Walny Legal Group LLC v. Angela M. Wendling

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 6, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP1354 Cir. Ct. No. 2022CV420

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

WALNY LEGAL GROUP LLC,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

ANGELA M. WENDLING F/K/A ANGELA M. WENDLING-HAWKINS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for
Outagamie County: MITCHELL J. METROPULOS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Angela Wendling, pro se, appeals from a decision
granting summary judgment to Walny Legal Group LLC. Wendling argues that
No. 2023AP1354

Walny failed to timely file its motion for summary judgment and that genuine
issues of material fact precluded the circuit court from ruling in Walny’s favor.
We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Walny and Wendling entered into a fee agreement for legal services,
whereby Walny agreed to provide legal representation to Wendling in a divorce
action. As part of the agreement, Wendling paid Walny a $10,000 advance fee.
The advance fee was held in the firm’s client trust account, and the agreement
stated that

[i]f you deplete your trust account and a bill is not paid
within 30 days after it is mailed to you, interest will accrue
on the unpaid balance of that bill beginning the [31st] day
and accruing thereafter at an interest rate of [1.5%] per
month. Interest charges will apply to specific monthly
bills.

The agreement further provided that Wendling agreed to pay the costs of
collection procedures, including attorney fees, if Walny was required to pursue
collection of amounts due under the agreement.

¶3 During Walny’s representation of Wendling in the divorce action,
the firm applied the advance fee to the outstanding balance for legal services.
Afterward, Wendling made some payments toward the outstanding balance;

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however, she stopped making payments before the balance was fully paid.1
Thereafter, Walny made several unsuccessful attempts to collect payment from
Wendling.

¶4 In December 2021, Walny filed the present lawsuit, alleging that
Wendling breached the agreement. Walny sought a monetary judgment against
Wendling for the outstanding balance of her legal bill, including interest, which
totaled nearly $40,000. Wendling filed an answer to the lawsuit asserting several
affirmative defenses and a counterclaim for a monetary judgment against Walny,
alleging that she overpaid for the legal services rendered. In addition, Wendling
filed a motion to change venue from the Waukesha County Circuit Court to the
Outagamie County Circuit Court, which was granted in April 2022.

¶5 Following the change of venue, the circuit court held a scheduling
conference in August 2022. Thereafter, the parties engaged in extensive pretrial
litigation, largely as a result of Wendling’s filing of numerous motions, none of
which were granted. For example, Wendling filed motions to compel responses to
discovery and to overrule Walny’s objections to Wendling’s discovery requests.
Wendling also subpoenaed a bank apparently used by Walny for “documents
related to the forgiveness of” any Paycheck Protection Program loans, which

1
Walny contends that a small balance remained in the trust account during the pendency
of Wendling’s divorce action and states, with citation to its appendix, that “[t]hese funds
remained because Wendling refused to provide Walny written authorization to deduct those funds
from trust and apply them to the outstanding balance.” However, the appendix is not the record,
and, to our knowledge, this information is not in the record. See United Rentals, Inc. v. City of
Madison, 2007 WI App 131, ¶2 n.2, 302 Wis. 2d 245, 733 N.W.2d 322; WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.19(1)(d)-(e) (2023-24).

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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required additional litigation and resulted in the court granting Walny’s motion to
quash the subpoena and issuing a protective order.

¶6 In February 2023, Walny filed a motion for summary judgment. In
support thereof, Walny argued that there were no genuine issues of material fact
and that Walny was entitled to a monetary judgment against Wendling as a matter
of law because she had breached the agreement. Walny sought a monetary
judgment in an updated amount, which included additional interest accrued.

¶7 In a notice of hearing dated February 15, 2023, the circuit court
scheduled a hearing for April 11, 2023, to address Walny’s motion for summary
judgment. The notice stated that Wendling’s response to Walny’s motion was due
by March 15, 2023. On March 15, Wendling submitted a letter to the court
requesting an additional 30 days to file a response brief. She also requested that
the court reschedule the hearing. Wendling stated in the letter that she was
making the requests under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and that she
was “experiencing a significant exacerbation of [her] health issues,” which she did
not detail in her letter. In a letter filed on March 31, the court denied Wendling’s
requests to delay the briefing deadline and the hearing.2

¶8 On April 11, 2023, the date of the scheduled hearing, Wendling sent
a letter to the circuit court requesting an adjournment due to “illness.” The court
granted Wendling’s request, and a new hearing was scheduled for May 17, 2023.

2
On April 3, 2023, Wendling submitted a letter to the circuit court requesting that the
court reconsider her request to modify the briefing schedule and move the date of the hearing. On
April 10, Wendling submitted additional documents with the court regarding her requests,
including doctors’ notes. The court never addressed the April 3 letter, but Wendling does not
raise any independent argument for reversal on that basis.

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Prior to the rescheduled hearing, Wendling submitted a motion for leave to amend
her counterclaim against Walny, but she did not file a formal response brief to
Walny’s motion for summary judgment.3

¶9 At the rescheduled motion hearing, Wendling argued that Walny’s
motion should be denied because it was not filed within eight months of the
complaint. See WIS. STAT. § 802.08(1). She further argued that genuine issues of
material fact existed because, among other things, Walny overcharged her at an
attorney-rate for menial tasks, she was incorrectly charged interest because the
trust account was never depleted, she was incorrectly charged interest during
certain periods, and the agreement was ambiguous because it did not state whether
interest would be calculated “on a simple or compound basis.”

¶10 Walny argued that Wendling had not responded to its motion for
summary judgment and that none of Wendling’s arguments made at the hearing
were supported by documentation. Moreover, Walny contended that its motion
for summary judgment was timely because it complied with the circuit court’s
scheduling conference, which was held after the change of venue,4 and the parties
were “where we are today” because of the change of venue and the subsequent
extensive litigation.

3
Wendling also inquired with the circuit court as to which motions would be heard at the
rescheduled hearing. On appeal, Wendling contends that she did not receive a response from the
court prior to the hearing.
4
Walny appeared to be referencing a scheduling conference that occurred in August
2022, which is not in the record before this court.

Separately, a summary judgment briefing schedule was entered but only after Walny had
submitted its motion for summary judgment.

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¶11 The circuit court determined that Walny’s motion for summary
judgment was timely due to the change of venue and the “many scheduling
conferences” dealing with “motions to strike” and “motions to quash.” The court
then granted summary judgment to Walny because it determined that there were
no genuine issues of material fact as to Walny’s claim for a monetary judgment.
Furthermore, the court denied Wendling’s motion to amend her counterclaim and
dismissed the counterclaim. Wendling filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court’s decisions, which the court denied.

¶12 Afterward, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Walny
that included the payments owed under the agreement and an additional amount
for attorney fees, which was objected to by Wendling but approved by the court.
The judgment also stated that Walny is entitled to recover from Wendling
reasonable attorney fees and costs of collection associated with the enforcement of
the judgment, as well as interest at the rate specified in the agreement, per month,
until the judgment is satisfied. Wendling now appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Timeliness of Walny’s motion for summary judgment

¶13 As she did in the circuit court, Wendling takes issue with the timing
of Walny’s motion for summary judgment. She argues that the court should not
have considered the motion because it was not filed within eight months of
Walny’s summons and complaint. We review a circuit court’s decision to allow a
party to file a summary judgment motion after the eight-month time limit in WIS.
STAT. § 802.08(1) for an erroneous exercise of discretion. See Lentz v. Young,
195 Wis. 2d 457, 466, 536 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1995), overruled on other

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No. 2023AP1354

grounds by Maple Grove Country Club Inc. v. Maple Grove Ests. Sanitary Dist.,
2019 WI 43, ¶¶46-48, 386 Wis. 2d 425, 926 N.W.2d 184.

¶14 Under WIS. STAT. § 802.08(1), “A party may, within 8 months of the
filing of a summons and complaint or within the time set in a scheduling order
under [WIS. STAT. §] 802.10, move for summary judgment on any claim,
counterclaim, cross claim, or 3rd-party claim which is asserted by or against the
party.” “[T]he purpose of requiring parties to file motions for summary judgment
within eight months of the filing of the summons and complaint is to prevent
parties from using summary judgment as a delay tactic.” Lentz, 195 Wis. 2d at
466. “[T]he eight-month deadline is not an inflexible rule that the [circuit] courts
must blindly apply,” and “courts have the inherent power to control their dockets
to achieve economy of time and effort.” Id. at 465.

¶15 Here, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by
permitting Walny to file its summary judgment motion after the eight-month
deadline because, as Walny contends on appeal, the court “acknowledged the
plethora of procedural motions and corresponding scheduling conferences that had
occurred. It further confirmed that a scheduling conference did not occur until
August 2022.” In other words, Walny’s filing of the motion in February 2023 was
not a delay tactic. See Lentz, 195 Wis. 2d at 466. Rather, it was a result of the
change of venue and the subsequent extensive pretrial litigation that required the
parties’ and the court’s attention. Under these circumstances, the court was
permitted, within its inherent authority and WIS. STAT. § 801.15(2)(a), to extend

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No. 2023AP1354

the eight-month deadline for Walny to file its motion.5 See Lentz, 195 Wis. 2d at
465.

¶16 Wendling asserts that the change of venue was required due to
Walny’s failure to file the lawsuit in the correct venue, and, therefore, the change
in venue should not excuse Walny’s late filing. The circuit court’s decision to
address the merits of the summary judgment motion did not rely solely on the
delay caused by the action’s change of venue. Instead, the court reached its
decision by also acknowledging the extensive pretrial litigation that occurred after
the change of venue, much of it initiated by Wendling. Likewise, the court’s
decision promoted judicial economy by avoiding an unnecessary trial. See Lentz,
195 Wis. 2d at 466; First Nat’l Bank of Columbus v. Hansen, 84 Wis. 2d 422,
428, 267 N.W.2d 367 (1978) (“[W]here a belated motion for summary judgment is
predicated on a legal issue totally dispositive of the case, the motion does not
cause delay but rather expedites the disposition of the litigation, and the [circuit]
court does not [erroneously exercise] its discretion in permitting it.”); WIS. STAT.
§ 801.01(2) (stating that WIS. STAT. chs. 801 to 847 “shall be construed,
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”).

5
Wendling does not argue that the circuit court was required to comply with WIS. STAT.
§ 801.15(2)(a) to enlarge the eight-month time period within its discretion, and we will not
address that statute further.

In addition, we note that Wendling appears to argue in her reply brief that the circuit
court’s decision to extend the eight-month deadline violated her due process rights. We will not
address this argument further because Wendling raised it for the first time in her reply brief.
See State v. Reese, 2014 WI App 27, ¶14 n.2, 353 Wis. 2d 266, 844 N.W.2d 396.

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No. 2023AP1354

¶17 Importantly, the record does not support a conclusion that Wendling
was prejudiced by the circuit court’s decision to permit Walny to file the motion
for summary judgment after the eight-month deadline. See Lentz, 195 Wis. 2d at
466 (stating the record was “devoid of any indication” that the circuit court’s
decision to permit a party to file a motion for summary judgment after the
eight-month deadline “was prejudicial” to the opposing party). Wendling argues
that she was prejudiced by the court’s decision because Walny’s motion for
summary judgment was intended “to cut off [her] opportunity to amend her
counterclaim.” However, the court found that the motion was filed beyond the
eight-month deadline due to the change of venue and extensive pretrial litigation.
Moreover, Wendling fails to explain how her proposed amended counterclaim
would have altered the outcome of the court’s summary judgment decision.
See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating
that we may decline to address undeveloped arguments). In short, we conclude
that the court properly exercised its discretion in deciding to address the merits of
Walny’s motion.

II. Wendling’s motion for extension

¶18 Wendling next asserts that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by denying her request for additional time to file a response to Walny’s
motion for summary judgment.6 The court did not provide its reasoning for

6
Walny did not address Wendling’s argument that the circuit court erred by denying her
request for an extension, and Wendling contends that Walny therefore conceded the issue.
See Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC Sec. Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 109, 279 N.W.2d 493
(Ct. App. 1979). We decline to summarily reverse the circuit court’s judgment based on Walny’s
purported concession. Whether a party concedes an argument by failing to respond to that
argument is a discretionary determination by this court. See id. Because Wendling’s arguments
on this issue are largely undeveloped, and resolving the issue requires a limited review of the
record, we exercise our discretion to address the merits.

(continued)

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No. 2023AP1354

rejecting Wendling’s request. Although the proper exercise of discretion
contemplates that a circuit court explain its reasoning, when a court does not do
so, we may search the record to determine if it supports the court’s discretionary
decision. Randall v. Randall, 2000 WI App 98, ¶7, 235 Wis. 2d 1, 612 N.W.2d
737.

¶19 Under the facts of this case, and upon considering the record as a
whole, we conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its
discretion by denying Wendling’s extension motion pursuant to the ADA.
Wendling’s request for an extension was made the day her response was due,
despite the court’s scheduling order having been issued over one month prior.
Thus, Wendling’s request for an extension could be seen both as tardy and, if
granted, as fundamentally altering the proceedings and imposing an undue burden
on the court and Walny by extending the lawsuit, which had been ongoing for well
over one year. We also note that Wendling did not detail, in her initial request,
what her medical condition entailed or why it prevented her from filing a timely
response to Walny’s motion for summary judgment.

¶20 Wendling’s arguments to the contrary are largely undeveloped, and
she has provided no authority within the ADA, or authority interpreting the ADA,
requiring courts to grant same-day requests for deadline extensions, particularly
where the requesting party had over one month to timely file the submission.

Furthermore, we note that Wendling does not challenge the circuit court’s decision via
scheduling order to require an earlier response from Wendling to Walny’s motion for summary
judgment than would otherwise have been required by statute. See WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2)
(stating that the adverse party to a motion for summary judgment “shall serve opposing affidavits,
if any, at least 5 days before the time fixed for the hearing” “[u]nless earlier times are specified in
[a] scheduling order”); Hefty v. Strickhouser, 2008 WI 96, ¶¶45, 51, 312 Wis. 2d 530, 752
N.W.2d 820 (stating that § 802.08(2) permits a court to require earlier filing by scheduling order).

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No. 2023AP1354

See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646. Furthermore, Wendling does not appear to
challenge the circuit court’s decision not to move the scheduled hearing date as a
result of Wendling’s ADA request. Regardless, the court eventually rescheduled
the hearing at Wendling’s request due to illness, and there would be no cause for
reversal in this case on that basis.

III. Merits of Walny’s motion for summary judgment

¶21 Finally, Wendling argues that genuine issues of material fact
precluded a grant of summary judgment in favor of Walny. In making this
argument, Wendling contends that despite her not responding to Walny’s motion,
she submitted materials to the circuit court throughout the course of the litigation
which demonstrated genuine issues of material fact.

¶22 “We review an order for summary judgment de novo, using the same
methodology as the circuit court.” Yahnke v. Carson, 2000 WI 74, ¶10, 236
Wis. 2d 257, 613 N.W.2d 102. Summary judgment shall be awarded if “there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and … the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2). We resolve “[a]ny
reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact … against
the moving party.” Schmidt v. Northern States Power Co., 2007 WI 136, ¶24,
305 Wis. 2d 538, 742 N.W.2d 294 (citation omitted). “If a moving party has
established a prima facie case [for summary judgment], the opposing party must
then establish that there are disputed material facts, or undisputed material facts
from which reasonable alternative inferences could be drawn, that entitle such a
party to a trial.” Baumeister v. Automated Prods., Inc., 2004 WI 148, ¶12, 277
Wis. 2d 21, 690 N.W.2d 1.

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¶23 The circuit court did not err by granting Walny’s summary judgment
motion and dismissing Wendling’s counterclaims. Wendling never submitted a
formal and timely written response to Walny’s motion for summary judgment. 7
Contrary to Wendling’s implicit assertions on appeal, the circuit court had no duty
to independently sift through the voluminous discovery that Wendling submitted
throughout the litigation to unearth issues of fact, and Wendling could not simply
rely on her previously submitted pleadings, such as her answer and counterclaims,
to suggest that there were issues of fact, as she does on appeal. See WIS. STAT.
§ 802.08(3). When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported by
affidavits and “papers,” “an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of the pleadings.” Id. Rather, “the adverse party’s response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided [§ 802.08], must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against such party.”
Id.

7
Wendling contends that she did respond to the motion for summary judgment when she
submitted an April 3, 2023 document titled, “Notice of Filing, Admissions of [Walny].” The
notice of filing listed over 60 allegedly unanswered questions that were sent in August 2022 to
Walny as requests for admissions. See WIS. STAT. § 804.11. According to Wendling’s notice of
filing, Walny had conceded all of the factual issues in Wendling’s favor because Walny had
failed to answer her requests for admissions. Wendling referenced some of the “admissions”
during the summary judgment hearing, but the circuit court did not specifically address whether
Walny filed a response to Wendling’s requests for admissions.

On appeal, the parties disagree over whether Walny filed a response to Wendling’s
requests for admissions. Both Walny and Wendling provide “evidence” on this issue in their
respective appendixes. However, the evidence provided by both parties is not in the record,
which it must be for us to consider on appeal. See United Rentals, 302 Wis. 2d 245, ¶2 n.2.
Regardless, Wendling’s April 3 submission was filed well beyond the scheduling order deadline
of March 15, and the circuit court never found that Walny failed to respond to Wendling’s
requests, which is particularly important here because the parties engaged in extensive pretrial
litigation surrounding discovery. Therefore, we do not conclude, as a matter of law, that Walny
conceded any issues as suggested by Wendling. See generally WIS. STAT. § 804.11(1)(b).

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¶24 Similarly, an adverse party cannot merely wait to submit evidence
and argument against the merits of a summary judgment motion until a hearing.
This last-minute, no-notice type of argument is precisely what the summary
judgment statute—or, alternatively, a scheduling order—are designed to prevent.
See WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2); Hefty v. Strickhouser, 2008 WI 96, ¶44, 312 Wis. 2d
530, 752 N.W.2d 820 (stating that a prior version of § 802.08(2), allowing the
adverse party to file affidavits and papers the day before a hearing, “proved to be
unfair because the nonmovant could serve opposing affidavits the day before the
hearing, giving the court and the movant minimal notice and opportunity to
prepare”).

¶25 Absent any contrary evidence, the circuit court was correct in
concluding that Walny was entitled to summary judgment. See David Christensen
Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Mehdian, 2006 WI App 254, ¶¶20-21, 297
Wis. 2d 765, 726 N.W.2d 689. “The elements of any breach of contract claim are
(1) the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant; (2) breach
of that contract; and (3) damages.” Pagoudis v. Keidl, 2023 WI 27, ¶12, 406
Wis. 2d 542, 988 N.W.2d 606.

¶26 There is no dispute that the agreement at issue in this case is a
contract between Walny and Wendling. Moreover, the documentation in the
record, including affidavits and billing records, clearly demonstrates that
Wendling failed to make timely payments on the outstanding balance owed to
Walny, despite Walny providing legal representation as dictated by the agreement.
Likewise, Walny proved the precise amount of money Wendling still owed under
the agreement, including interest. Thus, Walny made a prima facie case for
summary judgment, and it was Wendling’s burden to establish genuine issues of
material fact entitling her to a trial. See Baumeister, 277 Wis. 2d 21, ¶12. As

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explained above, Wendling failed to establish genuine issues of material fact
because she did not timely file a response to Walny’s motion for summary
judgment.

¶27 Wendling asserts that genuine issues of material fact exist as to
several issues, including whether Walny “performed its duties under” the
agreement by billing certain tasks at an attorney rate rather than at a paralegal rate;
whether Walny correctly applied interest to the account; and whether Walny
mitigated its damages. However, as explained above, these arguments, lacking
any supporting evidence, were not properly before the circuit court when it
decided Walny’s motion for summary judgment, and this court need not consider
them.

¶28 Furthermore, Wendling contends that interest should have been
calculated on a simple, not compounded, basis and that the circuit court violated
her due process rights when it granted judgment to Walny awarding the accrued
interest. Walny conceded that compound interest was not applicable under the
agreement. However, Walny argued that the submitted evidence demonstrated
that simple interest was applied. The circuit court appeared to agree with
Wendling at the hearing, stating, “It does appear that simple interest was
compounded. Again, if the [c]ourt would grant summary judgment and allow
[Walny] to submit billing and the judgment, Ms. Wendling could still object to
that.”

¶29 After issuing its decision, the circuit court stated, “Counsel can
submit a final order consistent with the ruling today, and then Ms. Wendling
certainly would have the authority to object to the final numbers that are in that
judgment.” Following the hearing, the court backtracked its finding, stating that it

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had found “that the interest calculated by [Walny] was ‘simple’ interest and not
‘compound’ interest.” Regardless, Walny submitted a proposed judgment amount,
and Wendling never responded prior to the court’s signing of that document over
one week later. We therefore reject her argument that she was denied due process
or that interest was calculated incorrectly.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

15