Jewell R. Hughey v. James M. Cagle, individually and as Partner in the Firm of Cagle & Jackson, and Cagle & Jackson; and Jewell R. Hughey v. P. Rodney Jackson

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
JEWELL R. HUGHEY,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

v.) No. 25-ICA-316 (Cir. Ct. of Kanawha Cnty. Case No. CC-20-2017-C-1100)

JAMES M. CAGLE, individually FILED
and as Partner in the Firm of June 2, 2026
Cagle & Jackson, and CAGLE & JACKSON, released at 3:00 p.m.
Plaintiffs Below, Respondents ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
and

JEWELL R. HUGHEY,
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

v.) No. 25-ICA-317 (Cir. Ct. of Kanawha Cnty. Case No. CC-20-2022-C-160)

P. RODNEY JACKSON,
Defendant Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner Jewell R. Hughey appeals the Kanawha County Circuit Court’s July 8,
2025, order in the consolidated cases of James M. Cagle, individually and as partner in the
firm of Cagle & Jackson and Cagle & Jackson, a partnership v. Jewell R. Hughey, Case
No. 17-C-1100 and Jewell R. Hughey v. P. Rodney Jackson, Esq., Case No. 22-C-160. This
order denied Ms. Hughey’s motion to amend her counterclaim in Case No. 17-C-1100 and
her complaint in Case No. 22-C-160 to add claims for quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment, granted respondents’ motion for summary and delcaratory judgment regarding
petitioner’s breach of contract claim, and converted the preliminary injunction against her
into a permanent injunction. Respondents James M. Cagle, P. Rodney Jackson, and Cagle
& Jackson filed a response. Petitioner Hughey filed a reply.1 Because these appeals from
the two Kanawha County cases2 involve the same facts and issues, we have consolidated

1
Ms. Hughey is represented by Michael D. Crim, Esq. Respondents James M.
Cagle, Esq., P. Rodney Jackson, Esq., and Cagle & Jackson are represented by J. Jeaneen
Legato, Esq., and Mark McMillian, Esq.
2
The circuit court consolidated Case No. 22-C-160 and Case No. 17-C-1100 and
then entered a single order disposing of both. 25-ICA-316 is an appeal from the circuit
court order as it pertained to Cagle v. Hughey, Case No. 17-C-1100, while 25-ICA-317 is

1
them for purposes of argument and decision. For reasons stated below, we affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In or about 2012, Mr. Cagle was retained by the West Virginia Attorney General to
prosecute claims on behalf of the State. Around that same time, Mr. Cagle and Mr. Jackson
formed a partnership, known as Cagle & Jackson, for the purpose of working exclusively
on cases involving opioids. In March of 2012, Ms. Hughey contracted with Cagle &
Jackson to provide paralegal services to the law firm related to “pill mill litigation” against
various defendants involved in the distribution of opioid pain medications. Under the
parties’ handwritten agreement, Ms. Hughey would make herself available for work forty
hours per week, be paid $1,000 per week, and be provided with a 1099 form. This
agreement also stated that she was entitled to bonuses based upon the attorney's fees the
firm earned on opioid cases, could perform paralegal services for other attorneys and law
firms so long as it did not interfere with her work requirements under the agreement, and
that the parties could terminate the agreement at any time.3

Regarding bonuses, the agreement divided the litigation into the following
categories: “Mingo Co. Individuals,” “County Litigation,” and “State Litigation.” For
Mingo County cases brought by individuals against pharmacies, pharmacists, and
physicians, Ms. Hughey would receive a bonus of 10% of any fees earned. The fee
agreement stated that if any county cases earned a fee, the amount of the bonus would be
determined by Cagle & Jackson after the amount of fees earned by them had been
established.4 As for state cases, the fee agreement simply stated that: “The same provision

an appeal from the circuit court order as it pertained to Hughey v. Jackson, Case No. 22-C-
160.
3
According to Ms. Hughey, before she signed the handwritten contract involved in
this case, she was working at another firm where she was paid $75,000 per year plus
overtime (which together usually totaled about $100,000 per year). She alleges that she
quit that job to work for Cagle & Jackson because she was promised the same salary she
had been receiving at the other firm, and benefits as a full-time employee. The terms of the
handwritten contract (1099 status, a salary of $52,000 per year subject to bonuses, no
insurance, and no sick pay) were different than what allegedly had been promised, but she
signed it on a take- it- or- leave- it basis because she had already quit her other job and did
not want to be without income.

4
Regarding county cases, the handwritten agreement states “[t]hat because this
litigation also involves another law firm, the amount of [a] bonus will be determined by

2
as with county litigation applies to the State (AG) case. However, a bonus will be provided
to Hughey.”

Ms. Hughey stopped working for Cagle & Jackson on pill mill litigation after
approximately five years, in mid-January of 2017. Prior to the end of her work on Cagle &
Jackson’s opioid cases, she was paid a bonus of $7,500 when one of the state cases settled.
This was the only bonus she was ever paid in connection with the state opioid cases. The
county cases never generated any fees for Cagle & Jackson which might trigger a bonus.
Some of the Mingo County cases settled after Ms. Hughey stopped working with Cagle &
Jackson, but she maintained that she should have been paid a bonus for those cases even
though she was no longer working for the firm. The state cases allegedly generated a $10
million fee for Cagle & Jackson, and Ms. Hughey claimed that she was entitled to 10% of
that amount although her handwritten contract did not say that she would receive a certain
percentage of the fee for state cases. The record does not indicate what the Mingo County
cases covered by the agreement settled for (unless the Preece case was covered), or what
Ms. Hughey thinks her bonus should have been for them.5

On August 3, 2017, Mr. Cagle and Cagle & Jackson filed Case No. 17-C-1100,
seeking an injunction against Ms. Hughey after it was allegedly discovered that she had
been offering respondents’ work product and that of co-counsel to market her services to
other professionals while acting as a paralegal on respondents’ behalf, saying that she was
a “freelance paralegal” in opioid pill mill cases with “institutional knowledge” of the
subject matter. According to respondents, Ms. Hughey told a prospective employer that she
“had everything that Jim Cagle did.”6 On October 11, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing
on a motion for preliminary injunction filed by respondents. Ms. Hughey did not appear at
this hearing, believing that it was going to be continued because her attorney had a

Cagle & Jackson after the fees earned by counsel are determined by [the] Court and other
counsel.”
5
Ms. Hughey worked with Mr. Cagle on a Mingo County opioid case which resulted
in a settlement of $875,000 and a 10% fee to Ms. Hughey of $27,500. According to Ms.
Hughey, this case settled in early 2009. It is unclear whether she was paid a bonus for the
Preece case before or after she signed an agreement with the respondents in 2012.
6
According to respondents, Ms. Hughey claimed to have all the documents that
Mr. Cagle did. Ms. Hughey did not remember the exact words she used when talking to
Mr. Simpkins, an attorney she approached about possible employment, but testified that
she meant that she had all the knowledge and experience that Mr. Cagle did about opioid
litigation. The parties do not dispute that Ms. Hughey was free to use, share, or tout her
knowledge of litigation strategies employed in pill mill cases.

3
scheduling conflict.7 Her counsel did attend but did not meet with Ms. Hughey prior to the
hearing to prepare and did not present any witnesses or exhibits. On November 7, 2017,
the circuit court issued a preliminary injunction.8

On March 30, 2018, respondents filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment in 17-C-
1100, asking the circuit court to declare that Ms. Hughey had breached their agreement and
was not entitled to receive a bonus or any further payments, and to grant such further relief
as might be appropriate, including a permanent injunction. Also on March 30, 2018, Ms.
Hughey filed a counterclaim for breach of contract alleging that she had not been paid the
bonuses that were due under the parties’ agreement.9 On February 23, 2023, Ms. Hughey
filed a motion to amend her counterclaim to add Mr. Jackson as a plaintiff and counterclaim
defendant, alleging claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, tort of outrage,
fraud, and violations of the Wage Payment and Collection Act. Her motion to amend was
denied by order entered on April 27, 2023.

On March 1, 2022, Ms. Hughey, acting pro se, filed Case No. 22-C-159 against Mr.
Cagle and the partnership of Cagle & Jackson. On the same date, she filed Case No. 22-C-
160 against Mr. Jackson and Cagle & Jackson. On June 21, 2022, she filed amended
complaints in both cases, asserting claims for breach of contract, violation of the Wage
Payment and Collection Act, promissory estoppel, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, civil conspiracy/joint venture, tort of outrage, punitive damages, and breach of
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.10 The circuit court dismissed many of the claims
against Mr. Cagle and all of the claims against Mr. Jackson and Cagle & Jackson on the
grounds of res judicata. Ms. Hughey appealed the order to this Court.

Our decision affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of all Ms. Hughey’s claims raised
in 22-C-159, and all her claims in 22-C-160, except for her breach of contract claim against
Respondent Jackson, individually, and remanded the matter to the circuit court for further
proceedings. See Hughey v. Cagle and Cagle & Jackson, No. 23-ICA-218, and Hughey v.
Jackson and Cagle & Jackson, No. 23-ICA-219, 2024 WL 3251829 (W. Va. Ct. App. July

7
Ms. Hughey is currently represented by different counsel.
8
Ruling from the bench, the circuit court subsequently denied Ms. Hughey’s motion
to dissolve the preliminary injunction on February 28, 2025, but did not issue a written
order memorializing this ruling and setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law.
9
There is no dispute that Ms. Hughey received the salary of $1,000 per week that
she had been promised, in addition to the bonus she was paid when the first state case
settled.
10
This amendment did not add any claims for quantum meruit or unjust enrichment.

4
1, 2024) (memorandum decision). In footnote two of our 2024 opinion, we noted our
ethical concerns about the fee-sharing agreement with Ms. Hughey, observing:

While the appellate record does not show how this issue was addressed
below, we would note our serious concerns about the ethical implications of
the fee-sharing language in the parties’ agreement in light of our Supreme
Court of Appeals’ holding in syllabus points 2 and 3 of Rich v. Simoni, 235
W. Va. 142, 772 S.E.2d 327, 328 (2015), wherein such agreements between
lawyers or law firms and nonlawyers were held to be in violation of Rule 5.4
of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct and void as a matter of
public policy.

Id. at *2 n.4.

After our mandate was issued in the 2023 Appeal, the circuit court held a status
conference on December 6, 2024, to determine what issues were outstanding for the court’s
consideration. As a result, the circuit court entered a new scheduling order and an order
consolidating 22-C-159 and 22-C-160. The circuit court subsequently directed the parties
to address whether the parties’ fee-sharing agreement was void under Simoni.

In the midst of the litigation regarding Ms. Hughey’s motion to dismiss, respondents
moved for declaratory judgment and summary judgment against Ms. Hughey. Ms. Hughey
filed a response to this motion on June 5, 2023, and a supplemental response on April 17,
2025.11 Ms. Hughey contended that she was clearly intended to receive a portion of
respondents’ legal fees from the pill mill litigation, and that there were several genuine
issues of material fact for jury consideration, such as the validity of the parties’ agreement,
its terms, and her performance thereunder. According to the circuit court’s order, while Ms.
Hughey made several arguments in opposition to summary judgment, she failed to address
the Simoni decision as previously directed.

On April 24, 2025, respondents filed their reply to Ms. Hughey’s supplemental
response, arguing that Ms. Hughey had no viable claim and attempting to factually counter
all the points raised in her supplemental response. Respondents addressed Simoni, and in
doing so, acknowledged that this Court correctly interpreted that decision; however,
respondents stated that they “preferred” for the circuit court to conclude that Ms. Hughey
breached the parties’ agreement. On May 1, 2025, the circuit court held a hearing on the
pending motion for summary judgment regarding the breach of contract claim against Mr.
Jackson. On the eve of the hearing, Ms. Hughey filed a motion for leave to amend her

11
Ms. Hughey filed a supplemental response following this Court’s decision in
Hughey v. Cagle and Cagle & Jackson, No. 23-ICA-218, and Hughey v. Jackson and Cagle
& Jackson, No. 23-ICA-219, 2024 WL 3251829 (W. Va. Ct. App. July 1, 2024)
(memorandum decision).

5
counterclaim and amended complaint to add claims for quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment.

In its order, the circuit court expressly found that the parties “purposefully side-
stepped” this Court’s concerns over Simoni. According to the circuit court, the parties each
sought rulings in this case which required a judicial finding that their 2012 agreement was
valid and enforceable. The circuit court rejected this notion, stating that the parties’
collective decision to ignore the issue could not prevent it from complying with its duty to
apply the laws of this State to the facts of the matter, a duty which required it to apply
Syllabus Points 2 and 3 of Simoni:

Rule 5.4 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which
proscribes the sharing of fees between lawyers or law firms and nonlawyers,
is an explicit judicial declaration of West Virginia public policy with the force
and effect of law. A fee-sharing agreement between a lawyer or a law firm
and a non-lawyer that violates the provisions of Rule 5.4 of the West Virginia
Rules of Professional Conduct is void as against public policy and wholly
unenforceable.

Syl. Pts. 2-3, Rich v. Simoni, 235 W. Va. 142, 772 S.E.2d 327 (2015).

The circuit court found the language of the parties’ agreement “inescapable” on this
issue. Specifically, the court emphasized that the “Litigation” section of the parties’
agreement states under “Mingo Co. Individuals” that “Hughey shall be entitled to a bonus
equaling 10% of the attorney fees earned” and the “County Litigation” subsection states
that “[b]ecause this litigation also involves another law firm, the amount of the bonus will
be determined by Cagle & Jackson after the fees earned by counsel are determined by Court
and other counsel.” The “State Litigation” portion provided that it was subject to the same
terms as the county litigation. Based upon this language, the circuit court determined that
the parties’ use of the term “bonus” instead of “fee” was merely semantic, because under
all three litigation categories Ms. Hughey was to receive a portion of respondents’ attorney
fees. Thus, it constituted an unlawful fee-sharing agreement.

The court found support for this ruling in Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Duty, 222
W. Va. 758, 671 S.E.2d 763 (2008) (per curiam) where the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia (“SCAWV”) rejected a similar “bonus” argument made by a lawyer who
argued he had not violated Rule 5.4(a) when he promised to give a non-lawyer employee
fifty percent of the attorney’s fees recovered if the employee could convince a certain client
to retain the lawyer to represent him in a car accident lawsuit. Thus, based on the decisions
in Duty and Simoni, the parties’ agreement to share attorney fees with Ms. Hughey was
void as a matter of public policy, and respondents were entitled to summary judgment on
Ms. Hughey’s counterclaim and complaint.

6
Next, the circuit court determined that the facts and circumstances of the case
warranted converting the temporary injunction to a permanent one. Lastly, the court denied
the motion to amend, finding that granting Ms. Hughey’s motion would be futile because
the requested amendments could not overcome the precedent established in Simoni. This
appeal followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Amend
As the court held in Syllabus Point 6, Perdue v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 152 W.
Va. 222, 161 S.E.2d 250 (1968):

A trial court is vested with a sound discretion in granting or refusing leave to
amend pleadings in civil actions. Leave to amend should be freely given
when justice so requires, but the action of a trial court in refusing to grant
leave to amend a pleading will not be regarded as reversible error in the
absence of a showing of an abuse of the trial court's discretion in ruling upon
a motion for leave to amend.

“A trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous assessment of the
evidence or the law.” Bartles v. Hinkle, 196 W. Va. 381, 389, 472 S.E.2d 827, 835 (1996)
(citations omitted). Although courts should liberally grant motions to amend, “[a] court
may exercise its discretion to deny a motion for leave to amend a complaint where such
amendment would not lead to a presentation of the case on its merits. The liberal
amendment rules under Rule 15(a) do not require the courts to indulge in futile gestures.”
Maryann Manor, Inc. v. Frankovitch, No. 25-ICA-50, 2025 WL 3496722, *3 (W. Va. Ct.
App. Dec. 4, 2025) (memorandum decision) (citation modified).

B. Summary Judgment
“A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there
is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to
clarify the application of the law.” Syl. Pt. 3, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co. of NY,
148 W. Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). “Summary judgment is appropriate where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving
party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an
essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.” Syl. Pt. 4, Painter v. Peavy,
192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

“A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1, id.
The de novo standard requires us to review the trial court’s ruling based on the same
standards that the trial court should have applied. Namely, appellate courts should reverse

7
the trial court decision if they conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact which
presents a trial worthy issue or, alternatively, they conclude that the failure to permit
discovery has denied a party the opportunity to develop facts that may have resulted in the
discovery of evidence sufficient to constitute a disputed material fact.

C. Permanent Injunction
The final order granting a permanent injunction is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard and the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. Baisden v. W. Va. Secondary Schs. Activities Comm'n, 211 W. Va. 725,
729, 568 S.E.2d 32, 36 (2002); see also Weaver v. Ritchie, 197 W. Va. 690, 478 S.E.2d 363,
366 (1996). Questions of law are subject to de novo review. Pancakes, Biscuits and More,
LLC v. Pendleton Cnty. Comm’n, No. 14-1263, 2015 WL 6143370, *3 (W. Va. Oct. 16,
2015) (memorandum decision); Starks v. Putnam Cnty. Comm’n, No. 23-ICA-128, 2024
WL 2859208, *3 (W. Va. Ct. App. June 5, 2024) (memorandum decision).

D. Declaratory Judgment
A circuit court’s ultimate decision in a declaratory judgment action is reviewed de
novo, while “any determinations of fact made by the circuit court in reaching its ultimate
resolution are reviewed pursuant to a clearly erroneous standard.” Willard v. Whited, 211
W. Va. 522, 524, 566 S.E.2d 881, 883 (2002) (quoting Mountain Lodge Ass'n v. Crum &
Forster Indem. Co., 210 W. Va. 536, 545, 558 S.E.2d 336, 345 (2001) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Hansen-Gier Family Trust of April 22, 2016 v.
Haywood, 250 W. Va. 42, 48, 902 S.E.2d 174, 180 (2024).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Amend
The circuit court held that amending the complaint and counterclaim would be futile
because Rich v. Simoni precluded Ms. Hughey’s claims for unjust enrichment and quantum
meruit. According to Paragraph 33 of the Final Order, “the requested amendments to her
counterclaim do nothing to address the Rich v. Simoni precedent, which is fatal to her
claims, and therefore any amendment to her claims would be futile.”

Ms. Hughey argues that even if her fee agreement was not enforceable, she should
be able to recover compensation for quantum meruit or unjust enrichment pursuant to
Gaddy Engineering Co. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, LLP, 231 W. Va. 577, 746
S.E.2d 568 (2013), where an engineering firm was allowed to recover based on quantum
meruit when a fee-sharing agreement could not be enforced. The fee-sharing agreement in
Gaddy was held to be unenforceable because of impracticability, rather than Rule 5.4, so
the court did not decide whether fee-sharing agreements with nonlawyers were in violation

8
of public policy. Ms. Hughey has not directed our attention to any West Virginia case where
a court awarded quantum meruit damages when a fee-sharing agreement with a nonlawyer
was held to be unenforceable because it violated public policy.

Although Respondent Jackson argues that Rich v. Simoni precludes quantum meruit
claims, as well as claims for breach of contract, he also invites us to decide the case on
other grounds that the circuit court did not rely on. Specifically, he argues that Ms. Hughey
waited too long under Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure to raise her
claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment12, that she did not file her motion to
amend in compliance with Rule 6.01(c) of the West Virginia Trial Court Rules, and that her
claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment were barred by both the applicable statute
of limitations and collateral estoppel.

In Rich v. Simoni, the SCAWV held that fee-sharing agreements with nonlawyers
were void and unenforceable because they violated public policy as embodied in Rule 5.4.
Interestingly, both parties in Simoni urged the court to hold that the petitioner could recover
based on quantum meruit if a breach of contract claim was not viable. The SCAWV
declined to do so, apparently on procedural grounds, noting that addressing whether a
quantum meruit recovery was available would involve rewriting the certified question it
was asked to consider, and that the petitioner’s claim in the lower court had been based on
breach of contract, not quantum meruit. See 235 W. Va. at 146 n.23, 772 S.E.2d at 331
n.23.13

12
Rule 15 does not provide a specific time within which a motion to amend with
leave of court must be filed, but undue delay is a factor which may be considered by a
circuit court in the exercise of its discretion. See Syl. Pt. 3, in part, State ex rel. Vedder v.
Zakaib, 217 W. Va. 528, 618 S.E.2d 537 (2005) (“Lack of diligence is justification for a
denial of leave to amend where the delay is unreasonable, and places the burden on the
moving party to demonstrate some valid reason for his or her neglect and delay.”).
13
Footnote 23 of Simoni explains:

In making this argument, Dr. Simoni necessarily reframes the certified
question to pose whether the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit fee-
sharing agreements between lawyers and non-lawyers where the agreement
contemplates payment based on the reasonable value of services provided—
i.e. quantum meruit recovery. Not only is this an improper attempt to engraft
quantum meruit-based recovery into the certified question, but the district
court was clear in its memorandum order that this type of equitable-based
recovery is inconsistent with Dr. Simoni's amended counterclaim in that his
claim relies on the existence of a fee-splitting agreement. The district court
opined in its memorandum order that “the evidence adduced in discovery ...

9
We find it unnecessary to determine whether quantum meruit damages are available
when a fee-sharing agreement with a nonlawyer is void and unenforceable because it
violates Rule 5.4.14 Instead, we affirm the ruling of the circuit court based on one of the
alternative grounds offered by Mr. Jackson, to wit, that the motion to amend was filed less
than forty-eight hours before the scheduled hearing. Rule 6.01(c) of the West Virginia Trial
Court Rules provides: “Time for Filing. Except by permission or order of the court, no
pleading shall be filed less than forty-eight (48) hours prior to oral presentation or argument
of a proceeding.” The record indicates that the hearing on this matter was scheduled to start
at 10:00 a.m. on May 1, 2025, and that the motion to amend was not filed until 6:09:31
p.m. on April 30, 2025, only about sixteen hours before the hearing.15 Thus, there is no
question that the motion to amend was filed less than forty-eight hours before the hearing.
Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that the circuit court entered an order to
allow late filing or that it otherwise gave permission to file a late motion to amend.16

Accordingly, we find it appropriate to affirm the ruling of the circuit court based on
Trial Court Rule 6.01(c), keeping in mind that West Virginia has long recognized that a
judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record, even if it was not relied
on by the lower court. See, e.g., Syl. Pt. 3, Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W. Va. 246, 140 S.E.2d
466 (1965) (“This Court may, on appeal, affirm the judgment of the lower court when it
appears that such judgment is correct on any legal ground disclosed by the record,
regardless of the ground, reason or theory assigned by the lower court as the basis for its
judgment.”); Murphy v. Smallbridge, 196 W. Va. 35, 36-7, 468 S.E.2d 167, 168-69 (1996)
(“An appellate court is not limited to the legal grounds relied upon by the circuit court, but

reinforces that his [Dr. Simoni's] compensation claim remains based entirely
on a fee-splitting agreement with Rich.”
14
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached different conclusions on this issue.
Contrast Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 178 F.Supp.2d 9
(D. Mass. 2001); Shtauber v. Gerson, 239 F.Supp.3d 248 (D.D.C. 2017) (allowing quantum
meruit recovery) with Gallagher v. Weiner, Civ. Action No. 92-1303, 1993 WL 460101, at
*3-4 (D. N.J. Oct. 29, 1993); Infante v. Gottesman, 558 A.2d 1338, 1340, 1343-44 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 1989) (denying quantum meruit recovery).
15
According to the hearing transcript, the hearing actually started at 10:20 a.m., but
that was still much less than the forty-eight hours contemplated by Trial Court Rule 6.01
(c).
16
Affirming a lower court ruling on alternative grounds it did not rely on would be
inappropriate if there were a factual dispute which required us to weigh evidence, engage
in fact finding, or make credibility determinations. See 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1031,
Westlaw (database updated April 2026); 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 839, Westlaw
(database updated April 2026). Here, the necessary facts are not in dispute.

10
it may affirm or reverse a decision on any independently sufficient ground that has adequate
support.”); Banbury Holdings, LLC v. May, 242 W. Va. 634, 636 n.4, 837 S.E.2d 695, 697
n.4 (2019) (“We have long held that this Court may affirm a circuit court for any reason
disclosed by the record.”); Carl A. v. Deborah A., 248 W. Va. 69, 73 n.5, 887 S.E.2d 54, 58
n.5 (2023) (upholding family court judgment because Rule 60(b)(1) motion was not timely
filed, a ground the lower court did not rely on).

B. Summary and Declaratory Judgment
The circuit court properly granted the motion for summary and declaratory
judgment when it correctly held that Rich v. Simoni barred Ms. Hughey’s claim for breach
of contract because she sought to recover a bonus under an unlawful fee-sharing agreement
with a nonlawyer. Rule 5.4(a) provides that “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal
fees with a nonlawyer” subject to certain exceptions not applicable to the present case. In
Syllabus Point 3 of Rich v. Simoni, 235 W. Va. 142, 772 S.E.2d 327 (2015), the court held
that fee-sharing agreements with nonlawyers are void as against public policy, unlawful,
and unenforceable. In Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Duty, 222 W. Va. 758, 671 S.E.2d 763
(2008), the court held that a nonlawyer could not receive a share of the fee as a “bonus.”

Ms. Hughey argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because she was not
allowed to do sufficient discovery before her claim was dismissed.17 Although granting
summary judgment is usually premature before the parties have had a reasonable
opportunity to conduct discovery, additional discovery would not have created a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Hughey’s fee-sharing agreement was enforceable.

Related to her discovery argument, Ms. Hughey argues that summary judgment was
inappropriate because the file had been sealed. Once again, she fails to demonstrate how
more access to the file would have allowed her to frame a triable issue as to her breach of
contract claim because that claim was incompatible with the Simoni case.

C. Conversion of preliminary injunction to permanent injunction

1. Standing
Ms. Hughey argues that respondents lack standing to seek injunctive relief because
they were merely working for the Attorney General’s Office, they were trying to protect
the Attorney General’s rights, and there was no hindrance to the Attorney General’s Office

17
Ms. Hughey’s discovery appears to have been very limited. On December 26,
2018, she served Defendant’s First Set of Discovery Requests. On February 14, 2023,
respondents answered these discovery requests. According to Ms. Hughey, they provided
limited responses and produced no documents although promising to make documents
available at a time and place to be agreed on.

11
protecting its rights through its own efforts. This issue was not raised in the circuit court,
but since standing is a jurisdictional issue, it may be raised for the first time on appeal. See
Pavone v. NPML Mortgage Acquisitions, LLC, 246 W. Va. 418, 421, 874 S.E.2d 21, 24
(2022); Northeast Natural Energy, LLC v. LT Realty Unlimited, LLC, 250 W. Va. 500, 505,
905 S.E.2d 179, 184 (Ct. App. 2024). Initially, we note that the Attorney General’s Office
was not involved in the Mingo County cases, so Ms. Hughey’s argument would not apply
to those cases. As for the state litigation which was filed in Boone County, respondents
have standing to seek an injunction because the files involved their clients, they were
protecting their files, the respondents were obligated to obey a protective order which
required the return or destruction of certain materials produced during discovery, they were
obligated by ethical rules to prevent the unauthorized release of confidential or privileged
material and information, they retained Ms. Hughey, gave her access to the material, and
were required to inform her that certain material had to be either returned or destroyed.
Attorneys have a duty to supervise nonlawyers they retain regardless of whether they are
employees or independent contractors. See W. Va. R. Prof’l Cond. 5.3; see generally W.
Va. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.6. If an attorney fails to meet these obligations, the attorney is subject
to disciplinary actions. Accordingly, we reject Ms. Hughey’s contention that the
respondents lack standing.

2. Sufficiency of the Final Order
A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test
before the court may grant such relief and must demonstrate that: (1) it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.

43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 42, Westlaw (database updated April 2026) (footnotes omitted).
Cf. Camden-Clark Memorial Hosp. Corp. v. Turner, 212 W. Va. 752, 756, 575 S.E.2d 362,
366 (2002) (in considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction, courts must consider
“(1) the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff without the injunction; (2) the
likelihood of harm to the defendant with an injunction; (3) the plaintiff's likelihood of
success on the merits; and (4) the public interest.”); State ex rel. McGraw v. Imperial
Marketing, 196 W. Va. 346, 352 n.8, 472 S.E.2d 792, 798 n.8 (1996) (setting out “the
customary standard… for issuing a preliminary injunction”).18 Respondents, as the parties
seeking an injunction, have the burden of establishing the factors justifying injunctive

18
The standard for granting a preliminary injunction is similar to the standard for
granting a permanent injunction, but one seeking a preliminary injunction must show a
mere likelihood of success on the merits, while one seeking a permanent injunction must
actually succeed on the merits.

12
relief. See Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corp. v. Turner, 212 W. Va. at 760; 575
S.E.2d at 370. The Final Order entered by the circuit court does not discuss these factors
even though a significant amount of additional evidence was submitted after the
preliminary injunction order was entered.

“‘After an evidentiary hearing on a complaint for a permanent injunction, a
trial court is required to make a finding of fact and conclusion of law
under Rule 52 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, and findings
and conclusions also should be made upon ruling on a motion to dissolve an
injunction in order to assist appellate courts in determining whether there is
a legitimate area for state regulation by injunction.’ Syl. pt. 4, United
Maintenance and Manufacturing Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 157
W. Va. 788, 204 S.E.2d 76 (1974).” Syllabus Point 2, West v. National Mines
Corp., 175 W. Va. 543, 336 S.E.2d 190 (1985).

Syl. Pt. 4, Reilley v. Bd. of Educ. of Cnty. Of Marshall, 246 W. Va. 531, 874 S.E.2d 333
(2022). If the circuit court fails to make the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the case may be remanded for compliance. Syl. Pt. 5, id.

Rule 65(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure also requires circuit courts
granting injunctive relief to include certain statements concerning the content and scope of
injunctions in their orders, providing: (1) Contents. Every order granting an injunction and
every restraining order shall:

(A) state the reasons why it issued;
(B) state terms specifically; and
(C) describe in reasonable detail and not by referring to the complaint or
other document the act or acts restrained or required.

“Whenever the extraordinary writ of injunction is granted, it should be tailored to restrain
no more than what is reasonably required to accomplish its ends.” Consol. Coal Co. v.
Disabled Miners of S. W. Va., 442 F.2d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir. 1971).

A permanent injunction should never be broader than is necessary to secure
to the injured party relief warranted by the circumstances involved in the
particular case. It should be narrowly tailored to fit the specific legal
violation, and not impose any greater restriction or burden than is necessary
to provide the protection sought.

43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 16, Westlaw (database updated April 2026) (footnotes omitted).

Rule 65’s requirements that the court issuing an injunction explain its reasons, state
terms “specifically,” and “describe in reasonable detail… the act or acts restrained or

13
required” serve important purposes. A party subject to an injunction is entitled to fair notice
of what is required lest he or she be held in contempt, and appellate courts tasked with
reviewing injunctions need to be able to effectively review the lower court’s fact finding,
legal reasoning, and exercise of discretion. Moreover, in this case, potential clients and
employers need to know what Ms. Hughey can or cannot do because of the injunction.
Knowing that Ms. Hughey is subject to an injunction, without knowing exactly what
conduct is proscribed, is bound to have a chilling effect on her job prospects if she wants
to work in opioid litigation.

The circuit court’s discussion of the injunction issue was cursory at best and did not
provide sufficient detail to permit meaningful appellate review, consisting of only three
sentences, one of which recognized that the question of whether to grant a permanent
injunction was usually a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the court. The other
two sentences adopted the limited findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
preliminary injunction order and stated:

Accordingly, considering the facts and circumstances of this particular case,
and specifically with respect to Ms. Hughey’s so-called “institutional
knowledge,” she gained from the file contents of the Plaintiff’s work product,
the Court ORDERS that the previously entered Preliminary Injunction on
November 7, 2017, is hereby converted into a Permanent Injunction. The
Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law previously found
with respect thereto, specifically enjoining Jewell R. Hughey from soliciting
persons through the use of Plaintiff’s information or data she may have
obtained while working for Plaintiffs in what have been described as “pill
mill” cases.

The preliminary order was based on a one-sided presentation of the evidence with
no input from Ms. Hughey.19 Ms. Hughey, who was out of state, was not present when the
preliminary injunction hearing was held. Her attorney at the time was present, but he didn’t

19
The circuit court relied on testimony by Mr. Cagle and Debbie Preece (two
witnesses called by respondents); an affidavit by Mr. Cagle; an affidavit by Jeff Simpkins
(an attorney allegedly contacted by Ms. Hughey to obtain employment); the verified
injunction complaint; and a few exhibits. In its Preliminary Injunction order, the circuit
court referred at least twice to the “uncontroverted” evidence. It was uncontroverted
because there was no one at the hearing who could controvert it. In fact, Ms. Hughey had
yet to file an answer to the complaint, instead filing a motion for a more definite statement,
with her then counsel arguing at the preliminary injunction hearing that he did not have
enough information to file an answer. The circuit court’s preliminary injunction order
indicates that Ms. Hughey’s counsel attempted to continue the hearing as premature.
According to Ms. Hughey, she did not meet with her counsel prior to the hearing to discuss
possible exhibits or testimony or otherwise prepare.

14
offer any affidavits or witnesses in support of Ms. Hughey’s position, apparently believing
that the hearing was going to be continued because he had another hearing scheduled
somewhere else. Nor did he explain why Ms. Hughey was absent.

After the preliminary injunction was entered, a substantial amount of additional
evidence was presented to the circuit court. Ms. Hughey filed two affidavits, gave a
deposition, submitted exhibits, and testified at the hearing on her motion to dissolve the
preliminary injunction. Mr. Cagle also testified at the hearing on the motion to dissolve the
preliminary injunction. None of this additional evidence was discussed in the circuit court’s
Final Order that converted the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction.

The preliminary injunction was based in large part on the circuit court’s conclusions
about the existence of irreparable harm:

Irreparable harm exits (sic) under the uncontroverted evidence … of
dissemination of private and protected material precluded by a court order
entered in the Circuit Court of Boone County and the use of a zip drive to
extract information from Plaintiffs’ computers and further from use of that
information obtained by the Attorney General of West Virginia from the
DEA.

Thus, the circuit court’s finding of irreparable injury in its preliminary injunction
order was based on three main concerns related to (a) the protective order issued in Boone
County, (b) Ms. Hughey’s zip drive, and (c) the information obtained from the DEA.

In the state litigation in Boone County, the defendants were allowed to designate
documents produced during discovery as “Confidential” or “Highly Confidential” and
material so designated was subject to protective order. The defendants used this mechanism
to place internal corporate information concerning pill distribution within the coverage of
the court’s protective order, which required such discovery materials to be returned or
destroyed when the litigation ended. The State of West Virginia succeeded in having most
of this information released from the Boone County protective order, except for distribution
information for three pharmaceutical companies. According to Ms. Hughey, the
distribution information for those three defendants was eventually released from the
protective order as well.20 Thus, if Ms. Hughey is correct, it appears that the information

20
The Charleston Gazette newspaper had the distribution data for one of the three
remaining companies unsealed, and according to Ms. Hughey, the Sixth Circuit unsealed
the remaining distribution data in connection with National Prescription Opiate Litigation,
MDL 2804, the federal opioid MDL (multidistrict litigation) in Cleveland, Ohio. Our
appendix does not contain a copy of the federal order allegedly unsealing data. According
to Ms. Hughey, the distribution data released by this order has been available online
through a Washington Post database for a nominal monthly subscription since 2019.

15
concerning pill distribution protected by the protective order in the Boone County litigation
when the preliminary injunction was entered is now freely available. The Final Order
entered by the circuit court does not discuss this change in circumstances and how it might
affect the basis for its injunction, or the appropriate scope thereof.

Further regarding the protective order that was entered in the state litigation in
Boone County, we note that it was the State of West Virginia itself which successfully
moved to unseal its Second Amended Complaint, a pleading which referenced both the
distribution data provided by the defendants in discovery and DEA statistics. In its briefing
in support of its motion, the state acknowledged that its complaint was based on
information from both the defendant pharmaceutical companies themselves and the DEA
and declared that “[a]n action by the State, its agencies and officers is by its very nature
one in which the public has an interest. As such it should be transparent, therefore the
factual basis for the State’s action should be available for all.” We recognize that the duty
of confidentiality under Rule 1.6 is broader than either attorney-client privilege or work
product, see Syl. Pt. 3, Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 194 W. Va. 788, 461 S.E.2d
850 (1995),21 but in this case, it appears that the State did not intend its Second Amended
Complaint or the corporate distribution data and DEA statistics which underpinned it to be
confidential.22 Instead, it intended that this information “should be available for all.”

Subsequent to issuance of the preliminary injunction, Ms. Hughey acknowledged
through affidavit and sworn testimony that she had stored some case-related information
on a zip drive23 to make it easier to respond to requests for information from the

21
Syllabus Point 3 of Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. McGraw states:

Unlike the evidentiary attorney-client privilege recognized under West
Virginia Rules of Evidence 501, a lawyer's ethical duty of confidentiality
under Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct applies to all
information relating to representation of a client, protecting more than just
“confidences” or “secrets” of a client. The ethical duty of confidentiality is
not nullified by the fact that the information is part of a public record or by
the fact that someone else is privy to it.
22
The Final Order does not indicate whether there may be other documents or
information still subject to the protective order entered in Boone County, or identify such
documents or information, if any. Nor has this issue been clearly developed on appeal.
23
Ms. Hughey also stored some information related to opioid litigation on a laptop
that was purchased in part with funds provided by respondents. According to Ms. Hughey,
she deleted all information on this laptop related to respondents’ opioid cases. She provided
this computer to the respondents for inspection, but the device was no longer operational

16
respondents. She also said that all information on this zip drive related to the respondents’
opioid cases had been purged, and that she had offered to make this zip drive available to
the respondents for inspection, but they had never asked for it. Furthermore, she stated that
she never made any disclosures to third parties which had not been authorized by the
respondents or in compliance with their protocols for disclosure; that she never sold, or
offered to sell, any material from respondents’ files; that she never contacted any lawyers
or law firms about employment related to opioid litigation other than Jeff Simpkins and
Pritt & Spano Law (neither of whom hired her); that she “never gave anybody any
document from Jim Cagle’s file that he did not tell [her] to give”; and that she did not have
any material subject to the Boone County protective order which had not been either
returned or destroyed.

The circuit court’s Final Order does not discuss these sworn statements by Ms.
Hughey or present any findings of fact concerning her credibility, even though she
contradicted much of the evidence that had been presented at the preliminary injunction
hearing. Not surprisingly, since Ms. Hughey did not provide any testimony or affidavits at
the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the court made no findings of fact concerning
her credibility in its Order Granting Preliminary Injunction which could be adopted by
reference in its Final Order. Nor did it make any findings of fact in either of these orders
concerning the credibility of any other witness in this case, or why some witnesses might
be more credible than others. A circuit court is not necessarily required to make detailed
findings about credibility in every case, but given the circumstances of this case, the
complete lack of any findings on credibility prevents us from effectively reviewing the
circuit court’s Final Order.

Finally, in support of its finding of irreparable injury, the circuit court relied on “use
of that information obtained by the Attorney General of West Virginia from the DEA.”
According to Ms. Hughey, the DEA data was never sealed or placed under protective order,
was freely available from public sources, including the DEA website, and was repeatedly
provided by the West Virginia Attorney General’s Office to newspaper reporters and law
firms across the state. Moreover, as noted above, it appears that the State did not intend for

and respondents’ expert was unable to extract any data from it. This laptop was not
mentioned in the circuit court’s preliminary injunction order.

17
distribution data to be treated as confidential client information,24 saying in a public
pleading that it should be freely available to all.25

Having reviewed the circuit court’s rationale, as stated in its Final Order, for
granting a permanent injunction, we now turn to the scope of its ruling. The circuit court’s
Final Order states that it was “specifically enjoining Jewell R. Hughey from soliciting
persons through the use of Plaintiffs’ information or data she may have obtained while
working for Plaintiffs in what have been described as ‘pill mill’ cases.” Neither the Final
Order nor the previous order regarding the preliminary injunction define “Plaintiffs’
information or data.26” The circuit court’s order fails to identify whether the permanent
injunction includes information or documents Ms. Hughey independently obtained through
her own efforts from public sources nor does it identify to what extent Ms. Hughey may
use the knowledge and experience she already possesses. We note in this regard that the
Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, which was “converted into a Permanent
Injunction,” used somewhat different language concerning what conduct was prohibited

24
Respondents rely heavily on Legal Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 194 W. Va. 788,
461 S.E.2d 850 (1995), and its discussion of client confidential information, but we find
that case distinguishable. In the McGraw case, which involved a lawyer disciplinary matter
rather than a request for injunctive relief, the Attorney General was publicly admonished
when he informed a private citizen of a possible change in the Department of
Environmental Protection’s (“DEP”) position regarding local site approval for a landfill. In
that case, the client, DEP, did not move to release the information at issue. In fact, it filed
an ethics complaint against Mr. McGraw, clearly indicating its displeasure with disclosure.
In addition, we note that the information involved in McGraw was plaintiff-specific, rather
than information of a general nature.
25
Although respondents rely primarily on the protection of confidential client
information in their appellate briefs, the State’s action in successfully moving to release
information in the Boone County action would also waive attorney-client privilege and
work product concerning the disclosure of that information. See McCormick v. Zakaib, 189
W. Va. 258, 430 S.E.2d 316 (1993) (voluntary production of documents without objection
during discovery waives both attorney-client privilege and work product). If producing
material without objection during discovery can waive these protections, then surely taking
affirmative action to unseal such material and make it publicly available must do so as well.
26
We also note that Ms. Hughey’s two affidavits purportedly identified all the opioid
documents in her possession, but neither the circuit court nor respondents went through her
lists to identify which documents were protected from disclosure. Apparently, they
believed that anything related to the opioid litigation was covered, even though Ms.
Hughey said that many of her documents had been obtained through her own independent
efforts from public sources and then shared with Mr. Cagle. This blanket approach was
probably overbroad.

18
than the Final Order. The order states that Ms. Hughey was “enjoined from soliciting
persons through the use of the Plaintiffs’ . . . information, data and research from Plaintiffs’
clients, co-counsel and/or obtained and developed in Plaintiffs’ pill mill related litigation
whether that information exists in hard copy or in electronic form.” The phrase “soliciting
persons” is ambiguous because it does not clarify whether it includes potential plaintiffs,
potential employers, or both. The preliminary injunction contained more than a prohibition
on soliciting persons using information or documents obtained from the respondents. It
also required Ms. Hughey to return any such documents to the respondents, to account for
all disclosures of information to third parties, to provide “reasonable means to verify and
confirm that all materials have been returned, deleted or destroyed,” and that Ms. Hughey
should “fully cooperate” with “such discovery as may be reasonably calculated to
accomplish the foregoing.” It is unclear from the order whether these requirements were
incorporated into the Final Order.

Does the permanent injunction issued by the circuit court prohibit Ms. Hughey from
sharing litigation strategies developed during the opioid litigation she was involved in? We
do not take that to be the intention of the parties, but the language of the Final Order is
arguably broad enough to encompass that subject. Such general information should be
outside the scope of “client confidential information” for purposes of Rule 1.6. See
generally Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59, Comment (3) (Am. L.
Inst. 2000),27 Hazard, Hodes, Jarvis and Thompson, The Law of Lawyering § 10.19,

27
Section 59 concerns the definition of “confidential client information.”
Comment (e) provides in part:

e. Information concerning law, legal institutions, and similar
matters. Confidential client information does not include what a lawyer
learns about the law, legal institutions such as courts and administrative
agencies, and similar public matters in the course of representing clients.
Such information is part of the general fund of information available to the
lawyer. During legal research of an issue while representing a client, a lawyer
may discover a particularly important precedent or devise a novel legal
approach that is useful both in the immediate matter and in other
representations. The lawyer and other members of the lawyer's firm may use
and disclose that information in other representations, so long as they thereby
disclose no confidential client information except as permitted by § 60. A
lawyer may use such information-about the state of the law, the best way to
approach an administrative agency, the preferable way to frame an argument
before a particular judge-in a future, otherwise unrelated representation that
is adverse to the former client. . . .

The Reporter’s Note for this comment indicates that it was “based on the principles behind
the concept of generally known information, the customary and accepted practices of

19
Illustration 10-7 (4th ed. 2025-2 Supp.) (A lawyer who develops “extraordinary knowledge
about a particular niche area of the law that is central to [a] client’s business” is not
prohibited from representing another client in the same area of the law) (“A lawyer’s
knowledge about the law is not ‘information relating to the representation,’ because it is
information that is not specific to the client. … If the rule were otherwise, no lawyer could
have more than one client with respect to any particular legal issue or area of the law.”).
Accordingly, we vacate and remand the court’s ruling on the permanent injunction with
instructions to enter an order that complies with Rule 65(d) of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure and the relevant case law.

IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the circuit court’s July 8, 2025, order insofar as it denied petitioner’s
motion to amend her counterclaim and complaint to add claims for quantum meruit and
unjust enrichment and granted respondents’ motion for summary and declaratory judgment
on petitioner’s claim for breach of contract. We vacate the circuit court’s ruling insofar as
it converted the preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We express no opinion as to whether the circuit
court should reach a different conclusion on remand as to whether to grant a permanent
injunction, but if it does, such injunction should be narrowly tailored to achieve clearly
stated purposes.

Affirmed, in part, Vacated, in part, and Remanded.

ISSUED: June 2, 2026

CONCURRED IN BY:

Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge S. Ryan White
Judge Debra McLaughlin, sitting by temporary assignment

Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear, not participating

lawyers, and the public interest in effective professional practice consistent with the general
protection of confidential client information.”

20