State v. V. T.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 23, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos.
2025AP1338 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2023TP124
2023TP125
2025AP1339 2023TP126
2025AP1340
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

APPEAL NO. 2025AP1338

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO A.T.H.-T., A PERSON UNDER
THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

V.T.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
Nos. 2025AP1338
2025AP1339
2025AP1340

APPEAL NO. 2025AP1339

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO T.S.M.H.T.,
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

V.T.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL NO. 2025AP1340

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO R.L.C.H.T.,
A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

V.T.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
LAURA GRAMLING PEREZ, Judge. Affirmed.

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Nos. 2025AP1338
2025AP1339
2025AP1340

¶1 COLON, P.J.1 V.T. appeals from orders terminating her parental
rights to her three children, and from an order denying her postdisposition motion.
V.T. argues that she was provided ineffective assistance of trial counsel when
counsel failed to review certain discovery materials before trial, and that the trial
court thereby erred in denying her postdisposition motion for a new trial. For the
following reasons, we affirm.2

¶2 On July 25, 2023, a court entered orders finding V.T.’s three
children to be in need of protection and services (CHIPS), and placing the children
outside of V.T.’s home. On July 31, 2023, the State initiated termination of
parental rights (TPR) proceedings, alleging as grounds that V.T. had failed to
assume parental responsibility for them. On January 26, 2024, the State filed
amended petitions, claiming that V.T.’s children were also children in continuing
need of protection or services (continuing CHIPS), because V.T. had not met the
conditions of return established in the CHIPS orders.

¶3 At the final pretrial hearing in October 2024, V.T. expressed
concerns about trial counsel’s representation, stating that she did not believe
counsel was prepared for trial, pointing out that she had made a list of witnesses
she wanted subpoenaed for trial, but that counsel had not subpoenaed them.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
2
Cases appealed under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.107 are “given preference and shall be
taken in an order that ensures that a decision is issued within 30 days after the filing of the
appellant’s reply[.]” RULE 809.107(6)(e). Conflicts in this court’s calendar have resulted in a
delay. It is therefore necessary for this court to sua sponte extend the deadline for a decision in
this case. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.82(2)(a); Rhonda R.D. v. Franklin R.D., 191 Wis. 2d 680,
694, 530 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, we extend our deadline to the date this
decision is issued.

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Counsel stated that she was prepared for trial, and the trial court decided the cases
would continue to trial as scheduled.

¶4 On the morning of trial, V.T. again expressed concerns regarding
counsel’s representation. Specifically, V.T. did not believe counsel was prepared
for trial because she had only met with counsel once. The court again decided that
the trial would go forward, stating that “[Counsel] is your third or fourth lawyer at
this time and we are moving forward with your trial. [Counsel] is an experienced
lawyer and … I have no doubt she is prepared for trial today[.]” When asked what
she had done to prepare for the trial, counsel stated that she had reviewed the
petitions with V.T., had made herself available to V.T. by phone, and had spoken
with the State and the guardian ad litem for the children. Counsel also mentioned
the fact that she had previously represented V.T. in other TPR proceedings. V.T.
contended, however, that counsel had not reviewed any of the discovery
documents from these cases with her. Again, the court stated that the trial would
continue as scheduled, with trial counsel continuing to represent V.T.

¶5 After a three-day jury trial, the jury determined that the State had
proven both grounds for termination, and the court found V.T. unfit. The
dispositional hearing occurred on December 5, 2024. The court heard testimony
from one of the children’s foster parents who testified that all three children had
been placed in their home since “close to birth” and that the children were doing
“amazing ... doing great in school” and were “adjusting great.” The court also
heard from the ongoing case manager, who testified that the children had been in
out-of-home care for the majority of their lives, were significantly bonded to their
foster parents, and that none of the children appeared to have a relationship with
V.T. While trial counsel indicated that she had intended to call V.T. as a witness

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2025AP1339
2025AP1340

to testify, V.T. failed to appear in person at the hearing. Trial counsel made a
short offer of proof, stating that V.T. had “been adamant that her children have a
relationship with her and that it would be harmful to sever that relationship[.]”
Ultimately, the court concluded that it would be in the children’s best interests if it
terminated V.T.’s parental rights.

¶6 V.T. subsequently filed a postdisposition motion requesting a new
trial, asserting that she was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial
counsel had failed to obtain and review any discovery in these matters. V.T.
further argued that she was not required to point to any specific instances of
prejudice at trial to succeed on her ineffective assistance of counsel claim, because
counsel’s failure to review and obtain the discovery made it unlikely that any
attorney could have been adequately prepared for trial.

¶7 The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which trial
counsel testified. Counsel stated that she estimated she had represented parents in
hundreds of TPR proceedings during the 18 years she had been practicing.
Counsel stated that she had no recollection as to whether she had obtained the
department’s file and the discovery in this case, although appellate counsel did
present evidence in the form of an email wherein trial counsel stated that she had
not obtained any of the discovery documents related to these cases. Counsel then
stated that she had “relied on [her] communication with [her] client about the
services that she was referred to[,]the services that she competed, [and] the
services that she had started[.]” Counsel further stated that “[t]he majority of the
discovery would not be related to anything beyond that and [her] client since [she
had] worked with her before” and she “has always been an accurate reporter about
her services and she was an accurate reporter this time as well.”

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¶8 Trial counsel explained that she intentionally chose not to review the
department’s case notes, instead reviewing “the dispositional court report, the
dispositional court order, … the most recent permanency plan, and then the initial
assessment.” Her reasoning for doing so was that “in the past sometimes it would
take [her] a long time to get the documents and so what [she] started doing was
just requesting” those four documents. “Those four documents pretty much have
in there everything that I would need to know for the trial and then supplemented
by my client’s commentary,” she stated, because “the focus is on the services that
have been referred and the services that have been completed or met … so that’s
the focus of the trial and that information gets me a long way.”

¶9 After hearing testimony, the trial court found that “it’s undisputed
that counsel failed to review the agency’s case notes” and determined that trial
counsel’s performance was deficient. However, the court disagreed with V.T.’s
argument that she did not have to demonstrate actual prejudice at trial, stating that
it was unclear whether the case law upon which V.T. relied “really stands for
that.” Because V.T. admitted that she could not point to any actual prejudice at
trial, the court denied her postdisposition motion.

¶10 On appeal, V.T. argues that the trial court erred in denying her
postdisposition motion, again asserting that she was denied her right to effective
assistance of counsel. She renews her argument that she does not need to show
actual prejudice at trial, since the circumstances of the case—i.e., the fact that trial
counsel failed to review any discovery materials—make it unlikely that any
attorney could provide effective assistance.

¶11 Such claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are examined under
the two-part test found in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under

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Strickland, a litigant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show both
that their counsel performed deficiently and that the deficiency prejudiced the
defense. Id. at 687.

¶12 While V.T. argues that Strickland does not apply to this case, and
that we should presume prejudice under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
661 (1984), we disagree. The holding in Cronic was narrow and did not provide a
clear-cut exception to the test in Strickland. Instead, Cronic rejected an argument
that prejudice should be presumed where a young, inexperienced attorney, being
appointed by the trial court to represent the defendant, was given only 25 days for
pretrial preparation. Id. at 649. The Supreme Court therein stated that, “[a]bsent
some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth
Amendment guarantee [of effective assistance of counsel] is generally not
implicated.” Id. at 658. The Court found that the circumstances in that case did
not justify a presumption of ineffectiveness and that the defendant could only
make a claim for ineffective assistance “by pointing to specific errors made by
trial counsel.” Id. at 666.

¶13 In the present case, we similarly conclude that V.T. may only make a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel by following the guidelines set forth in
Strickland. V.T. must show both that trial counsel’s performance was deficient
and that the deficiency prejudiced her defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

¶14 In regards to the first prong, counsel’s performance is considered
constitutionally deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Id. at 688. Whether counsel’s performance satisfies the constitutional standard for
ineffective assistance is a question of law we review independently. State v.
Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.

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¶15 Here, we agree with the trial court that trial counsel’s performance
was most certainly deficient. It is undisputed that trial counsel here failed to
review the entirety of the discovery available to her. Counsel’s failure to review
certain portions of discovery is deficient performance as a matter of law. Id., ¶37.
“[I]t falls below objective standards of reasonableness to fail to read all portions of
discovery that may have the potential to educe information that is either beneficial
or damaging to the client’s cause.” Id. The unread portions of discovery had the
possibility of providing “insight into other facets of the case that deserved more
thorough investigation,” particularly in consideration of the stakes involved in a
TPR case. See id., ¶38. Trial counsel should have reviewed all of the discovery
provided, as it could have contained information that could have aided in V.T.’s
defense, which V.T. would possibly be unable to recognize its significance on her
own but which trial counsel should have been able to recognize as helpful.

¶16 However, while we conclude that trial counsel’s performance was
deficient, V.T. is also required to show that trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies
prejudiced her defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. If a litigant fails to make
a showing on either prong of the Strickland test, their claim for ineffective
assistance fails. Id. V.T. notably makes no attempt to argue that her defense was
prejudiced by counsel’s performance, and she therefore fails this prong of the
Strickland test. Because V.T. has failed to make this showing, her claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel fails. We therefore affirm the orders of the trial
court.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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