State v. Glenn Terrell Turner

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 12, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP1373 Cir. Ct. No. 1991CF913671

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

GLENN TERRELL TURNER,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
JEFFREY A. WAGNER, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Donald, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Geenen, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP1373

¶1 PER CURIAM. Glenn Terrell Turner, pro se, appeals from an order
of the circuit court denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2023-24)1 motion without a
hearing. Turner argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea based
on newly discovered evidence. We conclude that Turner fails to meet the
requirements necessary for relief based on newly discovered evidence, and Turner’s
remaining arguments are procedurally barred. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 1992, Turner pleaded guilty to first-degree homicide while armed.
The circuit court sentenced him to life imprisonment with eligibility for parole in
2017. In 1996, Turner filed his first WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion, which the circuit
court denied in 1997. Turner alleged that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to
sentence him because his arrest was not supported by probable cause, that his right
to a speedy trial was violated, and that his confession was obtained in violation of
his Fifth Amendment rights. The circuit court concluded that these claims were
barred by the guilty plea waiver rule. Turner also alleged that his trial counsel was
ineffective in six ways, but the circuit court rejected these claims as conclusory and
because the record conclusively disproved them. Finally, Turner alleged that the
State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, but the circuit court determined that
this claim was also conclusory. Turner did not appeal.

¶3 In 2003, pursuant to a habeas corpus petition, we reinstated Turner’s
direct appeal rights. Turner filed a motion for postconviction relief under WIS.
STAT. § 809.30, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective, that the plea colloquy was
defective, that he had not actually pleaded guilty, and that the sentencing court

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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erroneously exercised its discretion. The circuit court denied Turner’s motion and
we affirmed, concluding that Turner failed to sufficiently plead his ineffective
assistance claims, that the record conclusively disproved his challenge to the plea
colloquy, that his claim that he never actually pleaded guilty was inadequately
briefed, and the sentencing court did not erroneously exercise its discretion.

¶4 In 2006, Turner filed his second WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion, alleging
that postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and pursue a
claim of imperfect self defense and for failing to obtain test results pertaining to
gunpowder residue and fingerprints. Additionally, Turner again alleged that he had
not actually pleaded guilty. The circuit court rejected these arguments, and we
affirmed, concluding that all claims were barred under either the law of the case
doctrine or under State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157
(1994). To the extent Turner’s ineffective assistance claim against postconviction
counsel was not procedurally barred, we concluded that the claim was meritless.

¶5 In 2023, Turner filed his third WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion seeking
plea withdrawal. Turner raised four justifications for plea withdrawal: newly
discovered evidence via the recantation of Kendrick Gatlin; a violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); ineffective assistance of postconviction and
appellate counsel; and an indistinct claim based on a 1994 letter from then-Governor
Tommy Thompson to the Secretary of Corrections concerning parole policy.

¶6 The circuit court denied Turner’s motion without a hearing. As to the
first claim, the circuit court ruled that Gatlin’s recantation was not corroborated by
other newly discovered evidence or circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as
required by State v. McAlister, 2018 WI 34, 380 Wis. 2d 684, 911 N.W.2d 77. The

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circuit court denied the second, third, and fourth claims as barred by WIS. STAT.
§ 974.06(4) and Escalona-Naranjo.

¶7 Turner appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Turner appeals the circuit court’s order with respect to the newly
discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his third WIS.
STAT. § 974.06 motion. Turner also argues that he never actually pleaded guilty and
argues that the circuit court should have vacated the judgment or allowed him to
withdraw his plea. We disagree.

I. The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it
denied Turner’s motion for plea withdrawal based on newly
discovered evidence.

¶9 Turner first argues that he is entitled to plea withdrawal based on
newly discovered evidence. “After sentencing, a defendant who seeks to withdraw
a guilty or no contest plea carries the heavy burden of establishing, by clear and
convincing evidence, that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice.” State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 473, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997).
“Newly discovered evidence may be sufficient to establish that a manifest injustice
has occurred.” Id. To establish that newly discovered evidence warrants plea
withdrawal to correct a manifest injustice, a defendant must prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that: (1) the evidence at issue was discovered after the
defendant’s conviction; (2) the defendant was not negligent in seeking (or not
seeking) the evidence earlier; (3) the evidence is material to an issue in the case; and
(4) the evidence is not merely cumulative. Id.

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¶10 However, when newly discovered evidence consists of a recantation,
it “must be corroborated by other newly discovered evidence.” Id. at 476. This is
because recantation evidence is inherently unreliable. McAlister, 380 Wis. 2d 684,
¶56. “Corroboration requires newly discovered evidence of both: (1) a feasible
motive for the initial false statement; and (2) circumstantial guarantees of the
trustworthiness of the recantation.” Id., ¶58. A circuit court’s ruling with respect
to whether these criteria are met is reviewed for an erroneous exercise of discretion.
State v. Vollbrecht, 2012 WI App 90, ¶18, 344 Wis. 2d 69, 820 N.W.2d 443; see
McAlister, 380 Wis. 2d 684, ¶63.

¶11 Turner fails to meet at least two requirements. First, Turner did not
demonstrate that he was not negligent for failing to seek the evidence of Gatlin’s
recantation earlier. Turner admits in his motion that he already knew Gatlin had
made a statement to the police on the day of the shooting. Turner does not explain
why he was not negligent for failing to question Gatlin about the truthfulness of his
statement before trial, before his previous WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motions, or at any
time in the past three decades.

¶12 Second, and importantly, Turner failed to corroborate Gatlin’s
recantation with other newly discovered evidence. While Turner arguably presents
a “feasible motive” for Gatlin’s initial false statement (i.e., a threat by the police to
charge him with statutory rape due to his sexual relationship with a minor), he fails
to present any circumstantial guarantees of the trustworthiness of Gatlin’s
recantation. Gatlin’s statement concerns events from over 30 years ago, and he
admitted that he was drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana at the time of the
events. Turner also states that he learned of Gatlin’s recantation after a chance
meeting with Gatlin in prison. The significant length of time between Turner’s trial
and Gatlin’s recantation “cuts against concluding” that Gatlin’s statement is

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“trustworthy.” See McAlister, 380 Wis. 2d 684, ¶60. Moreover, “recantations made
while in jail are ‘highly suspicious.’” Id. at ¶61 (quoting United States v. Walker,
25 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 1994)). Under these circumstances, the circuit court did
not erroneously exercise its discretion by concluding that Gatlin’s purported
recantation lacked circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.

¶13 Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion when it denied Turner’s plea withdrawal motion based on
newly discovered evidence.

II. The circuit court correctly determined that Turner’s other claims
were procedurally barred.

¶14 Having concluded that the circuit court properly rejected Turner’s
argument based on newly discovered evidence, we turn to Turner’s remaining
claims. Turner argues that he never actually pleaded guilty and that postconviction
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that he never pleaded guilty. Both of
these arguments are procedurally barred.

¶15 Turner did not argue that he never pleaded guilty in the WIS. STAT.
§ 974.06 motion that we review in this appeal. We typically do not address issues
that are raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Bucki, 2020 WI App 43, ¶74,
393 Wis. 2d 434, 947 N.W.2d 152. Moreover, Turner is barred from raising this
claim because we previously addressed and rejected this claim on direct review. “A
matter once litigated may not be relitigated in a subsequent postconviction
proceeding no matter how artfully the defendant may rephrase the issue.” State v.
Witkowski, 163 Wis. 2d 985, 990, 473 N.W.2d 512 (Ct. App. 1991).

¶16 Turner’s ineffectiveness argument is also barred, but for different
reasons. WISCONSIN STAT. § 974.06(4) bars successive postconviction motions

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based on issues that could have been but were not raised on direct appeal or in an
earlier motion absent a “sufficient reason” for failing to do so. Escalona-Naranjo,
185 Wis. 2d at 185. The circuit court correctly observed that there was no reason
why Turner could not have brought his ineffectiveness claim in the § 974.06 motion
he filed in 2006. Additionally, the State raised the Escalona-Naranjo procedural
bar in its respondent’s brief, and Turner did not reply. He therefore conceded the
issue. United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d
750, 738 N.W.2d 578.

¶17 Accordingly, we reject Turner’s other arguments for relief because
they are procedurally barred.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its
discretion by denying Turner’s motion for plea withdrawal based on newly
discovered evidence, and we further conclude that Turner’s other arguments for
relief are procedurally barred. We affirm.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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