Greg Griswold v. Jonathan T. Miles

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 14, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2614 Cir. Ct. No. 2020CV216

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

GREG GRISWOLD,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

JONATHAN T. MILES,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Grant County:
CRAIG R. DAY, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Blanchard, Kloppenburg, and Nashold, JJ.

¶1 BLANCHARD, J. This case calls for consideration of the
mechanism established by our supreme court that allows indigent people seeking
No. 2024AP2614

access to the courts to petition for court-ordered waivers of costs and fees incurred
in litigation based on findings of poverty. See WIS. STAT. § 814.29 (2023-24).1

¶2 Greg Griswold, pro se on appeal, challenges a circuit court order
denying his petitions for indigency waivers of his obligation to pay the fees for
transcripts of circuit court proceedings related to prior appeals in this action, based
on his alleged inability to pay due to poverty. The defendant in this action and the
respondent on appeal, Jonathan Miles, takes no position regarding the waiver
issue. The court denied Griswold’s petitions for a waiver based on the court’s
determination that Griswold, at pertinent times, controlled assets worth hundreds
of thousands of dollars and therefore was not entitled to a finding of poverty.

¶3 Griswold contends that this was error for two alternative reasons.
First, Griswold argues that, under WIS. STAT. § 814.29, the circuit court was
obligated to find that Griswold was unable to pay court costs and fees based on the
uncontested fact that, at all pertinent times, he received means-tested public
assistance. We conclude that § 814.29 allows a circuit court to consider not only
the existence of means-tested public assistance but also the value of a petitioner’s
assets when considering whether the petitioner’s allegation of poverty is untrue.
In appropriate cases, a court may order payment of court costs and fees wholly or
partially on the ground that the petitioner’s assets are sufficiently substantial to
render the allegation of poverty untrue, even if the petitioner proves receipt of
means-tested public assistance.

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version unless otherwise
noted.

2
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¶4 Second, Griswold asserts that the circuit court erred in determining
that he controlled hundreds of thousands of dollars of assets and that this
determination established that Griswold could afford to pay approximately $492 in
court costs and fees. We reject Griswold’s arguments on this point as
undeveloped because he fails to identify clearly erroneous factfinding or legal
error by the court.

¶5 For these reasons, Griswold fails to establish a basis to reverse the
circuit court’s application of WIS. STAT. § 814.29 to his waiver petitions, and
accordingly we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶6 Griswold, who was also pro se in the circuit court, commenced this
action in 2020. He brought claims against Miles, a real estate broker, regarding
Grant County land that Griswold had purchased. Over time, the circuit court
issued a series of orders that resulted in the dismissal of each of Griswold’s claims
and of his operative complaint in April 2022. Following the last of these orders,
Griswold commenced the first of three appeals to this court in this action.

¶7 In connection with the first appeal, Griswold petitioned the circuit
court for a waiver, under WIS. STAT. § 814.29, of his obligation to pay $308 in
fees to obtain hearing transcripts. See State ex rel. Girouard v. Circuit Ct. for
Jackson Cnty., 155 Wis. 2d 148, 153 n.3, 454 N.W.2d 792 (1990) (“Charges by
[circuit court] reporters for transcripts are referred to and defined as fees by [WIS.
STAT. § 814.69(1).]”). The petition included a form affidavit in which Griswold
averred that he was the recipient of identified forms of means-tested public
assistance. Griswold’s averments that he received means-tested public assistance

3
No. 2024AP2614

at pertinent times have never been contested, and they were consistently accepted
as true by the circuit court.

¶8 In May 2022, the circuit court issued an order granting Griswold’s
petition on a “preliminary” basis, although the court explained that it might revisit
the issue later. The court acknowledged that Griswold’s undisputed receipt of
means-tested public assistance qualified him, at least as an initial matter, for a
waiver of costs and fees under WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1)(a) and (d)1. However, the
court expressed the view that there was a “substantial question as to whether
Mr. Griswold is indigent” for purposes of § 814.29(1) and (2). Specifically, while
making the preliminary determination to grant the waiver request based on
§ 814.29(1), the court interpreted § 814.29(2) to provide authority for the court to
deny the waiver request and to order Griswold to pay if the court ultimately found
that Griswold controlled substantial assets. The court explained that, in
“preliminarily” granting the waiver, the court would not at that time exercise what
it viewed to be its authority under subsection (2) to consider denying the waiver
request based on the assets factor. The court’s preliminary decision allowed
Griswold to pursue the first appeal in this court.

¶9 Griswold voluntarily dismissed the first appeal. In December 2023,
following remittitur from the court of appeals, the circuit court issued an order
requiring Griswold to pay the transcript costs that the circuit court had waived on
an explicitly preliminary basis. This was based in part on the court’s
determination that, as stated in its prior order, the court was authorized to order
payment based on the facts as the court understood them and applying WIS. STAT.
§ 814.29(2).

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¶10 Griswold commenced a second appeal, challenging the circuit
court’s December 2023 order requiring him to pay the transcript fees. In June
2024, this court issued a summary order dismissing Griswold’s second appeal.
Griswold v. Miles, No. 2022AP2099, unpublished op. and order (WI App June 20,
2024). See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3) (summary orders of this court are citable
only to support an argument of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or identify the
law of the case).2

¶11 Following this second remittitur from this court, the circuit court
sent Griswold a notice requesting payment of the transcript costs related to his first
appeal, which had still not been paid. Griswold requested a hearing, effectively
renewing his petition to waive transcript fees related to his first appeal.

¶12 Griswold also filed a motion arguing that, in addressing the
indigency issue, the circuit court should limit its review to admissible evidence
adduced at the new hearing and that the court should not consider evidence that
had been offered, or court findings that had been made, in hearings regarding
Griswold’s indigency in other circuit court cases.

¶13 In November 2024, the circuit court held a hearing at which it denied
Griswold’s motion to limit the scope of the relevant evidence. The court said that

2
In Griswold’s favor, we assume without deciding that the law of the case doctrine does
not bar his attempt in this appeal to raise arguments that he may have intended to raise in any of
his prior appeals. See State v. Moeck, 2005 WI 57, ¶18, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 695 N.W.2d 783 (“The
law of the case doctrine is a ‘longstanding rule that a decision on a legal issue by an appellate
court establishes the law of the case, which must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the
trial court or on later appeal.’” (quoted source omitted)); State v. Stuart, 2003 WI 73, ¶24, 262
Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82 (courts can “disregard” law of the case doctrine when “‘cogent,
substantial, and proper reasons exist’” to reconsider prior rulings in a case (quoted source
omitted)).

5
No. 2024AP2614

it would treat evidence and court findings from other circuit court cases as creating
a “baseline” from which to consider Griswold’s latest waiver request, taking into
account any changes in Griswold’s financial circumstances over time.

¶14 With the scope of the proper background materials settled by the
circuit court, Griswold represented the following to the court. He had been
diagnosed with cancer. The illness had prompted him to arrange for all assets that
were held in trust on Griswold’s behalf to be placed in a new irrevocable trust for
the benefit of Griswold’s son. As a result, Griswold said, he was “not only
indigent, but … destitute,” apparently meaning in extreme poverty.

¶15 The circuit court rejected Griswold’s renewed waiver petition on the
grounds that Griswold continued to have control over significant assets even after
the purported asset transfer.

¶16 Griswold filed a new petition for waiver of fees, this time requesting
the waiver of the fee to obtain a transcript of the November 2024 hearing for
purposes of pursuing what would become this appeal. Griswold also requested a
circuit court hearing regarding this latest petition.

¶17 In December 2024, the circuit court issued an order rejecting this
latest petition without holding a hearing. The court’s order provided additional
reasoning, both for rejecting Griswold’s petition at the November 2024 hearing
and for rejecting his latest petition, under the court’s interpretations of WIS. STAT.
§ 814.29(1)(a), (1)(d) and (2).

¶18 Griswold appeals the circuit court’s December 2024 order. The
transcript of the November 2024 hearing is part of the record.

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No. 2024AP2614

DISCUSSION

¶19 We begin by addressing Griswold’s argument that, under WIS. STAT.
§ 814.29, the circuit court was not permitted to consider Griswold’s assets as a
basis to order Griswold to pay costs and fees, because it was undisputed that at all
pertinent times he received means-tested public assistance. After providing an
overview of pertinent provisions in § 814.29, we explain our conclusion that
§ 814.29 allows circuit courts to require payment of costs and fees based wholly or
partially on a determination that a petitioner has assets that allow the petitioner to
pay costs and fees, even if the petitioner establishes that the petitioner receives
means-tested public assistance.

¶20 Further below, we explain why we reject Griswold’s challenges to
the circuit court’s determination that he controlled hundreds of thousands of
dollars of assets at pertinent times and that this provided a basis to order Griswold
to pay costs and fees.

¶21 Our interpretations and applications of statutes present issues of law
that we review de novo. See Warehouse II, LLC v. DOT, 2006 WI 62, ¶4, 291
Wis. 2d 80, 715 N.W.2d 213. This is true regardless of whether a statute was
passed by the legislature or, as with pertinent aspects of WIS. STAT. § 814.29, was
promulgated by our supreme court pursuant to its rule-making authority. See
Waters ex rel. Skow v. Pertzborn, 2001 WI 62, ¶16, 243 Wis. 2d 703, 627 N.W.2d
497; WIS. STAT. § 751.12(1). For both legislatively and judicially created statutes,
“[t]he goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the enacting body.” Waters, 243 Wis. 2d 703, ¶16.

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No. 2024AP2614

¶22 We review for clear error the circuit court’s factual findings
regarding the poverty of a petitioner under WIS. STAT. § 814.29. See State v.
Jacobus, 167 Wis. 2d 230, 235, 481 N.W.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1992).

I. Interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 814.29

¶23 We begin our overview of WIS. STAT. § 814.29 with subpart (1)(a),
which addresses, as pertinent here, the topic of a circuit court’s ability to waive
costs and fees generally.3 See State ex rel. Hansen v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty.,
181 Wis. 2d 993, 995, 997-98, 513 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1994) (referring to
permission to commence an action without payment of costs or fees as “waiver” of
the costs and fees). It states in part that, “upon order of the [circuit] court,” “any
person may commence” an action in “any court” “without being required to give
security for costs or to pay any service or fee.” There is also the potential for
waiver of the payment of costs and fees, or giving security for them, in connection
with the commencement of “any … appeal.” See § 814.29(1)(a); Girouard, 155
Wis. 2d at 150 (concluding that circuit courts may waive transcription fees
requested by indigent appellants under § 814.29). The circuit court is to issue an
order waiving costs and fees when the court finds that, “because of poverty[,] the
person” commencing the action or appeal in the action “is unable to pay the costs
of the action … or appeal therein, or to give security for those costs.” See
§ 814.29(1)(a).

3
We note that on the facts of this case, “the court” referred to is a circuit court, but under
the rules of appellate procedure, appellants may file petitions or motions for waivers of appellate
filing costs and fees under WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1) or (1m). See WIS. STAT. RULES 809.11(1),
809.801(7)(b). We do not intend to separately interpret any rules of appellate procedure in this
opinion and we generally use “circuit court” as our default reference in this opinion, even when a
rule might apply equally or at least in some manner to an appellate court.

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No. 2024AP2614

¶24 A person seeking a waiver of costs and fees must “file in the court
an affidavit in the form prescribed by the judicial conference.” WIS. STAT.
§ 814.29(1)(b).4 This affidavit in support of a waiver order must “set[] forth
briefly the nature of the cause, defense or appeal and facts demonstrating his or
her poverty.” § 814.29(1)(b). “The court may deny the request for [a waiver] if
the court finds that the affidavit states no claim, defense or appeal upon which the
court may grant relief.” § 814.29(1)(c).

¶25 WISCONSIN STAT. § 814.29(1)(d) states that, if the petitioner’s
“affidavit demonstrates any of the following,” then the circuit court “shall make a
finding of poverty” and accordingly issue a waiver order:

1. That the person is a recipient of means-tested
public assistance, including aid to families with dependent
children, relief funded by a relief block grant under [WIS.
STAT.] ch. 49, relief provided by counties under [WIS.
STAT. §] 59.53(21), medical assistance, supplemental
security income, food stamps or benefits received by
veterans under [WIS. STAT. §] 45.40(1m) or under 38 USC
[§§] 1501 to 1562.

2. That the person is represented by an attorney
through a legal services program for indigent persons,
including, without limitation, those funded by the federal
legal services corporation, the state public defender or
volunteer attorney programs based on indigency.

3. That the person is otherwise unable, because of
poverty, to pay the costs of the action, proceeding or appeal
or to give security for those costs. In determining the
person’s ability under this subdivision to pay or give
security for costs and fees, the court shall consider the
person’s household size, income, expenses, assets and

4
The Judicial Conference has prescribed Form CV-410A, “Petition for Waiver of Fees
and Costs – Affidavit of Indigency.” See CIRCUIT COURT FORMS, https://www.wicourts.gov/
forms1/circuit/index.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2025).

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No. 2024AP2614

debts[,] and the federal poverty guidelines under 42 USC
§ 9902(2).

§ 814.29(1)(d)1.-3. We use the following shorthand references for these
provisions: subparts (1)(d)1.-3. are collectively “the (1)(d) categories”; subpart
(1)(d)1. is “the public assistance category”; subpart (1)(d)2. is “the representation
category”; and subpart (1)(d)3. is “the catchall category.”

¶26 Summarizing regarding the (1)(d) categories, the public assistance
and representation categories direct the circuit court to make a finding of poverty
in two sets of circumstances that each involve a government or nonprofit agency
setting and applying its own criteria for assessing poverty and the agency has
deemed the petitioner to have satisfied those criteria.

¶27 The public assistance category involves “means-tested public
assistance,” and it illustrates what can constitute “means-tested public assistance”
by giving a list of “include[d]” examples. See WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1)(d)1. For
example, the public assistance category references “food stamps,” which must
include Wisconsin’s federally funded administration of Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program or “SNAP” benefits, known in Wisconsin as FoodShare. See
WIS. STAT. § 49.79 (“Food stamp administration.”); WIS. ADMIN. CODE
§ DHS 149.03(15) (Jul. 1, 2008) (noting that Wisconsin’s “assistance program
under 7 U.S.C. [§§] 2011 to 2029” is known as “the FoodShare Program”).

¶28 Turning to the representation category, this is keyed to the provision
of legal services explicitly provided to “indigent persons,” again implicating a
determination by an agency that a person is sufficiently poor to qualify for such
services. See WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1)(d)2. Mirroring § 814.29(1)(d)1., the list of

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No. 2024AP2614

pertinent legal services is not exclusive—in the words of § 814.29(1)(d)2., it lists
examples “without limitation.”

¶29 The catchall category provides an alternative for waiver petitioners
who do not qualify under the other two categories, as signaled by the phrase
“otherwise unable.” Like the other two categories, the catchall category includes a
standard for defining poverty created by an agency, namely, “the federal poverty
guidelines under 42 U.S.C. [§] 9902(2).” See WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1)(d)3. But
unlike the first two categories, the catchall category treats the federal poverty
guidelines as but one factor to be considered as part of a holistic approach. The
court is to consider the poverty guidelines along with the petitioner’s “household
size, income, expenses, assets and debts[,] and the federal poverty guidelines.”
See § 814.29(1)(d)3.

¶30 Thus, if a petitioner’s affidavit demonstrates that the petitioner fits
one of the first two categories, the court shall make a finding of poverty. Failing
that, the court weighs the factors in the catchall category and makes a finding of
poverty if these factors establish to the satisfaction of the court an inability to pay
court costs and fees. See WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1)(d)1.-3.

¶31 But that is not the end of the analysis. WISCONSIN STAT.
§ 814.29(2) establishes circumstances in which a finding of poverty under any of
the (1)(d) categories may be, in effect, reversed by the circuit court. Pertinent
here, under § 814.29(2), the circuit court “may dismiss any action or proceeding”

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or “require the payment of, or the giving of security for, costs, fees and service if
the court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue.”5

¶32 Bearing in mind this background regarding WIS. STAT. § 814.29, the
first issue is whether the circuit court could determine, under subsection (2), that
Griswold’s “allegation of poverty is untrue” due to his control over substantial
assets, even though subpart (1)(d) directs that the court “shall make a finding of
poverty” based on Griswold’s receipt of means-tested public assistance.

¶33 Griswold argues that the only reasonable way to harmonize WIS.
STAT. § 814.29(1)(d) with § 814.29(2) is to construe these provisions to mean that,
if one of the (1)(d) categories is met and is not itself shown to be untrue, the circuit
court is strictly required to make a finding of poverty and to order costs and fees
waived. Under this view, the court could determine that an “allegation of poverty
is untrue” under subsection (2) only if the court finds that an allegation of fact
specifically material to the application of the (1)(d) categories is untrue. Here,
Griswold points out, there was no basis for the court to find that his claim of
qualifying for means-tested public assistance was untrue, and therefore the circuit
court was required to issue an order waiving Griswold’s obligation to pay the
transcript fees.

¶34 In contrast, the circuit court here interpreted WIS. STAT.
§ 814.29(1)(d) and (2) to allow the court to require payment of costs in an

5
For context, we note that WIS. STAT. § 814.29(2) also provides that the circuit court
“may later require the payment of, or the giving of security for, costs, fees and service if the court
determines that the [petitioner] no longer meets any of the requirements under” § 814.29(1). But
this ability to account for changing circumstances does not apply here because the facts relevant
to Griswold’s petition, including his undisputed receipt of means-tested public assistance, have
been consistent at all times pertinent to this appeal.

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No. 2024AP2614

additional circumstance. That is, the court interpreted subsection (2) to also
permit a court to require payment based on a determination that—despite a
petitioner’s undisputed averment that the petitioner satisfied the public assistance
category or the representation category—the allegation of the petitioner’s poverty
overall should be rejected as untrue based on a finding that the petitioner had
sufficient assets to pay the costs and fees. Applying that rule here, the court
rejected Griswold’s petitions based a determination that he retained control over
significant assets that allowed him to pay court costs and fees.

¶35 We agree with the circuit court’s view. Interpreting the pertinent
provisions of WIS. STAT. § 814.29 as a whole, we conclude that a circuit court may
determine that an “allegation of poverty is untrue” when the court determines that
a waiver petitioner controls assets sufficient to render the petitioner able to pay
costs and fees, even when the court has already found, or has no basis to question,
that the petitioner satisfies either the public assistance category or the
representation category.6

¶36 In support of that conclusion, we note that, in drafting WIS. STAT.
§ 814.29(2) our supreme court used the broadly inclusive phrase “the allegation of
poverty is untrue” without tying it to any particular aspect of § 814.29(1),
including any of the (1)(d) categories or any of the elements of those categories.
This contrasts with the other statement of subsection (2), which addresses when a

6
We note that, given our interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1) and (2), a circuit court
could be asked to, or could on its own initiative, consider other kinds of financial resources
available to a petitioner, besides the kinds of tangible assets at issue here, that are not considered
under the public assistance category or the representation category. This could include sources of
income that might not be considered by an agency when it applies its standards. In this opinion,
however, we address only the effect of Griswold’s assets, as determined by the circuit court, on
the court’s ability to order payment of costs and fees under subsection (2).

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No. 2024AP2614

petitioner “no longer meets any of the requirements under sub[section] (1).”
§ 814.29(2). It would have been simple to qualify the phrase “the allegation of
poverty is untrue” in a way that links it to one or more of the (1)(d) categories.

¶37 Further supporting our conclusion, the structure and content of WIS.
STAT. § 814.29(1) and (2) convey an intent by the supreme court for circuit courts
to efficiently arrive at an assessment of when a person is “unable to pay” court
costs and fees because of “poverty.” See § 814.29(1)(a), (b), (d)3., (2). The goal
of efficiency is achieved in part by directing that the initial determination shall be
based on the readily ascertainable standards in the first two (1)(d) categories, since
they consist of standards applied by agencies and may involve relying strictly on a
relatively simple metric such as income (however income might be specifically
defined by an agency). It would appear that in many cases this initial
determination will be the only consideration that a court needs to give to a party’s
claim of indigency.

¶38 But additional goals are reflected in the catchall category and the
unambiguous language of WIS. STAT. § 814.29(2), noted above. In these
provisions, the supreme court signaled an intent to allow circuit courts, when the
circumstances dictate, to address the concept of poverty more holistically, not
strictly limited by standards set by agencies and not necessarily limited to some
particular measure of the person’s income. These features of § 814.29 establish
that courts are to make a finding of poverty under the relatively objective public
assistance and representation categories, or the more holistic catch-all category, if
any apply. But then, when it comes to an assessment of a petitioner’s “allegation
of poverty,” the court is not obligated to ignore evidence of what the court might
reasonably find to be substantial means that render the petitioner able to pay court
costs and fees.

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No. 2024AP2614

¶39 Expanding on this last point, the first two (1)(d) categories are
somewhat fluid in nature, making it unlikely that the supreme court intended to
rigidly bind circuit courts to determinations of eligibility based on any and all
means-tested public assistance or representation benefits, no matter what the
criteria for those services might be at a given time. The two categories are fluid in
two ways that would have been apparent to our supreme court in promulgating
WIS. STAT. § 814.29. First, each provides a non-exclusive list of indigency-related
services.7 Second, as noted above, whether an individual service is enumerated or
not, the conditions to qualify for the service can change over time. For example,
since our supreme court promulgated § 814.29(1)(d), the type of means-testing
used to determine eligibility for FoodShare has varied. Eligibility was initially
based in part on assets, but in more recent times it has focused solely on income.8

7
Our interpretation that the public assistance and representation categories are merely
illustrative and not exclusive is based on the general rule that the word “includes” has a non-
exclusive meaning, unless there is “textual evidence that the legislature intended” the word
“includes” to be “a term of limitation or enumeration.” See State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55,
¶¶43-44, 309 Wis. 2d 601, 749 N.W.2d 611. The court further explained that when “includes” is
used to enumerate relatively more specific examples of relatively more general terms, that word
sheds light on the scope of the more general terms. See id., ¶¶46-48 & n.25. To be clear, here
there is no dispute that at all pertinent times Griswold received what WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1)(d)1.
refers to as “food stamps,” and therefore we are not called upon to address the scope of “means-
tested public assistance” as illustrated by the statute’s enumerated examples. However, the
overall structure of § 814.29(1)(d)1., including its apparently non-exclusive listing of public
assistance sources, is relevant to our interpretation of other aspects of § 814.29.
8
Historically, eligibility for FoodShare benefits depended in part on asset limits, such
that a person with low income but sufficient assets did not qualify for benefits. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 2014(g); WIS. STAT. § 49.79(1p)-(1r). More recently, however, food stamp administration in
Wisconsin has adopted “broad-based categorical eligibility,” which has expanded the ability to
receive benefits without testing assets under certain circumstances. See 7 U.S.C. 2035(b)-(d)
(permitting states to adopt “simplified” eligibility rules for state administration of federally
funded SNAP benefits); § 49.79(7) (authorizing state department of health to pursue simplified
food stamp program under federal law); WISCONSIN DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., FOODSHARE
HANDBOOK, release 25-01, § 4.2.1 (Apr. 2025).

(continued)

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No. 2024AP2614

¶40 To clarify, when a petitioner qualifies for services under the public
assistance or representation categories, the fact of qualification as well as the
circumstances that led to the qualification could well serve as relevant evidence to
support the petitioner’s allegation of poverty for purposes of the more holistic
review that a court may undertake pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 814.29(2). But here,
we do not understand the circuit court to have affirmatively discredited or
misunderstood Griswold’s representations about how low his income was or about
how its meager nature properly allowed him to qualify for multiple public
benefits. Further, Griswold does not argue that the court failed to take into
account evidence of indebtedness on the assets that would have rendered them of
low or no monetary value to him, assuming that he controlled them. Rather, as
discussed below, the court weighed facts regarding assets controlled by Griswold,
which the court found were substantial, to determine that he could afford to pay
court costs and fees based on his overall financial resources, even though he
qualified for means-tested public assistance.

¶41 We understand Griswold to argue that the phrase “shall make a
finding” in WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1)(d), when considered in light of the public
assistance category, expresses supreme court’s intent to prevent circuit courts from
making inquiries that go beyond reliable assessments of income alone. As part of
this argument, he quotes a note by the Judicial Council, which the supreme court
did not adopt but did order printed. See Judicial Council Committee Note, 1993,
§ 814.29; S. CT. ORDER 93-15, 179 Wis. 2d xxxiii. This note addressed the intent

In contrast, the state public defender tests indigency in part by reference to the person’s
assets. See WIS. STAT. § 977.02(3); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § PD 3.03(2) (Aug. 1, 2013) (tying
eligibility for public defender representation in part to an asset limit of $2,500, subject to partial
exclusions of the petitioner’s equity in real estate and vehicles).

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No. 2024AP2614

behind the supreme court’s amendments to § 814.29 in 1993, which included
adding subpart (1)(d) to the statute. According to the note, evident purposes for
the 1993 changes were to “simplify and make more uniform the procedure for
determining when costs and fees for indigent persons should be waived by the
court.” See S. CT. ORDER 93-15, 179 Wis. 2d xxxiii. Griswold cites the note in
support of an argument that his interpretation of § 814.29 better promotes the goal
of creating a more uniform and simplified indigency procedure. This is so,
Griswold contends, because his interpretation limits more strictly what a circuit
court may inquire into about the finances of a waiver petitioner.

¶42 It is true that WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1)(d)1. and (1)(d)2. allow a circuit
court to rely on assessments of financial means made by agencies offering benefits
fitting those categories, without requiring the court to inquire further. See S. CT.
ORDER 93-15, 179 Wis. 2d xxxiii (“To simplify the determination of indigency,
detailed financial statements are not necessary if the person is receiving means-
tested public assistance or legal services based on indigency.”). However, for
reasons we discuss above involving § 814.29(2), we conclude that it is not
reasonable to interpret the language of § 814.29(1)(d) to foreclose circuit courts
from inquiring into a waiver petitioner’s assets when, as here, the court becomes
aware of evidence that a waiver petitioner has substantial assets even though the
petitioner receives means-tested benefits. Consistent with the purposes identified
in the Judicial Council note, our interpretation leaves a uniform procedure,

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described above, and adds clarity and simplicity to when a circuit court should
make a finding of poverty.9

¶43 Moreover, even if we were to conclude that Griswold’s narrower
interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1)(d) and (2) is one reasonable
interpretation, the result would be that the statute is ambiguous, and we would
resolve this ambiguity in favor of the interpretation we give above. This is
because pertinent materials from the Wisconsin Judicial Council reflect that the
drafters of current § 814.29 were concerned with avoiding the very result that
Griswold advocates for here. See Waters, 243 Wis. 2d 703, ¶20 n.5 (supreme
court “may look to Judicial Council materials in determining the meaning of
statute promulgated under [the court’s] rule-making authority”); see also
Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶¶13-14, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717
N.W.2d 258 (court may look to “extrinsic sources such as legislative history to
find legislative intent” when a statute is ambiguous or “to confirm the plain
meaning”). Specifically, these materials demonstrate an effort to avoid a situation
in which the waiver petitioner has ample assets to make payment, but the circuit
court is prevented from ordering payment because the petitioner receives an
income-based benefit that triggers a finding of poverty under subpart (1)(d).

¶44 Explaining further, in April 1993, the Judicial Council initially
requested that our supreme court adopt a new version of WIS. STAT. § 814.29 in
order to “simplify or clarify procedure and promote the speedy determination of

9
The 1993 change to WIS. STAT. § 814.29, referenced in the Judicial Council note
discussed above, added the current subparts (1)(b)-(d). Prior to the 1993 change, § 814.29(1)
allowed circuit courts to waive the payment of costs and fees due a person’s inability to pay due
to poverty, but without any guidance regarding the meaning of poverty provided by the current
(1)(d) categories. See § 814.29(1) (1991-92).

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No. 2024AP2614

litigation upon its merits.” See WIS. STAT. § 758.13(2)(a) (empowering Judicial
Council in part to “advise the supreme court as to changes” to “rules of …
procedure” that “simplify procedure and promote a speedy determination of
litigation upon its merits”). Under this initially proposed version of the rule, the
court would promulgate a separate statute specifying the form of the affidavit
submitted by the waiver petitioner. This form included boxes for the petitioner to
check that roughly correspond to subparts (1)(d)1. through 3. in the current
§ 814.29. But, regarding federal poverty guidelines, the form simply asked
whether the affiant’s income fell below the federal poverty threshold set in
42 U.S.C. § 9902, without referring to other factors unless the affiant earned
income above the threshold. While the Judicial Council’s request was pending, a
committee of the council—the committee of the state’s chief circuit court
judges—objected to the proposed rule on the ground that it “require[d] the [circuit]
court to waive fees when the affidavit shows that the person’s household income is
below the federal poverty level.” The committee noted that “[s]ome chief judges
were concerned that the federal poverty guidelines are based only on income, and
might require waiver although the person had substantial assets.” In response to
the committee’s objection, the Judicial Council as a whole voted to amend the
request to change § 814.29, proposing that the court adopt language substantially
in the form of current § 814.29(1)(d)1.-3. The court granted the amended request
in October 1993. See S. CT. ORDER 93-15, 179 Wis. 2d xxxi (eff. Jan. 1, 1994).

¶45 Griswold emphasizes that WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1)(d) uses the word
“shall” in stating that a circuit court “shall make a finding of poverty” if one of the
(1)(d) categories are met. He argues that this reinforces his interpretation that
§ 814.29(1)(d) required the circuit court here to find that he was unable to pay
court costs and fees due to poverty, especially given that other provisions of the

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No. 2024AP2614

statute direct that circuit courts “may” take certain actions. See State v. Villamil,
2017 WI 74, ¶¶54-55, 59, 377 Wis. 2d 1, 898 N.W.2d 482 (“‘shall’ is presumed”
to describe a mandatory action, especially when “may” is used elsewhere in the
same statute, though “shall” can be interpreted as “directory” when necessary to
carry out the legislature’s intent). But this solves only half of the puzzle. The
“shall” in subpart (1)(d) could be mandatory for purposes of an initial review, but
it remains that subsection (2) permits the circuit court to require payment of costs
and fees whenever it determines that “the allegation of poverty is untrue.” Here,
the circuit court was transparent in its approach at each stage in a manner that we
conclude is consistent with the statutory provisions. The court preliminarily
granted a waiver of Griswold’s transcript costs from his first appeal while
expressly notifying Griswold that the court intended to later revisit whether it
would require payment of the costs under § 814.29(2).

¶46 In sum, we conclude that WIS. STAT. § 814.29(1)(d)1. does not
prohibit a circuit court from determining that an allegation of poverty is untrue
under subsection (2) when the circuit court finds that substantial assets render a
petitioner able to pay court costs and fees.

II. Factual Basis for Determining Allegation of Poverty Was Untrue

¶47 We now expand on the background summarized above in order to
provide context for Griswold’s challenge to the circuit court’s determination that
his allegation of poverty was untrue.

¶48 At the November 2024 hearing, Griswold represented that he had
been diagnosed with lung cancer in April 2024. As a result, Griswold said, he had
decided to take a major estate-planning step. This involved an irrevocable,
“spendthrift” trust for which he was the sole beneficiary (“Griswold’s trust”).

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No. 2024AP2614

Specifically, Griswold represented that he sought from the trustee, and was
granted, a transfer of all Griswold’s trust assets into a new, irrevocable trust held
for the benefit of Griswold’s son. As relief, Griswold renewed his request that the
circuit court waive fees relating to his first appeal, which the court found to total
$308.10 Griswold also requested that the court waive fees associated with his
second appeal, the value of which is less evident from the record, but which he
asserts total $184.

¶49 The following are some of the circuit court’s findings provided in its
written order rejecting Griswold’s petitions, all addressing events dating from
before the court’s decision, including the purported trust transfer. Griswold
controlled 13 cars and trucks, which were owned either by Griswold personally, or
by the Griswold trust (before the transfer to his son’s trust). Griswold controlled
between 45 and 50 boats, ranging in value “from $10,000 to $50,000 or more.”
The boats were “originally titled, if at all, in Mr. Griswold’s individual name,”
with only some boat titles later transferred to the Griswold trust. Griswold had

10
We briefly summarize a potential alternative basis to affirm the circuit court’s
rejection of Griswold’s petition to waive $308 in transcript fees from the first appeal, which we
need not resolve. The circuit court concluded that Griswold’s decision to voluntarily withdraw
the appeal was a concession that the first appeal could not have been a basis to grant relief, which
itself can provide grounds to reject a petition to waive costs and fees. See WIS. STAT.
§ 814.29(1)(c); State ex rel. Luedtke v. Bertrand, 220 Wis. 2d 574, 578, 583 N.W.2d 858 (Ct.
App. 1998) (standard for whether “a proposed action states a claim for relief” under
§ 814.29(1)(c) “is the same standard that is applied when considering a motion to dismiss in an
ordinary civil case “for [f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”), aff’d by
equally divided court, 226 Wis. 2d 271, 594 N.W.2d 370 (1999), superseded in part by statute as
noted in Spence v. Cooke, 222 Wis. 2d 530, 532, 587 N.W.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1998). In this
appeal, the references that Griswold makes to this determination by the circuit court are difficult
to track, and he does not develop a legally supported argument. However, given that we are
obligated to address Griswold’s arguments about transcript fees from the second appeal, we
assume without deciding that the court’s application of § 814.29(1)(c) does not provide an
alternative basis to affirm the court’s rejection of Griswold’s petition to waive fees from the first
appeal.

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No. 2024AP2614

“an interest in” two parcels of Grant County real estate constituting eight acres in
total, although the circuit court did not make a finding regarding the value of this
real estate.11

¶50 The circuit court made specific findings regarding Griswold’s
exercise of control over these assets. These included, for example, Griswold’s
practices in: acquiring boats; repairing or dismantling boats for parts; and
controlling proceeds from such sales, which Griswold did not deposit into a bank
account for the Griswold trust. The court found that Griswold was not credible in
asserting that the proceeds he accrued from liquidating some of the assets under
his control were treated as funds belonging to the Griswold trust. Based on these
findings, the court further found that Griswold “has access to hundreds of
thousands of dollars of assets. He does in fact control those assets, transfer those
assets, and in all respects treats those assets as his personal assets in all manners
except name, and even in name only in some circumstances.”

¶51 Based on these findings, the circuit court concluded that Griswold
treated the Griswold trust as his alter ego, invoking a doctrine under which courts
can disregard an entity “when it is used to accomplish an improper or unlawful
purpose.” See Olen v. Phelps, 200 Wis. 2d 155, 163, 546 N.W.2d 176 (Ct. App.
1996) (quoted source and alteration marks omitted). The alter ego doctrine applies

11
The circuit court found that Griswold arranged to purchase the two parcels from the
Griswold trust for a nominal value on contracts that he planned to default on, which would cause
ownership of the parcels to revert to the trust. The court further found that Griswold did this in an
attempt to create standing for him to pursue, as an individual, his claims against Miles regarding
the parcels in this case, because he could not as a matter of law represent the Griswold trust in
making claims regarding land owned by the trust. Later, despite the transfer of assets to his son’s
trust, Griswold represented to the court at the November 2024 hearing that he remained the
vendee in the land contract regarding the two parcels, but that his son’s trust had replaced the
Griswold trust as the vendor.

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No. 2024AP2614

to the relationship between corporate forms and individuals, see id., but the circuit
court reasoned that the doctrine also applies to trusts based on WIS. STAT.
§ 701.0810(2)-(3) (discussing the duty of a trustee to keep trust property separate
from trustee property). Although the court did not extensively discuss Griswold’s
transfer of assets to the son’s trust, the court extended its reasoning on the alter-
ego topic to the son’s trust as well. That is, the court determined that the transfer
did not alter its findings regarding how Griswold exercised control over the assets
at issue. Based on this, the court determined that the value of assets nominally
held by the Griswold trust and his son’s trust (in addition to those that Griswold
held in his own name individually) needed to be weighed as part of the court’s
determination of whether Griswold was indigent for purposes of WIS. STAT.
§ 814.29. Given the significant value of these assets, the court determined that
Griswold’s “allegation of poverty is untrue.”

¶52 With this additional background, we turn to Griswold’s positions as
best we understand them. To the extent that we do not address arguments which
Griswold intends to make, it is because the arguments are too unclearly briefed to
merit discussion. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633
(Ct. App. 1992) (declining to address undeveloped arguments).

¶53 We do not discern an argument by Griswold that, assuming that we
reject his other arguments on this topic, the court erred in finding that the total
value of the assets under Griswold’s control were more than adequate to allow him
to pay court costs and fees. Instead, the thrust of Griswold’s argument is that the
circuit court erred in relying on evidence from other cases before the circuit court
in reaching the challenged rulings in this case. We reject this argument as
undeveloped. The only legal support that Griswold provides for this argument
comes from jurisdictions outside Wisconsin and secondary authority that he fails

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No. 2024AP2614

to link in any meaningful way to Wisconsin law. Griswold fails to account for
Wisconsin statutes that allow a circuit court to take judicial notice of certain facts,
and he also ignores case law that specifically relates to the court’s “own records in
another case.” See WIS. STAT. § 902.01(2)(b), (3), (5) (circuit court, of its own
accord, “may take judicial notice” of a fact “capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned); Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2003 WI App 110, ¶23 n.9, 263 Wis. 2d 241,
663 N.W.2d 817 (noting that the unqualified rule prohibiting a circuit court from
“tak[ing] judicial notice of its own record in another case” on a party’s request had
been overturned by our supreme court). Moreover, Griswold fails to apply any
legal authority, Wisconsin-based or otherwise, addressing the specific context
here, in which the circuit court added to the record of this case an order and
transcript from another case addressing his indigency. Cf. Perkins v. State, 61
Wis. 2d 341, 346-47, 212 N.W.2d 141 (1973) (concluding that supreme court
could not take judicial notice of an alleged conviction from another case “when
that conviction has not been made a part of the record”).

¶54 Griswold makes a series of confusing references to facts from this
and other circuit court cases regarding the Griswold trust and also to statutory law
regarding spendthrift trusts. His argument appears to be that it was not proper for
the circuit court to consider assets held by the Griswold trust. However, he fails to
develop an argument that would connect any aspect of trust law (or any other
authority that we recognize) to the reasoning applied by the circuit court in the
order that Griswold challenges in this appeal. For example, Griswold does not
attempt to develop a legally supported argument challenging the circuit court’s

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No. 2024AP2614

application of the alter ego doctrine or its basis in the court’s findings regarding
Griswold’s control over certain assets.12

¶55 Turning to the facts, setting aside Griswold’s argument about
considering evidence from other cases, he does not contend that any of the circuit
court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. In particular, he does not come to
grips with the court’s findings that Griswold exercised control over property worth
hundreds of thousands of dollars, including findings that cast doubt on how much
of that property was ever held by the Griswold trust and thus transferred to his
son’s trust.

¶56 The closest Griswold may come to attempting to address the circuit
court’s application of the alter ego doctrine or the court’s related references to
Griswold’s control over substantial assets fails because it is based on a complete
mischaracterization of the court’s ruling. Griswold asserts that the court ruled that
courts can never grant petitions for cost waivers made by trust beneficiaries. In
fact, the court made no such statement and instead grounded its decision on the
evidence bearing on whether Griswold had control over extensive assets, and the
court did not take a blanket position about trust beneficiaries as waiver petitioners.

¶57 Griswold asserts that the circuit court’s analysis ignored the transfer
of assets held by his trust to his son’s trust. It is true that the court explained that it
was disregarding this transfer for purposes of assessing Griswold’s claim of

12
Griswold repeatedly refers to his alleged lack of access to trust documents that the
circuit court ordered Griswold to produce in another Grant County case addressing Griswold’s
indigency under WIS. STAT. § 814.29 (Hon. Robert P. VanDeHey, presiding). However,
Griswold does not explain how this alleged obstacle undermines the reasoning of the circuit court
in this case that Griswold controlled substantial assets.

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No. 2024AP2614

poverty, based on the alter-ego and control concepts. And, as just explained,
Griswold fails on multiple levels to provide a reason to question the court’s
reliance on those concepts. Without citation to legal support or the record,
Griswold asserts that the evidence relied upon by the circuit court from a previous
hearing in another case was “stale,” but he does not develop a legally supported
argument demonstrating that the court clearly erred in weighing the evidence.
Court decisions in this context can be based on factual circumstances that
materially change over time, but Griswold does not show that the court here
misconstrued or ignored material timing considerations.

CONCLUSION

¶58 For all of these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order rejecting
Griswold’s petitions for waiver of court costs and fees.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.

26