ECLI:EU:C:1981:50•Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl delivered on 24 February 1981. # Firma Anton Dürbeck v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen. # Reference for a preliminary ruling: Hessisches Finanzgericht - Germany. # Community protective measures - Trade with non-member countries. # Case 112/80.
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Reischl delivered on 24 February 1981. # Firma Anton Dürbeck v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen. # Reference for a preliminary ruling: Hessisches Finanzgericht - Germany. # Community protective measures - Trade with non-member countries. # Case 112/80.
ECLI:EU:C:1981:50Eu CjeuFeb 24, 1981
Full text
OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL REISCHL
DELIVERED ON 24 FEBRUARY 1981 ( 1 )
Mr President,
Members of the Court,
Article 29 (1) of Regulation No 1035/72 of the Council on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1972 (II), p. 437) as amended by Regulation No 2454/72 of the Council (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1972 (November), p. 60) provides :
“(1) Appropriate measures may be applied in trade with third countries if :
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By reason of imports or exports, the Community market in one or more of the products referred to in Article 1” (including dessert apples coming under tariff subheading 08.06 A II) “experiences or is threatened with serious disturbances which may endanger the objectives set out in Article 39 of the Treaty, or |
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For the products listed in Annex III a, the withdrawal or buying-in operations effected pursuant to Articles 18 and 19 concern significant quantities. |
Such measures may be applied only until, depending on the case, either the disturbance or threatened disturbance disappears or the quantities withdrawn or bought-in have decreased substantially.”
By Article 29 (2) the Commission is to lay down provisions for the application of that paragraph. Article 29 (2) further provides that if the situation mentioned in paragraph (1) arises the Commission is to decide upon the necessary measures and the measures are to be communicated to the Member States and are to be immediately applicable.
The conditions for the application of protective measures in the fruit and vegetable sector were laid down in Regulation No 2707/72 of the Council (Official Journal, English Special Edition 1972 (28-30 December), p. 3). Article 1 thereof provides :
“In order to determine whether the situation referred to in the first indent of Article 29 (1) of Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72 exists, account shall be taken in particular of:
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the actual or probable volume of imports or exports, |
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(b) |
the availability of products on the Community market, |
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the prices of domestic products recorded on the Community market, or the probable trend of those prices, ... and in particular their tendency to fall or rise excessively in relation to basic prices or, with regard to products which do not have basic prices, in relation to the prices of preceding years, |
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(d) |
if the situation referred to in the first part exists by reason of imports :
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Article 3 states:
“(1) The measures which may be taken pursuant to Article 29 (2) and (3) of Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72 are:
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When the situation covered by the first indent of paragraph (1) of that article exists, the suspension of imports or exports or the levying of export taxes; |
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When the situation referred to in the second indent of paragraph (1) of that article exists, the suspension of imports or the levying of an additional amount equal to 50% of the difference between the basic price and the price referred to in the first indent of Article 18 (1) (a) of Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72. This additional amount shall be added to the customs duties and to the countervailing charges, if any, which may have been introduced pursuant to Article 25 of Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72. |
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(2) Such measures may only be taken in so far, and for as long, as they are strictly necessary.
(3) The measures provided for in paragraph (1) shall take account of the special position of products in transit to the Community. They shall apply only to products exported from, or intended for, third countries. They may be limited to products exported from, originating in, or intended for certain countries, or to certain qualities, size grades or groups.
As regards the measures provided for in the first indent of paragraph (1), they may be limited to imports intended for certain areas of the Community or to exports from such areas.”
In the spring of 1979 the Commission came to the conclusion that it should use those provisions once it had determined that the production of apples in the current marketing year had considerably exceeded that of the previous year, that the stocks still available were substantially higher than those at the same period in the two previous years, that producer prices in several Member States were at a particularly low level in relation to the basic price and that the quantities available for export in the then current marketing year in the countries of the southern hemisphere seemed to be considerably larger than in previous years. However, at the beginning of March it first tried through negotiations with the most important supplier countries to achieve a reduction of the probable exports of 380000 tonnes, of which 75000 tonnes were to come from Chile, to 310000 tonnes. It was able to reach an agreement with South Africa, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand. Chile on the other hand insisted on being able to export at least 55000 tonnes to the Community because export contracts had already been concluded for that quantity. On the assumption that the Community market could not, without creating a disturbance, absorb more than 310000 tonnes, of which 42000 tonnes were to be allocated to Chile after a proportionate reduction of the probable exports, the Commission therefore set out to achieve that object with regard to Chile by the use of unilateral protective measures.
With that aim in view, and because from information available to it on goods already in the course of transit or recently loaded on board ship it was to be expected that the amount in question would be reached on 25 April, the Commission, on 5 April 1979, adopted Regulation No 687/79 (Official Journal L 86 of 6 April 1979, p. 18). Article 1 thereof provided that the placing in free circulation of apples falling under subheading 08.06 A II of the Common Customs Tariff originating in Chile was to be suspended during the period 25 April to 15 August 1979. At the same time by a note verbale of 6 April 1979 the Commission notified the Chilean Government that it was prepared to reconsider the measure adopted if imports had not reached the stated amount (42000 tonnes) on 25 April.
The Commission was informed by an aide-mémoire from the Chilean Embassy of 17 April 1979 that three ships with a cargo of 6400 tonnes which had been taken into account in the earlier estimates would not arrive in the Community before 25 April and on 23 April 1979 it adopted Regulation No 797/79 (Official Journal L 101 of 24 April 1979, p. 7) in order to make those imports possible but also to ensure that there were no further imports. Article 1 thereof added the following provision to Article 1 of Regulation No 687/79:
“However, in respect of the apples referred to in the paragraph above which left Chile not later than 12 April 1979 in vessels bound for a Community port, placing in free circulation in the Community shall be suspended only as from 5 May 1979.
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On 5 May 1979 it became clear that certain quantities of Chilean apples previously taken into account were not destined for the Community market and that only 38600 tonnes of the quantity allocated to Chile had been imported. As it was known that two ships with a cargo of 3800 tonnes had reached the Community between 5 and 19 May — the goods having been put in a customs warehouse — on 12 June 1979 the Commission adopted another regulation, No 1152/79 (Official Journal L 144 of 13 June 1979, p. 13) which replaced the second paragraph of Article 1 of Regulation No 687/79 with the following paragraph :
“However, in respect of the apples referred to in the preceding paragraph transported in ships which reached a Community port before 19 May 1979, placing in free circulation in the Community shall be suspended only as from 17 June 1979.”
Thus apparently a total of 42400 tonnes of Chilean apples was allowed to be imported into the Community in 1978/79.
Firma Dürbeck, an importer and wholesaler of fruit and vegetables and the plaintiff in the main action, had made contracts for the import from Chile of 300000 boxes of apples of which only 180000 boxes had been imported when Regulation No 687/79 was adopted. The remainder was to be loaded so as to enable the ship to leave port in Chile between 18 and 20 April 1979. In view of the measures adopted by the Commission and because the Commission had not granted an application made to it in telex messages of 10 and 12 April 1979 to make an exemption in the case of 2000 tonnes, Dürbeck cancelled its purchase and affreightment contract.
In order to be able to test the legality of the measures adopted by the Commission and perhaps also in order to prepare the way for an action for damages which was subsequently brought against the Commission (see Case 11/81) on 25 July 1979 Dürbeck imported by air two cartons of Chilean apples weighing 45 kilograms. The Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen refused to allow them to be released into free circulation on the ground of Commission Regulation No 687/79.
Dürbeck brought the matter before the Hessisches Finanzgericht on the ground that the regulations adopted by the Commission, which I have already mentioned, were invalid. It alleged that the Commission had not made a diligent inquiry into and assessment of the facts as required by the Community provisions referred to. Moreover the Commission regulations offend against the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation and the prohibition of discrimination. Finally the measures adopted should be treated as inadmissible because they infringe Article 110 of the EEC Treaty ih conjunction with the provisions of GATT and the provisions of international commercial law.
In view of those arguments, by an order dated 24 March 1980 the Hessisches Finanzgericht stayed the proceedings and submitted the following question for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty:
“Is Commission Regulation (EEC) No 687/79 of 5 April 1979 (Official Journal L 86, p. 18), in conjunction with amending Regulations (EEC) No 797/79 of 23 April 1979 (Official Journal L 101, p. 7) and No 1152/79 of 12 June 1979 (Official Journal L 144, p. 13), valid?”
Before dealing with this question I would point out that in view of the measures which had been adopted the Chilean Government sought consultations in accordance with Article XXIII (2) of GATT and as a result a working group met on 24 March 1980 and 18 June 1980. The Commission's representative informed us in the oral procedure about the results of those investigations.
Moreover the Commission measures in issue here have been contested in three further sets of proceedings (Cases 201, 202 and 253/80) which have been brought directly before the Court under the second paragraph of Article 215 of the EEC Treaty by other undertakings. In so far as additional arguments about the legality of the measures which were adopted have been advanced in those proceedings I will of course deal with them here, too. For, even if it is not obliged to do so when considering a matter of validity under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, the Court of Justice should in my view nevertheless still include in its examination actions concerning the same issue.
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I must preface my opinion with a brief remark on the matter of admissibility. Although it is not expressly questioned by the Commission it does however indicate in its written submissions that it regards the method of importation at issue in the main action, the importation by air of a small quantity of Chilean apples, as wholly out of the ordinary. I should like here to repeat the plaintiff's point that we cannot refuse to resolve the issue of Community law now before us on the ground that there is no legitimate interest in the proceedings because they have been deliberately engineered. The court seised of the main proceedings has to decide whether there is such an interest and it obviously did not see any reason for doubt. Nor can it be argued that the plaintiff could protect its rights in some other way. In fact the possibility of directly challenging the protective measures adopted by the Commission under Article 173 of the EEC Treaty on the ground that they are legislative in nature does not arise. However, an action to establish public liability, which the plaintiff has in the meantime also decided upon, rests on quite special conditions. Consequently one can scarcely object if, first, the validity of the allegedly damaging act is examined, in an alternative way which is available; for this, under German law, as import licences are not required, it is essential for an actual importation to be effected. |
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It is clear from the legal grounds on which the Commission measures were based and which I described at the beginning of my opinion that investigations of an economic nature — into the situation on the Community market and the effect of imports thereon — are of great importance in answering the question which has been raised. Before I go into them I should like to start with some purely or mainly legal considerations to which the submissions in these proceedings and in the actions for damages give rise.
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I now come to the heart of the proceedings, namely the question whether the Commission correctly assumed in the spring of 1979 that serious disturbances were to be expected on the Community market in dessert apples owing to imports. We must determine in particular, as Regulation No 2707/72 requires, which findings the Commission arrived at and was properly entitled to arrive at with respect to the volume of probable imports, the quantities available on the common market, the prices of domestic produce on the common market and the quantities for which withdrawals were or might be effected; then we must consider whether the supension of imports from Chile appears justified.
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The next matter requiring examination is whether the Commission regulations are invalid for offending against the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation, which is the view taken by the plaintiff in the main action. The plaintiff has claimed that that principle fundamentally precludes interference with existing contracts; if they are not to be regarded as having been interfered with, provision should at least be made for transitional measures. Further to that submission the plaintiff also expresses the view that the measures could have been taken much earlier. Export contracts had in fact already been made in October and November and the Commission knew that; the Commission also had estimates at that time about the size of the domestic harvest and it was pursuing inquiries in the exporting countries. So it could have given notice as early as the end of 1978 that protective measures were a possibility but it did not even mention them at the sitting of the Consultative Committee in February 1979. In my view that argument of the plaintiff cannot be accepted either. As the Commission has rightly pointed out, the very fact that effective protective measures would often not be conceivable and the protection clause laid down in the common organization of the market would accordingly be robbed of much of its value militates against the assumption that the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation can have, in a legal context such as this, the scope claimed by the plaintiff. One must consider not only the risk of the backdating of contracts which might undermine the measures to a large extent, but it must also be borne in mind that the protection clause can be used only if there is a clear picture — which, however, requires concluded contracts — and it should not be forgotten either that export contracts are made very early on (in October and November), in other words, at a time when it is difficult to predict a critical situation on the common market. In any event there is no support to be found in previously decided cases for the correctness of such a far-reaching argument as propounded by the plaintiff. In so far as case-law has dealt with that principle it tends rather to confirm the Commission's view whereby the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation requires at most that goods already in transit should be taken into account, as Article XIII of GATT also provides. I am thinking here of the judgments in Case 68/77 IFG-Interkontinentale Fleischbandelsgesellschafi mbH & Co KG v Commission [1978] ECR 353 et seq., judgment of 14 February 1978, and Case 84/78 Angelo Tomadini v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1979] ECR 1801 et seq., judgment of 16 May 1979; the first concerned the adoption of protective measures in the case of disturbances on the market, the second monetary compensation. All we learn from them in fact is that the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation precludes the amendment of rules not containing special transitional provisions if traders relying on contracts which have already been made have entered into special legal relationships with the authorities for external trade (applications for import licences, obligations to carry out specific import transactions), but only if the grant of such protection is not contrary to overriding public interests. In principle, therefore, it is necessary to concur in essentials with the Commission's view, not least in view of the requirement on which the judgment in Case 84/78 also laid stress, that market rules should be constantly adjusted to the changed economic situation, and in a case such as this it must be described as reasonable for importers who are familiar with the mechanisms of the market organization and can be expected to watch it closely to protect themselves against the risks of protective measures by inserting appropriate clauses in the contracts which they make. In addition to that, as far as the alleged late enactment of the protective measures is concerned, it seems not only questionable whether the invalidity of the measures may be accepted on that ground at all, assuming that the conditions required for their adoption do exist; that may well be a consideration which more properly belongs to an action alleging public liability. The point here is that the Commission made its first inquiries of the exporting countries not in October, as the plaintiff maintains, but that the first contacts were made only in January and in particular the Commission's statement that it did not receive the information about the internal market required to enact the protective measures (marketing, intervention and price trends) in a reliable form until March could not be disproved either. So the Commission is hardly open to the reproach that it should have adopted the measures earlier or at any rate have given notice of them, quite irrespective of the fact that even if the protective measures had been announced or adopted at the beginning of 1979 it would have been too late for the plaintiff as it had already concluded its import contracts in November and December of the previous year, that is to say at a time when a definite forecast about the development of the market in the Community was certainly still not possible. |
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The plaintiff in the main action has claimed that a further ground of invalidity is the breach of the prohibition of discrimination. The allegation is not that protective measures were adopted only in relation to Chile or about how the reduction of Chilean exports was calculated in relation to non-member countries which had entered into voluntary restriction agreements which, as said before, cannot in fact be objected to. Rather the plaintiff discerns a failure to observe Article 40 of the EEC Treaty regarding the principle of equal treatment of consumers, among whom are to be included importers, in the fact that transitional rules were adopted in Regulations Nos 797/79 and 1152/79 only in respect of certain imports and that the plaintiff was excluded from those transitional arrangements despite its application for the grant of an exemption. I explained at the outset how the two additional Commission regulations came to be enacted. In view of the forecasts on which the Commission relied concerning the maximum quantities of apples which could be imported without disturbance they were necessary so as to observe the principle of proportionality as laid down in Article 3 (2) of Regulation No 2707/72. It can hardly be objected that when the first supplementary regulation was adopted (23 April 1979), that is some time after the plaintiff had approached the Commission by telex and after it had cancelled its purchase and affreightment contracts, attention was paid only to goods already at sea and the plaintiff's import arrangements were left out of consideration. That approach was the appropriate one under Article 3 (3) of Regulation No 2707/72, since it does of course require account to be taken of the special position of products in transit to the Community. Moreover it is clear that on an objective view the plaintiff was in that respect in a different position from that of the importers favoured by Regulation No 2707/72. As it later turned out that the volume of imports viewed as permissible had still not been attained, it must also be considered proper that goods which had already arrived in the Community and which had obviously been loaded by some importers at their own risk after the adoption of the first protective regulation were dealt with first. At any rate in my opinion that circumstance and the fact that the Commission decided not to distribute the remaining import quantity among all importers do not amount to a form of discrimination consisting in an abuse of discretion and in grossly unequal treatment which, over and above the assumption that the regulation is invalid, could also found a claim for public liability, which is now the only conceivable legal consequence for the plaintiff. |
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Finally, it is still necessary to consider whether there is anything in the plaintiff's allegation that Articles 39 and 110 of the EEC Treaty and provisions of GATT have been infringed. It has been submitted that Article 37 of Regulation No 1035/72 requires that when it is applied appropriate account should also be taken of the aims set out in Articles 39 and 110 of the Treaty. The plaintiff contends however that there clearly can be no question of the aims of Article 39 being endangered by the import transactions planned in the spring of 1979; on the other hand the import reductions required by the disputed regulations must be regarded as an infringement of Article 110 of the EEC Treaty in which may be discerned a duty to open the market and which furthermore represents the specific application of obligations under GATT to which, according to case-law, the Community is bound. As to those points, it is clear to me from all that we have learned, first, that the plaintiff's contention that the imports planned in the spring of 1979 could not have endangered the aims of Article 39 is not tenable. In my view the Commission correctly considered that there was such a danger, since it was after all to be feared that imports would lead to a decline in the sales of domestic produce and to a further fall in the prices prevailing, thereby directly affecting the aim set out in Article 39 (b). Secondly, as far as any allegation of a failure to observe Article 110 of the EEC Treaty is concerned, it is necessary to agree with the Commission that Article 110 outlines only a programme or at any rate cannot be treated as a provision which might serve as a yardstick for whether a Community regulation is valid or not. In my view nothing further needs to be said on that point. The same is true so far as the plaintiff relies in a very general way on commitments of GATT which are to the like effect. I would remind the Court here of the decided cases in which the General Agreement has been repeatedly described in general terms (with special emphasis being placed on Articles XIX, XXII and XXIII) and which have reached the conclusion that neither Article II nor Article XI of GATT gives rights to private individuals, which is the precondition for assessing validity on the basis of GATT (judgments in Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and Others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219, judgment of 12 December 1972; Case 9/73 Carl Schlüter v Hauptzollamt Lörrach [1973] ECR 1135, judgment of 24 October 1973). In so far as further objections concerning observance of the provision on the nondiscriminatory application of quantitative restrictions (Article XIII) have emerged in these proceedings, upon complaint by Chile recorded by a special GATT group in a report of November 1980 the Commission was able to point out on one point — improperly taking as a reference the year 1976 in which Chile did not keep to a voluntary restriction agreement — that the adoption of another approach, taking the year 1975 as a basis for instance, would not have led to any other result in the reduction of the volume of imports as far as Chile was concerned. As regards the other point recorded in that report, that insufficient consideration was given to the fact that as a newcomer to the field of apple exports Chile had some ground to make up, it is important to consider not only that this point is clearly a relatively novel consideration; it should not be forgotten either, as far as both objections are concerned, that where other contracting parties do not agree to quantitative restrictions GATT makes provision only for a consultative procedure in accordance with Article XXIII. However, as in the two judgments just cited, that justifies the conclusion that Article XIII of GATT is not a provision which creates rights for private individuals either and that a Community regulation cannot be held invalid on the strength of it. |
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In conclusion I can accordingly only propose that a reply should be sent to the Hessisches Finanzgericht to the effect that no factors have emerged in the proceedings which would lead to the conclusion that Regulations Nos 687/79, 797/79 and 1152/79 are void. |
( 1 ) Translated from the German.
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