State v. Roseann M. Reyes

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 27, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos.
2023AP2204-CR Cir. Ct. Nos. 2023CM277
2023CM281
2023AP2205-CR 2023CM333
2023AP2206-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

JUNEAU COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

RESPONDENT,

V.

ROSEANN M. REYES,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Juneau County:
STACY A. SMITH, Judge. Dismissed.

Before Kloppenburg, P.J., Nashold, and Taylor, JJ.
Nos. 2023AP2204-CR
2023AP2205-CR
2023AP2206-CR

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or

authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. In these consolidated appeals, Roseann Reyes
appeals orders of commitment for treatment (incompetency) and for involuntary
administration of medication (“the involuntary medication order”).1 She also
appeals an order to provide emergency medical care and treatment (“the
emergency medical treatment order”). Because we conclude that the issues are
moot and that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply, we dismiss these
appeals.2

BACKGROUND

¶2 Reyes was charged in three separate misdemeanor cases with two
counts of disorderly conduct and two counts of resisting an officer.

¶3 After meeting with Reyes in the Juneau County Jail, Reyes’s
attorney raised the issue of Reyes’s competency to proceed. The circuit court
ordered a competency examination and scheduled a competency hearing.

¶4 A competency report was filed by a forensic psychiatrist, who also
testified at the hearing. The psychiatrist testified that Reyes had schizophrenia and

1
Although a separate order for involuntary administration of medication was entered in
each of the three underlying misdemeanor cases, for ease of reference, we refer to these orders
collectively as the “involuntary medication order.”
2
These appeals were consolidated for briefing and disposition by an order dated
December 1, 2023. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.10(3) (2023-24). All references to the Wisconsin
Statutes are to the 2023-24 version unless otherwise noted. These appeals were converted from a
one-judge appeal to a three-judge appeal under WIS. STAT. § 752.31(3) and WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.41(1).

2
Nos. 2023AP2204-CR
2023AP2205-CR
2023AP2206-CR

had been treated in the past with monthly, long-acting antipsychotic injections
which she was now refusing; that, due to her mental illness, Reyes lacked the
capacity to understand the charges or court proceedings or to assist in her own
defense; and that Reyes was “not capable of applying an understanding of the
advantages or disadvantages of taking psychiatric medications” and “not
competent to refuse medications” because she could not have a meaningful
discussion about the need for medications or their advantages or disadvantages.

¶5 Also addressed at the hearing was a petition to provide emergency
medical care and treatment filed by Juneau County Corporation Counsel on behalf
of the Juneau County Sheriff’s Office, with a letter from a physician assistant
attached. The petition alleged that Reyes was “gravely ill” with MRSA
(Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus), which was “potentially life
threatening” and could rapidly spread through the jail, and that Reyes refused to
accept any care or treatment for her emergency condition.

¶6 Following the hearing, the circuit court issued an order of
commitment for treatment in each of the three cases. The court determined that
Reyes was not competent but was likely to be restored to competency within 12
months if provided with appropriate treatment. The court suspended the criminal
proceedings, ordered Reyes committed to the Department of Health Services, and
authorized the department to administer involuntary medication based on Reyes’s
dangerousness. The court also granted the Sheriff’s Office’s petition for
emergency medical care and treatment.

¶7 Reyes moved the circuit court to stay the involuntary medication
order pending appeal, arguing that the order violated due process because the State
failed to prove the four factors established in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166

3
Nos. 2023AP2204-CR
2023AP2205-CR
2023AP2206-CR

(2003).3 The court denied Reyes’s motion for a stay. In support of its ruling, the
court referenced language from WIS. STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm)2. and a passage from
Sell.4

¶8 This court granted Reyes’s requests for temporary and continuing
stays of the involuntary medication order pending appeal but denied a temporary
stay and a supervisory writ as to the emergency medical treatment order.

3
In Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), the United States Supreme Court held
that, before forcibly medicating a defendant to competency to stand trial in a criminal case, the
State must show: (1) an important government interest is at stake; (2) involuntary medication
will significantly further that interest; (3) involuntary medication is necessary to further that
interest; and (4) involuntary medication is medically appropriate. Id. at 180-81.
4
WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm)2. provides:

[A] defendant is not competent to refuse medication … if,
because of mental illness … and after the advantages and
disadvantages of and alternatives to accepting the particular
medication … have been explained to the defendant[:]

.…

The defendant is substantially incapable of applying an
understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives
to his or her mental illness … in order to make an informed
choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication ….

The passage from Sell states:

A court need not consider whether to allow forced medication
for [competency to stand trial], if forced medication is warranted
for a different purpose, such as the purposes set out in Harper
related to the individual’s dangerousness, or purposes related to
the individual’s own interests where refusal to take drugs puts
his [or her] health gravely at risk. [Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 225-26 (1990).] There are often strong reasons for a
court to determine whether forced administration of drugs can be
justified on these alternative grounds before turning to the trial
competence question.

Sell, 539 U.S. at 181-82.

4
Nos. 2023AP2204-CR
2023AP2205-CR
2023AP2206-CR

¶9 Twelve days after the circuit court issued its emergency medical
treatment order, Juneau County Corporation Counsel filed a motion in circuit court
requesting that the court vacate that order. In an attached letter, the physician
assistant reported that Reyes had completed her course of antibiotics, that she no
longer had life-threatening health concerns, and that she was voluntarily treating
her mental health as her psychiatrist prescribed.5 The court vacated the emergency
medical treatment order as moot the same day the petition was filed.

¶10 Reyes appealed the involuntary medication order and the emergency
medical treatment order. Pertinent here, in their appellate briefing, the parties
argue whether, in light of the circuit court order vacating the emergency medical
treatment order, that issue is moot and, if so, whether a mootness exception
applies.

¶11 After the parties filed their briefs, the State notified this court that
the circuit court had found Reyes competent; that Reyes and the Juneau County
District Attorney’s office had thereafter resolved all underlying misdemeanor
cases through a plea agreement; and that the circuit court had accepted Reyes’s
plea, sentenced her, and entered judgments of conviction. Based on this
notification, we issued an order directing Reyes and the State to file supplemental
briefs addressing mootness solely as to the involuntary medication order, which
they have done.

5
The parties agree that Reyes took the antibiotics voluntarily, although Reyes asserts
that she only did so when presented with the alternative of being administered them involuntarily.
Reyes offers no support for this assertion other than the order for involuntary medication.

5
Nos. 2023AP2204-CR
2023AP2205-CR
2023AP2206-CR

DISCUSSION

¶12 The parties agree that, as to the involuntary medication order, the
issue is moot; however, they dispute whether a mootness exception applies.
Regarding the emergency medical treatment order, the parties dispute whether the
issue is moot and, if so, whether a mootness exception applies. For the reasons
that follow, we conclude that the issues are moot as to both orders and that no
exception applies. Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals.

I. General Principles Governing Mootness

¶13 “An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on
the underlying controversy.” Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶11, 386
Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. However, collateral consequences to a challenged
order may render an appeal not moot if there exists a “‘causal relationship’
between a legal consequence and the challenged order.” Sauk County v. S.A.M.,
2022 WI 46, ¶20, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162 (quoted source omitted).

¶14 “Mootness is a doctrine of judicial restraint.” Marathon County v.
D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶19, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901. “Appellate courts
generally decline to reach moot issues, and if all issues on appeal are moot, the
appeal should be dismissed.” J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶12. However, we may
choose to address moot issues in “‘exceptional or compelling circumstances.’” Id.
(quoted source omitted). “There are several established exceptions under which
this court may elect to address moot issues: (1) the issue[] [is] of great public
importance; (2) the constitutionality of a statute is involved; (3) the situation arises
so often a definitive decision is essential to guide the trial courts; (4) the issue is
likely to arise again and should be resolved by the court to avoid uncertainty; or

6
Nos. 2023AP2204-CR
2023AP2205-CR
2023AP2206-CR

(5) the issue is capable and likely of repetition and yet evades review.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted).

II. Involuntary Medication Order

¶15 As to the involuntary medication order, the primary issue on appeal
is whether a court may order involuntary medication in a WIS. STAT. § 971.14
competency proceeding based on dangerousness and without applying the Sell
factors.

¶16 Reyes argues that the circuit court could not base its involuntary
medication order on dangerousness and was required to apply the Sell factors. In
contrast, the State argues, as pertinent here, that Sell recognizes a court’s authority
to consider involuntary medication on dangerousness grounds in a competency
proceeding; that the court’s order was permissible under WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g);
and that our supreme court’s opinion in State v. Anthony D.B., 2000 WI 94, 237
Wis. 2d 1, 614 N.W.2d 435, confirms that § 51.61(1)(g) authorizes orders for
involuntary medication for dangerousness when an individual is committed under
WIS. STAT. ch. 971.

¶17 As noted, following the submissions of briefs in this appeal, the
circuit court determined that Reyes had been returned to competency, the parties
settled the underlying criminal cases, and Reyes was sentenced. In addition, as
Reyes notes, because the involuntary medication order in this case was stayed and
Reyes was never medicated, she is not subject to any costs associated with it and
thus there is no collateral consequence of the involuntary medication order that
would render the issue not moot. As a result, both Reyes and the State agree that
issues related to the involuntary medication order are moot. However, Reyes

7
Nos. 2023AP2204-CR
2023AP2205-CR
2023AP2206-CR

argues that the following three exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply: (1) the
issue is of great public importance; (2) the issue occurs frequently and a decision
is essential to guide circuit courts; and (3) the issue is likely to arise again and a
decision of this court would alleviate uncertainty.

¶18 We conclude that the second and third exceptions do not apply. That
is because after the parties submitted their supplemental briefs on mootness, this
court decided State v. N.K.B., 2024 WI App 63, 414 Wis. 2d 218, 14 N.W.3d 681,
review granted (WI Feb. 12, 2025) (No. 2023AP722-CR), which resolves the
issue presented here.6

¶19 Under facts not materially distinguishable from those here, the
N.K.B. court concluded that neither Sell, WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g), nor
Anthony D.B. allows for the involuntary medication of a defendant who is ordered
to be committed for restoration to competency based on that defendant’s
dangerousness, and that the circuit court is instead required to apply the Sell
factors. N.K.B., 414 Wis. 2d 218, ¶¶30-34, 45-46. Thus, contrary to Reyes’s
contentions, a decision on the merits in this moot case is not necessary to guide
circuit courts or to alleviate uncertainty because there is already controlling
precedent deciding the issue.

¶20 As to the first exception, whether the issue is of “great public
importance,” J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶12, we conclude that although the issue is

6
In its initial and supplemental briefs, the State noted that the issue presented here was
also before this court in State v. N.K.B., 2024 WI App 63, 414 Wis. 2d 218, 14 N.W.3d 681,
review granted (WI Feb. 12, 2025) (No. 2023AP722-CR), which was briefed and submitted for
review prior to the instant case. We placed this case on hold while a decision was pending in
N.K.B.

8
Nos. 2023AP2204-CR
2023AP2205-CR
2023AP2206-CR

undoubtedly important, it is less so given the existence of controlling precedent
addressing this very issue, precedent which the State and circuit courts must
follow going forward. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the issue is of such
great public importance that it requires our review, despite its status as moot.

¶21 In sum, given our opinion in N.K.B., two of the three exceptions
upon which Reyes relies do not apply, and the third does not provide the type of
“exceptional or compelling circumstances” that would justify deviating from our
usual practice of declining to reach moot issues. Id.7

III. Emergency Medical Treatment Order

¶22 As noted, twelve days after the circuit court issued its emergency
medical treatment order, corporation counsel petitioned the court to vacate the
order, stating that Reyes had completed her course of antibiotics and had
recovered from MRSA. The court vacated the order that same day and the State
now argues that any issue regarding the emergency medical treatment order is
therefore moot.

¶23 In response, Reyes argues that the issue is not moot because there
may be collateral consequences as a result of the order. Specifically, she argues
that she may be responsible for treatment fees as a result of the administration of
the medication. See S.A.M., 402 Wis. 2d 379, ¶¶24-25 (the “threat of potential

7
We note that Reyes also challenges the involuntary medication order on the basis that
the circuit court failed to properly apply WIS. STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm) or make the necessary
findings that Reyes was not competent to refuse medication. The parties’ supplemental briefs do
not address whether any mootness exception pertains to this particular issue. We conclude that
this issue is also moot and that no mootness exception applies.

9
Nos. 2023AP2204-CR
2023AP2205-CR
2023AP2206-CR

collection actions to recoup the costs” associated with an order for medical care
and treatment may be a collateral consequence rendering an issue not moot). In
support of her argument, Reyes cites the Juneau County Jail’s “Inmate Rules &
Regulations,” which, according to Reyes, states that inmates “‘will be charged a
$3.00 fee for each nurse visit & $5.00 fee to see the [physician assistant],’” that
indigent individuals’ accounts “‘will be held in arears until [they] are able to make
a payment,’” and that “‘[m]oney placed in [their] account will then be deducted to
pay [their] bill.’” Reyes provides a link to a website for these rules and argues that
we may take judicial notice of them. See WIS. STAT. § 902.01(2)(b).

¶24 However, with no factual record developed in the circuit court as to
the Juneau County Jail’s administration of these rules and no factual record
regarding the extent of Reyes’s visits with medical professionals, we decline to
take judicial notice of these rules or to consider an argument based on them.8
Accordingly, because Reyes has not sufficiently demonstrated a resulting
collateral consequence and because the resolution of this issue will have no
practical effect on the underlying controversy, the issue is moot.

¶25 Reyes further argues that even if the issue is moot, various
exceptions apply that warrant our consideration of this issue on the merits. Reyes

8
Indeed, as to the jail’s administration of such rules, the Sheriff’s Office has attached to
its respondent’s brief an affidavit from the captain of the Sheriff’s Office, who is in charge of the
Juneau County Jail. In this affidavit, the captain avers that it is not mandatory that Reyes pay
such expenses but is instead discretionary, and that in its discretion, the Sheriff’s Office has not
charged or attempted to charge Reyes for any of the costs related to her medical treatment and
that it will not do so in the future. In response, Reyes argues that we may not consider this
affidavit because it was not part of the circuit court record. We agree with Reyes and refer to the
affidavit only to further show that we lack a developed factual record as to the jail’s
administration of its rules, making judicial notice of these rules inappropriate.

10
Nos. 2023AP2204-CR
2023AP2205-CR
2023AP2206-CR

argues that the issue presented is of great public importance, comparing this
situation to the COVID epidemic and the public debate over vaccine mandates.
She also argues that the issue in this case is likely to arise again and that a decision
by this court would alleviate uncertainty. In support, Reyes provides statistics
regarding the number of incarcerated people in Wisconsin and cites sources for the
contention that incarcerated individuals are more likely to suffer from any number
of medical issues and mental health disorders. She also notes that the State and
Sherriff’s Office provide multiple bases to support their position that the
emergency medical treatment order was lawful, which she contends further
demonstrates the legal uncertainty surrounding this issue. Finally, she argues that
the issue will likely be repeated and will almost always evade review,9 given the
number of incarcerated individuals in Wisconsin, their greater risk of mental
illness and infectious disease, and that treatments may be accomplished quickly.

¶26 What Reyes fails to acknowledge, however, is the very narrow and
fact-specific situation that generated the petition and emergency medical treatment
order in this case. The record shows that Reyes was suffering from a mental
health issue to such an extent that her counsel, after visiting her in the jail, raised

9
The parties dispute the scope of this exception. The State argues that Reyes
misunderstands the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, citing Portage
County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶30, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509, for the proposition that
this exception “is limited to situations involving a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and quoted source omitted). The State argues that this exception is inapplicable to Reyes because
Reyes makes no argument that she will be subject to the same action again. In her reply, Reyes
concedes the point, but then in her supplemental brief, Reyes states that, based on Outagamie
County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶80, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607, her prior concession
was “inappropriate” and that we should instead rely on her broader interpretation of the exception
set forth in her brief-in-chief. We need not decide the scope of this exception because under
either interpretation, we conclude that this exception does not compel our review of the moot
issue here.

11
Nos. 2023AP2204-CR
2023AP2205-CR
2023AP2206-CR

the issue of competency and the circuit court ultimately committed her to the
Department of Health Services for treatment. At the same time, Reyes was also
suffering from a life-threatening infection that was treatable through antibiotics,
which Reyes refused to take. We question Reyes’s assertions as to the likelihood
of such a fact-specific situation arising again and Reyes’s comparison to the
COVID epidemic. See J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶30 (declining to apply mootness
exceptions to a fact-specific issue). Moreover, to the extent that this issue may
arise again, it would be better to address it in the context of a live controversy with
a more fully developed factual record. As with the involuntary medication order,
we conclude that the emergency medical treatment order does not provide the type
of “exceptional circumstances” that would compel us to deviate from our general
practice of declining to address moot issues.

CONCLUSION

¶27 We conclude that the issues pertaining to the involuntary medication
order and the emergency medical treatment order are moot and that no exceptions
to mootness apply. Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals.

By the Court.—Appeals dismissed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

12