State v. Dajuan B. Deshazer

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 23, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP716-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF469

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DAJUAN B. DESHAZER,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Manitowoc County: JERILYN M. DIETZ, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer, and Grogan, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP716-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Dajuan B. Deshazer appeals from a judgment
convicting him of first-degree intentional homicide, felon in possession of a
firearm, and felony bail jumping. He also appeals from an order of the circuit
court denying his postconviction motion. Deshazer argues that trial counsel was
ineffective in four respects: (1) failure to object to the admission of a threatening
text allegedly implicating Deshazer or present evidence that the text was
fabricated; (2) failure to challenge identification testimony with the victim’s
statements to police that he could not identify Deshazer as the shooter; (3) failure
to introduce evidence about the location of Deshazer’s phone at the time of the
shooting; and (4) failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct during closing
arguments. Deshazer also asserts that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s
errors entitles him to a new trial. We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 After a three-day jury trial, Deshazer was convicted of first-degree
intentional homicide and other related charges stemming from a shooting that
killed Robert Bauer in Manitowoc. At the time of the shooting, Deshazer had a
pending drug case in Manitowoc. For about a year before the shooting, Bauer had
been acting as a confidential informant for the metro drug unit with the
Manitowoc Police Department. Deshazer was one of the individuals, and the only
African American man, on whom Bauer had informed.

¶3 About three months before the shooting, Bauer went to the police to
report that Deshazer, who Bauer knew as “Tony,” had threatened him. Bauer told
police that his friend, Samantha Cohen, showed him a screenshot of a text
message reportedly threatening Bauer (the threat-text screenshot or screenshot).
The message, introduced at trial as written, stated:

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I’m going to take car of him tomorrow n I need you to help
me can’t talk much over phone I’m going to have Jessica
stop by at like 12 to fill u all the way in and I really need u
your the closest thing to him that I have and it needs to be
done ASAP I’m thinking his kid u no and I really need u
I’m going to give u 1000 to for helping me I no u said he’s
your friend and yo don’t want anything to do with it but
I’m going to look out for wat ever you need frfr and keep
$$ in your pocket if u do this and not no little $$ my BM
stupid ass still here lease stay by your phone call u back in
like 20 n sorry I had to hang up my BM or nobody can no
what’s going on ok

Cohen, who sent Bauer the screenshot, had obtained it from the phone of a person
named Donte Walker. Bauer is not named in the text, and the State could not
prove it originated from Deshazer’s phone. Cohen reportedly later told police she
had “used one of her pimp’s cell phones to [compose] the text message and send it
to her own personal cell phone.” Neither Cohen nor Walker testified at trial.

¶4 Bauer’s girlfriend, Tess,1 witnessed the shooting and called 911.
Although Tess did not see the shooter’s face, she consistently told authorities that
the shooter was a black man with thick, chest-length dreadlocks. While Tess was
talking to the 911 dispatch operator, Tess asked Bauer who shot him. Bauer,
whose condition was deteriorating rapidly, could not provide a name or
identification of the shooter, but he was able to report that it “was someone he
knew through working with” the metro drug unit or “the person from metro that he
talked with.” In the ambulance, a police officer asked Bauer if he saw who shot
him. Bauer replied: “No.” Bauer never identified Deshazer as the shooter by
name.

1
We use a pseudonym to protect this victim/witness’ right to privacy.

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¶5 Three days after the shooting, a wig with long black dreadlocks was
found in a ditch off a county road about five miles away from the crime scene.
The dreadlocks on the wig were thick at the root and tapered down to thinner ends.
Forensic testing of samples taken from the cap portion on the inside of the wig
matched Deshazer’s DNA.

¶6 Immediately after the shooting, police in Manitowoc and Milwaukee
were alerted to find Deshazer or his vehicle, but he was not located in either place.
Police later talked to Deshazer, who admitted that he went by the name “Tony.”
Deshazer also admitted both that he knew Bauer and that he knew Bauer was a
witness in Deshazer’s pending criminal case.

¶7 Deshazer turned over a cell phone to investigators. On that phone, a
forensic investigator found a text message from four days before the shooting in
which a person called “Booman” appeared to provide prices for various guns,
including for a 9-millimeter firearm. Police had found three 9-millimeter shell
casings at the scene of the shooting. All three casings had been fired from the
same gun—likely a 9-millimeter firearm.

¶8 After Deshazer was convicted, the circuit court sentenced him to life
imprisonment without eligibility for parole, as well as consecutive bifurcated
sentences on the less serious counts. Deshazer filed a motion for postconviction
relief in which he asserted the same four instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel as he now raises on appeal.

¶9 As pertinent here, the postconviction court determined that trial
counsel was not deficient because his challenged decisions and strategies were
reasonable under the circumstances. The court further found counsel’s strategic
decisions consistent with the theory of defense; namely, that investigators had

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mistakenly focused their efforts on Deshazer and stretched the evidence to tie him
to the homicide, all while “ignor[ing] other potential areas for investigation.”
Deshazer appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Deshazer argues that his trial counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance in four respects. The Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance of
counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66, ¶13, 382 Wis. 2d
273, 914 N.W.2d 95. The Wisconsin Constitution similarly provides the right to
effective assistance of counsel. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also State v. Sanchez,
201 Wis. 2d 219, 226, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996) (concluding that the right to counsel
under the Wisconsin Constitution is “substantially similar” and “interpreted
identically” to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).

¶11 A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must
establish that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance
claim ... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an
insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697; see also State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI
100, ¶37, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93 (“If the defendant fails to satisfy either
prong, we need not consider the other.”). The defendant bears the burden on both
prongs. State v. Roberson, 2006 WI 80, ¶24, 292 Wis. 2d 280, 717 N.W.2d 111.

¶12 We resolve this appeal based on the lack of a showing on the
deficient performance prong. Our review of counsel’s performance is highly
deferential. See State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, ¶36, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d

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786. The defendant must show that the attorney’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under all of the circumstances. Id. “This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

¶13 We will attempt to reconstruct the circumstances under which
defense counsel made his or her decisions when evaluating the reasonableness of
counsel’s conduct. Jenkins, 355 Wis. 2d 180, ¶36. In assessing counsel’s
performance, courts “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689. Counsel’s decisions based on a reasonably sound strategy, without
the benefit of hindsight, are “virtually unchallengeable” and do not constitute
ineffective assistance. Id. at 690-91.

¶14 We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a mixed
question of fact and law. State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶26, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697
N.W.2d 811. “A circuit court’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they
are clearly erroneous.” State v. Ward, 2011 WI App 151, ¶9, 337 Wis. 2d 655,
807 N.W.2d 23. “Findings of fact include ‘the circumstances of the case and the
counsel’s conduct and strategy.’” State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 Wis. 2d
571, 665 N.W.2d 305 (citation omitted). The court’s “legal conclusions as to
whether the lawyer’s performance was deficient and, if so, prejudicial, are
questions of law that we review de novo.” Ward, 337 Wis. 2d 655, ¶9.

Failure to object to admission and attack authenticity of threat-text screenshot

¶15 Deshazer first argues trial counsel’s ineffectiveness based on his
treatment at trial of the threat-text screenshot. He claims counsel should have

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objected to the admission of the screenshot at trial. However, at the
postconviction hearing, trial counsel testified that although he had bases to object
to admission of the screenshot, he did not object because he wanted it admitted at
trial. The threat text, he explained, was so far removed from Deshazer that it was
“ludicrous.” Counsel believed its seeming significance to the police and their
shaky attempts to link it to Deshazer bolstered the defense strategy of showing that
the investigation was focused on mistakenly implicating Deshazer.

¶16 As we have observed, the postconviction court found that trial
counsel’s defense strategy was a reasonable one. When a circuit court determines
that counsel had a reasonable trial strategy, the strategy “is virtually unassailable
in an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.” State v. Maloney, 2004 WI App
141, ¶23, 275 Wis. 2d 557, 685 N.W.2d 620; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-
91. Deshazer has presented no basis on which to overturn the court’s findings that
counsel’s “virtually unassailable” use of trial strategy and the screenshot to
Deshazer’s benefit were reasonable. See Maloney, 275 Wis. 2d 557, ¶23; see also
Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶20. Deshazer has not persuaded us that counsel
performed deficiently in choosing this strategy.

¶17 Deshazer also argues trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to
call Cohen as an impeachment witness to challenge the authenticity of the
threat-text screenshot. “Evidence of impeachment is material if the witness whose
testimony is attacked ‘supplied the only evidence linking the defendant(s) to the
crime,’ or ‘where the likely impact on the witness’s credibility would have
undermined a critical element of the prosecution’s case.’” State v. Rockette, 2006
WI App 103, ¶41, 294 Wis. 2d 611, 718 N.W.2d 269 (citations omitted).

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¶18 We reject Deshazer’s arguments as to this alleged deficiency
because the threat-text screenshot was not material to the case; the State did not
rely exclusively on the screenshot to establish Deshazer’s guilt at trial. Nor would
further attacks on its credibility in terms of authenticity have undermined the
State’s case. Even if the screenshot had been excluded, the jury still would have
learned that three months before the shooting, Bauer reported to police that he
received a threat and that he believed Deshazer was planning a hit on him and his
son. The dreadlock wig, ditched on a county road about five miles from the crime
scene, had Deshazer’s DNA on it. A phone of Deshazer’s had a text message sent
just days before the murder with pricing information for a 9-millimeter firearm.
Thus, even without the screenshot, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of
Deshazer’s guilt.

¶19 Moreover, it was well-established that Bauer had informed on
Deshazer’s illegal drug activity. It was well-established that Deshazer knew Bauer
would be testifying against Deshazer in his pending drug case. The threat text was
not the only evidence establishing motive for Deshazer to kill Bauer. See Kelly v.
State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 320 n.7, 249 N.W.2d 800 (1977) (“[M]otive may be shown
as a circumstance to aid in establishing the guilt of a defendant.”). Deshazer had
been charged in Manitowoc based on Bauer’s role as an informant not long before
the shooting. In other words, there was other evidence of Deshazer’s motive.

¶20 The circuit court instructed the jury to determine witness credibility
using several factors, including his or her interest in the result of the trial and
possible motives for falsifying testimony. See WIS JI—CRIMINAL 300 (2023).
Counsel indicated at the postconviction hearing that there were major issues with
Cohen’s credibility such that anything she testified to would be of little value to
Deshazer, and could harm the case, due to her unreliability as a truthful witness.

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¶21 To summarize, Deshazer has failed to meet his burden of
establishing deficient performance regarding trial counsel’s handling of the
threat-text screenshot at trial. It was a reasonable decision to want it admitted, and
it was consistent with the defense strategy. Deshazer also has not persuaded us
that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to call Cohen. To have
called Cohen would have put her credibility, and possibly the entire defense
strategy, on the line.

Failure to introduce evidence that victim said Deshazer was not the shooter

¶22 We turn next to Deshazer’s assertion that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in failing to use a statement in a police report indicating that
Bauer, at one point during an interview, denied that Deshazer was the shooter.
Deshazer argues trial counsel should have used this statement to impeach an
officer who testified that Bauer never specifically excluded Deshazer as the
shooter.

¶23 Deshazer’s argument fails to acknowledge the postconviction court’s
finding, consistent with the record, that Bauer was never able to identify by name
who shot him, though he consistently stated that Deshazer orchestrated the
shooting. Counsel could not have admitted that portion of the recording “in a
bubble” without opening the door to the entire recording. And as the court noted,
in other parts of the recording, Bauer said that Deshazer was behind the shooting.
The recording also included information reflecting that Deshazer operated a robust
drug trade, such as sizable dollar figures, which would have undercut counsel’s
efforts to sanitize Deshazer’s image for the jury.

¶24 Deshazer has failed to persuade us that the postconviction court’s
factual finding is erroneous. It had support in the record and was consistent with

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the law. Bauer’s interview reflects that while Bauer said he did not think
Deshazer was the shooter, he consistently maintained that Deshazer orchestrated
the shooting. Had counsel attempted to impeach the officer’s testimony as
Deshazer now suggests he should have, it likely would have done Deshazer more
harm with the jury than counsel’s chosen strategy of hammering on the fact that
Bauer never identified the shooter. It was not deficient performance to
intentionally avoid the questionable statement at trial rather than open the door to
the other harmful evidence that would have accompanied the one good fact for
Deshazer in the officer’s reports.

¶25 As the postconviction court found, trial counsel’s decision to not
introduce Bauer’s statement excluding Deshazer was a “strategic decision made in
furtherance of the overall trial strategy that also at the same time kept a lot of ...
damaging information out.” In this context, counsel’s decision is “virtually
unassailable” and does not constitute deficient performance. See Maloney, 275
Wis. 2d 557, ¶23.

Failure to introduce evidence that Deshazer’s phone was connected to Wi-Fi in
Milwaukee at time of shooting

¶26 Deshazer next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not
introducing evidence that a cell phone belonging to Deshazer was connected to
Wi-Fi in Milwaukee at the time of the shooting. At the postconviction hearing,
counsel testified that he was aware that Deshazer had multiple cell phones at the
time of the shooting. Counsel therefore concluded that introducing evidence that
one phone was connected to Wi-Fi in Milwaukee would not have established a
meaningful alibi. Instead, it would have opened the door to evidence that
Deshazer had multiple cell phones, supporting an inference that Deshazer was a
prolific drug dealer. Because counsel concluded that the information would have

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done more harm than good to Deshazer’s defense, the fact that a phone was in
Milwaukee during the shooting was not introduced at trial. In addition, even
without the Wi-Fi evidence, counsel indicated he was able to stress a similar, less
risky point, arguing strenuously to the jury that police had no proof from cell
phone GPS data placing Deshazer in Manitowoc at the time of the shooting.

¶27 As with trial counsel’s decisions discussed above, the postconviction
court determined that counsel’s decision not to introduce the Wi-Fi evidence was
reasonable. The court agreed that without introducing the phone, counsel “was
able to preserve th[e] sanitized version of events that worked toward the theory of
defense that he and ... Deshazer had agreed upon and presented. Again, this is a
phone versus the only phone and that is an important distinction.” As we
concluded regarding counsel’s other challenged decisions, because counsel’s
decision not to introduce the Wi-Fi evidence furthered the overall trial strategy
while sanitizing Deshazer’s image, it does not constitute deficient performance.
See Id., ¶23.

Failure to object during prosecutor’s closing argument

¶28 We now turn to Deshazer’s argument that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to object to portions of the State’s closing
argument. Specifically, he takes issue with the prosecutor remarking that Bauer
had named “Tony” as the person who sent the threat text and that Bauer had never
excluded Deshazer as the shooter, and suggesting that police were not able to
locate Deshazer in Milwaukee or Manitowoc the evening of the shooting.

¶29 Counsel is allowed considerable latitude in closing argument. See
State v. Draize, 88 Wis. 2d 445, 454, 276 N.W.2d 784 (1979). The prosecutor
may comment on the evidence, detail the evidence, argue from it to a conclusion,

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and state that the evidence convinces him or her and should convince the jurors.
See id. “The line between permissible and impermissible argument is thus drawn
where the prosecutor goes beyond reasoning from the evidence to a conclusion of
guilt and instead suggests that the jury arrive at a verdict by considering factors
other than the evidence.” Id.

¶30 In all three challenged respects, the prosecutor was simply
commenting on the evidence presented and proposing reasonable inferences to be
drawn from them. There were no grounds for objection. Deshazer does not
suggest, and the record does not reveal, that the prosecutor asked the jury to
consider any factors aside from the evidence. See id.

¶31 We conclude that the prosecutor’s comments were permissible
characterizations of the evidence presented at trial. There was no question that
Bauer had told police that he thought Deshazer was behind the threat text and had
indicated, at least at one point, that Deshazer had orchestrated the shooting, and
there was no question that the police did not locate Deshazer in Manitowoc or
Milwaukee when looking for him the night of the shooting. The prosecutor’s
closing argument did not go beyond “reasoning from the evidence to a conclusion
of guilt.” See id. Trial counsel did not perform deficiently in this respect.

Cumulative effect of errors

¶32 Finally, we reject Deshazer’s argument that the cumulative effect of
trial counsel’s errors entitles him to a new trial. See Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶60.
As explained above, there was nothing objectively unreasonable about trial
counsel’s decisions and strategy. We previously concluded that trial counsel did
not perform deficiently regarding the threat-text screenshot or by failing to object
during the prosecutor’s closing arguments. We further ascertained no deficiency

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with regard to the failure to introduce specific evidence. We conclude that
whether viewed separately or together, trial counsel’s alleged errors do not
undermine our confidence in the outcome of Deshazer’s trial.

CONCLUSION

¶33 Based on the foregoing reasons, all of the claims raised by Deshazer
on appeal fail. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction and the order
denying his postconviction motion.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2023-24).

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