ECLI:EU:C:2025:853•Opinion of Advocate General Richard de la Tour delivered on 30 October 2025.#YO and CT v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.#Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg.#Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Immigration policy – Right to family reunification – Directive 2003/86/EC – Article 10(3)(a) – Right of a refugee to family reunification with his or her parents – Concept of ‘unaccompanied minor’ – Application for family reunification for parents with a minor refugee who has reached the age of majority during the asylum procedure – Scope of the judgment of 12 April 2018, A and S (C‑550/16, EU:C:2018:248) – Reasonable time limit for lodging that application – Dies a quo – Right to respect for private and family life – Best interests of the child – Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.#Case C-571/24.
Opinion of Advocate General Richard de la Tour delivered on 30 October 2025.#YO and CT v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.#Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg.#Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Immigration policy – Right to family reunification – Directive 2003/86/EC – Article 10(3)(a) – Right of a refugee to family reunification with his or her parents – Concept of ‘unaccompanied minor’ – Application for family reunification for parents with a minor refugee who has reached the age of majority during the asylum procedure – Scope of the judgment of 12 April 2018, A and S (C‑550/16, EU:C:2018:248) – Reasonable time limit for lodging that application – Dies a quo – Right to respect for private and family life – Best interests of the child – Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.#Case C-571/24.
ECLI:EU:C:2025:853Eu CjeuOct 30, 2025
Full text
Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
RICHARD DE LA TOUR
delivered on 30 October 2025 (1)
Case C‑571/24
YO,
CT
v
Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
other party:
Kreis Bergstraße
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg (Higher Administrative Court, Berlin-Brandenburg, Germany))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Immigration policy – Directive 2003/86/EC – Right to family reunification – Article 10(3)(a) – Family reunification of a refugee, who arrived as an unaccompanied minor, with his or her first-degree relatives in the dsirect ascending line – Unaccompanied minor who has reached the age of majority on a date prior to the granting of refugee status and the delivery of the judgment of 12 April 2018, A and S (C‑550/16, EU:C:2018:248) – Consequences to be drawn from that judgment as regards the date of submission of an application for family reunification )
I. Introduction
1. By the present reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court is asked to clarify the consequences to be drawn from its judgment of 12 April 2018, A and S, (2) as regards the processing of an application for family reunification submitted on the basis of Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86/EC (3) by the parents of a young third-country national (‘the sponsor’), (4) who, having arrived on the territory of a Member State as an unaccompanied minor, reached the age of majority during the procedure for examining his application for international protection and was granted refugee status prior to the date of delivery of that judgment.
2. In that judgment, the Court clarified the conditions under which unaccompanied minors who have attained the age of majority during that procedure may claim entitlement to the right to family reunification under the more favourable provisions laid down in that article. In particular, the Court has held that an application for family reunification must, in principle, be submitted within a time limit of three months of the date on which the ‘minor’ concerned was declared to have refugee status. (5)
3. In the present case, the ‘minor’ concerned acquired refugee status on a date well before the delivery of the judgment in A and S, with the result that that period of three months had expired when his parents, YO and CT, both Syrian nationals residing in Türkiye, sought to assert the right to family reunification provided for in Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86. It is against that background that the present case arises, since the consulate general of Germany in Istanbul (Türkiye) rejected their application on the ground that that right had lapsed when the child reached the age of majority and, in any event, their application had not been submitted promptly after their son had been granted refugee status.
4. The Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg (Higher Administrative Court, Berlin-Brandenburg, Germany), which is the referring court, is asking the Court, in essence, whether it is necessary to adjust the rules it established in the judgment in A and S and, in particular, whether the three-month time limit should run from the date of delivery of that judgment or whether that time limit should be increased. The German Government suggests, in its written observations, that the submission of an application for family reunification should be made subject to an absolute age limit, after which such an adjustment would no longer be possible.
5. In this Opinion, I shall set out the reasons why I do not share the view that, in a situation as specific as this one, the submission of an application for family reunification based on Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 should be subject to compliance with a fixed period of three months from the date of delivery of the judgment in A and S. By contrast, I shall propose to the Court that a presumption be applied and that a period of three months from the date on which the sponsor is presumed to have become aware of that judgment be applied.
II. Legal framework
A. European Union law
6. Article 1 of Directive 2003/86 is worded as follows:
‘The purpose of this Directive is to determine the conditions for the exercise of the right to family reunification by third country nationals residing lawfully in the territory of the Member States.’
7. Under Article 2(f) of that directive:
‘For the purpose of this Directive:
…
(f) “unaccompanied minor” means third country nationals or stateless persons below the age of eighteen, who arrive on the territory of the Member States unaccompanied by an adult responsible by law or custom, and for as long as they are not effectively taken into the care of such a person, or minors who are left unaccompanied after they entered the territory of the Member States.’
8. In Chapter V of that directive, entitled ‘Family reunification of refugees’, Article 10(3)(a) states:
‘If the refugee is an unaccompanied minor, the Member States:
(a) shall authorise the entry and residence for the purposes of family reunification of his/her first-degree relatives in the direct ascending line without applying the conditions laid down in Article 4(2)(a)’.
B. German law
9. Paragraph 36 of the Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet (Law on the residence, employment and integration of foreign nationals in the Federal Territory) (6) of 30 July 2004 (7) (‘the AufenthG’), entitled ‘Reunification of parents and other family members’, provides in point 1:
‘By way of derogation from Paragraph 5(1)(1) and Paragraph 29(1)(2), a [temporary] residence permit shall be issued to the parents of a foreign national who is a minor and possesses a [temporary] residence permit under Paragraph 23(4), Paragraph 25(1) or (2), first sentence, first alternative, a [permanent] settlement permit under Paragraph 26(3) or, after being granted a [temporary] residence permit under Paragraph 25(2), first sentence, second alternative, a [permanent] settlement permit under Paragraph 26(4),if no parent possessing the right of care and custody is resident in federal territory.’
III. The facts of the dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
10. The sponsor is a Syrian national of Kurdish origin who was born on 31 January 1999. He entered Germany on 6 August 2015 at the age of 16. Represented by a guardian, he made an application for international protection on 3 June 2016, thus when he was 17 years and 4 months old. He was granted refugee status by decision of 15 May 2017 of the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Germany) at the age of 18 years and 3 months.
11. The sponsor’s parents did not submit an application for family reunification at the end of the procedure for examining the application for international protection, since their child had been informed on several occasions by his guardian, his lawyer and various authorities and organisations responsible for foreign nationals that, in accordance with the case-law of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court, Germany), the right of the parents to be reunited with their child as a recognised refugee, under Paragraph 36(1) of the AufenthG, existed only until the date on which the child reached the age of majority. (8) According to the referring court, in the light of that case-law and the resulting decision-making practice of the authorities at the material time, applications for family reunification based on Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 had no prospect of success for refugees in such a situation.
12. In its judgment in A and S, the Court held that Article 2(f) of Directive 2003/86, read in conjunction with Article 10(3)(a) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that a third-country national who is below the age of 18 at the time of his or her entry into the territory of a Member State and of the introduction of his or her asylum application in that State, but who, in the course of the asylum procedure, attains the age of majority and is thereafter granted refugee status must be regarded as a ‘minor’ for the purposes of that provision. (9) In such a situation, according to the Court, the application for family reunification must be made within a ‘reasonable time’ and must, in principle, be submitted within a period of three months of the date on which the ‘minor’ concerned was declared to have refugee status. (10)
13. After becoming aware of that judgment and on the basis of it, the sponsor requested, by letter of 24 April 2018 to the competent authority in matters relating to foreign nationals of the national administration, the German embassy in Türkiye and the consulate general of Germany in Istanbul, that a residence permit be issued for the purposes of family reunification with his parents and siblings. He also made an application for restitutio in integrum as a precautionary measure in relation to the three-month time limit which, in accordance with the judgment in A and S, must, in principle, be observed in such a case. For their part, his parents applied by letter of 11 July 2018, addressed to the German embassy in Ankara (Türkiye) and the consulate general of Germany in Istanbul, for visas to be issued for the purposes of family reunification. On 20 November 2018, they went to the consulate general in Istanbul to submit their application in person.
14. By decisions of 10 April 2019, the consulate general of Germany in Istanbul rejected those applications on the ground that a right to family reunification for the parents of a refugee exists only until he or she reaches the age of majority and that, in any event, the parents had not submitted their application promptly after their son had been granted refugee status.
15. By judgment of 30 March 2021, the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin (Administrative Court, Berlin, Germany) dismissed the action brought by the sponsor’s parents against the decision of the consulate general of Germany in Istanbul concerning them. First, it held that the right to family reunification could not be based either on Paragraph 36(1) of the AufenthG, which requires the sponsor to be a minor on the date of the administrative decision, or on Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86, which means that their application must be submitted within the period of three months from the grant of refugee status laid down in the judgment in A and S. Secondly, it considered that there was nothing to justify extending the time limit or postponing the starting point of that period. Thirdly, it held that there was no scope for restitutio in integrum or ‘clemency’ on grounds of force majeure, since the fact that the applicants had failed to act in good time on the ground that their application was bound to fail did not constitute a permissible impediment.
16. In their appeal before the Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg (Higher Administrative Court, Berlin-Brandenburg), the applicants claimed that the failure to comply with the three-month time limit as set out in the judgment in A and S could not be relied on against them since that time limit could begin to run only from the time when the persons concerned became aware of it. However, that was not the case here, since the applicants could not have known, before that judgment was published, that, despite the fact that their son had reached the age of majority, they had a right to family reunification with him. The Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) had previously held, as the highest court at national level, that the family reunification of parents with a refugee child, under Paragraph 36(1) of the AufenthG, presupposed, in accordance with Directive 2003/86, that the child was still a minor on the date on which an application for family reunification was made. Moreover, compliance with the three-month time limit after the grant of refugee status for the submission of such an application had not previously been required, but had been established only by the Court of Justice by that judgment.
17. Mindful of the arguments put forward by the applicants, the referring court asks how they could rely on the right to family reunification referred to in Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 after the judgment in A and S had been delivered.
18. In those circumstances the Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg (Higher Administrative Court, Berlin-Brandenburg) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Does the time limit of three months from the grant of refugee status, to which, in accordance with the judgment [in A and S], an application for family reunification made on the basis of Article 10(3)(a) of [Directive 2003/86] must be subject in the case where the sponsor was under 18 years of age at the time when he or she entered the territory of a Member State and applied for asylum in that State but reaches the age of majority during the asylum procedure, apply unchanged even if that time limit had already expired at the time of [that judgment] but the then practice of the administrative authorities and the case-law of the supreme court in such matters in that Member State offered no realistic prospect for a refugee having already reached the age of majority to be able to make a successful application for family reunification?
(2) If Question 1 is to be answered in the negative, does that time limit start to run from a later date in such cases or does a longer time limit apply in those circumstances?’
19. Written observations have been submitted by the German Government and the European Commission. Those parties and interested parties participated in the hearing held on 18 September 2025, during which they also replied to the questions put by the Court for an oral answer.
IV. Analysis
20. By its questions for a preliminary ruling, which, in my view, should be considered together, the referring court is asking the Court to clarify the consequences to be drawn from the judgment in A and S as regards the processing of an application for family reunification submitted on the basis of Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 by the parents of an unaccompanied minor who has reached the age of majority during the procedure for examining his application for international protection and was granted refugee status on a date well before the delivery of that judgment. In particular, the Court is asked to determine the detailed rules for the application of the time limit for submitting such an application for family reunification in that situation.
21. Before turning to the examination of that question and in order to determine its precise scope, it seems to me essential to recall the context of the present case.
22. First, the Court did not limit the temporal effects of the judgment in A and S. (11)
23. Secondly, I would point out that, in accordance with settled case-law, a preliminary ruling does not create or alter the law, but is purely declaratory. (12) The Court’s interpretation of Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 by way of a preliminary ruling in the judgment in A and S, which was confirmed by the judgment of 30 January 2024, Landeshauptmann von Wien (Family reunification with a minor refugee), (13) defined and clarified the meaning and scope of that article, as it should or ought to have been understood and applied since its entry into force.
24. In that regard, I recall that the Court has held that an administrative and judicial practice, such as that relied on against the applicants in the present case, which makes the right to family reunification based on Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 conditional on the date on which the minor concerned was granted refugee status, is contrary to EU law (14) for three reasons:
– first, because such a practice, in so far as it makes the right to family reunification dependent on how quickly or slowly the application for international protection is processed by the competent national authorities, calls into question the effectiveness of that provision;
– secondly, because that practice, in so far as it discourages those authorities from prioritising applications for international protection from unaccompanied minors, runs counter to the objective of granting a specific protection to refugees, in particular unaccompanied minors, and infringes Article 24(2) and (3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; and
– thirdly, because that practice is contrary to the principles of equal treatment and legal certainty, in so far as it makes it entirely unforeseeable for the minor concerned to know whether he or she will be entitled to the right to family reunification with his or her parents.
25. The present case illustrates the consequences of such administrative and judicial practice.
26. The sponsor submitted his application for international protection at the age of 17 years and 4 months, thus when he was close to the age of majority, which justified his application being examined expeditiously. However, even though the Member States are regularly called upon to give priority to applications for international protection from unaccompanied minors, in order to take account of their particular vulnerability, the procedure for examining the sponsor’s application lasted 11 months, which is much longer than usual and is contrary to the provisions of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU. (15) In the course of that procedure, the applicant therefore naturally reached the age of majority and his parents, residing in Türkiye, at the same time lost the right to submit an application for family reunification on the basis of Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86, in accordance with the administrative and judicial practice applicable at that time in Germany.
27. Following the judgment in A and S, from which it followed that the administrative and judicial practice at issue in the main proceedings was incompatible with EU law, the principle of effectiveness required the competent German authorities to guarantee the full effect of the right to family reunification based on Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 by disapplying that practice for the purpose of examining the application for family reunification submitted by the applicants. (16)
28. The consulate general of Germany in Istanbul could not therefore reject the applicants’ application on the ground that such a right existed only until their son reached the age of majority. Moreover, they could not be criticised for not having submitted their application promptly after the sponsor had been granted refugee status. It is clear that, in a situation such as that at issue, which arose before the judgment in A and S was delivered, the applicants cannot be criticised for the time limit having expired since the principle and duration of that limit had not yet been formally established at the time when the competent national authority granted their child refugee status. The absence of a clearly defined time limit therefore renders inadmissible, in my view, the argument that the time limit has been exceeded. (17)
29. It is for the referring court, hearing the action for annulment of the decision of the consulate general of Germany in Istanbul to reject the application, to ensure that Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 is given full effect for the purpose of resolving the dispute pending before it. Under the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, this would involve nullifying the unlawful consequences which resulted from such an infringement of EU law and, in particular, remedying the damage which it has caused to the persons concerned. (18)
30. It is for that reason that the referring court seeks a ruling from the Court.
31. In the present case, it is common ground that the most suitable means of restoring, at least with prospective effect, the legal and factual situation in which persons like the applicants would have been had it not been for the judicial and administrative practice at issue, would be to find that the application for family reunification which they submitted after the delivery of the judgment in A and S is admissible. However, as the Commission pointed out, it is not a question of allowing every refugee, who had the status of unaccompanied minor when they entered the host Member State, but have reached the age of majority during the procedure for examining their application for international protection, to invoke the benefit of that judgment without any time limit following its delivery. In view of the inexorable passage of time, the latter may have reached a sufficiently advanced age which no longer necessarily justifies granting them the right to family reunification referred to in Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86.
32. Consequently, it is essential to set the period within which such an application for family reunification had to be made, after the date of delivery of the judgment in A and S, and the starting point of that period.
33. The referring court, the Commission and the German Government essentially agree that a period of three months from the date of delivery of the judgment in A and S should be set. According to the German Government, it is essential that this period should run from the date on which the young adult could objectively have become aware of that judgment, in order to guarantee identical treatment and foreseeability for all applicants. The government is therefore opposed to the time limit running from the date on which the young adult could actually have become aware of it, on the ground that such a rule would be contrary to the principle of equal treatment and the requirements of legal certainty. The Commission is more nuanced since it proposes that account be taken of the particular circumstances in which the delay in submitting an application for family reunification may be ‘objectively excusable’. As for the applicants, they suggest that that three-month time limit should run from the expiry of a period of two weeks from the date of delivery of that judgment, a period which would enable everyone to take cognisance of the judgment.
34. I would point out that it is common ground that, in a situation as specific as the one at issue, the application for family reunification must be submitted within a reasonable time. There is no argument about that. As the Court held in the judgment in A and S, it would be ‘incompatible with the aim of Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 for a refugee who had the status of an unaccompanied minor at the time of his or her application [for international protection] but who attained his or her majority during the procedure to be able to rely on the entitlement under that provision without any time limit in order to obtain a family reunification’. (19)
35. However, I do not think it is reasonable to adopt a period of three months from the date on which the judgment in A and S was handed down, as suggested by the German Government in particular. Although that solution appears to be inspired by that adopted by the Court in that judgment, the applicants’ situation is not comparable to that of the applicants in the case which gave rise to that judgment.
36. In that case, the time limit for submitting an application for family reunification, of three months from the date on which refugee status was granted, is explained by the fact that the applicant for international protection is notified of the decision recognising his refugee status since it is an individual decision. In accordance with Article 22 of Directive 2011/95/EU, (20) that person is to be informed by the host Member State of the rights and obligations attaching to his or her status, including the right to family reunification recognised in Article 9(1) of Directive 2003/86. Consequently, the person concerned is fully informed, in a language which he or she understands, of the measures which it is for him or her to take without delay in order effectively to assert his or her right to family reunification based on Article 10(3)(a) of that directive.
37. However, the situation is very different in a case such as that at issue. The judgment in A and S was not notified or officially brought to the attention of the sponsor or his parents, since none of them was a party to the proceedings which gave rise to that judgment. It is apparent from the discussions held at the hearing that that judgment received a certain amount of publicity in Germany, in particular, within associations and it is true that the sponsor and his parents exercised particular care and diligence in submitting their applications for family reunification within the period of three months from that judgment. However, I do not think that their situation can be generalised. In view of the diversity of the situations encountered, it cannot reasonably be expected that a young adult refugee, who no longer necessarily benefits from representation and care by his legal guardian and who is therefore no longer necessarily informed and advised by qualified staff, becomes aware of the judgment in A and S on the day it is published, draws the legal conclusions from it and takes steps without delay to obtain family reunification, even though his command of the language and procedures of the host Member State may be rather weak.
38. That is all the more striking with regard to parents who reside in the country of origin or in another third country.
39. To make those young adult refugees or their parents subject to the same level of requirement as those expected in the judgment in A and S, by requiring them to assert their rights to family reunification within a period of three months from the date of delivery of that judgment, seems to me to be unreasonable in view of the very specific situation in which they find themselves, which makes the late submission of their application objectively excusable.
40. However, to adopt a period of three months from the date on which the sponsor actually became aware of the judgment in A and S does not seem to me to be a satisfactory method either. First of all, that date is not easily identifiable by the competent national authority, which might also be exposed to the risk of abusive behaviour on the part of those concerned. Next, that date could be a particularly long time ago, and therefore such an arrangement would run the risk of failing to comply with the objectives of the regime provided for in Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86. Lastly, that arrangement would fail to meet the requirement of legal certainty and would clearly result in different treatment of sponsors in so far as the starting point of that period would vary according to the individual circumstances. On this point, I therefore share the concerns expressed by the German Government.
41. In order to avoid those pitfalls, I propose that a presumption be applied and therefore that that period of three months should start to run from the date on which the sponsor is presumed to have become aware of the judgment in A and S. In the light of the specific difficulties which the young refugee may have encountered in order to be fully informed of the Court’s case-law, it is reasonable to presume that he was able to become acquainted with it at the end of a period of six months from the delivery of that judgment. (21)
42. Recourse to such a presumption makes it possible, in a situation such as that at issue, effectively to assert the right to family reunification based on Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86, while ensuring that the objectives of that regime are not infringed by limiting in time the application of the more favourable provisions from which unaccompanied minors benefit for the purposes of family reunification.
43. By establishing that presumption, the Court would apply against the sponsors the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse, while recognising that they do not necessarily have sufficient means to be immediately and fully informed of the Court’s case-law. By simplifying the burden of proof, it would enable the competent national authority to establish a date from which the period of three months for submitting an application for family reunification in that situation runs, thus guaranteeing legal certainty and, in particular, the foreseeability of the rule, as well as equal treatment of applicants for family reunification.
44. However, in view of the importance of the interests at stake, that presumption should not prevent the competent national authority from taking account of all the circumstances of each individual case and, where appropriate, determining the extent to which an application for family reunification submitted after the expiry of the time limit may be deemed admissible having regard to the nature of the reasons for that delay and to the diligence shown by the sponsor or his or her family members.
45. In the light of those considerations, I consider that an application for family reunification made on the basis of Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 by the parents of an unaccompanied minor, who has reached the age of majority during the procedure for examining his or her application for international protection and who was granted refugee status prior to the date of delivery of the judgment in A and S, must be submitted within a time limit of three months of the date on which the sponsor or members of his or her family are presumed to have become aware of that judgment, that is to say from the expiry of a period of six months from the date of delivery of that judgment.
46. As regards the suggestion made by the German Government in its observations that that application for family reunification should be subject to an absolute age limit of 21 years, in order to ensure that the link with the status of minor is maintained, I consider that it is not necessary in the context of the present case, or even appropriate, for the Court to rule on such a proposal.
47. First, a general rule that an application for family reunification based on Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 must be submitted before the refugee has reached the age of 21 is a rule of substantive EU law. It must be stated that, although the EU legislature provides that the sponsor must be of a minimum age in Article 4(5) of that directive in order to prevent forced marriages, it has not laid down such a rule in Article 10(3)(a) of that directive. Therefore, in the absence of a legal basis and unless the Court is legislating, I do not think that it is for the Court to lay down such a rule. Nor should the Member States be given the freedom to lay down such a rule, since the disparity in national legislation relating to the treatment of this specific category of refugees, described as a ‘transitional category’, would run the risk of undermining the harmonisation sought by the EU legislature. (22)
48. Secondly, the establishment of an absolute age limit of 21 years in the context of the implementation of Article 10(3)(a) of Directive 2003/86 would lead the Court to extend the subject matter of the questions referred by the referring court. In view of the specific protection needs of unaccompanied minors who reach the age of majority during the procedure for examining an application for international protection, (23) it is necessary to consider the scope of a standardised rule in the light of the case-law of the Court. (24) In addition, it is necessary to consider the details of that rule and, in particular, the age from which that young adult may, in principle, be regarded as being sufficiently autonomous and capable of meeting his or her needs to live alone in the host Member State. Such a reflection would clearly merit the attention of the EU legislature and the Member States.
V. Conclusion
49. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court should answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg (Higher Administrative Court, Berlin-Brandenburg, Germany) as follows:
Article 10(3)(a) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification
must be interpreted as meaning that where a third-country national who, having arrived on the territory of a Member State as an unaccompanied minor, has reached the age of majority during the procedure for examining his or her application for international protection and has obtained refugee status and the rights attaching to that status prior to the date of delivery of the judgment of 12 April 2018, A and S (C‑550/16, EU:C:2018:248), the application for family reunification must be submitted within a period of three months from the date on which the sponsor or members of his or her family are presumed to have become aware of that judgment, that is to say from the expiry of a period of six months from the date of delivery of that judgment.
1 Original language: French.
2 C‑550/16, ‘the judgment in A and S’, EU:C:2018:248.
3 Council Directive of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12).
4 In accordance with Article 2(c) of Directive 2003/86, a ‘sponsor’ is ‘a third country national residing lawfully in a Member State and applying or whose family members apply for family reunification to be joined with him/her’.
5 See judgment in A and S (paragraph 61).
6 BGBl. 2004 I, p. 1950.
7 In the version published on 25 February 2008 (BGBl. 2008 I, p. 162), as last amended by Paragraph 3 of the Law of 8 May 2024 (BGBl. 2024 I, No 152).
8 The referring court mentions the judgment of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) of 18 April 2013, 10 C 9/12, paragraph 17 et seq.
9 See judgment in A and S (paragraph 64 and operative part).
10 See judgment in A and S (paragraph 61).
11 See judgment of 6 March 2007, Meilicke and Others (C‑292/04, EU:C:2007:132, paragraphs 34 to 37).
12 See judgments of 18 November 2021, État belge (Pilot training) (C‑413/20, EU:C:2021:938, paragraph 58), and of 10 March 2022, Grossmania (C‑177/20, EU:C:2022:175, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
13 C‑560/20, EU:C:2024:96.
14 See judgment of 30 January 2024, Landeshauptmann von Wien (Family reunification with a minor refugee) (C‑560/20, EU:C:2024:96, paragraphs 35, 51 and 57).
15 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60). Under Article 31(3) of that directive, Member States must ensure that the examination procedure is concluded within six months of the lodging of the application. See also Article 31(7)(b) thereof.
16 See judgments of 9 March 1978, Simmenthal (106/77, EU:C:1978:49, paragraph 24); of 10 March 2022, Grossmania (C‑177/20, EU:C:2022:175, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited); and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli (C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 63).
17 See, in that regard, judgment of 11 September 2019, Călin (C‑676/17, EU:C:2019:700, paragraphs 50 to 57). I agree with the Commission (paragraph 31 of its observations).
18 See judgment of 10 March 2022, Grossmania (C‑177/20, EU:C:2022:175, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
19 Judgment in A and S (paragraph 61).
20 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9). Article 22 provides that ‘Member States shall provide beneficiaries of international protection, as soon as possible after refugee status or subsidiary protection status has been granted, with access to information, in a language that they understand or are reasonably supposed to understand, on the rights and obligations relating to that status’.
21 I refer to my considerations set out in point 37 of this Opinion.
22 See, in that regard, European migration network November 2022 concept note entitled ‘Transition of unaccompanied minors to adulthood’.
23 According to legal literature and various specialised international bodies, those young adults fall within a specific category of refugees referred to as a ‘transitional category’. See, in that regard, Viterbo, H. and Ioffe, Y., ‘No Refuge from Childhood: How Child Protection Harms Refugees’, European Journal of International Law, European University Institute, Florence, Vol. 35, No 3, 2024, pp. 647 to 677, in particular, p. 676. See, also, UNICEF, ‘Enfants non accompagnés, Mettre l’enfant au centre’ November 2023; Recommendation CM/Rec(2019)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 24 April 2019 entitled ‘Supporting young refugees in transition to adulthood’, and the guidelines annexed to that recommendation (in particular, point 27) and the practical guide to that recommendation, entitled ‘Turning 18 with confidence’, April 2023 (point 3.7, p. 36 et seq.); Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe issue paper entitled ‘Realising the right to family reunification of refugees in Europe’, June 2017, in particular recommendation 7 (p. 7); and Resolution 1996 (2014) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, of 23 April 2014 entitled ‘Migrant children: what rights at 18?’.
24 See, on the Court’s approach to the extent to which a child who has reached the age of majority continues to need the presence and care of his or her parent, judgment of 8 May 2013, Alarape and Tijani (C‑529/11, EU:C:2013:290, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited), concerning the right of residence of the parent of a child who has become an adult and is pursuing his studies in the host Member State, and judgment of 30 September 2020, CPAS de Seraing (C‑402/19, EU:C:2020:759, paragraph 42), relating to the enforcement of a decision ordering the return of a parent of an adult child.
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