State v. Roxanne Rae Reichert

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 14, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP1224-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2021CT1573

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

ROXANNE RAE REICHERT,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
JENNIFER R. DOROW, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 NEUBAUER, J.1 Roxanne Rae Reichert appeals from a judgment
of conviction entered following her plea of no contest to one count of operating a

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(f) (2021-22).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2023AP1224-CR

motor vehicle while under the influence (OWI) in violation of WIS. STAT.
§ 346.63(1)(a). Reichert contends that the circuit court erred in denying her
motion to suppress evidence the police collected after stopping her vehicle. She
argues that the police violated her Fourth Amendment rights by stopping her
vehicle without reasonable suspicion or other justification and by extending the
stop to investigate whether she was driving while impaired.2 As explained more
fully below, this court concludes that neither the initial stop nor the extension
violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The circuit court held a hearing on Reichert’s suppression motion at
which the officer who stopped her vehicle testified. The court also received and
watched video footage of the stop from the officer’s squad car. The hearing
testimony and video footage reveal the following undisputed, relevant facts.

¶3 On the night of November 26, 2021, Waukesha police received a
report from Reichert’s neighbor that a male and a female had argued outside
Reichert’s residence and then left in separate vehicles, the female in a purple
Honda Pilot and the male in a silver Chevy Malibu. The neighbor reported further
that “the vehicles may have collided” and that a third individual had been present
and was following the vehicles in a dark-colored truck. Officer Ryan Solberg
responded and began driving towards the residence. On the way, a dispatcher
informed him that the male in the silver Malibu had been in touch to say that he
would return to the residence to speak with police. Around this time, Solberg also

2
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

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No. 2023AP1224-CR

learned of “some type of a threat of a gun involved” and that at least one child was
in one of the vehicles that may have collided.

¶4 As he continued to search for the Honda Pilot, Solberg approached
North University Drive and heard from dispatch that both vehicles had been seen
heading south on that road. Solberg then “saw what appeared to be a dark colored
SUV that was driving southbound on North University” turn right onto another
street. Solberg followed the vehicle and confirmed it was a purple Honda Pilot.
He did not observe any damage to the rear of the vehicle and did not know the
license numbers of the involved vehicles. He also did not know whether a man or
woman was driving the Pilot or how many people were in it.

¶5 Solberg stopped the Pilot after following it for several minutes. At
the suppression hearing, he explained that decision as follows:

There was a domestic incident that occurred, which we
did not know the status of any individual and whether or
not they were injured. There was also a possible crash
involving this vehicle. And there were … the driver and at
least one child inside the vehicle.[3] I did not know the
status of any injuries of anybody inside the vehicle.

The purple Honda Pilot is a very distinct and specific
vehicle at approximately 8:30 p.m., where there were
almost no cars on the road. It was in the expected vicinity
and area traveling the expected direction at the expected
time.

On top of that, my main concern was the well-being of
the individuals inside the vehicle.

3
There appears to be a discrepancy between Solberg’s testimony that “at least one child”
was in Reichert’s vehicle and his description of the initial dispatch report, which indicated that a
child may have been in one of the vehicles that left Reichert’s residence. Because Solberg’s
degree of certainty on this point at the time he stopped Reichert’s vehicle is not legally
significant, and neither party proffers an explanation for this discrepancy, this court need not
analyze the point further.

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No. 2023AP1224-CR

¶6 Solberg and two other officers approached the vehicle and asked the
driver—Reichert—if she had been in an altercation with her boyfriend. When she
confirmed that she had been in an altercation, Solberg asked her to step out of the
vehicle to speak further. As she did so, Solberg asked her children if they were
okay; one responded that they were. Solberg then asked Reichert if she needed an
ambulance, to which she responded, “No, I’m okay.” At the hearing, Solberg
acknowledged that he had determined that Reichert and her children “appeared to
be safe and not in need of any medical assistance” within “a couple minutes of the
stop[.]”

¶7 After exiting the vehicle, Reichert walked out of the frame of the
squad car video to continue speaking with Solberg. Their ensuing conversation
can be heard on the video, but neither Solberg nor Reichert are visible.

¶8 Solberg began by confirming with Reichert that her boyfriend kept
multiple firearms in the house and then asked what had happened at her residence.
At the hearing, he identified two potential crimes—domestic violence and a hit-
and-run—that he was required to investigate.

¶9 Solberg testified that Reichert told him that her boyfriend, with
whom she lived, had been “acting strange” and repeatedly contacting her at work
that day, so “she wanted to get her kids and take them away from the residence for
safety.” After Reichert arrived home that evening, she argued with her boyfriend
and then went into her residence to gather her kids’ belongings. When she came
back outside, she saw that her boyfriend had moved his car so that it blocked hers
from backing out of the driveway. As a result, Reichert had to drive onto a
neighbor’s yard and driveway to get around his vehicle and leave the residence.

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No. 2023AP1224-CR

She denied that her car and her boyfriend’s car had made contact or that either
vehicle had been damaged.

¶10 After further discussion about the argument, Solberg asked Reichert
about the third individual who had been present, whom she identified as her ex-
boyfriend. Reichert then began describing the events that led up to the altercation
in greater detail. During this portion of the conversation, Reichert recounted
threatening statements her boyfriend had recently made. She explained that he
had taken one of her children with him to a gas station earlier that day, which
made her fearful.

¶11 Approximately thirteen minutes into their conversation, Solberg
asked Reichert if she had anything to drink that evening. She stated that she had
two drinks “over the course of dinner.” Solberg relayed that information, along
with Reichert’s version of the day’s events, to another officer. At the suppression
hearing, Solberg testified that the other officer, who was speaking with Reichert’s
boyfriend, “advised that the root cause of this issue and why the vehicle chase had
occurred was because [Reichert] was impaired, and [her boyfriend] was trying to
stop her from driving while intoxicated with the kids.” At that point, Solberg
testified, his investigation “became an investigation into an OWI as well.”

¶12 On the squad car video, Solberg can be heard saying that he would
probably administer field sobriety tests to Reichert. He acknowledged that she
was not slurring her speech but stated that he wanted to make sure she would be
able to safely drive away from the scene. Solberg then asked Reichert about her
boyfriend’s purported concern that she was impaired and should not be driving
with her children. Reichert denied that her boyfriend had expressed that sentiment
to her and told Solberg that her boyfriend had said “he was going to say whatever

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No. 2023AP1224-CR

it took to keep [her] home.” Solberg then told Reichert that he wanted to make
sure that she was “okay to drive” in light of her boyfriend’s statement and drove
her to a nearby gas station to perform field sobriety tests. In total, their
conversation up to that point lasted approximately twenty minutes.

¶13 At the hearing, Solberg explained his decision to conduct field
sobriety tests as follows:

There were several—or a few signs of impairment. That
being the weaving between the lane[s],[4] the thick[ and]
slightly slowed speech, that she admitted to drinking
several alcoholic beverages, and the information from
Officer Lincoln that the reason behind the road rage, or car
crash, or the [boyfriend] trying to stop the female, was due
to the fact that she was impaired on alcohol driving with
children.

Solberg acknowledged that he did not smell intoxicants on Reichert during their
conversation.

¶14 Reichert exhibited clues of impairment on each test Solberg
administered. After finishing the tests, Solberg placed Reichert under arrest. A
subsequent blood test revealed Reichert’s blood alcohol concentration to be in
excess of the legal limit.

¶15 At the end of the hearing, the circuit court denied Reichert’s motion.
The court concluded that the initial stop of Reichert’s vehicle was justified under
the community caretaker doctrine. The court noted that the stop emerged out of “a
very chaotic situation” in which a neighbor called 911 to report a domestic
disturbance and possible hit-and-run. The court also referenced Solberg’s
4
Solberg acknowledged that he did not refer in his report to Reichert weaving in her lane
before the stop as one of the reasons he requested field sobriety tests.

6
No. 2023AP1224-CR

testimony, which it described as “very credible,” that “[h]is primary concern” and
“subjective intent [was] a well-being check.”

¶16 The circuit court concluded further that Solberg had reasonable
suspicion to extend the stop and conduct field sobriety tests because Reichert
drove her vehicle from the scene of the altercation, admitted to Solberg that she
had been drinking earlier that day, and spoke to him in a “thick and slow” manner.
The court also cited Reichert’s boyfriend’s concern, which was relayed to Solberg,
that she was impaired when she drove away from her residence. Reichert
subsequently pled no contest to one count of operating while intoxicated.

DISCUSSION

¶17 When reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a suppression motion, this
court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Scull, 2015 WI 22, ¶16, 361
Wis. 2d 288, 862 N.W.2d 562. The court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the
deferential clear error standard, but this court reviews the circuit court’s
application of the governing legal principles to those facts de novo. Id. Here,
neither party challenges the circuit court’s factual findings; thus, this court focuses
on the application of Fourth Amendment principles to the facts.

¶18 The Fourth Amendment generally protects persons “against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A traffic stop
constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. State v. Floyd, 2017 WI
78, ¶20, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560. Such a seizure conducted without a
warrant is unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies.
See State v. Brown, 2020 WI 63, ¶10, 392 Wis. 2d 454, 945 N.W.2d 584.

7
No. 2023AP1224-CR

¶19 Before this court can apply Fourth Amendment standards to the
police conduct in this case, it addresses Reichert’s argument that her encounter
with the officers included more than one seizure. Where an interaction with police
consists of more than one seizure, “the constitutionally-acceptable scope and
duration of each seizure is inextricably bound up with its justifiable purpose.”
State v. Brooks, 2020 WI 60, ¶9, 392 Wis. 2d 402, 944 N.W.2d 832. Reichert
divides her interaction with Solberg into three phases—(1) the initial stop; (2) an
extension of the stop to investigate the reported domestic altercation and possible
hit-and-run accident; and (3) a second extension to investigate Reichert for
possible OWI. This court will adopt Reichert’s three-stage framework for the
purpose of its analysis.

I. The Initial Stop

¶20 Reichert argues that the initial stop of her vehicle was
unconstitutional because it was not permitted under either of two potentially
applicable exceptions to the warrant requirement—reasonable suspicion or the
community caretaker doctrine. This court agrees with the circuit court’s
conclusion that the initial stop was permissible community caretaker activity.

¶21 The community caretaker doctrine permits law enforcement officials
to effect warrantless seizures “to protect property or help ‘a member of the public
who is in need of assistance.’” State v. Wiskowski, 2024 WI 23, ¶15, 412 Wis. 2d
185, 7 N.W.3d 474 (quoting State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶32, 315 Wis. 2d 414,

8
No. 2023AP1224-CR

759 N.W.2d 598).5 The doctrine recognizes “that law enforcement work is
multifaceted.” Wiskowski, 412 Wis. 2d 185, ¶15. Police officers enforce the law
but also help members of the public who need medical or other assistance. See
Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶32. When assessing whether a seizure is justified
under this doctrine, Wisconsin courts must make three determinations:
(1) whether a seizure for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment occurred;
(2) whether the officer was engaged in a bona fide community caretaker activity;
and (3) whether the public interest furthered by the officer’s conduct outweighs
the intrusion on the privacy interest of the seized individual. See State v.
Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶¶43-48, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26. Here, there
is no dispute that Reichert was seized when Solberg stopped her vehicle. Thus,
this court focuses on the second and third elements.

A. Bona Fide Community Caretaker Activity

¶22 In determining whether Solberg was engaged in bona fide
community caretaker activity, this court considers the totality of the circumstances
and focuses on whether an objectively reasonable basis existed for Solberg to
believe that someone in Reichert’s vehicle was in need of assistance. See Kramer,
315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶¶30, 36; see also State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶17, 345 Wis. 2d
488, 826 N.W.2d 87. Here, the evidence presented to the circuit court showed that
such a basis existed. That court found that Solberg was dispatched in response to

5
In State v. Wiskowski, 2024 WI 23, 412 Wis. 2d 185, 7 N.W.3d 474, our supreme court
observed that several justices of the United States Supreme Court have recently “raised questions
about community caretaking as a separate doctrinal category” of warrantless seizures. Id., ¶17
n.6 (citing Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021)). However, the Wiskowski court declined to
“alter or modify” its community caretaker precedent. Wiskowski, 2024 WI 23, ¶17. This court
therefore applies that precedent to the facts presented in this case.

9
No. 2023AP1224-CR

a neighbor’s report of “a possible domestic-related incident and a hit and run
where subjects who were involved [were] seen fleeing the scene.” Shortly
thereafter, Solberg spotted a vehicle of the same color, make, and model as one
that had reportedly driven away from the scene traveling in the same direction and
on the same street as the dispatcher had reported. The court also accepted
Solberg’s testimony that his primary goal in stopping the vehicle was to check on
the well-being of its occupants.

¶23 In addition to these findings, the evidence presented to the circuit
court showed that Solberg had also been informed that a child was in one of the
vehicles that had driven away from the scene and that someone involved in the
incident may have made a threat involving a gun. These facts provide additional
support for the conclusion that Solberg had an objective basis to believe that the
purple Honda Pilot he encountered was one of the vehicles that had left the scene
and that someone in that vehicle, including possibly a child, could have been
injured and in need of medical attention.

¶24 Reichert’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. First, she
emphasizes certain facts that could arguably support a contrary conclusion,
including that “Solberg did not note any traffic violations or observe any obvious
damage to the vehicle.” She also notes that Solberg did not know the identity of
the Pilot’s owner or how many people were in the vehicle when he stopped it.
Even if true, these facts are not sufficient to show error by the circuit court. The
community caretaker function analysis considers all of the relevant circumstances;
those that might have suggested that no one in the vehicle needed assistance
cannot be considered in isolation and without also considering the circumstances
discussed above that support the opposite conclusion.

10
No. 2023AP1224-CR

¶25 Reichert also asserts that although the information Solberg received
could give him reason to think “that the woman involved in the altercation might
be in need of assistance,” he lacked a sufficient basis to believe that woman was in
the particular purple Honda Pilot he stopped. Again, this court disagrees. As
Solberg drove towards Reichert’s residence, he learned that a purple Honda Pilot
and the other vehicle that had left the scene had been seen traveling southbound on
North University Avenue. Shortly after receiving this information, Solberg
observed a purple Honda Pilot traveling in that direction on that street. He spotted
the vehicle at night in an area where, in his words, “[t]here was very little to
almost no traffic.” These facts provided a sufficient basis for Solberg to believe
that the vehicle he encountered was one of the vehicles the dispatcher had
described.

¶26 Finally, Reichert argues that the stop cannot be characterized as bona
fide community caretaker activity because it was not “totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute.” See Brooks, 392 Wis. 2d 402, ¶13 (citation omitted). Here, she
relies on Solberg’s testimony that he stopped her vehicle in part because he was
investigating possible criminal activity by the individuals involved in the
altercation.

¶27 This argument is not supported by Wisconsin law. The “totally
divorced” language quoted in Brooks originated in the United States Supreme
Court’s description of the community caretaker function in Cady v. Dombrowski:

Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently
investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of
criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better
term, may be described as community caretaking functions,
totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or

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No. 2023AP1224-CR

acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute.

413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has rejected the
argument that this language “mean[s] that if the police officer has any subjective
law enforcement concerns, he cannot be engaging in a valid community caretaker
function.” Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶30. Instead, our supreme court has
recognized that “[o]fficers may base their actions simultaneously on law
enforcement and community caretaker functions.” Blatterman, 362 Wis. 2d 138,
¶47. Thus, any “subjective law enforcement concerns” Solberg harbored at the
time he stopped Reichert’s vehicle do not negate or undermine the objectively
reasonable basis for the community caretaker function. See id., ¶44 (quoting
Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶30).

B. Balance of Interests

¶28 The third element of the community caretaker analysis requires a
balancing of “the ‘public interest or need that is furthered by the officer’s conduct
against the degree of and nature of the restriction upon the liberty interest of the
citizen.’” Wiskowski, 2024 WI 23, ¶20 (quoting Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶40).
In conducting this balancing, this court considers the following factors:

(1) the degree of the public interest and the exigency of the
situation; (2) the attendant circumstances surrounding the
seizure, including time, location, the degree of overt
authority and force displayed; (3) whether an automobile is
involved; and (4) the availability, feasibility and
effectiveness of alternatives to the type of intrusion actually
accomplished.

Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶41 (citation omitted). “The central question” this
balancing analysis is intended to answer is whether “the police intrusion aimed at

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No. 2023AP1224-CR

assisting a member of the public in need [was] reasonable under the
circumstances[.]” Wiskowski, 2024 WI 23, ¶20.

¶29 Reichert does not make any argument regarding how this balancing
analysis shakes out in this case, but this court agrees with the State that the factors
weigh in favor of a conclusion that the stop was a valid community caretaker
activity. As to the first factor, “[a]n individual’s physical and mental health status
is an issue of public interest and presents an exigency when an officer reasonably
determines that physical or mental health could be in jeopardy.” Blatterman, 362
Wis. 2d 138, ¶49. As explained above, the reports Solberg received from the
dispatcher before he stopped Reichert’s vehicle gave him reason to believe that
someone in her vehicle could have been physically injured and in need of medical
attention. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of a conclusion that the stop was
reasonable.

¶30 The second factor considers the circumstances surrounding the
seizure. Here, Solberg encountered Reichert’s vehicle after being dispatched to
her residence in response to a report from a neighbor about a domestic disturbance
and potential hit-and-run. Thus, Solberg did not control the time or location of the
seizure. See id., ¶53. Though Solberg displayed authority and force when he
stopped Reichert, the degree was not excessive given the circumstances. Solberg
did not draw his service weapon or begin his interaction with Reichert by ordering
her out of her vehicle. He asked if she had just been in an altercation with her
boyfriend and asked her to step out of her vehicle after she responded in the
affirmative. Solberg asked Reichert and her children if they were okay before he
began questioning her about the altercation, and although their conversation
occurred out of the view of the squad car video camera, there is no indication that
Reichert was physically restrained in any way during the conversation.

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No. 2023AP1224-CR

¶31 Next, the third factor is whether the seizure involved an automobile.
This is relevant because individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy
while in an automobile and because a person operating an automobile while in
need of medical attention may present a risk of harm to others. See id., ¶56. Here,
because Reichert was seized while in her vehicle, this factor weighs in favor of the
conclusion that Solberg “reasonably performed a community caretaker function.”
See id.

¶32 The fourth and final factor to consider is “the feasibility and
availability of alternatives” to stopping Reichert’s vehicle. See Kramer, 315
Wis. 2d 414, ¶45. Here, the safest and most effective means available to Solberg
of determining whether the purple Honda Pilot had been driven away from the
scene of the altercation, and whether anyone in the vehicle needed medical
attention, was to effect a brief stop of the vehicle. Reichert does not identify a
more feasible alternative that could have accomplished these goals.

¶33 Accordingly, this court concludes that the initial stop of Reichert’s
vehicle was justified as a permissible community caretaker activity.

II. The First Extension

¶34 Reichert next challenges Solberg’s extension of the stop beyond the
point at which he determined that no one in Reichert’s vehicle was in need of
assistance. At that point, she contends, any community caretaker justification for
the stop ended and Solberg’s continued detention of her violated the Fourth
Amendment. This court disagrees.

¶35 A traffic stop is a temporary seizure that must “last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Blatterman, 362 Wis. 2d 138,

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No. 2023AP1224-CR

¶20 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). Here, the record
supports Reichert’s contention that the justification for a community caretaker stop
evaporated rather quickly. At the suppression hearing, Solberg acknowledged that
he was able to determine that none of the occupants in the Honda Pilot needed
medical assistance within “a couple minutes” after making the stop. At that point,
his community caretaker concern dissipated and the justification for Reichert’s
detention ended “provided no other independent reason exist[ed] to detain” her.
See Wiskowski, 2024 WI 23, ¶24.

¶36 Reichert contends that no other independent reason existed to
continue the stop. Specifically, she argues that at the point Solberg determined
that the occupants of the vehicle were not injured and did not need assistance, he
lacked reasonable suspicion that Reichert was driving while intoxicated. Even if
Reichert is correct that Solberg was not aware of sufficient facts at that point to
reasonably suspect Reichert of driving while intoxicated, the record shows that
Solberg did have reasonable suspicion that Reichert may have committed a crime
during the altercation with her boyfriend. Accordingly, the first extension of the
stop to question Reichert about that incident was constitutional.

¶37 It is well-established that a police officer may temporarily detain an
individual to investigate possible criminal behavior if the officer has reasonable
suspicion that a crime has been committed. See State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79,
¶5, 364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 N.W.2d 143; State v. Rose, 2018 WI App 5, ¶14, 379
Wis. 2d 664, 907 N.W.2d 463 (2017). Reasonable suspicion requires that the
officer have more than just an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
‘hunch’”; rather, the officer must have specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, warrant a reasonable belief that
the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.

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No. 2023AP1224-CR

State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶¶10, 13, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634 (citation
omitted). In assessing reasonable suspicion, this court also considers what a
reasonable officer would have reasonably suspected given his or her training and
experience. State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 56, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996). This
court must look at the totality of the circumstances, and as facts accumulate,
reasonable inferences about their cumulative effect can be drawn. Id. at 58.

¶38 Here, Solberg had more than a hunch that Reichert had been
involved in criminal activity. Before he stopped Reichert’s vehicle, Solberg
learned from the dispatcher that a neighbor had reported a loud argument between
a male and a female outside Reichert’s residence that ended with the participants
driving away in separate vehicles. The dispatcher also reported that the vehicles
may have collided as they left the scene. In addition, Solberg testified that he
learned that “some type of a threat of a gun [was] involved.” Finally, Reichert
confirmed that she had been in an altercation with her boyfriend before Solberg
ascertained that she and her children were not injured.

¶39 Considering these facts, all of which were known to Solberg before
his community caretaker concerns dissipated, an officer would have reason to
suspect that Reichert may have violated the criminal law during the altercation
with her boyfriend or by making contact with his car and then driving away.
Therefore, Solberg was justified in continuing to detain Reichert in order to obtain
further information from her about what had happened during the altercation and
whether a hit-and-run had occurred.

III. The Second Extension

¶40 Lastly, Reichert argues that Solberg impermissibly extended the stop
at the end of his conversation with her about the altercation to perform field

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No. 2023AP1224-CR

sobriety tests. She contends that this second extension was not supported by
reasonable suspicion.

¶41 As a general matter, an extension of a traffic stop to investigate
possible violations of criminal law other than those that prompted the stop is
lawful provided reasonable suspicion of additional criminal behavior exists:

If, during a valid traffic stop, the officer becomes aware of
additional suspicious factors which are sufficient to give
rise to an articulable suspicion that the person has
committed or is committing an offense or offenses separate
and distinct from the acts that prompted the officer’s
intervention in the first place, the stop may be extended and
a new investigation begun. The validity of the extension is
tested in the same manner, and under the same criteria, as
the initial stop.

State v. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, ¶19, 260 Wis. 2d 406, 659 N.W.2d 394
(quoting State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 94-95, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999)).
Applying this general principle to the specific context presented here—an
extension to perform field sobriety tests—our supreme court has explained that
such extensions are permissible if an officer has reasonable suspicion that a
motorist has committed an offense “the investigation of which would be
furthered” by the tests. State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, ¶37, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 868
N.W.2d 124.

¶42 Reichert contends that Solberg lacked reasonable suspicion that she
was impaired when he “concluded his community caretaker function,” but that is
not the proper point at which to ground the reasonable suspicion analysis. Rather,
this court must assess reasonable suspicion at the time Solberg extended the stop
to perform the tests. In its ruling, the circuit court identified four facts known to
Solberg at that point in time that, in its view, provided reasonable suspicion to
administer the tests. First, Solberg knew that Reichert had been driving. Second,

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No. 2023AP1224-CR

having spoken to Reichert for approximately twenty minutes, Solberg perceived
her speech to be “thick and slow.” Third, Reichert had admitted to drinking
alcohol at dinner that evening. And finally, just before he decided to administer
the tests, Solberg learned from the officer who was speaking with Reichert’s
boyfriend that the boyfriend had been concerned that she was impaired as she
prepared to leave with her children. This court agrees with the circuit court that
these facts provided reasonable suspicion that Reichert had been driving while
impaired and thus justified Solberg’s decision to administer field sobriety tests.

¶43 Reichert criticizes what she describes as the circuit court’s
overreliance on “the self-serving reporting of [her] boyfriend,” suggesting that the
reliability of the report was compromised because it was provided by “the reported
aggressor attempting to prevent Ms. Reichert from leaving with her children.” It
is true that the police must consider the reliability and content of a tip before it can
justify a seizure. State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶17, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 623
N.W.2d 516. An assessment of reliability considers both the veracity of the tipster
and the basis for his or her knowledge. Id., ¶18. Here, the information relayed to
Solberg came from a person who had recently observed Reichert and was
corroborated by Reichert’s admission that she had consumed multiple drinks at
dinner that evening and her “thick and slow” speech. This court sees no error in
the circuit court’s consideration of the boyfriend’s reported concern as one of the
specific, articulable facts that provided reasonable suspicion to order the field
sobriety tests.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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