by the General Court. As I have already stated, in that judgment it was found that the General Court had distorted some of the facts alleged against AL. However, those facts were taken into account, to the detriment of the official, when examining the effects of certain criteria (those provided for in points (a) (62) and (c) (63) of Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations) on the penalty of removal from post.

77. In my view, the General Court could not validly allege against the official (more correctly, accept the administrative authority’s allegation) facts which, in truth, were not attributable to him. It was not acceptable, therefore, to confirm the existence of such facts to the official’s detriment in order to adjudicate on the validity of the penalty. (64)

78. Secondly, in paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court states that it will apply the ‘limited’ standard of judicial review, a standard which, as I have already pointed out, is not compatible with Article 47 of the Charter in circumstances such as those of the present case. The references to a ‘manifest error of assessment’ appear frequently in the judgment under appeal. (65)

79. Lastly, in paragraph 177 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court states that ‘the Council imposed a disciplinary penalty on the applicant that was proportionate to the seriousness of the misconduct committed, and carried out a correct assessment of the overall circumstances of the case, in particular those listed in Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. Consequently, the Council carried out a proportionate weighting of the aggravating and mitigating factors …’ (emphasis added).

80. A mere declaration that each of the (non-exhaustive) criteria laid down in Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations was properly assessed does not by itself amount to confirmation that those criteria as a whole were indeed appropriately weighted.

81. As I have already explained, a ‘full’ judicial review of the proportionality of the penalty, as required by Article 47 of the Charter, means that the General Court must form, and provide reasons for, its own conviction regarding the appropriateness of the penalty, by means of an examination of the reciprocal relationship, as already determined, between the different mitigating and aggravating circumstances. That is the only way in which an effective review of the proportionality of the penalty imposed is possible.

82. In short, without it being necessary to examine in detail whether the findings reached in the assessment of the criteria listed in Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations were correct, I believe that the General Court did not apply the standard of judicial review required by Article 47 of the Charter. Therefore, the third ground of appeal must be upheld.

VII. Referral of the case back to the General Court

83. In accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Court of Justice, where it quashes the decision of the General Court, may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits, or refer the case back to the General Court for judgment.

84. In view of the limited nature of my examination of the appeal, I am not in a position to propose that the Court of Justice give final judgment in the matter.

VIII. Award of costs

85. For the same reasons, it is not appropriate for me to state a view on the imposition of costs.

IX. Conclusion

86. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice uphold the third ground of the appeal against the judgment of the General Court of 10 April 2024, AL v Council (T‑22/22, EU:T:2024:219), and set aside the part of that judgment to which it relates.

1 Original language: Spanish.

2 The dispute between AL and the Council (in its capacity as employer) and the Commission (PMO, to which certain powers relating to the management of individual rights have been delegated) has resulted in seven decisions of the General Court (orders of 22 December 2022, AL v Commission (T‑692/21, EU:T:2022:862); of 31 March 2022, AL v Council (T‑22/22 R, EU:T:2022:200); and of 17 January 2023, AL v Council and Commission (T‑50/22, EU:T:2023:11); and judgments of 24 May 2023, AL v Commission (T‑714/21, EU:T:2023:282); of 10 April 2024, AL v Council (T‑22/22, EU:T:2024:219); of 10 April 2024, AL v Commission (T‑50/22, EU:T:2024:220); of 6 November 2024, AL v Council (T‑315/23, EU:T:2024:771)) and two of the Court of Justice (order of 6 February 2024, AL v Commission (C‑498/23 P, EU:C:2024:204), and judgment of 23 April 2026, AL v Commission (C‑882/24 P, ‘the judgment in AL v Commission’, EU:C:2026:329)).

3 Judgment of 10 April 2024, AL v Council (T‑22/22, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2024:219).

4 Decision of the General Secretariat of the Council of 27 September 2021 (‘the contested decision’).

5 ‘The Staff Regulations’.

6 ‘The appointing authority’ or ‘the administrative authority’.

7 In accordance with the report of 20 December 2020 (Case OF/2016/0928/A1), AL: (1) made inaccurate declarations in his applications so that his mother would be treated as a dependent child, which enabled him to receive undue family allowances; (2) intentionally provided incomplete information in July 2010 to the Romanian authority responsible for deciding on the foster family placement measures for two children and failed to inform the Council when those measures came to an end on 30 January 2013, and therefore continued to receive allowances for the two children after that date; (3) made inaccurate declarations in the context of applications for education allowances for two dependent children; (4) submitted inaccurate information in the supporting documents used to apply for dependent status for two other children, an application which was rejected by the Council; (5) provided inaccurate or incorrect information to the Romanian court which, in 2019, approved the adoption of a child, on the basis of which AL applied for recognition of that child as a dependent child and the grant of the corresponding allowances.

8 OLAF’s recommendation regarding recovery of the allowances led to the events examined by the Court in Case C‑882/24 P, AL v Commission, and I refer to the Court’s judgment in that case.

9 In addition, AL applied for and was granted, as an interim measure, the suspension of the operation of the decision with effect from 1 October 2021.

10 In his application, AL relied on 13 pleas in law. The General Court examined his arguments by organising them into four groups.

11 Paragraph 32 of the defence before the General Court, citing case-law.

12 Paragraphs 47 to 55 of the judgment under appeal.

13 Paragraphs 101, 128, 134, 146, 163 and 177 of the judgment under appeal.

14 The judgment in AL v Commission, paragraph 66.

15 In that document, the Council transcribes paragraphs 129 to 131 of the judgment under appeal and argues that the General Court’s findings which follow from those paragraphs ‘had nothing to do with the question examined by the Court of Justice in the judgment [in AL v Commission], but concerned only the question of the appellant’s behaviour vis-à-vis the Council, i.e. whether the appellant had deliberately omitted to provide information concerning the end of the foster family placement of the children A and B as from 1 February 2013’. However, I fail to see how it could be alleged that the appellant ‘deliberately omitted’ to notify the Council of the termination of a measure which, as acknowledged in the judgment in AL v Commission, had not ended on the date indicated by the Council but rather had continued validly to produce effects throughout the period in which AL (legitimately) received the allowance. Therefore, there was no ‘intentional omission’ on the part of AL, a matter which was, however, assessed to his detriment for the purposes of application of the penalty.

16 Conversely, that judgment confirmed the Commission’s right to recover the sums unduly paid to AL, by way of allowances for a dependent child to support his mother and another adopted child.

17 The references to the Court of Justice contained in that case-law must, in the context of the current structure of the EU system of remedies, be taken to indicate the General Court.

18 That was how Advocate General Mancini summarised the state of the question in his Opinion in F. v Commission (228/83, EU:C:1984:396). He added that, where the Disciplinary Board and the appointing authority are of the same view in selecting the appropriate penalty, ‘it is clearly [inappropriate – “fuori luogo” in the original Italian version of that Opinion] to claim that the penalty imposed was disproportionate to the conduct complained of’.

19 In accordance with the settled principle that the assessment of the professional competence of officials and other servants of the European Union is, in the first place, a matter for the institutions which employ them: judgment of 19 July 1955, Kergall v Assemblée commune (1/55, EU:C:1955:9).

20 There is abundant settled case-law in this respect, which is encapsulated in the judgment of 30 May 1973, De Greef v Commission (46/72, EU:C:1973:57, paragraphs 45 and 46). As regards the subsequent case-law of the Court of Justice, see judgments of 29 January 1985, F. v Commission (228/83, EU:C:1985:28, paragraph 34); of 19 April 1988, M. v Council (175/86 and 209/86, EU:C:1988:180, paragraph 9); and of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission (C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 127). As regards the General Court, see judgments of 16 July 1998, Y v Parliament (T‑144/96, EU:T:1998:173, paragraphs 34 and 36); of 12 September 2000, Teixeira Neves v Court of Justice (T‑259/97, EU:T:2000:208, paragraphs 108 and 109); of 3 July 2001, E v Commission (T‑24/98 and T‑241/99, EU:T:2001:175, paragraphs 86 and 87); of 5 December 2002, Stevens v Commission (T‑277/01, EU:T:2002:302, paragraphs 73 and 79); and of 5 October 2005, Rasmussen v Commission (T‑203/03, EU:T:2005:346, paragraph 80).

21 Judgment of 21 November 2024, UG v Commission (C‑546/23 P, EU:C:2024:975, paragraph 122). The Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in ESC v E (C‑150/98 P, EU:C:1999:297), points 26 to 37, takes the same line. In the advocate general’s view, in the assessment of the proportionality of a penalty, the Court of First Instance could dismiss the reasoning of the contested disciplinary decision only by setting out in detail ‘in what respect the inappropriate nature of the penalty to the infringement was so manifest that, despite the discretion allowed to the appointing authority, the Court was bound to set aside the contested decision’ (paragraph 27, emphasis added). Demonstration of a ‘manifest lack of proportion’ is ‘a precondition for an order to annul a decision pursuant to review by the courts’ (paragraph 37).

22 Judgment of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission (C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited): ‘The principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of EU law to which expression is now given by Article 47 of the [Charter] …’

23 Done in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’).

24 Judgment of 6 November 2018, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal (CE:ECHR:2018:1106JUD005539113), § 196 (‘the judgment in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho’).

25 The judgment in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho, § 132, and judgment of 3 November 2022, Dahan v. France (CE:ECHR:2022:1103JUD003231414), § 50.

26 Judgment of 3 November 2022, Dahan v. France (CE:ECHR:2022:1103JUD003231414), § 51.

27 The judgment in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho, § 132.

28 The judgment in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho, § 183.

29 Judgment of 21 July 2011, Sigma Radio Television Ltd v. Cyprus (CE:ECHR:2011:0721JUD003218104), § 157.

30 Judgment of 26 September 1995, Diennet v. France (CE:ECHR:1995:0926JUD001816091), § 34.

31 Judgment of 9 September 2010, Andreasen v Commission (T‑17/08 P, EU:T:2010:374, paragraphs 141 to 148).

32 Paragraph 145, citing the judgment of 11 July 2007, Schneider Electric v Commission (T‑351/03, EU:T:2007:212, paragraph 184), in relation to jurisdiction.

33 Judgment of 9 September 2010, Andreasen v Commission (T‑17/08 P, EU:T:2010:374, paragraph 146).

34 In the interests of simplification, I shall refer to the General Court to indicate the EU Court which is entrusted at first instance with the judicial review of the appointing authority’s decision, although, between 2005 and 2016, jurisdiction for this lay with the Civil Service Tribunal.

35 Judgment of 9 June 2021, DI v ECB (T‑514/19, ‘the judgment in DI v ECB’, EU:T:2021:332, paragraph 160 and the case-law cited).

36 The judgment in DI v ECB, paragraph 161.

37 The judgment in DI v ECB, paragraph 196, and judgment of 23 March 2022, OT v Parliament (T‑757/20, EU:T:2022:156, paragraph 170).

38 Judgment of 15 May 2012, Nijs v Court of Auditors (T‑184/11 P, EU:T:2012:236, paragraph 85).

39 Judgment of 16 March 2004, Afari v ECB (T‑11/03, EU:T:2004:77, paragraph 203), and the judgment in DI v ECB, paragraph 197.

40 ‘… it is for the appointing authority to choose the appropriate penalty where the truth of the matters alleged against the staff member is established, and it is not open to the Courts of the European Union to criticise that choice unless the penalty imposed is disproportionate to the matters alleged …’ (judgment of 26 June 2013, BM v ECB (F‑106/11, EU:F:2013:91, paragraph 51, emphasis added)).

41 The judgment in DI v ECB, paragraph 162, reformulated the plea alleging manifest errors of assessment as ‘an incomplete examination of the circumstances of the case, errors in the assessment of evidence and an error of law’.

42 See, inter alia, judgments of 5 June 2019, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission (T‑273/18, EU:T:2019:371, paragraphs 125 and 126); and of 6 October 2021, AV and AW v Parliament (T‑43/20, EU:T:2021:666, paragraphs 136 and 137); and order of 10 February 2026, IR v Council (T‑214/25, EU:T:2026:134, paragraphs 32 and 35).

43 In particular, paragraphs 52 to 54.

44 The concept of ‘weighting’ (ponderación in Spanish, itself derived from the Latin word pondus (meaning ‘weight’)) evokes a balancing exercise between contrasting interests and circumstances, which transcends the mere legal classification of the facts. It requires a joint examination of the factual and legal findings previously made in order to determine the proportionate punitive response in each case.

45 See, for example, in relation to the classification of dangerous substances, judgment of 21 July 2011, Etimine (C‑15/10, EU:C:2011:504, paragraph 60); in relation to the resolution of banks, judgment of 11 December 2025, ABLV Bank v SRB (C‑602/22 P, EU:C:2025:953, paragraph 131); in relation to State aid, judgment of 29 June 2023, TUIfly v Commission (C‑763/21 P, EU:C:2023:528, paragraph 76); and in relation to the protection of competition, judgment of 15 February 2005, Commission v Tetra Laval (C‑12/03 P, ‘the judgment in Tetra Laval’, EU:C:2005:87, paragraph 38).

46 Advocate General Biondi recently stated that that review standard must be restricted exclusively to appraisals which, by their very nature, present a genuine technical complexity, and that it ‘should not become a general formula that unduly limits the EU judicature from exercising a sufficiently intense degree of judicial review on entire categories of appraisals’: Opinion of Advocate General Biondi in Commission and Others v Ryanair (Covid-19 State aid – KLM) (C‑266/24 P, C‑269/24 P and C‑289/24 P, EU:C:2026:271, point 45), referring to the considerations set out in the Opinion in Deutsche Lufthansa v Ryanair and Condor Flugdienst (C‑457/23 P, EU:C:2025:802, point 18). I concur with those observations, which can be applied to the field of the EU civil service.

47 The judgment in Tetra Laval, paragraph 39.

48 See, for example, judgment of 4 June 2026, Ausnit, Olariu și Asociații v Commission (C‑389/25 P, EU:C:2026:455, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

49 Judgment of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission (C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).

50 The judgment in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho, § 196.

51 The judgment in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho, § 203.

52 The judgment in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho, §§ 180 and 181.

53 In the judgment in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho, §§ 204 to 206 and 214, the ECtHR held that a review of the facts was insufficient where that review was limited to the identification of contradictions, inconsistencies, insufficiency in the evidence and any manifest errors of assessment, in the light of the characteristics of the disciplinary proceedings and the nature of the questions at issue in that case, in which the evidence gathering was considered inadequate. Conversely, in the judgment of 3 February 2026, Salvador Coutinho dos Santos Amado v. Portugal (CE:ECHR:2026:0203JUD004479419), §§ 72 and 73, the ECtHR explained that a review which is limited to a manifest error of assessment could be compatible with Article 6 ECHR in a (very different) situation where: (1) the administrative file was complete with regard to the matters subject to review by the courts; and (2) despite the exclusion of a number of factual assessments (relating to professional performance) from the scope of its review, the court had verified the evidence on which the administrative authority’s appraisal was based and confirmed the proportionality of the penalty.

54 Judgment of 15 July 2021, DK v EEAS (C‑851/19 P, EU:C:2021:607, paragraph 41).

55 See, in that connection, judgment of the ECtHR of 6 January 2026, Altıner Akıncı v. Türkiye (CE:ECHR:2026:0106JUD000957023), §§ 98 and 99: a merely formal or superficial review, which does not enable the correct use of administrative discretion to be verified, cannot be regarded as a sufficient or effective review for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR.

56 It should be recalled that the ECtHR has held that full jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR does not require that a court may directly substitute its own assessment for that of the administrative authorities simply by modifying the penalty previously imposed. It will be enough if the court has sufficient powers to review the legality of the contested decision and, where appropriate, quash that decision and remit the case to the same body or a different one for a fresh decision (judgment of 21 July 2011, Sigma Radio Television Ltd v. Cyprus (CE:ECHR:2011:0721JUD003218104), § 153, and the judgment in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho, § 183.

57 Judgment of 15 July 2021, DK v EEAS (C‑851/19 P, EU:C:2021:607, paragraph 41).

58 Judgment of 1 August 2025, France and Commission v CWS Powder Coatings and Others (C‑71/23 P and C‑82/23 P, EU:C:2025:601, paragraph 67).

59 Judgment of 28 July 2011, Diputación Foral de Vizcaya and Others v Commission (C‑474/09 P to C‑476/09 P, EU:C:2011:522, paragraph 57).

60 Order of 16 July 1998, N v Commission (C‑252/97 P, EU:C:1998:385, paragraphs 58 to 64), and judgment of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission (C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraphs 127 and 128).

61 See, by analogy, judgment of 29 April 2004, British Sugar v Commission (C‑359/01 P, EU:C:2004:255, paragraph 47).

62 Paragraphs 94 to 96 of the judgment under appeal.

63 Paragraphs 129 to 131 of the judgment under appeal.

64 I refer to points 19 to 21 of the present Opinion.

65 See paragraphs 101, 128, 134, 146 and 163.

Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered on 8 October 2026.###

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