State v. Barbara E. Meyer-Spidell

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 2, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP941-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2023CF642

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

BARBARA E. MEYER-SPIDELL,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
MICHAEL O. BOHREN, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Grogan, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP941-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. The State appeals from a judgment of dismissal of
the complaint filed against Barbara E. Meyer-Spidell. We reverse and remand the
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶2 According to the complaint filed against her, in October 2016,
Meyer-Spidell (then 49) met Sam1 (then one month shy of 77) as he limped into a
restaurant. Approximately three weeks later, Sam paid $10,257 in cash to
purchase a car for Meyer-Spidell. In November 2017, Sam purchased a ranch
home in New Berlin for Meyer-Spidell with a $205,232.54 cashier’s check. The
realtor handling the sale expressed concern over Meyer-Spidell’s changing stories
about the purchase, that Meyer-Spidell didn’t seem to “feel 100% great about”
Sam buying her the home, and that the entire situation seemed “weird.” A few
days before the closing, Sam also spent $1,608.01 on furniture for Meyer-Spidell.

¶3 Meyer-Spidell’s version of the house purchase varied—it was
purchased with a loan “fronted” by a real estate company, it was “flipped” for her,
or her boss was getting her a land contract—but she bragged that her “take” of the
transaction was “substantial over 200k of real estate [she will] end up with.” She
also asked a friend to keep the address of the house a secret.

¶4 Sam’s family and others had concerns about his cognitive decline
prior to him meeting Meyer-Spidell. In 2014, a psychiatrist and neurologist had

1
Pursuant to the policy underlying WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86(4) (2023-24), we use a
pseudonym instead of the victim’s name.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP941-CR

been contacted regarding Sam’s behavioral changes, including “aggression,
forgetfulness, impatience, confusion,” and “sun downing.”2

¶5 Meyer-Spidell also recognized Sam’s possible dementia, at least
prior to the real estate purchase. In a text in February 2017, when discussing the
possible purchase of a Las Vegas condominium, she described Sam as “a runaway
elder with developing dementia” and instructed the realtor to contact her only.
Meyer-Spidell also searched the internet on December 27, 2017, for “5 Early
Signs of Dementia (and why everyone should know them).” In February 2018,
she suggested to a friend that she knew someone who could help that friend out
financially; he was older, enjoyed investing and “seeing that women were
successful and comfortable, and cared for,” and was “not all there, but a sweet
guy.” Even a waitress at the restaurant where Meyer-Spidell and Sam met (and
where she observed the two of them together) said Sam “[w]asn’t all there,” that
she saw him “deteriorating” over time, that he began staring off into space, and
that his appearance and hygiene began to decline during the time he spent with
Meyer-Spidell.

¶6 When questioned about the real estate purchase in July 2018, Sam
told his family that he had bought a residence to rent to someone. According to
Sam’s family, this was not typical behavior. Nor was it true. The family then
learned that Sam had bought three houses for three different women, including
Meyer-Spidell, since November 2017.

2
The psychiatrist and neurologist noted that “sun downing”—where an individual sleeps
during the day and wanders at night—was typical for patients with dementia or those
experiencing cognitive decline.

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No. 2024AP941-CR

¶7 A geriatric assessment performed on Sam by a board-certified
specialist in geriatric medicine on July 30, 2018, reflected that he was
“incapacitate[d] permanently.” The specialist further determined that “the
incapacity interferes with [Sam’s] ability to receive and evaluate information, use
information in a decision process, protect himself from abuse, exploitation, neglect
or rights violation, ... manage his property and financial affairs, address risk of
property being dissipated in whole or in part, ... and prevent financial
exploitation.”

¶8 Another board-certified neuropsychologist prepared a report on
Sam’s cognitive abilities in 2020. He opined that Sam suffered from “Major
Neurocognitive Disorder,” and was “clearly” an “Elder Adult at Risk between
01/01/17 and 12/31/18.” He concluded that Sam was “vulnerable to financial
exploitation” that was “likely present since his family reported behavioral changes
... in 2014, and, given the progression in symptoms over time, it certainly was
present during the interval in question.” The neuropsychologist further opined that
Sam “lacked capacity to consent to the purchases of residences for Barbara
Meyer-Spidell on 11/16/17 by reason of a defective mental condition.” Simply
put, he believed “that because of a brain condition, [Sam] lacked the capacity to
say ‘no’ to young women to whom he was attracted.”

¶9 In April 2023, the State filed a complaint against Meyer-Spidell
alleging one felony count of Theft—Movable Property (Special Facts) (Elder
Adult at Risk) for her conduct between October 9, 2016 and August 13, 2018, in

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No. 2024AP941-CR

which she obtained the car, residence, and furniture as described above. 3 In
June 2023, Meyer-Spidell moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting it was
defective for failure to state probable cause. She contended that the complaint
failed to allege that Sam’s deteriorating mental state invalidated his consent to the
transfer of property. After the court commissioner denied the motion,
Meyer-Spidell sought de novo review from the circuit court.

¶10 At the conclusion of a hearing, the circuit court granted the motion
to dismiss the complaint, stating

[T]here’s never anything in the complaint that indicates that
then [Sam] fell hand [sic] over heels, and did these
transactions. It’s all supposition, its speculation, there has
to be more than that in criminal complaints.

Following the judgment of dismissal, the State appealed.

¶11 Whether a complaint sets forth probable cause is a legal
determination that we review de novo. State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶11, 280
Wis. 2d 68, 695 N.W.2d 315. We examine the complaint to determine “whether
there are facts or reasonable inferences set forth that are sufficient to allow a
reasonable person to conclude that a crime was probably committed and that the
defendant probably committed it.” Id., ¶12. “Where reasonable inferences may
be drawn establishing probable cause to support a charge and equally reasonable
inferences may be drawn to the contrary, the criminal complaint is sufficient.”
State v. Grimm, 2002 WI App 242, ¶15, 258 Wis. 2d 166, 653 N.W.2d 284.

3
An earlier complaint (on these same grounds) had been filed against Meyer-Spidell two
years prior and dismissed by the circuit court. This current complaint alleges additional facts not
included in the prior complaint.

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No. 2024AP941-CR

¶12 “A complaint is sufficient if it answers the following questions:
‘(1) Who is charged?; (2) What is the person charged with?; (3) When and where
did the alleged offense take place?; (4) Why is this particular person being
charged?; and (5) Who says so? or how reliable is the informant?’” Reed, 280
Wis. 2d 68, ¶12 (citation omitted). We evaluate the sufficiency of a complaint in a
common-sense manner rather than in a hypertechnical manner. State v. Chagnon,
2015 WI App 66, ¶7, 364 Wis. 2d 719, 870 N.W.2d 27; State v. Smaxwell, 2000
WI App 112, ¶5, 235 Wis. 2d 230, 612 N.W.2d 756 (we consider minimal
adequacy gauged by common sense).

¶13 The complaint answered all five questions. Meyer-Spidell was
charged with theft of movable property from an elder adult at risk for conduct that
occurred from October 9, 2016, through August 13, 2018, in New Berlin, when
Sam, without the capacity to consent, agreed to provide her with a $10,000 car, a
$205,000 residence, and $1,600 in furnishings for that residence. There are two
expert opinions that establish Sam’s dementia and cognitive inability to prevent
financial exploitation, together with the testimony of three witnesses (a realtor, a
waitress, and a friend of Meyer-Spidell) and Meyer-Spidell’s own text messages.

¶14 Theft of movable property from an elder adult at risk, pursuant to
WIS. STAT. § 943.20(1)(a) and (3)(d)6, has five elements: (1) the defendant
intentionally transferred movable property of another; (2) the property’s owner did
not consent to the transfer; (3) the defendant knew that the owner did not consent
to the transfer; (4) the defendant intended to deprive the owner permanently of the
property; and (5) the owner was an individual at risk. See WIS JI—CRIMINAL
1441 (2022); WIS JI—CRIMINAL 1441B (2020).

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No. 2024AP941-CR

¶15 There can be no dispute that the complaint sufficiently alleges that
Meyer-Spidell received, and intended to permanently retain, the three items of
property from Sam. The circuit court’s statements concerning supposition and
speculation appear to relate to the second and third elements: whether Sam lacked
capacity to consent due to dementia or cognitive decline during each of the three
transfers and whether Meyer-Spidell knew he was unable to consent. In a
probable cause evaluation, however, the court must determine whether facts or
reasonable inferences are sufficiently pled to lead to the conclusion that
Meyer-Spidell probably committed the felony alleged in the complaint. The court
appears to have both misunderstood the elements of the crime and to have
imposed a stricter and higher burden on the State.

¶16 Wisconsin’s legislature has determined that a victim’s consent is
invalid where “the victim does not understand the nature of the thing to which the
victim consents … by reason of ... defective mental condition, whether permanent
or temporary.” WIS. STAT. § 939.22(48)(c). As identified above, several facts are
set forth in the complaint that reasonably support the inference that Sam lacked the
capacity to consent to transfer his property to Meyer-Spidell. There are also
several texts and statements by Meyer-Spidell which establish that she knew she
had a “runaway elder with developing dementia” whom she could exploit and
whose assets she could potentially share with her friends.

¶17 The complaint contains sufficient allegations of fact to establish that
Meyer-Spidell knew she was getting a windfall from her random meeting with
Sam that would allow her to garner over $200,000 from a nice man who was “not
all there.” At the very least, the reasonable inferences support that conclusion and
the mere existence of other explanations does not necessarily negate probable
cause. See Grimm, 258 Wis. 2d 166, ¶15. We are satisfied that the complaint was

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No. 2024AP941-CR

sufficient for the prosecution to go forward. It was error for the circuit court to
have dismissed the complaint, and we reverse the court’s judgment and remand
the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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