Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar delivered on 18 December 2025.#CY v Gândul Media Network SRL and HO.#Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie.#Reference for a preliminary ruling – Approximation of laws – Directive 2001/29/EC – Harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society – Reproduction right – Article 2(a) – Concept of a ‘work’ – Short text posted on a social network and reproduced in the online press – Article 5 – Exceptions and limitations – Article 5(3)(c) – Reporting of current events – Degree of harmonisation – Article 5(5) – Three-stage test.#Case C-598/24.

ECLI:EU:C:2025:1002Eu CjeuDec 18, 2025

Full text

Provisional text

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL

SZPUNAR

delivered on 18 December 2025 (1)

Case C‑598/24

CY

v

Gândul Media Network SRL,

HO

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania))

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Intellectual property – Directive 2001/29/EC – Copyright and related rights – Article 2 – Reproduction right – Article 3 – Right of communication to the public – Concept of a ‘work’ – Short text shared on Facebook and reproduced in the online press – Article 5(3)(c) – Exceptions and limitations – Exception linked to the objective of the reporting of current events – Degree of harmonisation )






 Introduction

1.        Copyright law in the European Union provides for a series of exceptions to the exclusive rights of authors, allowing users of works to perform, without their authorisation, certain acts that typically fall within the monopoly of the holders of those rights.

2.        All but one of those exceptions is optional. The Member States thus enjoy broad discretion as regards not only the choice of the exceptions which they wish to transpose into their national law, but also the specific way in which they are implemented.

3.        However, some of those exceptions make it possible to reconcile the exclusive nature of authors’ prerogatives with the fundamental rights of the users of works, in particular freedom of expression in its various forms. It therefore seems to me difficult to conceive that they would not be transposed, in one way or another, into the national law of all Member States. (2)

4.        The present case gives the Court the opportunity to clarify the extent of Member States’ discretion when transposing the exception intended to guarantee freedom of information regarding current affairs enjoyed by the press.

 Legal framework

 European Union law

5.        Articles 2, 3 and 5 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (3) provide:

‘Article 2

Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part:

(a)      for authors, of their works;

…

Article 3

1.      Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.

…

Article 5

…

3.      Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights provided for in Articles 2 and 3 in the following cases:

…

(c)      reproduction by the press, communication to the public or making available of published articles on current economic, political or religious topics or of broadcast works or other subject matter of the same character, in cases where such use is not expressly reserved, and as long as the source, including the author’s name, is indicated, or use of works or other subject matter in connection with the reporting of current events, to the extent justified by the informatory purpose and as long as the source, including the author’s name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be impossible;

…

5.      The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.’

 Romanian law

6.        Article 35(1) and (2) of Legea nr. 8/1996 privind dreptul de autor și drepturile conexe (Law No 8/1996 on copyright and related rights) of 14 March 1996 (4) provides:

‘1.      The following uses of a work that has previously been made available to the public are permitted without the author’s consent and without the payment of any remuneration, provided they are compatible with fair practice, do not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and do not cause harm to the author or the rightholder:

…

2.      Under the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, reproduction, distribution, broadcasting or communication to the public is permitted, where there is no direct or indirect commercial or economic advantage:

…

(c)      short extracts of works, in the context of information on current events, but only to the extent justified by the purpose in pursuit of which the information is being provided;

…’

7.        Article 35(4) of that law, having regard in particular to the situations referred to in paragraph 2(c) thereof, lays down the obligation to indicate the source and the name of the author of the work used, unless that turns out to be impossible.

 Facts, procedure and questions referred for a preliminary ruling

8.        On 8 September 2021, the applicant in the main proceedings, a teacher in a school, published on her Facebook page a text of 22 lines entitled ‘Short guide for parents at the start of school’. In a tone that was both humorous and didactic, she indicated that she did not wish to receive gifts from her pupils’ parents.

9.        On 14 September 2021, the journalist HO published on the website of the online daily newspaper Gândul, managed by Gândul Media Network SRL, a company governed by Romanian law, an article entitled ‘An original message from a teacher for parents who are thinking of giving her gifts at the start of the school year’. In the standfirst, the entire text published by the applicant in the main proceedings was reproduced. According to the order for reference, it is common ground, first, that the text at issue was used without the prior consent of the applicant in the main proceedings and, second, that her name and the source of that text were subsequently added, by means of a hyperlink to the original.

10.      The applicant in the main proceedings brought an action claiming the right to compensation for the material and non-material damage suffered as a result of the infringement of her copyright. By judgment of 26 April 2022, the Tribunalul București (Regional Court, Bucharest, Romania) dismissed that action, taking the view that the text at issue did not qualify for copyright protection. The Curtea de Apel București (Court of Appeal, Bucharest, Romania) upheld that judgment by its decision of 3 May 2023.

11.      The applicant in the main proceedings brought an appeal before the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania), which decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)      Must the provisions of Article 2(a) of [Directive 2001/29] be interpreted as meaning that a text posted on a social network expressing an opinion relating to social practices regarded as inappropriate may be considered to be a work protected by copyright?

(2)      Must the provisions of Article 5(3)(c) of [Directive 2001/29] be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law that permits the use, for the purposes of providing information on topical issues, of only short extracts from a work but not of the work as a whole, in particular where it is of short length, and only on condition that there is no direct or indirect commercial or economic advantage?’

12.      The request for a preliminary ruling was received by the Court on 16 September 2024. Written observations were submitted by the applicant in the main proceedings, the Romanian Government and the European Commission. The Court decided to give judgment without holding a hearing.

 Analysis

13.      Two questions have been referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling in the present case. In accordance with the wishes of the Court, I shall focus my Opinion on the second question. As regards the first question, it is sufficient for the Court to recall its settled case-law according to which classification of subject matter as a ‘work’, within the meaning of EU copyright law, requires only two cumulative conditions to be satisfied, namely that the subject matter be original, being the author’s own intellectual creation, and that it be the expression of that creation. (5) Circumstances such as the length of the text, the place where it is published and whether or not it belongs to a predetermined literary type therefore have no bearing on that classification. Ascertaining whether those two conditions are satisfied in a specific case is entirely a matter of factual assessment and, therefore, falls within the jurisdiction of the courts adjudicating on the substance of the case.

14.      I shall therefore proceed directly to the analysis of the second question referred for a preliminary ruling.

 The subject matter of the second question

15.      The second question referred for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 5(3)(c) of Directive 2001/29.

16.      More specifically, the referring court seeks guidance on the interpretation of the final passage of that provision, which governs the exception relating to the reporting of current events. Under that provision, Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to exclusive rights for ‘use of works or other subject matter in connection with the reporting of current events, to the extent justified by the informatory purpose and as long as the source, including the author’s name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be impossible’.

17.      It is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court is uncertain, in the first place, whether the publication of the text at issue in the main proceedings may be classified as a ‘current event’ within the meaning of Article 5(3)(c) of Directive 2001/29 and, in the second place, as to the compatibility with that provision of the Romanian legislation which transposed it, in so far as the latter limits the authorised use to ‘short extracts’ of works and prohibits any commercial or economic advantage, even indirect, being derived from it whereas those restrictions do not appear in the relevant provision of Directive 2001/29. Only that second aspect is reflected in the second question referred for a preliminary ruling. However, the first aspect concerns the very applicability of the exception for the reporting of current events to the dispute in the main proceedings. I therefore consider it useful to dispel the referring court’s doubts in that regard.

18.      It is important to emphasise that the main proceedings do not concern a review of the validity of the national provision at issue in the light of Directive 2001/29, but a specific dispute to which that national provision might be applicable. It is therefore for the referring court alone to interpret that provision, in so far as possible, in a manner that is consistent with that directive, or, as the case may be, to refrain from applying it in the main proceedings. (6) The compatibility of the national provision at issue with Directive 2001/29 must therefore be assessed by that court in the light of the circumstances of the dispute in the main proceedings and taking into account the need to strike a fair balance between the fundamental rights involved.

19.      By its second question referred for a preliminary ruling, the referring court asks, more specifically, in essence, first, what the conditions are for the application of Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29 and, second, whether that provision must be interpreted as precluding national legislation transposing it which limits authorised use in connection with the reporting of current events to short extracts of works and prohibits direct or indirect economic advantage to be derived from such use.

 Case-law on the exception for the reporting of current events

20.      Before embarking on an analysis of the legal problems raised by the referring court, I consider it necessary to provide a brief reminder of the case-law on Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29.

21.      The dispute in the main proceedings concerns a specific case of application of the exception laid down in that provision, in that the very publication of the work used in connection with the reporting of a current event constitutes that event and the report in question consists, in essence, in a communication to the public of the content of that work. However, the Court has implicitly, but necessarily, held that the exception can apply in such circumstances, in particular in the judgment in Spiegel Online. (7)

22.      It is in that judgment that the Court also set out the broad outlines of the interpretation of Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29, holding, inter alia, that that provision does not constitute full harmonisation of the exception which it contains, leaving the Member States significant discretion in the detailed definition of the conditions for its use, allowing them to strike a balance between the relevant interests. According to the Court, that discretion follows in particular from the wording ‘to the extent justified by the informatory purpose’ contained in that provision. (8)

23.      Nevertheless, the Court has also held that the discretion of the Member States is circumscribed in several regards. (9)

24.      First, in implementing Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29, Member States must comply with the requirements arising from EU law, in particular the conditions laid down in that provision and the principle of proportionality. (10)

25.      Second, Member States must ensure that they do not compromise the attainment of the objectives of Directive 2001/29 concerning the establishment of a high level of protection of copyright and the proper functioning of the internal market, while safeguarding the effectiveness of the exception in question. (11)

26.      Third, the Member States’ discretion is circumscribed by Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29.

27.      Lastly, fourth, in transposing Article 5(3)(c) in fine of the directive, Member States are to rely on an interpretation of the directive which allows a fair balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the European Union legal order. (12) The fundamental rights at stake are, in particular, the intellectual property rights of authors enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and, second, the freedom of expression and information of users of protected works, guaranteed by Article 11 of the Charter. (13)

28.      It is in the light of that case-law that Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted in the context of the present case.

 Classification as a ‘current event’

29.      The referring court asks, in the first place, whether Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29 may be applied in the case of the communication to the public, by an online newspaper, of a text published at the start of the school year on a Facebook page, in which a teacher states that she considers certain behaviour to be inappropriate in the school environment. That court’s doubts arise, in particular, from the fact that the newspaper did not encourage public debate on the subject, for example by inviting its readers to react.

30.      As regards the concept of a ‘current event’, within the meaning of Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29, the Court has held that it refers to an ‘event that, at the time at which it is reported, is of informatory interest to the public’. (14)

31.      I do not think it appropriate to supplement the definition of that concept with additional elements. First, in view of the objective of the exception at issue, which is to safeguard the right of the press to inform and the public’s right to be informed, that definition must cover all subject matter that is important from the point of view of society at the time when the public is informed of it. Second, neither the level of copyright protection nor the degree of seriousness of the infringement of those rights depends on the nature of the event reported using the protected work at issue. In striking a balance between the interests involved in such a case, therefore, it is clearly preferable to adopt a broad definition of the concept of ‘current event’, as formulated by the Court.

32.      The classification as a ‘current event’ of the publication by a teacher of his or her opinion that certain behaviour is inappropriate in the school environment is, of course, a matter for the national courts. In my view, there is nothing to preclude such a classification, since the functioning of the school system is a subject of information that may clearly be of interest to the public, and the opinion in question may be indicative of practices affecting that functioning.

33.      The fact that, in the present case, the readers of the newspaper in which the work at issue was used were not invited to react is, in my view, irrelevant. While it is true, as the referring court observes, that those were the circumstances in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Funke Medien, (15) that fact does not in any way constitute a condition for the application of Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29.

34.      As the Court has already stated, the action of ‘reporting’, referred to in that provision, must be understood as that of providing information on a current event. Moreover, although merely announcing that such an event has occurred does not amount to reporting it, the word ‘reporting’, according to its usual meaning, does not, however, require the user to analyse such an event in detail. (16) The same applies, a fortiori, to an invitation to react, since that manifestly goes beyond the usual meaning of the word ‘reporting’. More generally, it should be noted that, while a debate may often be the – desirable – consequence of the exercise of freedom of expression, it is by no means a precondition.

35.      It is therefore sufficient, in order for Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29 to be applied, that the protected work at issue be used in order to provide information on an event which, at the time at which that information is provided, is of interest to the public.

 The conditions for the application of the exception for the reporting of current events in Romanian law

36.      The referring court’s doubts as to the compatibility of the Romanian legislation governing the exception for the reporting of current events with Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29 concern two points, namely the fact that the authorised use is limited to short extracts of works and the fact that it is prohibited to derive any direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage from that use. (17)

 Limitation of authorised use to short extracts of works

37.      The referring court’s doubt as to the conformity of the Romanian legislation transposing Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29 relates to the fact that that provision allows the use of ‘works’, whereas the Romanian legislation limits authorised use to ‘short extracts of works’.

38.      I wish to state at the outset that, in so doing, the Romanian legislature did not, in my view, exceed the discretion which it enjoys for the purposes of transposing that provision, as defined by the Court. (18)

39.      First, as regards the wording and the scheme of Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29, that provision is optional for Member States, as is the case with almost all the exceptions to copyright provided for by that directive. However, according to a universally accepted rule of interpretation, ‘he who can do more can do less’, meaning that Member States are not in principle required, when implementing those exceptions, to transpose them to their full potential extent.

40.      Moreover, the provision itself contains a limitation, according to which use under the current event reporting exception is authorised only ‘to the extent justified by the informatory purpose’. According to the Court, that wording allows Member States broad discretion when implementing the exception at issue. (19) That discretion necessarily concerns, in particular, the scope of the use of the work. In that context, Member States are therefore entitled to limit authorised use to short extracts of works if they consider that a more extensive use is not justified by the informatory purpose pursued by the exception in question.

41.      Second, such a limitation, while consistent with the objective of Directive 2001/29 of establishing a high level of protection of copyright, does not, in my view, call into question the effectiveness of the exception provided for in Article 5(3)(c) in fine of the directive. The objective of that provision is not to allow the use of protected works as such, but to prevent the freedom to report on current events from being unduly limited by the exclusive rights protecting works associated – in one way or another – with those events. Even where, as in the present case, the work itself or its publication constitutes the event which is reported, that reporting should not be confused with the reproduction and communication to the public of the work in its entirety; to hold otherwise would be to completely distort the meaning of the provision in question. The limitation of authorised use to short extracts of works does not therefore undermine the effectiveness of the exception in question.

42.      Third, the implementation of the exceptions provided for in Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 must comply with paragraph 5 of that article. The latter provision lays down a threefold condition, also called the ‘three-step test’, under which exceptions to copyright are only to be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.

43.      In that regard, it is clear that the reproduction in full and the communication to the public of a work is, by definition, likely to conflict with a normal exploitation of that work and consequently – under the logic of the three-step test – to unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. In such a situation, the secondary communication of the work, made in the context of the exception, replaces the original communication, so that recipients do not have to consult it; the result is a conflict with the normal exploitation of the work by its author.

44.      In the online environment, a communication to the public is often permanent and easily reproducible, so that authors may lose any control over their works, which circulate independently of their will, thereby adversely affecting not only their economic rights but also their moral rights. (20) Furthermore, although the exception in question is primarily intended to preserve the right of the press to provide information on current events, (21) its application is not subject to the user concerned having the formal status of a media outlet. In the online environment, anyone can claim to be reporting on a current event in order to rely on that exception and communicate a work to the public without the author’s authorisation. There is therefore a considerable risk of abuse.

45.      Consequently, I take the view, in the light of Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29, that it is legitimate for a Member State to limit authorised use, in the context of the exception for the reporting of current events, to short extracts of works.

46.      Fourth, the implementation of that exception must strike a fair balance between the applicable fundamental rights, in particular, on the one hand, intellectual property enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter and, on the other hand, freedom of expression and of the press, protected by Article 11 of the Charter. The question therefore arises as to whether the limitation of authorised use to short extracts of works respects that balance.

47.      As regards intellectual property, as I have already observed, the communication to the public of the entire work without the author’s authorisation constitutes a serious infringement of that author’s rights. In extreme cases, such as those mentioned in point 44 of this Opinion, where the author loses control over the exploitation of his or her work, that infringement would, in my view, be manifestly disproportionate. Limiting authorised use, under the exception for the reporting of current events, to short extracts of works helps to safeguard that fundamental right.

48.      On the other hand, freedom of expression is, of course, restricted in such a scenario. Nevertheless, I do not believe such a restriction to be disproportionate. The freedom of expression at issue in the present case concerns the provision of information about an event. The use of the protected work therefore serves only as an illustration to supplement that information and should not constitute the main part of it. The use of short extracts should therefore normally be sufficient. It is also necessary, of course, for the extracts whose use is authorised to be of reasonable length in order to achieve the intended purpose of providing information. However, that aspect concerns the application of national law in concreto.

49.      In my view, the above applies, in principle, irrespective of the length of the work concerned. However, in the case of works so brief that they can be usefully reproduced only in their entirety, the domestic legislation of the Member State in question, as interpreted by the national courts, must allow the entirety of those works to be used, by treating them as extracts, if that is necessary to achieve the informatory purpose pursued. In all other cases, it is normally possible to extract from a work the passages necessary from the point of view of the information to be transmitted, without reproducing that work in full. I would point out that the objective of Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29 is not to allow the use of protected works without the authorisation of the rightholders, but to ensure the freedom to report on current events.

50.      Furthermore, in many situations, particularly on the internet, including that at issue in the main proceedings, techniques such as hyperlinks make it possible to give the public access to the entirety of the work concerned and thus easily achieve the aim pursued, without having to seek the author’s authorisation, but also without infringing the author’s rights. (22) In such cases, the reproduction and communication to the public of the entire work are therefore not necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of freedom of expression and information.

51.      I conclude that Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29 does not preclude legislation of a Member State that restricts use for the purpose of the reporting of current events to short extracts of works, provided that the length of the extract whose use is authorised is sufficient to achieve the intended purpose of providing information.

 The prohibition on deriving an economic or commercial advantage

52.      The prohibition provided for by Romanian legislation on deriving any direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage from the use of a work, under the exception for the reporting of current events, is more problematic.

53.      The referring court does not indicate the exact meaning of the words ‘any direct or indirect commercial or economic advantage’ in Romanian law. That being said, if the prohibition on indirect economic advantage were to be interpreted broadly, it would raise serious doubts. While they have a fundamental role in a democratic society consisting of informing the public and scrutinising public figures, media outlets usually pursue an economic activity. That activity may be financed either directly by customers or through advertising. In both cases, the publication of information constitutes the service provided, the content of which, by attracting customers, has an impact on the income of the economic operator concerned. That operator therefore derives an indirect economic advantage from all its publications, including reports of current events in which protected works are used under the exception in question.

54.      The prohibition of such an indirect advantage therefore undermines the effectiveness of that exception, by making it impossible, in reality, to apply it to any media outlet whose operation constitutes an economic activity. (23) It goes without saying that such a prohibition has no basis in the wording of Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29. The words ‘to the extent justified by the informatory purpose’ do not concern the economic advantage which may be derived from it indirectly, but only the extent of the use of the protected works.

55.      Nor is that prohibition justified by the three-step test in Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29. Unlike a direct advantage derived from the use of a work, which may be treated as commercial exploitation of that work, an indirect advantage consisting of financing the activity of the press through the revenue derived from that activity, including the publication of reports of current events, is unlikely to conflict with the normal exploitation of works used in those reports, or to cause unreasonable prejudice to their authors. Consequently, that prohibition also undermines the balance between the various fundamental rights that the exception for the reporting of current events seeks to reconcile.

56.      Thus, by prohibiting any indirect economic advantage deriving from the use of protected works under the exception for the reporting of current events, the Romanian legislature has exceeded the limits of its discretion in transposing Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29. That provision must therefore be interpreted as precluding such a prohibition.

 Conclusion

57.      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania) as follows:

Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society

must be interpreted as meaning that:

–        it is sufficient, in order for it to be applied, that the work at issue be used in order to provide information on an event which, at the time at which that information is provided, is of interest to the public;

–        it does not preclude legislation of a Member State which restricts the authorised use in connection with the reporting of current events to short extracts of works, provided that the length of the extract the use of which is authorised is sufficient to achieve the purpose of providing information;

–        it precludes legislation of a Member State which prohibits any indirect commercial or economic advantage being derived from the use of works in connection with the reporting of current events.


1      Original language: French.


2      See, to that effect, inter alia, judgment of 29 July 2019, Spiegel Online (C‑516/17, ‘the judgment in Spiegel Online’, EU:C:2019:625, paragraphs 42 and 43).


3      OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10.


4      Monitorul Oficial al României, Part I, No 60 of 26 March 1996.


5      See, most recently, judgment of 24 October 2024, Kwantum Nederland and Kwantum België (C‑227/23, EU:C:2024:914, paragraph 48).


6      See, to that effect, recently, judgment of 28 January 2025, ASG 2 (C‑253/23, EU:C:2025:40, paragraphs 90, 91 and 93).


7      Paragraphs 60 to 74, in particular paragraph 69 of that judgment. See, also, judgment of 29 July 2019, Funke Medien NRW (C‑469/17, EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 75).


8      Judgment in Spiegel Online, paragraphs 27 to 29.


9      Judgment in Spiegel Online, paragraph 30.


10      Judgment in Spiegel Online, paragraphs 31 to 34.


11      Judgment in Spiegel Online, paragraphs 35 and 36.


12      Judgment in Spiegel Online, paragraphs 37 and 38.


13      Judgment in Spiegel Online, paragraph 42.


14      Judgment in Spiegel Online, paragraph 67.


15      Judgment of 29 July 2019 (C‑469/17, EU:C:2019:623, paragraph 75).


16      Judgment in Spiegel Online, paragraph 66.


17      The Commission also observes that, unlike Article 5(3)(c) in fine of Directive 2001/29, Article 35(2)(c) of Law No 8/1996 of 14 March 1996 does not lay down an obligation to indicate the source of the work used, including the author’s name. Such a requirement is, however, apparent from Article 35(4) of that law and concerns, inter alia, the cases referred to in paragraph 2(c) of that article.


18      See points 22 to 27 of the present Opinion and the case-law cited.


19      See point 22 of the present Opinion and the case-law cited.


20      By way of illustration, at the time of writing, the text at issue in the main proceedings was still available on the Gândul website, and on at least two other sites which had reproduced it, whereas the hyperlink to the original was broken, probably because the original had been removed from the place of its initial publication.


21      See, to that effect, judgment in Spiegel Online (paragraph 70).


22      See, inter alia, judgment of 13 February 2014, Svensson and Others (C‑466/12, EU:C:2014:76, point 1 of the operative part).


23      That is to say, in practice, to any media outlet, since even ‘public’ media are rarely financed solely by State resources.

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