State v. Devin M. Kirkland

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 20, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP866-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF74

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DEVIN M. KIRKLAND,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Portage County:
THOMAS B. EAGON, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Graham, Nashold, and Taylor, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Devin Kirkland appeals her conviction for
possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, as a party to a crime.
No. 2023AP866-CR

Specifically, Kirkland challenges the circuit court’s denial of her motion to
suppress statements that she made to police on the basis that the statements were
involuntary. We conclude that Kirkland’s statements were voluntary and we
therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The following facts are derived from the evidence introduced at the
hearing on Kirkland’s motion to suppress and are not disputed.

¶3 Kirkland made incriminating statements during an interview with
Lieutenant Lisa Rennie and Detective Aaron Yenter, both of whom testified at the
suppression hearing. At the time of the interview, Rennie was a drug investigator
with the Wausau Police Department. Rennie testified that she and Kirkland “had
ongoing contact over the years”: Kirkland, who Rennie described as “an active
meth addict,” would provide Rennie with information that Rennie used in her
investigations, and Kirkland would reach out to Rennie when she was concerned
about her safety.

¶4 Yenter, a drug detective with the City of Stevens Point Police
Department, identified Kirkland as a potential witness while investigating a
methamphetamine distributor in Stevens Point. Yenter knew that Rennie had
contact with Kirkland and Yenter reached out to Rennie because he wanted to
speak with Kirkland as part of his investigation. Yenter asked Rennie to
coordinate a meeting between him and Kirkland. At around the same time,
Kirkland reached out to Rennie because Kirkland had received a letter that she
perceived to be threatening.

2
No. 2023AP866-CR

¶5 Rennie arranged for Kirkland to come to the Marathon County
Sheriff’s Department to discuss the letter, where, unbeknownst to Kirkland,
Yenter would also be present. When Kirkland arrived, she was brought to an
interview room where Rennie and Yenter joined her.1 The interview was recorded
and a transcript of the interview was admitted into evidence at the suppression
hearing.2 Both Rennie and Yenter were present for the entire interview.

¶6 At the interview, Rennie introduced Kirkland to Yenter but did not
explain why Yenter was present. Rennie and Kirkland first discussed the letter
that Kirkland had received. Kirkland believed that the letter contained threats that
she was receiving because she had provided information to Rennie. Rennie went
through the letter with Kirkland, addressing the specific parts of the letter that
Kirkland identified as threatening and the reasons that Kirkland offered in support
of her belief that the letter was threatening. Rennie assured Kirkland that there
was no threat and told Kirkland that her concerns were the result of “meth
paranoia.”

¶7 The discussion transitioned to Kirkland’s knowledge about specific
individuals and their involvement in methamphetamine transactions. While
answering Rennie and Yenter’s questions, Kirkland made incriminating statements
regarding her involvement in these transactions; specifically, she told Rennie and

1
Rennie testified that she was not sure whether it was Rennie herself or Kirkland who
requested to meet regarding the letter that Kirkland had received. The circuit court found that
Rennie “was not sure who initially requested the meeting,” but that “[i]t does sound that the most
likely scenario was that Miss Kirkland had contacted Detective Rennie and wanted to meet with
her.”
2
The transcript is not of the entire interview; rather, it begins partway through the
interview.

3
No. 2023AP866-CR

Yenter about occasions on which she had “middled,” or been “the middle person,”
in the transactions. Relevant here, during the course of the interview, Yenter
stated that he knew that Kirkland was not telling them everything that she knew
and he exhorted her to be honest. Kirkland asked, “So I am getting arrested?”
Rennie responded, “No. I’m not -- I told you, I’m not arresting you, and I don’t
lie to you; right?” Similarly, Yenter responded, “No. We’re -- you’re not getting
arrested, but you need to tell us the truth.” When Yenter once again encouraged
Kirkland to be honest, Kirkland asked, “So that way, it can be used against me?”
Yenter responded, “Not necessarily…. It depends on if you’re going to
cooperate.” Yenter stated, “[T]he more honest and open you are that we don’t
have to go into details of what we know makes your case a lot better.” Rennie and
Yenter did not provide Kirkland with Miranda warnings,3 and at the end of the
interview, Kirkland left. We discuss the relevant parts of the interview in greater
detail, and quote the interview transcript at length, in the analysis that follows.

¶8 Approximately five months after the interview, the State charged
Kirkland with possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, as a party to a
crime.4 Kirkland moved to suppress the statements that she made during the
interview, which Kirkland argued were involuntary and thus inadmissible.5

3
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4
In addition to alleging that Kirkland had made incriminating statements during the
interview with Rennie and Yenter, the complaint alleged that Facebook messages and text
messages between Kirkland and the methamphetamine distributor whom Yenter had been
investigating showed Kirkland’s involvement in the relevant methamphetamine transactions.
5
In the circuit court, Kirkland also argued that her statements from the interview should
be suppressed because she had not been provided Miranda warnings.

4
No. 2023AP866-CR

¶9 The circuit court concluded at the suppression hearing that
Kirkland’s statements were voluntary and it denied Kirkland’s motion. The court
found that “Kirkland came to the sheriff’s department of her own accord,” that
Kirkland “was told on her arrival that she was not going to be arrested,” that “there
were no handcuffs placed on her,” that “Kirkland was repeatedly told she was not
under arrest, but that she should tell them the truth,” and that Kirkland “was not
fearful” during the interview. The court additionally noted that it had “not heard
any testimony that [Kirkland] was in any way restrained or not allowed to leave.”

¶10 Kirkland pled no contest to the charge of possession with intent to
deliver methamphetamine. She now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶11 “The question of voluntariness involves the application of
constitutional principles to historical facts. We give deference to the circuit
court’s findings regarding the factual circumstances that surrounded the making of
the statements. However, the application of the constitutional principles to those
facts is subject to independent appellate review.” State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43,
¶34, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 407 (citations omitted).

¶12 The admission of a defendant’s involuntary statements violates due
process. Id., ¶36. Statements are voluntary “if they are the product of a free and
unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of
a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on
the defendant by representatives of the State exceeded the defendant’s ability to
resist.” Id. “It is the State’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the statements were voluntary.” Id., ¶40.

5
No. 2023AP866-CR

¶13 “Coercive or improper police conduct is a necessary prerequisite for
a finding of involuntariness.” Id., ¶37. “[E]stablishing coercion is a high bar for a
defendant to surmount.” State v. Vice, 2021 WI 63, ¶32, 397 Wis. 2d 682, 961
N.W.2d 1. That is because “the protections of the Due Process Clause are
intended to safeguard against conduct or circumstances that ‘destroyed [the
suspect’s] volition and compelled [the suspect] to confess.’” Id. (first alteration in
original) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 162 (1986)). When
identifying coercive police conduct, we are aided by case law analyzing various
police tactics to determine whether they were coercive. Id., ¶33.

¶14 To determine whether a defendant’s statements were voluntary, the
pressures imposed upon the defendant are balanced against the personal
characteristics of the defendant using a totality of the circumstances standard.
Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶38. The relevant police pressures and tactics include:

the length of the questioning, any delay in arraignment, the
general conditions under which the statements took place,
any excessive physical or psychological pressure brought to
bear on the defendant, any inducements, threats, methods
or strategies used by the police to compel a response, and
whether the defendant was informed of the right to counsel
and right against self-incrimination.

Id., ¶39 “The relevant personal characteristics of the defendant include the
defendant’s age, education and intelligence, physical and emotional condition, and
prior experience with law enforcement.” Id.

¶15 Kirkland argues that, in considering the totality of the circumstances
and balancing the police conduct against Kirkland’s personal characteristics,
Kirkland’s statements were involuntary. See State v. Kruckenberg, 2024 WI App
45, ¶40, 413 Wis. 2d 226, 11 N.W.3d 131 (“‘The balancing of the defendant’s

6
No. 2023AP866-CR

personal characteristics against the police pressures reflects a recognition that the
amount of police pressure that is constitutional is not the same for each defendant.’
Our supreme court recognizes that police pressures ‘that are not coercive in one
set of circumstances may be coercive in another set of circumstances if the
defendant’s condition renders him or her uncommonly susceptible to police
pressures.’” (quoted sources omitted)). The State counters that there was no
coercive police conduct and that as a result we need not consider Kirkland’s
personal characteristics. See Vice, 397 Wis. 2d 682, ¶31 (“If our analysis of the
facts does not reveal coercion or improper police pressures, there is no need for us
to engage in the balancing test between the suspect’s personal characteristics and
those nonexistent pressures.”).

¶16 For purposes of this opinion, we will assume that Kirkland is correct
and that we must consider Kirkland’s personal characteristics when analyzing the
totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, we begin by considering the allegedly
coercive police conduct, we then consider Kirkland’s personal characteristics, and
finally, we balance the police conduct against Kirkland’s personal characteristics.
Based on our analysis, we ultimately conclude that the State has met its burden in
showing that Kirkland’s statements were voluntary.

I. Police conduct.

¶17 Kirkland argues that the tactics that Rennie and Yenter used were
coercive. Specifically, she argues that Rennie and Yenter employed a coercive
“‘false friend’ approach,” that Rennie and Yenter “told her that she was not under
arrest and would not be arrested,” and that Yenter gave Kirkland a “false
assurance that Kirkland’s statements would not be used against her if she
cooperated.” We address each contention in turn.

7
No. 2023AP866-CR

¶18 First, Kirkland argues that because she believed that she was
meeting with Rennie, whom she trusted, to discuss her safety concerns arising
from the letter that she had received, Rennie and Yenter obtained her
incriminating statements using a coercive “‘false friend’ approach.” Kirkland
relies on Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). Spano, however, is materially
distinguishable.

¶19 In Spano, after the defendant was indicted for first-degree murder
and a warrant issued for his arrest, he called a childhood friend who was a
“fledgling police officer” and explained his version of events and that he intended
to obtain counsel and turn himself in. Id. at 316-17. The defendant turned himself
in and was then questioned by police for approximately eight hours, which “began
in early evening” and lasted “until the not-too-early morning.” Id. at 322. The
defendant repeatedly requested to speak to his attorney, which police refused. Id.
After more than five hours of questioning, police told the officer whom the
defendant had called before turning himself in (the defendant’s friend from
childhood) to falsely “tell [the defendant] that [the defendant’s] telephone call had
gotten [the officer] ‘in a lot of trouble,’ and that [the officer] should seek to extract
sympathy from [the defendant] for [the officer’s] pregnant wife and three
children.” Id. at 318-19. The officer did so without obtaining a confession during
three separate “sessions” over the course of the interrogation. Id. at 319. On the
fourth such attempt, which lasted an hour, the defendant confessed. Id. In
concluding that the defendant’s confession was involuntary, the Spano court
described the use of the officer who was the defendant’s childhood friend as
“another factor which deserves mention in the totality of the situation.” Id. at 323.

¶20 Spano does not support Kirkland’s argument for a number of
reasons. First, the “false friend” tactic in Spano was accompanied by other

8
No. 2023AP866-CR

coercive tactics, such as the prolonged, overnight questioning and the repeated
refusals of the defendant’s requests to speak with his attorney. Id. at 322-23.
Additionally, whereas Kirkland had only ever known Rennie through Rennie’s
professional role as a police officer, in Spano, the officer was “a close friend of 8
or 10 years’ standing who had attended school with [the defendant],” and who had
only recently become a police officer. Id. at 317. Finally, in Spano, the officer
used his relationship with the defendant to the police’s advantage by falsely
claiming that, because of the defendant’s earlier phone call, the officer’s job was
at risk and that the officer’s family would suffer if the defendant did not cooperate,
thereby creating “sympathy falsely aroused.” Id. at 318-19, 323. In contrast, here,
the circuit court did not find that the officers relied on Rennie’s relationship with
Kirkland to “play on [Kirkland’s] sympathies,” see id. at 319, nor does the record
suggest that this occurred. As a result, Spano does not assist Kirkland.

¶21 Additionally, as the State argues, as a general matter “the [Supreme]
Court has held that officers may deceive suspects through appeals to a suspect’s
conscience, by posing as a false friend, and by other means of trickery and bluff.”
Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 2017). Further, other than
Spano, Kirkland does not cite any case law to support her argument that Rennie
and Yenter’s conduct was coercive because Kirkland believed that she was
meeting with Rennie to discuss the letter that she had received. And because
Spano is not analogous to the situation here, we reject Kirkland’s “false friend”
argument.

¶22 Kirkland’s argument is essentially that it was coercive, given the
existing relationship between Kirkland and Rennie, for Rennie and Yenter not to
tell Kirkland that Yenter was present because he was investigating a crime and
that Rennie and Yenter would be asking Kirkland questions related to Yenter’s

9
No. 2023AP866-CR

investigation. However, although Rennie and Yenter may not have explicitly told
Kirkland about this additional purpose for setting up the interview, the interview
transcript reflects that Rennie’s and Yenter’s questions clearly conveyed that they
were investigating criminal activity, in particular, illegal methamphetamine
transactions.6

¶23 Kirkland also argues that Yenter promised her that she would not be
arrested and that her statements would not be used against her if she cooperated.
During the interview, the following exchange occurred:

DETECTIVE YENTER: So, Devin, there is -- there is
more to this that we know that you’re not telling us. Okay?
And now is your time to be completely honest. Okay?
Because there’s more. And you’re giving us this much, and
there’s this much, if not more. Because --

MS. KIRKLAND: So am I getting arrested?

LIEUTENANT RENNIE: No. I’m not -- I told you, I’m
not arresting you, and I don’t lie to you; right?

DETECTIVE YENTER: No. We’re -- you’re not getting
arrested, but you need to tell us the truth.

MS. KIRKLAND: Okay. I seriously have not done
anything so …

6
We also observe that Yenter’s testimony suggests that he requested the interview to
investigate an individual other than Kirkland:

[T]he whole point of this conversation between myself and Miss
Kirkland was [that] I was trying to gather evidence against [a
different individual], and ultimately it came to the point that
Miss Kirkland is basically middling quarter- and half-pound
meth deals for [this other individual], and that’s what this
eventually turned into.

See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959) (stating that confessions must be examined
“with the most careful scrutiny” when “[t]he undeviating intent of the officers [is] to extract a
confession”).

10
No. 2023AP866-CR

DETECTIVE YENTER: So when -- those ounce, ounce
and a half, levels that you were middling was early August
before you went to jail?

MS. KIRKLAND: Yep.

DETECTIVE YENTER: Okay. And you’ve done nothing
-- no middling since you got out of jail? Now is the time to
be honest.

MS. KIRKLAND: So that way, it can be used against me?

DETECTIVE YENTER: Not necessarily. It might be used
against someone else. It depends if you’re going to
cooperate or not. And --

MS. KIRKLAND: I really don’t want this to bite me in the
ass --

DETECTIVE YENTER: Well, it doesn’t have to --

MS. KIRKLAND: -- honestly.

DETECTIVE YENTER: -- if you’re -- if you’re honest.
The more -- the more honest and open you are that we
don’t have to go into details of what we know makes your
case a lot better.

MS. KIRKLAND: How does that make my case better?

DETECTIVE YENTER: Because you’re -- you’re being
honest. You’re -- you’re saying, this is what I’m doing for
other people; other people are doing this much more.

¶24 Based on this interaction, Kirkland argues that Rennie and Yenter
promised Kirkland that she “was not under arrest and would not be arrested,” and
that this promise was part of Rennie and Yenter’s coercive conduct. We observe
initially that the officers’ statements appear to be ambiguous as to whether there
were assurances that Kirkland was not under arrest at that time, would not be
arrested during the interview, or would not ever be arrested based on what she told
Rennie and Yenter. Regardless, Kirkland appears to acknowledge in her
appellant’s brief that whatever “promise” was made was “technically kept,”

11
No. 2023AP866-CR

although she was ultimately charged and convicted, presumably based in part on
the statements obtained during the interview.7

¶25 However, Kirkland argues that even if kept, “well-established case
law requires that promises be considered when examining the totality of the
circumstances of an involuntary confession.” In support of this argument,
Kirkland cites two cases: Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶57, and State v. Clappes, 136
Wis. 2d 222, 238, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987). Although we look at the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether there was coercion, Vice, 397 Wis. 2d
682, ¶¶30, 31, the case law that Kirkland cites does not appear to support
Kirkland’s argument that Rennie and Yenter’s promise, even if it was fulfilled, is
significant in analyzing whether Rennie and Yenter’s conduct was coercive. The
Hoppe court stated that “[t]here were no threats or promises” in observing that the
question of voluntariness in that case was “a very difficult one.” Hoppe, 261
Wis. 2d 294, ¶57. And the Clappes court observed that “[n]o threats or promises
or attempts at physical or mental coercion were made” in the course of concluding
that there was no coercion. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 238. The relevant language
from these cases does not support Kirkland’s suggestion that a promise, even if
fulfilled, is significant for purposes of determining whether there was coercion.
See also State v. Owens, 148 Wis. 2d 922, 931, 436 N.W.2d 869 (1989)

7
Kirkland argues for the first time in her reply brief that she was “ultimately arrested.”
However, she does not provide a record cite to support this assertion, nor does our nonexhaustive
review of the record indicate that she was ever arrested, even though, as stated, Kirkland was
ultimately charged. We decline to address Kirkland’s argument that she was ultimately arrested
because it is raised for the first time in reply and not supported by a citation to the record. See
State v. Mata, 230 Wis. 2d 567, 576 n.4, 602 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1999) (“We do not address
issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.”); Tam v. Luk, 154 Wis. 2d 282, 291 n.5, 453
N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1990) (we need not address arguments that are not supported by citations
to the record).

12
No. 2023AP866-CR

(“Although a promise was made to the defendant, it was fulfilled. Therefore, it
was not part of an impermissible, coercive police tactic which could have rendered
the confession involuntary.”); State v. Lemoine, 2013 WI 5, ¶28, 345 Wis. 2d 171,
827 N.W.2d 589 (“It is not automatically unduly coercive to promise a benefit to a
suspect in exchange for cooperation.”). In any event, however, we will consider
the officers’ assurances in examining the totality of the circumstances—as we
explain below, even when we consider these assurances, they do not render
Kirkland’s statements involuntary.

¶26 Kirkland also argues that “Yenter explicitly and falsely told Kirkland
that whether her statements would be used against her depended on whether she
cooperated.” We disagree with this characterization of what occurred. After
Yenter told Kirkland, “Now is the time to be honest,” Kirkland asked whether her
statements could be used against her. In response, Yenter equivocated by stating
“not necessarily,” and told Kirkland that the more honest she was, the better the
outcome would be for her. This does not constitute coercive conduct.

An officer telling a defendant that [the defendant’s]
cooperation would be to [the defendant’s] benefit is not
coercive conduct, at least so long as leniency is not
promised. Similarly, coercive conduct does not occur
when, as here, an officer, without promising leniency, tells
a defendant that if he or she does not cooperate the
prosecutor will look upon the case differently. In either
case, the officer does nothing other than predict what the
prosecutor will do, without making a promise one way or
the other.

State v. Deets, 187 Wis. 2d 630, 636-37, 523 N.W.2d 180 (Ct. App. 1994)
(citation omitted); see also State v. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, ¶32, 320 Wis. 2d
209, 769 N.W.2d 110 (“[I]t is not coercive conduct for an officer to invite a
defendant’s cooperation by informing the defendant of potential benefits of

13
No. 2023AP866-CR

cooperation or to offer a prediction as to what the prosecutor will do.”). As the
State argues, Yenter did not lie or make any promises. In particular, contrary to
what Kirkland argues, Yenter did not promise Kirkland that if she cooperated, her
statements would not be used against her.

¶27 Kirkland also argues that Yenter’s “false assurance” “was
particularly coercive” because it implicated her Fifth Amendment rights and
because Kirkland did not receive Miranda warnings. As stated, we disagree with
Kirkland’s argument that Yenter promised that Kirkland’s statements would not be
used against her if she cooperated. However, whether or not a defendant has
received Miranda warnings is nonetheless relevant in determining whether there
was coercion. See Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶39. As we explain below, here the
lack of Miranda warnings does not render Kirkland’s statement involuntary.

¶28 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, to the extent there was
any evidence of police coercion, it was insubstantial.

II. Kirkland’s personal characteristics.

¶29 Kirkland argues that she was particularly susceptible to police
pressure as a result of her experience with law enforcement, her relationship with
Rennie, and her fearful emotional condition. We address each in turn.

¶30 First, Kirkland argues that she was susceptible to police pressure
because she provided information to police during prior interviews with Rennie,
after which she was not prosecuted. Kirkland argues that in this way, she is like
the juvenile defendant in State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699
N.W.2d 110. In Jerrell C.J., prior to the interrogation at issue in that case, the

14
No. 2023AP866-CR

defendant had been arrested twice for misdemeanor offenses. Id., ¶29. “In both
instances, he answered police questions, admitted to involvement, and was
allowed to go home. Significantly, he was never adjudged delinquent.” Id.
Under those circumstances, our supreme court stated that the defendant’s prior
experience with law enforcement “may have contributed to his willingness to
confess in the case at hand,” and the court additionally noted the defendant’s
argument “that such an experience may have taught him a dangerous lesson that
admitting involvement in an offense will result in a return home without any
significant consequences.” Id. Here, we observe that Kirkland does not argue that
she made incriminating statements during her prior interviews with Rennie. We
similarly observe that the caution that Kirkland demonstrated before making her
incriminating statements suggests that, notwithstanding her prior interviews with
Rennie, Kirkland was aware that any incriminating statements could be used
against her.

¶31 Additionally, as the State notes, the defendant in Jerrell C.J. was
fourteen years old. Our supreme court has recognized that “the condition of being
a child renders one ‘uncommonly susceptible to police pressures.’” Id., ¶26
(quoted source omitted). Further, the defendant had an eighth-grade education and
low average intelligence, and had limited experience with law enforcement. Id.,
¶¶26-29. We therefore disagree with Kirkland’s argument that her prior contacts
with Rennie are analogous to the defendant’s prior police contacts in Jerrell C.J.,
and Kirkland does not otherwise provide any case law in which analogous police
contact was deemed a significant personal characteristic for purposes of
determining voluntariness.

15
No. 2023AP866-CR

¶32 Second, Kirkland characterizes Rennie and Kirkland as having a
“friendly personal relationship,” and quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 286 n.2 (1991), Kirkland argues that this relationship “‘may well have made
[Kirkland] particularly susceptible to [Rennie’s] entreaties.’” Here again, the case
law that Kirkland cites in support of this argument is not on point. In Fulminante,
the defendant, while incarcerated, confessed to a fellow inmate—a paid FBI
informant with whom the defendant had become friends—that the defendant had
sexually assaulted and killed his 11-year-old stepdaughter. Id. at 282-83. The
defendant confessed after the informant told him that he knew that the defendant
“was ‘starting to get some tough treatment and whatnot’ from other inmates”
based on rumors that the defendant had killed a child, and after the informant
offered to protect the defendant if the defendant told him what had happened. Id.
at 283. The relevant relationship in Fulminante is thus readily distinguishable:
whereas the defendant there did not know that his friend and fellow inmate was an
FBI informant, here Kirkland knew that Rennie was a police officer. See id. at
283. Additionally, in Fulminante the defendant’s personal friendship with the
FBI informant was but one of several factors that the Supreme Court noted in
determining that the defendant’s confession was coerced. Id. at 286-87; see also
Lemoine, 345 Wis. 2d 171, ¶3 (listing the fact that a defendant was familiar with
one of the interrogating police officers as support for the conclusion that nothing
about the defendant made him “particularly vulnerable”).

¶33 Third, Kirkland argues that she was susceptible to police pressure
because of her “fearful emotional condition.” Specifically, Kirkland argues that
“[a]t the time of the interrogation, Kirkland was in a state of fear that led her to

16
No. 2023AP866-CR

seek Rennie’s protection.” However, the circuit court specifically found that
Kirkland “was not fearful” during the interview.8 Kirkland does not argue that this
finding was clearly erroneous, and on that basis we reject her argument that her
emotional state during the interview rendered her susceptible to police pressures.
See Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶34 (“We give deference to the circuit court’s
findings regarding the factual circumstances that surrounded the making of the
statements.”).9 Accordingly, Kirkland fails to persuade us that she was
particularly susceptible to police pressure.

III. Balancing the officers’ conduct against Kirkland’s personal
characteristics.

¶34 Looking at the totality of the circumstances, and balancing Rennie’s
and Yenter’s conduct against Kirkland’s personal characteristics, we conclude that
Kirkland’s statements were voluntary.

¶35 As to police conduct or pressure, we have concluded that, contrary to
what Kirkland argues, police did not use a coercive “‘false friend’ approach.”
Moreover, although Rennie and Yenter assured Kirkland that she would not be
arrested, Kirkland concedes that this promise was kept—Kirkland was not arrested
that day, nor does Kirkland show that she was later arrested. Additionally, any

8
Consistent with the circuit court’s finding, although Kirkland met with Rennie to
discuss her concerns about the perceived threats in the letter that she had received, Kirkland does
not point to any evidence in the record that shows that her fears were not addressed by Rennie’s
assurances that there was no real threat and that Kirkland was being paranoid.
9
The circuit court did not make explicit findings about other relevant personal
characteristics, such as Kirkland’s age, education, or intelligence, nor does the State or Kirkland
argue that these characteristics are relevant. See State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶39, 261 Wis. 2d
294, 661 N.W.2d 407 (listing relevant personal characteristics for purposes of determining
whether a statement is voluntary). We likewise do not address these characteristics.

17
No. 2023AP866-CR

promise made by the officers is not the type of promise that would reasonably
overcome the ability of a suspect like Kirkland to resist. See Lemoine, 345
Wis. 2d 171, ¶28 (concluding that a promise that the defendant would not spend
the night in jail, which was fulfilled, did not overcome the defendant’s ability to
resist). Further, Yenter did not promise Kirkland that if she cooperated her
statements would not be used against her. Finally, the lack of Miranda warnings,
although relevant, “is not dispositive, and in this case, it does not tip the scales to
make [Kirkland’s] statements involuntary.” See id., ¶33.

¶36 The circuit court found that “Kirkland came to the sheriff’s
department of her own accord,” and that Kirkland “was told on her arrival that she
was not going to be arrested, there were no handcuffs placed on her.” The court
noted that it had “not heard any testimony that she was in any way restrained or
not allowed to leave.” The court additionally found that “Kirkland was repeatedly
told she was not under arrest, but that she should tell them the truth.”

¶37 Regarding Kirkland’s personal characteristics, as noted, Kirkland
relies heavily on her prior relationship with Rennie and the fact that she went to
Rennie to discuss her concerns regarding a letter she had received. To be sure,
Kirkland had ongoing contact with Rennie, Kirkland would reach out to Rennie
with concerns regarding her safety, and Kirkland met with Rennie based on her
concerns about the letter that she had received, without knowing in advance that
Yenter would be present. However, as stated, we reject Kirkland’s argument that
she was fearful during the interview—the circuit court found that she was not—
and Kirkland does not argue that she was susceptible to coercion for reasons other
than her alleged fear and her prior relationship with Rennie.

18
No. 2023AP866-CR

¶38 In sum, we conclude that the pressures brought to bear on Kirkland
did not exceed Kirkland’s ability to resist and that Kirkland’s statements were
therefore voluntary. See Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶34. In other words, we
conclude that the State has met its burden of establishing that Kirkland’s
statements were “the product of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting
deliberateness of choice.” Id., ¶36.10

CONCLUSION

¶39 For the reasons stated above, we affirm.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5. (2023-24).

10
Kirkland suggests that this case is like Hoppe, in which our supreme court concluded
that the defendant’s statements were involuntary even after it observed, “We are not dealing here
with egregious or outrageous police conduct. There were no threats or promises. A relatively
friendly tone was used in portions of the interviews.” Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶57. We
conclude that Hoppe is readily distinguishable. Kirkland’s relevant personal characteristics are
not comparable to the personal characteristics of the defendant in Hoppe, who “was having
significant mental and physical difficulties at the time of the interviews.” Id., ¶47. For example,
in Hoppe, the defendant “was suffering from cognitive impairment associated with his chronic
alcoholism,” “had deficits in his short-term memory and impairment of his reasoning and
problem-solving abilities,” “was hallucinating,” and “was confabulating, meaning that he was
making up for his deficits by answering questions by stating what he thought sounded correct or
reasonable.” Id., ¶48. Nor is the conduct of Rennie and Yenter comparable to the coercive
tactics employed in Hoppe, in which the defendant was questioned for five hours over the course
of three days; the police used emotional topics, “such as the death of [the defendant’s] parents,
the concerns of the family of the deceased, and [the defendant’s] prior military service in
Vietnam,” to apply psychological pressure; and the questioning was at times direct and
accusatory. Id., ¶¶54-55. Kirkland’s comparison to Hoppe is therefore unavailing.

19