Melvin D. Graham-Jackson v. Sandra Martin

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 7, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2274 Cir. Ct. No. 2024CV1871

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

MELVIN D. GRAHAM-JACKSON,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

SANDRA MARTIN AND ROCK PRAIRIE FARMS, LLC,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane County:
EVERETT D. MITCHELL, Judge. Affirmed and cause remanded with directions.

Before Graham, P.J., Kloppenburg, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP2274

¶1 PER CURIAM. Melvin Graham-Jackson, pro se, appeals a circuit
court order that dismissed his claims against Sandra Martin and Rock Prairie
Farms, LLC with prejudice.1 We reject Graham-Jackson’s arguments and affirm
the order of dismissal.

¶2 Separately, the defendants’ attorneys have called our attention to
certain false legal citations in Graham-Jackson’s opening appellate brief. More
specifically, the brief contains citations to legal authority that does not exist, or
that is unrelated to the proposition for which it was cited. This is a violation of
WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(e) and (4)(b) (2023-24).2 Although these issues were
noted in the respondents’ brief that Martin and Rock Prairie Farms filed, Graham-
Jackson continued to cite false legal authority in his reply brief. We ordered
Graham-Jackson to file a response with any arguments he wished to make in
opposition to the imposition of sanctions under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.82(2).
Having reviewed his response, we conclude that two sanctions are warranted.
First, in any future appeal or other proceeding in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals,
Graham-Jackson must submit an affidavit certifying that all of the legal authority
that is cited in his briefs exists, is accurately cited, and relates to the propositions
for which it is cited. Second, we order monetary sanctions of $500, payable to
Martin and Rock Prairie Farms to defray their legal expenses, and we remand to
the circuit court to enter an order imposing that monetary sanction.

1
For ease of reference in this opinion, we sometimes refer to Martin and Rock Prairie
Farms collectively as the “defendants.” We note that Graham-Jackson disputes Rock Prairie
Farms’ status as a defendant in the circuit court proceeding, and we address his argument below.
2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP2274

BACKGROUND

¶3 Graham-Jackson filed this action in Dane County Circuit Court. The
allegations in this lawsuit concern the ownership of and ability to control a nearly
400-acre farm in Evansville, Wisconsin (the “property”), and also concern
Graham-Jackson’s history and relationship with Martin.

¶4 This is not the first lawsuit to have dealt with these and related
issues. As pertinent to this appeal, Rock Prairie Farms filed a prior action in 2023
to evict Graham-Jackson from the property. See Rock Prairie Farms LLC v.
Graham-Jackson, Rock County Case No. 2023SC3047 (filed Nov. 3, 2023) (the
“eviction action”). As we discuss at greater length below, Graham-Jackson
challenged Rock Prairie Farms’ right to evict him—he claimed that Rock Prairie
Farms was not the rightful owner of the property, and that the rightful owner was
actually a trust for which he was a trustee. The circuit court rejected Graham-
Jackson’s claims and entered a judgment of eviction, which this court upheld on
appeal. Rock Prairie Farms LLC v. Graham-Jackson, No. 2023AP2371,
unpublished slip op. (WI App July 11, 2024).

¶5 The disposition of the eviction action is pertinent to the arguments in
the instant appeal. Therefore, before turning to the facts of the instant case, we
recount the pleadings, hearing, and judgment in that action in some detail, and we
also briefly summarize the dispositions of three other actions that Graham-Jackson
filed in other courts.

The eviction action and other prior litigation

¶6 Rock Prairie Farms made the following allegations in its
November 2023 eviction complaint. Sandra Martin is the sole member of Rock

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No. 2024AP2274

Prairie Farms, which owns the property. Beginning in 2021, Martin, who is
Graham-Jackson’s step-grandmother, allowed Graham-Jackson to reside at the
property.

¶7 Martin eventually determined that she wanted Graham-Jackson to
leave the property. On June 1, 2023, Rock Prairie Farms served him with a notice
terminating his tenancy as of the end of June. Shortly thereafter, on June 16,
2023, Graham-Jackson executed a quitclaim deed that purported to transfer
ownership of the property to an entity called “2553300 Rock Prairie,” and he
recorded that deed with the county register of deeds. As we understand it,
2553300 Rock Prairie is not registered as an entity with the Wisconsin Department
of Financial Institutions—Graham-Jackson contends that 2553300 Rock Prairie is
a trust and that he is one of its trustees.

¶8 The Rock County Circuit Court held an eviction hearing on
December 11, 2023. Witnesses including Martin and Graham-Jackson testified at
the hearing, and the court received certain exhibits. Among other documents, the
court received a document titled “Member Agreement,” which appears to have
been signed by Martin on April 18, 2023, and which stated that Graham-Jackson
will be the “manager” of Rock Prairie Farms and “will govern and decide all [its]
business & financial affairs.” The court also received the quitclaim deed that
purportedly transferred the property to 2553300 Rock Prairie as of June 16, 2023.

¶9 During the hearing, Rock Prairie Farms took the position that
Graham-Jackson had never been a member of Rock Prairie Farms and had no
authority to act on its behalf. Rock Prairie Farms also took the position that the
quitclaim deed transferring the property to 2553300 Rock Prairie was fraudulent,
and the conveyance it purported to effect was invalid.

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¶10 After the hearing, the circuit court issued a written order that granted
a judgment of eviction in favor of Rock Prairie Farms. The order expressly states
that the court found that Rock Prairie Farms “is the true owner” of the property,
and that “Graham-Jackson is not now, and has never been, a member of Rock
Prairie Farms.” The order also states that Graham-Jackson “has no lawful basis to
be on or in possession of” the property.

¶11 Following his unsuccessful attempt to defend against the eviction
action, Graham-Jackson initiated numerous other actions in Rock County and
Dane County against Rock Prairie Farms or Martin. The following three actions
are most notable for purposes of this appeal.

¶12 Graham-Jackson filed two different actions on behalf of 2553300
Rock Prairie that sought to evict Rock Prairie Farms from the property. The first
was captioned Graham-Jackson v. Rock Prairie Farms LLC, Rock County Case
No. 2023SC3514. The Rock County Circuit Court dismissed the action based on
the doctrine of claim preclusion—specifically, its prior determination in the
eviction action that Rock Prairie Farms owns the property, and that neither
Graham-Jackson nor 2553300 Rock Prairie own the property. Graham-Jackson
did not appeal. The second case was captioned 2553300 Rock Prairie v. Rock
Prairie Farms LLC, Dane County Case No. 2024SC2210, and again sought to
evict Rock Prairie Farms from the property. The Dane County Circuit Court
granted Rock Prairie Farms’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the case with
prejudice. Graham-Jackson appealed to this court, and his appeal of Case
No. 2024SC2210 was still pending when he filed the lawsuit that is at issue here.
That appeal was eventually dismissed when Graham-Jackson failed to file an
appellant’s brief. 2553300 Rock Prairie v. Rock Prairie Farms LLC,
No. 2024AP920, unpublished op. and order (WI App Aug. 16, 2024).

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No. 2024AP2274

¶13 The final action that is notable for our purposes here was captioned
Graham-Jackson v. Martin, Dane County Case No. 2024CV631. In that action,
Graham-Jackson filed a petition seeking a harassment injunction against Martin.
In so doing, he repeated his claims about his ownership and right to control the
property, and he also made a number of allegations about physical and sexual
abuse, defamation, and wrongful arrest that are also at issue in the instant appeal.
The circuit court dismissed Graham-Jackson’s petition after concluding that there
were no genuine issues of material fact and that Martin was entitled to dismissal as
a matter of law. Graham-Jackson appealed. Although his appeal of Case
No. 2024CV631 was still pending when he filed the lawsuit at issue here, it was
dismissed after he failed to file an appellant’s brief. Graham-Jackson v. Martin,
No. 2024AP586, unpublished op. and order (WI App Sept. 27, 2024).3

This action

¶14 This action, filed in Dane County Circuit Court, is one of Graham-
Jackson’s more recent lawsuits that address matters related to his alleged
ownership and ability to control the property, as well as his history and
relationship with Martin. Graham-Jackson’s original complaint in this action
identified Rock Prairie Farms, LLC and Sandra Martin as defendants. It alleged
the following claims against both defendants: wrongful eviction, wrongful arrest,
trespassing, malicious prosecution, harassment, battery, defamation, breach of

3
Graham-Jackson has also filed several other lawsuits that address these and similar
issues, but are not directly pertinent to our resolution of the issues on appeal. To the best of our
knowledge, these lawsuits include Dane County Case Nos. 2023CV3055 (contract case against
Martin), 2023CV3360 (domestic violence restraining order against Martin), 2024CV341
(domestic violence restraining order against Martin), and 2024CV3419 (declaratory judgment
against Martin).

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No. 2024AP2274

contract, theft, an “action of possession” under WIS. STAT. § 843.01, and an action
under “Chapter 183 Uniform Liability Company Law.” Graham-Jackson attached
various documents as exhibits to the original complaint, including the June 16,
2023 quitclaim deed that Graham-Jackson purportedly signed on behalf of Rock
Prairie Farms.

¶15 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint.
They argued that the claims for wrongful eviction, wrongful arrest, and trespassing
were barred by the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion. They argued that the
claims for harassment, battery, defamation, breach of contract, and theft, among
others, were barred under WIS. STAT. § 802.06(2)(a)10 because there were other
pending actions between the same parties for the same causes of action. And they
argued that the claims for malicious prosecution and for relief under WIS. STAT.
ch. 183 and WIS. STAT. § 843.01 should be dismissed under § 802.06(2)(a)6.
because they failed to state a claim.

¶16 The circuit court entered a scheduling order directing a response and
a reply on the motion to dismiss, but Graham-Jackson did not file a response in
opposition to the motion. He instead filed an amended complaint, which
purported to withdraw all of the claims that he originally filed against Rock Prairie
Farms. The amended complaint alleged the following claims from the original
complaint, but this time only against Martin: malicious prosecution, harassment,
battery, defamation, breach of contract, and theft. The amended complaint also
added two new claims against Martin: assault and a claim under the Wisconsin

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No. 2024AP2274

Fair Employment Act.4 The amended complaint did not include any claims
against Rock Prairie Farms.

¶17 The attorneys for the defendants filed a letter notifying the circuit
court of their position regarding the effect of the amended complaint. Among
other things, they stated that Graham-Jackson could not dismiss Rock Prairie
Farms at this stage of the proceeding without prejudice unless Rock Prairie Farms
consented, which Rock Prairie Farms would not do. See WIS. STAT. § 805.04.

¶18 The defendants also filed a reply in support of their motion to
dismiss, and, eventually, an answer to the amended complaint. In that answer, the
defendants alleged that the claims in the amended complaint should be dismissed
for many of the same reasons that the original complaint should have been
dismissed (that is, issue and claim preclusion and failure to state a claim). The
defendants asked the circuit court to enter a judgment dismissing all claims against
them with prejudice.

¶19 Graham-Jackson also filed various documents and requests with the
circuit court. Among other things, he asserted that Martin was incompetent and
asked the court to appoint a guardian ad litem for Martin. He filed a motion for
default judgment against Martin because, he asserted, the answer to the amended
complaint was untimely. And he filed a motion to strike the answer, both on
timeliness grounds and because, he asserted, Martin had “incorrectly included …
Rock Prairie Farms LLC (Defendant), who was previously withdrawn from the

4
The amended complaint also withdrew some of the claims that Graham-Jackson had
originally filed against Martin—it did not include the claims for wrongful eviction, wrongful
arrest, or trespassing, or the claims under WIS. STAT. ch. 183 and WIS. STAT. § 843.01.

8
No. 2024AP2274

case, and should not be included in defendants[’] reply to the amended summons
and complaint.”

¶20 The circuit court held two hearings: the first on October 9, 2024, and
the second on November 4, 2024. The transcript of the October 9 hearing was not
made part of the appellate record, but based on docket entries, we understand that
the court agreed to appoint a guardian ad litem for Martin, at least provisionally,
and to set the matter over for several weeks. Based on a subsequent circuit court
order, we also understand that counsel for the defendants “orally amended” the
previously filed motion to dismiss “to apply to the [a]mended [c]omplaint, and
offered argument” about why the motion to dismiss should be granted.

¶21 When the hearing was reconvened on November 4, the appointed
guardian ad litem was present and gave the opinion that there was not any need in
the proceeding to address Martin’s competency. After hearing additional
arguments on the motion to dismiss, the circuit court concluded that, based on its
review of documents filed in the prior litigation in Rock County and Dane County,
“it seems as though this case … has been completely litigated, almost to the point
of exhaustion,” and that there was not “any new issue that is being raised here that
is different than what has been litigated in another court.” The court also noted
that Graham-Jackson had not been able to provide factual support for his claims
against Martin in the other cases, and that there were not any “more issues …
which this Court needs to be able to address factually that [have not] already been
addressed in other cases.”

¶22 The circuit court entered a written order dismissing the claims with
prejudice. Graham-Jackson appeals.

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No. 2024AP2274

DISCUSSION

¶23 We first address the arguments that Graham-Jackson makes on
appeal, and we then address his citation to false legal authorities and our decision
to impose sanctions for that conduct.

I.

¶24 On appeal, Graham-Jackson argues that the circuit court made
various procedural errors in the course of addressing his case, and he also argues
that the court’s determination that some of his claims are barred by the doctrine of
claim preclusion is erroneous. We address the developed arguments as best we
understand them and to the extent that Graham-Jackson has preserved his
arguments in the circuit court and in his opening brief.5 We will not reverse a
judgment if the circuit court did not err, or if any error made by the court was
harmless, meaning that it did not affect Graham-Jackson’s substantial rights. See
WIS. STAT. § 805.18; Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶30, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629
N.W.2d 698.

5
Although we make some allowances for the failings of parties who, as here, are not
represented by counsel, “[w]e cannot serve as both advocate and judge,” and we need not
consider Graham-Jackson’s arguments to the extent that they are unsupported by adequate factual
and legal citation or are otherwise undeveloped. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492
N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). We also need not address any arguments that Graham-Jackson
made in his opening appellate brief that he did not properly preserve in the circuit court. See
Green v. Hahn, 2004 WI App 214, ¶21, 277 Wis. 2d 473, 689 N.W.2d 657 (“Except in rare
circumstances that are not present here, we will not address an issue that an appellant raises for
the first time on appeal.”).

We note that Graham-Jackson’s reply brief cites additional legal authorities and raises
new arguments that were not made in his opening brief. We need not address these additional
authorities or arguments because “as a general rule,” we do not “consider issues raised by
appellants for the first time in a reply brief.” See Swartwout v. Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 346 n.2,
302 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1981).

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No. 2024AP2274

A.

¶25 Graham-Jackson first argues that the circuit court erred by “failing to
recognize the superseding amended complaint he filed pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§ 802.09.” That statute provides that a plaintiff may amend a complaint “once as a
matter of course at any time within 6 months after the summons and complaint are
filed ….” § 802.09(1). As we understand it, Graham-Jackson’s argument is that
he had the statutory right to amend his complaint by withdrawing all of his claims
against Rock Prairie Farms, and that by withdrawing Rock Prairie Farms as a
defendant in this action, Graham-Jackson could avoid the effect of claim
preclusion on his claims against Martin. This argument is unfounded.

¶26 It is true that, generally speaking, a plaintiff may amend a complaint
one time within six months without seeking leave from the court. See WIS. STAT.
§ 802.09. It is also true that, generally speaking, an amended complaint
supersedes an original complaint. However, as the defendants pointed out both in
the circuit court and on appeal, once a defendant files a pleading that responds to
the complaint, the plaintiff is no longer entitled to unilaterally dismiss that
defendant from the action without prejudice. WIS. STAT. § 805.04(2); see also
Gowan v. McClure, 185 Wis. 2d 903, 913, 519 N.W.2d 692 (Ct. App. 1994).
Therefore, once Rock Prairie Farms filed its motion to dismiss, Graham-Jackson
no longer had the right to unilaterally dismiss Rock Prairie Farms as a defendant

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No. 2024AP2274

by amending his complaint, even if he wished to do so within the timeframe that
was otherwise set by § 802.09(1).6

¶27 As to the action against Rock Prairie Farms, the circuit court
dismissed it with prejudice pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 805.04(2), which allows a
court to dismiss an action “at the plaintiff’s insistence … upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper.” Dismissal with prejudice was appropriate,
both because the original complaint’s claims against Rock Prairie Farms were
barred by claim and issue preclusion, and also because Graham-Jackson no longer
wished to pursue those claims in his amended complaint.

¶28 As to the claims against Martin, Graham-Jackson was entitled to
amend those claims by filing the amended complaint. Yet, as discussed, the
defendants took the position that the claims in the amended complaint were also
precluded by issue and claim preclusion, and the circuit court agreed with that
position. Contrary to Graham-Jackson’s argument, it is evident that the court
considered all of the claims that Graham-Jackson advanced in this litigation when
it determined that Martin was entitled to dismissal with prejudice, including but
not limited to the claims that Graham-Jackson made in the amended complaint.
We therefore reject Graham-Jackson’s argument that the court failed to
appropriately recognize the amended complaint.

6
Graham-Jackson cites some non-existent authorities to argue for a contrary rule. We
need not address arguments that are unsupported by legal authority, see Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at
646-47, and we consider arguments premised on false legal citations as unsupported by legal
authority within the meaning of Pettit.

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No. 2024AP2274

B.

¶29 Graham-Jackson next argues that his claims against Martin are not
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. His arguments about claim preclusion
appear to be limited to the claims in this litigation that relate to the ownership and
right to control the property. That is, Graham-Jackson does not make any
argument about claim preclusion with respect to the remaining claims that he
brought in the circuit court that concern his history and relationship with Martin.
Nor does he make any argument with respect to issue preclusion.

¶30 We take Graham-Jackson’s failure to develop an argument about
issue preclusion as a tacit concession that the circuit court correctly granted the
motion to dismiss to the extent that it relied on that ground. See Schlieper v.
DNR, 188 Wis. 2d 318, 322, 525 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1994) (it is a tacit
concession when an appellant ignores a ground on which the circuit court ruled).
We focus our analysis on Graham-Jackson’s arguments about claim preclusion,
and specifically, whether the eviction action filed by Rock Prairie Farms has a
preclusive effect on his claims in this litigation that relate to the true ownership of
the property.

¶31 Generally speaking, the doctrine of claim preclusion provides that a
final judgment on the merits in one action bars parties from relitigating any claim
that arises out of the same relevant facts, transactions, or occurrences.
Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2005 WI 43, ¶19, 279 Wis. 2d 520, 694 N.W.2d 879.
Claim preclusion “has three elements: (1) identity between the parties or their
privies in the prior and present suits; (2) prior litigation resulted in a final
judgment on the merits by a court with jurisdiction; and (3) identity of the causes
of action in the two suits.” Id., ¶21. The doctrine is “designed to draw a line

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No. 2024AP2274

between the meritorious claim on the one hand and the vexatious, repetitious and
needless claim on the other hand.” Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189
Wis. 2d 541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723 (1995) (citation omitted). It recognizes that
“after a party has had his day in court, justice, expediency, and the preservation of
the public tranquility requires that the matter be at an end.” Kruckenberg, 279
Wis. 2d 520, ¶20.

¶32 On appeal, Graham-Jackson appears to argue that the eviction action
does not have a preclusive effect because there is not identity between the parties.
He points out that the parties in the eviction action were himself and Rock Prairie
Farms, but here, the parties are himself and Martin. Yet, as defendants point out
in their respondents’ brief, it is sufficient for there to be “identity between the
parties or their privies in the prior and present suits,” Pasko v. City of Milwaukee,
2002 WI 33, ¶14, 252 Wis. 2d 1, 643 N.W.2d 72 (emphasis added, citation
omitted), and “[p]rivity exists when a person,” here Martin, “is so identified in
interest with a party to former litigation” here Rock Prairie Farms, that the person
“represents precisely the same legal right in respect to the subject matter
involved.” Id., ¶16. As applied here, Martin is the sole member of Rock Prairie
Farms, and she argues that her interest in protecting Rock Prairie Farms’
ownership of the property is the same as Rock Prairie Farms’ interest in that issue.
Graham-Jackson does not address this standard from Pasko, nor does he make any
argument to the contrary. We therefore conclude that the circuit court did not err

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No. 2024AP2274

when it determined that the eviction action had preclusive effect with respect to
the ownership and ability to control the property.7

¶33 Having made this determination, we need not address the preclusive
effect of the two subsequent eviction actions that Graham-Jackson pursued on
behalf of 2553300 Rock Prairie (Rock County Case No. 2023SC3514 and Dane
County Case No. 2024SC2210). Even so, for the sake of completeness, we briefly
address Graham-Jackson’s argument about those two actions.

¶34 In both actions, Graham-Jackson attempted to evict Rock Prairie
Farms from the property, and the circuit courts dismissed the claims based on
Rock Prairie Farms’ established ownership of the property. Graham-Jackson
argues that these two actions do not give rise to claim preclusion because there
was no final judgment in either case, but Graham-Jackson is mistaken. The final
judgments in both cases were attached to an affidavit that was filed in this case
well in advance of the hearing, and the court properly took judicial notice of the
existence and content of those judgments. See WIS. STAT. § 902.01 (judicial
notice). Graham-Jackson may be arguing that those judgments were not final

7
We briefly mention an argument that Graham-Jackson could have made, but did not
make, about the application of claim preclusion under these facts. Specifically, Graham-Jackson
could have argued that claim preclusion does not apply because he is a plaintiff in this action and
was a defendant who did not file a counterclaim in the original eviction action. Had Graham-
Jackson made that argument, we would have rejected it.

It is true that the general application of claim preclusion is “to a plaintiff in a second
action who was also a plaintiff in the first action, to a plaintiff in privity with the plaintiff in the
first action, or to a counterclaiming defendant who did not prevail in the first action.” See
Wickenhauser v. Lehtinen, 2007 WI 82, ¶23, 302 Wis. 2d 41, 734 N.W.2d 855. However, we
will apply claim preclusion to a non-counterclaiming defendant from the first action if the
“common-law compulsory counterclaim rule applies.” Id., ¶¶25-27. This rule applies if “all the
elements of claim preclusion are present,” and “the claim in the second suit, if successful [would]
nullify the first judgment or impair the rights established in the first action.” Id., ¶27. That
appears to be the case here.

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No. 2024AP2274

because he abandoned the appeals he filed of the final judgments that were entered
by the circuit courts in those cases—if so, he does not cite any legal authority to
support that argument, which is based on a misunderstanding of law.

C.

¶35 Graham-Jackson next argues that the circuit court erred when it
failed to enforce statutory deadlines. The argument appears to be about the
defendants’ answer to the amended complaint, which was filed 45 days after
Graham-Jackson filed his amended complaint. But Graham-Jackson does not
identify any applicable statutory deadline that the defendants missed with this
filing.

¶36 Graham-Jackson cites WIS. STAT. § 802.06(1)(a), which provides
that, “if the court denies [a] motion [to dismiss] or postpones its disposition until
the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within 10 days after
notice of the court’s action.” Graham-Jackson may be asserting that this statute is
applicable because the circuit court denied or postponed ruling on the motion to
dismiss at the October 9, 2024 hearing. If so, this argument is mistaken. The
court did not deny the motion at the October 9 hearing, nor did it “postpone[] its
disposition until a trial on the merits.” See § 802.06(1)(a). Instead, the court set
over its decision until the following month so that a guardian ad litem could be
appointed for Martin at Graham-Jackson’s request.

¶37 Graham-Jackson also cites WIS. STAT. § 802.09(1), which provides
deadlines for the answer when an amended complaint is filed. But the
unambiguous text of § 802.09(1) demonstrates that the answer was timely. That
statute provides a 45-day deadline to answer an amended complaint if any of the
claims in the original complaint “is founded in tort,” and here, the original and

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No. 2024AP2274

amended complaints both allege tort claims—battery and defamation.
Accordingly, the answer, which was filed on the 45th day, was timely under
§ 802.09(1).8

D.

¶38 Graham-Jackson next argues that the circuit court erred with respect
to his motion to determine Martin’s competency. Specifically, Graham-Jackson
argues that the court was required to make a judicial determination about Martin’s
competency, and that the court erred by instead deferring to the guardian ad
litem’s opinion that Martin’s competency need not be addressed in this
proceeding. This argument fails because Graham-Jackson does not cite any
authority requiring the court to make a judicial determination of competency in a
civil case like this.

¶39 Graham-Jackson primarily relies on WIS. STAT. § 971.13 and State
v. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d 214, 58 N.W.2d 626 (1997). Generally speaking, those
authorities provide that the State cannot criminally prosecute a person who is not
competent to stand trial. See Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 216-17. If there is a
question about a criminal defendant’s competency, the circuit court must make a

8
In a related argument, Graham-Jackson contends that the circuit court erred by not
considering the motion to strike that Graham-Jackson filed the morning of the November 4, 2024
hearing. But the primary subject of the motion to strike was the defendants’ answer to the
amended complaint, and the grounds for the motion was Graham-Jackson’s assertion that the
answer was untimely. The court did not disregard Graham-Jackson’s motion—the transcript of
the hearing shows that the court explicitly considered his argument about timeliness and
unequivocally rejected it. As we have explained, we agree with that conclusion.

To the extent that Graham-Jackson means to argue that the circuit court failed to consider
any other argument or request he made in his November 4, 2024 filing, we reject any such
argument as undeveloped.

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No. 2024AP2274

judicial finding of competence as a prerequisite to proceeding with the criminal
prosecution. Id. at 221-22. These authorities plainly address competency in the
criminal context, and Graham-Jackson does not point us to any authority that
states that these rules also apply to civil actions.

¶40 To be sure, Graham-Jackson cites WIS. STAT. § 807.10 and Kainz v.
Ingles, 2007 WI App 118, 300 Wis. 2d 670, 731 N.W.2d 313, both of which
provide that a guardian ad litem may make or approve a settlement in a civil action
if the settling party is a minor or is an individual that has been adjudicated
incompetent. That statute and case address important issues that could arise in
some cases, but they are wholly immaterial here—nobody is seeking to settle any
claims in this litigation. Graham-Jackson also cites WIS. STAT. ch. 54 and cases
that address guardianships under that chapter, but those statutes and cases are inapt
because this is not a guardianship proceeding.

¶41 Instead, the issue here is whether the circuit court was entitled to
consider the civil claims that Graham-Jackson filed against Martin and to dismiss
them with prejudice. Graham-Jackson does not cite any legal authority that would
allow him to delay the court’s resolution of Martin’s motion to dismiss while he
questions her competency.

E.

¶42 Graham-Jackson next argues that the circuit court erred by failing to
provide an explanation in its order for dismissing his claims, and that such
explanation is required by WIS. STAT. § 806.01(1)(b) and (c). This argument fails
for at least two reasons. First, there is no provision in § 806.01 that requires a
court to articulate a specific rationale for dismissing claims as part of its judgment.
Second, it is apparent that Graham-Jackson understood the court’s rationale for

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No. 2024AP2274

dismissing the claims sufficiently well enough to take aim at the court’s
conclusions about the doctrine of claim preclusion in his appellant’s brief.

F.

¶43 Finally, Graham-Jackson makes a number of assertions in his reply
brief about the motivations of the attorneys and the law firm that are currently
representing the defendants. He seems to be arguing that the defendants’ law firm
is conducting an “unlawful takeover of Rock Prairie Farms LLC,” and that the law
firm’s goal is to separate Martin from Graham-Jackson, who is the only person
who is motivated to look out for Martin’s best interest. Graham-Jackson’s
position on these topics is questionable at best—there is evidence in the record
that would support a finding that, to the extent Martin is vulnerable to
psychological coercion, it is Graham-Jackson, rather than the lawyers who
represent her, who has attempted to take advantage of that vulnerability. But we
are not a factfinding court, and our resolution of this appeal does not turn on an
inquiry into anyone’s motivation. The issue here is whether the claims were
properly dismissed, and we conclude that they were. To the extent that Graham-
Jackson is concerned about Martin’s well-being, there are agencies in Wisconsin
that address allegations regarding the manipulation and abuse of vulnerable
individuals.

¶44 For all of these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court properly
dismissed the claims against Martin and Rock Prairie Farms with prejudice.9

9
To the extent that Graham-Jackson means to make any other argument in his briefing,
we reject it because any such argument is undeveloped, because the legal authority Graham-
Jackson cites as support for the argument does not say what he says it says, or because the
argument is raised for the first time in his reply brief. See supra, n.5.

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No. 2024AP2274

II.

¶45 We now turn to the false legal citations that are contained in
Graham-Jackson’s opening appellant’s brief and in his reply brief. As noted, some
of the citations in these briefs are to legal authorities that do not exist, and other
citations are to legal authorities that exist but are wholly unrelated to the
proposition for which they were cited. Graham-Jackson’s inclusion of false legal
citations in his appellate briefing violates WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(e) and
(4)(b).

¶46 After reviewing Graham-Jackson’s briefing, we issued an order
directing him to address these violations. We explained that, given the serious
nature of Graham-Jackson’s violations of this court’s briefing rules, we were
inclined to impose the following sanctions:

(1) a $1,000 penalty, payable to [Martin and Rock Prairie
Farms], to offset their expenses in responding to Graham-
Jackson’s false legal citations; and (2) an order that would
require Graham-Jackson, in any future appeal or
proceeding in this court, to submit an affidavit certifying
that all of the legal authority that is cited in his briefs exists,
is accurately cited, and relates to the propositions for which
it is cited.

Both sanctions are authorized by WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2), which provides
broad authority to sanction a party for failure to comply with this court’s rules.10
And, in support of the second proposed sanction, we also cited State v. Casteel,

Specifically, WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2) provides that the “[f]ailure of a person to
10

comply with … a requirement of [rules found in WIS. STAT. ch. 809] … is grounds for dismissal
of the appeal, summary reversal, striking of a paper, imposition of a penalty or costs on a party or
counsel, or other action as the court considers appropriate.”

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No. 2024AP2274

2001 WI App 188, ¶23, 247 Wis. 2d 451, 634 N.W.2d 338 (“A court may exercise
its inherent power to ensure that it ‘functions efficiently and effectively to provide
the fair administration of justice,’ and to control its docket with economy of time
and effort.” (citation omitted)). Before imposing any sanction, we sought
Graham-Jackson’s input.

¶47 Graham-Jackson filed a timely response, and his response appears to
express contrition. He asks us to take into account that he is not a licensed
attorney, that he is proceeding pro se, and that he is indigent. He states:

Any errors in legal citation were not made in bad faith or
with intent to mislead the Court or the respondents. I now
understand that some citations may have been inaccurate or
not fully on point. That was not intentional. I relied on
public legal databases, secondary resources, and
independent research.

¶48 We are mindful of the challenges faced by self-represented litigants,
and we will, when appropriate, hold the documents they draft to “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972). At the same time, self-representation does not grant “a license
not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). Like attorneys, “a pro se litigant is
required to make a reasonable investigation of the facts and the law” before filing
an appellate brief. Holz v. Busy Bees Contracting, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 598, 608,
589 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1998).

¶49 The contrition expressed in Graham-Jackson’s response comes too
late to count for all that much. Graham-Jackson was put on notice of the fact that
his brief contained citations to nonexistent authorities by the respondents’ brief
that Martin and Rock Prairie Farms filed in this appeal. It would have gone a long

21
No. 2024AP2274

way for Graham-Jackson to acknowledge and correct this error in his reply brief.
At a minimum, we would have expected him to have taken care to not repeat the
rule violations in his reply brief. But that is not what happened. Graham-Jackson
instead filed a reply brief that perpetuated his violations with additional false
citations, beyond those contained in his opening brief.

¶50 Graham-Jackson’s violations come with a cost, which takes the form
of shifting work to other players in the legal system. Martin and Rock Prairie
Farms state that their counsel was forced “to expend time and effort tracking down
all of this non-existent precedent.” Graham-Jackson’s actions have also created
significant unnecessary work for the court system, which comes at the expense of
work that court staff could have done on other appeals involving other litigants.

¶51 Under the circumstances, based on our inherent power and the
holding of Casteel, 247 Wis. 2d 451, ¶23, we conclude that it is appropriate to
require Graham-Jackson, in any future appeal or other proceeding in this court, to
submit an affidavit certifying that all of the legal authority that is cited in his briefs
exists, is accurately cited, and relates to the propositions for which it is cited.11

11
In their respondents’ brief, the defendants argue that Graham-Jackson’s appeal is
wholly frivolous, and they ask us to order additional sanctions that “include a ban on further
litigation over claims arising prior to the filing of these many lawsuits and appeals.” See
Minniecheske v. Griesbach, 161 Wis. 2d 743, 748, 468 N.W.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1991) (“A court
faced with a litigant engaged in a pattern of frivolous litigation has the authority to implement a
remedy that may include restrictions on that litigant’s access to the court.”). Although some
restrictions on Graham-Jackson’s access to courts may be warranted, we decline this request at
this point for two reasons. First, although we have inherent authority to place restrictions on
Graham-Jackson’s ability to file appeals and writs in this court, most new litigation would
originate in the circuit court and the defendants do not identify any similar source of inherent
authority over circuit court filings. Second, any order imposing such restrictions must be drafted
narrowly to strike the right balance between competing interests, including Graham-Jackson’s
“access to the courts, the [defendants’] interest in res judicata, the taxpayers’ right not to have
frivolous litigation become an unwarranted drain on their resources[,] and the public interest in
(continued)

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No. 2024AP2274

¶52 Turning to the issue of monetary sanctions, Graham-Jackson asks us
to consider his indigency status as we decide the appropriate penalty. It is true that
we have waived various filing fees due to Graham-Jackson’s claim of indigency.
Yet, we have already considered Graham-Jackson’s claim of indigency, which
factored into our proposed sanction of $1000 rather than some larger amount. To
be clear, a larger sanction could easily be justified given the gravity of Graham-
Jackson’s violations. However, in light of Graham-Jackson’s expressed contrition
and our hope that that the deterrence objective of a monetary sanction will be
served by a smaller amount, we will impose a monetary sanction of $500. We
remand this matter to the circuit court and direct the court to enter an order
imposing a sanction of $500, payable to Martin and Rock Prairie Farms, to defray
a portion of their legal expenses.

CONCLUSION

¶53 For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the circuit court order
dismissing Graham-Jackson’s claims against Martin and Rock Prairie Farms. We
order two sanctions for Graham-Jackson’s violations of WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.19(1)(e) and (4)(b). First, in any future appeal or other proceeding in
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Graham-Jackson must submit an affidavit
certifying that all of the legal authority that is cited in his briefs exists, is
accurately cited, and relates to the propositions for which it is cited. Second, we
order monetary sanctions of $500, payable to Martin and Rock Prairie Farms. We

maintaining the integrity of the judicial system.” Id. at 749. The defendants have not provided
any draft language that is aimed at satisfying that balance.

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No. 2024AP2274

remand to the circuit court with directions to enter an order imposing that
monetary sanction.

By the Court.—Order affirmed and cause remanded with directions.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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