State v. William A. Churchill

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 23, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP96-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2022CF1716

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

WILLIAM A. CHURCHILL,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Kenosha County:
ANGELINA GABRIELE, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Grogan, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP96-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. William A. Churchill appeals from a judgment
entered after a jury found him guilty of second-degree recklessly endangering
safety and attempting to flee or elude an officer, contrary to WIS. STAT.
§§ 941.30(2) and 346.04(3) (2023-24).1 Churchill asserts the circuit court:
(1) erred in handling his request to require the State to introduce evidence pursuant
to the Rule of Completeness, see WIS. STAT. § 901.07; (2) misstated the law
during Churchill’s closing argument; and (3) should have held an evidentiary
hearing on his Franks-Mann2 motion. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 In December 2022, the State charged Churchill with attempting to
flee or elude an officer and second-degree recklessly endangering safety based on
an incident wherein a Kenosha Police Officer (PO#1)3 responded to a “shots fired”
complaint that led to PO#1 ultimately apprehending Churchill, who was seen near
the area driving away in his Mitsubishi, following a high-speed chase.

¶3 The preliminary hearing occurred on December 20, 2022, and the
circuit court found probable cause. Churchill pled not guilty and requested a jury
trial. On July 31, 2023, Churchill filed a Franks-Mann motion, which sought
dismissal of both counts based on his assertion that the Complaint omitted key
facts that would have resulted in a finding of no probable cause. Specifically, he

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
2
See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); State v. Mann, 123 Wis. 2d 375, 367
N.W.2d 209 (1985).
3
Based on Churchill’s recklessly endangering safety conviction, the testifying officer, as
the officer conducting the vehicle chase, can be considered a victim, and this opinion therefore
does not identify the officer by name. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86.

2
No. 2024AP96-CR

asserted the Complaint failed to: (1) state there were no people around during the
high-speed chase, thereby making it impossible for him to have recklessly
endangered anyone; and (2) demonstrate that he knowingly was fleeing the officer.
The court denied the motion both on the merits and on procedural grounds. First,
it concluded that the Complaint did not omit critical facts, and second, it ruled the
motion was untimely because Churchill filed it more than six months after the
preliminary hearing. See WIS. STAT. § 971.31(5)(c). The court also found that
although Churchill’s contentions were insufficient to affect probable cause, the
defense would be free to argue to the jury that there were no people around to
endanger and that he did not know he was fleeing from police.

¶4 The circuit court held a jury status conference shortly before the
scheduled trial date in September 2023. Churchill complained that the State had
filed a witness list indicating it would only call PO#1 at trial and argued that under
the Rule of Completeness, the State was required to call a second Kenosha Police
Officer (PO#2) because Churchill had made statements captured on both officers’
body camera videos. Specifically, Churchill asserted that during the traffic stop,
he was removed from his car and placed in a squad car with PO#2 guarding him
while PO#1 searched the Mitsubishi and that during that time, PO#2’s body
camera recorded Churchill commenting to PO#2 that he was aware of the police
presence for the shots fired complaint. He argued that under the Rule of
Completeness, the State should be required to call both officers to testify or at
least show PO#2’s body camera video to the jury so it would hear the statements
he made to both police officers. In particular, Churchill wanted the jury to hear
his statement to PO#2 that he “saw a lot of officer’s [sic] all over the area.”

¶5 After some discussion, the circuit court ruled that it had not seen the
statements Churchill made to either officer and that Churchill could either file a

3
No. 2024AP96-CR

formal motion and submit the statements for the court to review or the court would
address it during the trial after it heard the testimony. Churchill did not file such a
motion, although he did file a motion asking the court to reconsider its decision on
the Rule of Completeness. The court again discussed the issue prior to the start of
the jury trial and indicated it had not made a ruling and could not make a ruling
until it reviewed the statements involved. After additional discussion, the court
told counsel to provide the statements so the issue could be addressed after PO#1
testified.

¶6 PO#1 was the only witness to testify at the jury trial. He explained
that he observed Churchill’s vehicle in the course of responding to a “shots fired”
complaint and that he thereafter made a U-turn to follow Churchill, who
immediately accelerated to speeds in excess of 60 miles per hour in a residential
area with a 35-mile-per-hour speed limit in an attempt to get away from the police.
It was “pitch black” out at the time, and at one point, the Mitsubishi turned off all
its lights and continued to speed away. PO#1 activated the squad’s lights and
siren and continued his pursuit; however, he eventually lost sight of the Mitsubishi
and stopped his pursuit. A short time later, PO#1 noticed the Mitsubishi leaving a
parking lot and conducted a traffic stop, at which time he identified Churchill as
the driver. After being stopped, Churchill told PO#1 that he saw the squad car
make the U-turn and follow him and saw PO#1 activate his lights and siren but
that he tried to flee because he had “bad plates” and “couldn’t afford tickets.”

¶7 The State played a portion of PO#1’s body camera video from the
traffic stop during his testimony, and the defense played portions during its
cross-examination. Despite his prior arguments regarding PO#2’s body camera
video under the Rule of Completeness, Churchill seemingly abandoned the issue at
trial as he did not raise this issue with the circuit court following PO#1’s testimony

4
No. 2024AP96-CR

and the introduction of PO#1’s body camera video. The case proceeded to closing
arguments, and during the defense closing, the following exchange occurred:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, there’s no reason to think
that anyone was placed in any type of danger, reasonable or
unreasonable, substantial or unsubstantial, by the speed that
Mr. Churchill was going. Let alone the fact that there is no
human being, actual human being, not just a guess that
there was somebody in that house or someone in that
house, there might have been someone sitting in that car or
on that porch or across the street. That’s speculation, those
aren’t real humans. That’s not appropriate to argue that to
you, and they shouldn’t.

THE COURT: Well, the Court is the judge of that.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Certainly. I’ll withdraw that
and I’ll say, I cannot understand how someone could argue
that to you based on the plain language of the jury
instructions.

(Emphases added.)

¶8 The jury convicted. Churchill now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

¶9 Churchill presents three claims of error: (1) the circuit court should
have required the State to present the statement he made to PO#2 under the Rule
of Completeness; (2) the court erred when it interrupted the defense’s closing
argument to state that the court—not defense counsel—decides what is
“appropriate argument”; and (3) the court should have held an evidentiary hearing
on the Franks-Mann motion.

A. Rule of Completeness

¶10 The Rule of Completeness is codified at WIS. STAT. § 901.07, which
provides that: “When any part of a writing or statement, whether recorded or

5
No. 2024AP96-CR

unrecorded, is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the party at that
time to introduce any other part or any other writing or statement which ought in
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it to provide context or prevent
distortion.” See also State v. Eugenio, 219 Wis. 2d 391, 407, 579 N.W.2d 642
(1998). Because the Rule of Completeness involves an evidentiary decision, we
apply a discretionary standard of review and will not reverse unless the circuit
court erroneously exercised its discretion. See State v. Novy, 2013 WI 23, ¶¶21,
36, 346 Wis. 2d 289, 827 N.W.2d 610 (“[W]hether to admit or deny evidence rests
in the sound discretion of the circuit court, which we will not overturn absent an
erroneous exercise of discretion.”).

¶11 Here, Churchill argues the circuit court should have required the
State to introduce PO#2’s body camera video under the Rule of Completeness
because the State introduced PO#1’s body camera video. The State responds that
Churchill forfeited the issue because he failed to raise it during the trial. We agree
with the State.

¶12 Although the Record reflects that Churchill repeatedly raised this
issue before trial, the circuit court repeatedly said it would not make a decision
until after PO#1 testified and it had reviewed the statement the defense believed
“completed” PO#1’s testimony. Nevertheless, Churchill failed to raise his Rule of
Completeness argument following PO#1’s trial testimony. In other words, despite
having been informed that the court would not make a decision on his Rule of
Completeness request until after it heard PO#1’s testimony, Churchill failed to ask
the court to do so after PO#1 testified and PO#1’s body camera video was
presented to the jury. Consequently, there is no final circuit court decision on this
issue to review, and we conclude that Churchill failed to preserve this issue for
appeal. See Staskal v. Symons Corp., 2005 WI App 216, ¶74, 287 Wis. 2d 511,

6
No. 2024AP96-CR

706 N.W.2d 311 (“In order to properly preserve a claim of evidentiary error for
appeal, a litigant must raise the issue in a manner that gives the circuit court [the]
opportunity to make a ruling. If a court does not make a definitive pretrial ruling
on an issue raised by a party, the party must raise the issue during [the] trial in
order to preserve it for appeal.” (internal citation omitted)); see also State v. Kutz,
2003 WI App 205, ¶¶27, 30, 267 Wis. 2d 531, 671 N.W.2d 660 (concluding
pretrial hearsay objection not preserved for trial where “[t]he [circuit] court made
very clear it could not rule on what exceptions might apply … until it heard how
the evidence came in at trial”).

B. Closing Argument

¶13 Churchill’s next argument challenges the circuit court’s statement
that “the Court is the judge of that” during the defense’s closing argument. He
argues the court misstated the law and told the jury it did not need to weigh the
evidence about people being on the street to endanger. We reject his argument. It
is clear from the transcript that the court’s statement was a correction of defense
counsel’s claim about the State having made an inappropriate argument. Stated
differently, the court interjected that the court, not defense counsel, decides
whether an argument is appropriate. Defense counsel immediately acknowledged
its mistake and withdrew the comment. See State v. Burns, 2011 WI 22, ¶48, 332
Wis. 2d 730, 798 N.W.2d 166 (“Counsel is allowed considerable latitude in
closing arguments, with discretion given to the trial court in determining the
propriety of the argument.”). Churchill’s attempt on appeal to interpret the court’s
comment differently has no merit, and we need not address it further. See
Libertarian Party of Wis. v. State, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 801, 546 N.W.2d 424 (1996)
(An appellate court need not address arguments that “lack sufficient merit to
warrant individual attention.”).

7
No. 2024AP96-CR

C. Franks-Mann Motion

¶14 Churchill’s final argument is that the circuit court erred when it
denied his Franks-Mann motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. We
reject this argument as well.

¶15 The United States Supreme Court has held that:

where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary
showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally,
or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the
affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false
statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the
Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the
defendant’s request.

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). The Wisconsin Supreme
Court extended Franks to include omissions equivalent to deliberate falsehoods or
reckless disregard for the truth “in the context of a challenge to a criminal
complaint.” State v. Mann, 123 Wis. 2d 375, 378, 385-90, 367 N.W.2d 209
(1985). “For an omitted fact to be the equivalent of ‘a deliberate falsehood or a
reckless disregard for the truth,’ it must be an undisputed fact that is critical to an
impartial judge’s fair determination of probable cause.” Id. at 388 (footnote
omitted; citation omitted). We review de novo whether the circuit court erred
when it denied Churchill’s motion for a Franks-Mann hearing. See State v.
Jones, 2002 WI App 196, ¶25, 257 Wis. 2d 319, 651 N.W.2d 305.

¶16 As noted, the circuit court denied Churchill’s motion both on
substantive and procedural grounds. First, it found the facts that Churchill alleged
the State omitted did not change the probable cause determination. Specifically, it
found:

[T]here were no critical “omitted” facts as alleged by the
defendant. Instead, the defendant is challenging probable

8
No. 2024AP96-CR

cause based on the sufficiency of the complaint. Even with
the facts as alleged by the defendant (distance between the
two cars and no other actual person within the vicinity of
the fleeing) there is probable cause to support the charges.

No hearing is required if, even with the allegedly omitted facts, the court finds
probable cause still exists. See Mann, 123 Wis. 2d at 388-89. Because the court
so found, it did not need to hold a hearing.

¶17 Second, the circuit court found that the Franks-Mann motion was
untimely. WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.31(5)(c) requires a defendant to raise
challenges to the sufficiency of a complaint before the preliminary hearing. It
provides: “In felony actions, objections based on the insufficiency of the
complaint shall be made prior to the preliminary examination or waiver thereof or
be deemed waived.” Id. In his brief-in-chief, Churchill asserts the circuit court
erroneously exercised its discretion in denying his Franks-Mann motion because
the “motion did establish questions of fact specifically challenging the truthfulness
of information provided in the complaint upon which a Franks-Mann motion is
considered.” He also asserts that his Franks-Mann motion “did not violate
procedural or substantive law.”

¶18 As noted, however, WIS. STAT. § 971.31(5)(c) requires that motions
challenging the sufficiency of the complaint be filed prior to the preliminary
hearing, and here, Churchill did not file his Franks-Mann motion—a motion
effectively challenging the sufficiency of the complaint—until six months after the
preliminary hearing because that is when he claims he first discovered the basis

9
No. 2024AP96-CR

for the motion.4 Having failed to file a timely motion challenging the sufficiency
of the complaint, Churchill waived his right to make this challenge, and the circuit
court therefore did not err in denying his motion. See State v. Berg, 116 Wis. 2d
360, 365, 342 N.W.2d 258 (Ct. App. 1983).

¶19 As a final note, we recognize that Churchill asserts—for the first
time—in his Reply brief that WIS. STAT. § 971.31 “does not apply … because the
nature of a Franks-Mann motion is that evidence not known to when the court is
determining probable cause is discovered, and had that evidence been included,
probable cause would have been defeated. [sic]” He goes on to argue that “[t]o
require Franks-Mann to apply only before the preliminary hearing would be a
logical fallacy” and that doing so would “undermine[]” “the purpose and value of
Franks-Mann motions[.]”5 Nevertheless, Churchill fails to otherwise develop any
argument that the law supports an exception to § 971.31(5)(c)’s pre-preliminary
hearing requirement, and we therefore do not address this issue—or his arguments
as to the sufficiency of his Franks-Mann motion—further. See Gaethke v.
Pozder, 2017 WI App 38, ¶36, 376 Wis. 2d 448, 899 N.W.2d 381 (“[O]n appeal ‘it
is the burden of the appellant to demonstrate that the [circuit] court erred.’”
(second alteration in original; citation omitted)); Clean Wis., Inc. v. PSC, 2005

4
Despite asserting that the “exculpatory evidence was gathered from” the officer’s
“body worn camera” and that “[t]his type of evidence is only turned over to the defense after the
preliminary hearing[,]” Churchill fails to explain how this “exculpatory evidence”—a statement
he himself claims to have made that was captured on the officer’s body camera—only became
known to him six months after the preliminary hearing. Presumably, Churchill was aware of
what he himself stated to the officers during the traffic stop, which necessarily pre-dated the
preliminary hearing.
5
State v. Mann, 123 Wis. 2d at 393, however, states that “it would certainly be unjust to
require an individual charged by a criminal complaint to wait until the preliminary hearing … to
show the critical error which has been made.” (Emphasis added.) This statement itself suggests
that a Franks-Mann motion is to be filed prior to—not after—a preliminary hearing.

10
No. 2024AP96-CR

WI 93, ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768 (“We will not address
undeveloped arguments.”).6

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

6
Because we conclude that Churchill’s Franks-Mann motion was untimely, we need
not further address the substantive aspect of the circuit court’s decision denying Churchill’s
motion. See Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Consolidated Ins. Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶33 n.18,
369 Wis. 2d 607, 881 N.W.2d 285 (“We decide cases on the narrowest grounds possible.”);
Martinez v. Rullman, 2023 WI App 30, ¶5, 408 Wis. 2d 503, 992 N.W.2d 853 (this court decides
cases on the narrowest possible grounds); State v. Lickes, 2021 WI 60, ¶33 n.10, 397 Wis. 2d
586, 960 N.W.2d 855 (“Issues that are not dispositive need not be addressed.” (quoted source
omitted)).

11