Brown County v. L. M. R.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 6, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP2314 Cir. Ct. No. 2022ME199

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF L. M. R.:

BROWN COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

L. M. R.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Brown County:
JOHN P. ZAKOWSKI, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 STARK, P.J.1 Luke2 appeals orders for his involuntary commitment
and his involuntary medication and treatment pursuant to WIS. STAT. §§ 51.20 and

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2021-22).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2023AP2314

51.61(1)(g), respectively, as well as an order denying his postcommitment motion
to vacate the commitment and medication orders. Luke argues that Brown County
presented insufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding of
dangerousness, that the court failed to make the specific factual findings of his
dangerousness as required by Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391
Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, and that he was deprived of his right to effective
assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to object to hearsay evidence.
He further argues that even if we affirm the court’s commitment order, the County
presented insufficient evidence to support his involuntary medication and
treatment order. We reject these arguments, and accordingly we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Luke was emergently detained in March 2022, after he was found
walking down a public street completely naked. Luke was unable to recall the last
time he took his medication, ate food, or drank water, and he stated that he had
been unable to sleep for the last two days. Luke explained that he was walking
naked because he is “a free man, [and] [G]od told [him] today is the day of
salvation.”

¶3 After a probable cause hearing, the circuit court found that there was
probable cause to have Luke involuntarily committed pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20. The court ordered that Luke be examined, and it scheduled a final
hearing. At the final hearing, the County called three witnesses: crisis counselor

2
For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant in this confidential matter using a
pseudonym, rather than his initials.

2
No. 2023AP2314

Antonio Nelson, Green Bay Police Department Patrol Officer Heath Hermans, and
psychiatrist Marshall Bales.

¶4 Nelson testified to the above facts. See supra ¶2. Officer Hermans
testified that he responded to a call regarding Luke walking naked down the street
and that when he arrived at Luke’s location, Luke was in custody, still fully naked,
and across the street from the Boys and Girls Club. Hermans stated that Luke had
been driving, pulled his car over, took his clothes off, and then began walking
down the street. Luke performed these actions while it was twenty-five or thirty
degrees Fahrenheit outside. According to Hermans, Luke explained that he was
“cleansing himself for God” and that he would strip and walk naked again if he is
not committed.

¶5 Doctor Bales testified that he examined Luke, that Luke suffers from
bipolar disorder, and that Luke was manic and psychotic at the time of the
examination. Bales stated that Luke’s mental illness manifested itself in religious
preoccupation, including Luke believing that he was “God-like.” Bales opined
that Luke’s disorder is treatable with medication and that he explained to Luke the
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to Luke’s medication. However,
according to Bales, Luke stated that he did not want any psychotropic medication,3
described the medication as “bondage” and “demonic,” and could not express
anything about the medication review or apply it to himself. Bales testified that
Luke’s mental illness prevented him from understanding the advantages of

3
Doctor Bales testified that while Luke was opposed to any psychotropic medication,
Luke was not opposed to taking testosterone. Bales clarified that testosterone is not an
antipsychotic medication.

3
No. 2023AP2314

medication, and he therefore opined that Luke was incompetent to refuse
medication.

¶6 Doctor Bales’ report was admitted into evidence. In that report,
Bales described Luke’s medication and listed the specific advantages,
disadvantages, and alternatives to that medication, which he had explained to
Luke. The report stated that Luke is incapable of understanding the advantages
and disadvantages of his medication, and he is incapable of applying them to his
situation.

¶7 Regarding Luke’s dangerousness, Dr. Bales opined that Luke was
dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c and 2.d. Bales explained that this
opinion was due to Luke being naked in the cold weather. Bales then stated that
he saw Luke in 2019 when Luke had done the same thing while “it was 30-below
windchill,” and Luke suffered from frostbite during that incident. Luke’s counsel
did not object to Bales’ references to the 2019 incident.

¶8 Luke testified that he stopped taking his medication because he was
getting dizzy at work and throwing up. He stated that he wanted to keep working
at his two jobs, talked about his religious views, and said that, on the date of the
incident, he was following the wishes of the Lord—he “just wanted to get the
gospel out at that time.”

¶9 The circuit court found that Luke was mentally ill, a proper subject
for treatment, and created a danger to himself. The court stated that it found Luke
a danger to himself because his lack of insight into his mental illness resulted in
his being naked outside in freezing or subfreezing temperatures on two different
occasions. The court also found that Luke was not competent to refuse medication
because he is substantially incapable of applying an understanding of the

4
No. 2023AP2314

advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives of medication to his condition. The
court entered orders for Luke’s involuntary commitment for six months, pursuant
to WIS. STAT. § 51.20, and for his involuntary medication and treatment, pursuant
to WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g).4

¶10 Luke filed a postcommitment motion to vacate the commitment and
involuntary medication orders, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Luke
argued that his counsel at the commitment hearing performed deficiently by
failing to object to Dr. Bales’ testimony regarding Luke’s actions precipitating his
2019 commitment as hearsay and that his counsel’s deficiency prejudiced him
because Bales’ testimony was “critical to a determination of the issue” and was
not duplicative of any properly admitted evidence.5 The circuit court entered a
written order denying Luke’s motion without a hearing, stating that it did not
consider the testimony regarding the 2019 commitment to be “very significant”
and that “[t]he court would have made the same findings independent of any
mention of the 2019 incident.” Luke now appeals.

4
The circuit court’s oral finding of dangerousness corresponds to WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. However, the court’s written order states that Luke is dangerous under
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a. We note that “an unambiguous oral pronouncement controls” when there is a
conflict between an oral pronouncement and a written order. See State v. Prihoda, 2000 WI 123,
¶24, 239 Wis. 2d 244, 618 N.W.2d 857. Thus, this court analyzes whether Luke is dangerous
under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. Luke does not challenge the discrepancy between the court’s oral ruling
and written order. Accordingly, we do not address this issue any further.
5
Luke also argued in his motion that the circuit court failed to make sufficient factual
findings to satisfy Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.
The circuit court did not address this argument in its decision and order. Because Luke raises this
argument again on appeal, we address the merits of this claim later in our analysis. See infra
¶¶20-22.

5
No. 2023AP2314

DISCUSSION

¶11 Luke raises several arguments regarding the involuntary
commitment proceedings. First, Luke argues that the County presented
insufficient evidence of his dangerousness and that the circuit court failed to make
specific factual findings of his dangerousness. Relatedly, Luke contends that his
commitment hearing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay
evidence. Finally, Luke argues that the evidence was insufficient to support an
involuntary medication order.6

6
As an initial matter, the County argues solely that Luke’s appeal is moot because the
involuntary commitment order and the involuntary medication order have expired. The County
acknowledges that, pursuant to Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975
N.W.2d 162, appeals of an expired involuntary commitment order are typically not moot due to
the collateral consequences of the firearms ban and mandatory cost of care associated with the
commitment. See id, ¶¶24-27. The County attempts to distinguish the present appeal from
S.A.M. by noting that case involved a recommitment and that the instant case involves an initial
commitment where Luke was already subject to a firearms ban from a prior expired commitment.
The County further argues that Luke has not provided any evidence of the monetary costs
associated with his commitment.

Mootness is a question of law that we review de novo. Id., ¶17. The County
misunderstands and misapplies S.A.M. While Luke is subject to a firearms ban from a prior
commitment, in S.A.M., our supreme court made it clear that “[p]revailing on appeal would
vacate the recommitment order and practically alter a committed person’s ‘record and reputation’
for dangerousness, a factor a reviewing court must consider when weighing a petition to cancel a
firearms ban.” Id., ¶23 (citation omitted). The County provides no basis in support of a different
result in this case involving an initial commitment. Further, our supreme court rejected a nearly
identical argument regarding the cost of care due to WIS. STAT. § 46.10(2)’s “mandatory
language” imposing the cost of care of an involuntary commitment onto the patient. S.A.M., 402
Wis. 2d 379, ¶25. Accordingly, we conclude that Luke’s appeal is not moot.

Because the County fails to respond to the merits of Luke’s appeal—and failed to request
supplemental briefing in the event that we do not find the appeal moot—Luke correctly argues
that we could deem Luke’s arguments conceded and reverse on that ground. See Charolais
Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC Sec. Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 109, 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App.
1979). However, we choose to decide this appeal on the merits.

6
No. 2023AP2314

¶12 We review the sufficiency of the evidence and factual findings in a
WIS. STAT. § 51.20 involuntary commitment, the sufficiency of the evidence for
an involuntary medication order, and ineffective assistance of counsel under a
mixed standard of review. D.J.W.,391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶23-24; Outagamie County v.
Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶37-38, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607; State v.
Pico, 2018 WI 66, ¶13, 382 Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95. “[W]e will uphold a
circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding of fact
is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the
evidence.” D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶24. Further, this court “must accept
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence” by the circuit court. K.S. v.
Winnebago County, 147 Wis. 2d 575, 578, 433 N.W.2d 291 (Ct. App. 1988).
“Whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard is a question of law that we
review de novo.” Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶15, 375 Wis. 2d
542, 895 N.W.2d 783; Pico, 382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶13.

¶13 For a person to be involuntarily committed pursuant to WIS. STAT.
ch. 51, a petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the subject
individual is “(1) mentally ill; (2) a proper subject for treatment; and (3) dangerous
to themselves or others.”7 D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶29. As relevant to this
appeal,8 dangerousness can be established by proving that the individual
“[e]vidences such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of

7
Luke does not contest that he is mentally ill or a proper subject for treatment.
8
WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. provides five different standards of dangerousness.
At the final hearing, the County argued that Luke was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. and 2.d.
The circuit court found that Luke was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. but did not find Luke
dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.d., and we therefore do not discuss this standard or any of the
other three standards further.

7
No. 2023AP2314

recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical
impairment or injury to himself or herself or other individuals.” See WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

¶14 In D.J.W., our supreme court mandated that “circuit courts in
recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings with reference to
the subdivision paragraph of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the
recommitment is based.” D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶3. This mandate has two
requirements: (1) that the circuit court make specific factual findings regarding
the patient’s dangerousness, and (2) that the circuit court identify the specific
standard of dangerousness on which the recommitment is based. See Sheboygan
County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶41, 402 Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733 (Hagedorn, J.,
concurring).

¶15 Here, the circuit court found Luke dangerous because Luke stripped
off all of his clothes and walked naked outside when the temperature was freezing
or near freezing. The court stated that Luke’s behavior was “dangerous” because
“people can die from hypothermia” and that Luke was “exposing himself to
situations in which he could be badly injured.”

¶16 Luke challenges these findings by arguing that he had only “walked
a short distance” before being stopped, that there was “no evidence that [he] was
shivering,” that it was unclear how long he intended to remain unclothed in the
freezing weather, and that there was no other evidence that he had been neglecting
himself. Luke also notes that he walked to a location “where he was nearly certain
to draw public attention to [his] unclothed condition.” Luke does not argue that
the circuit court’s findings were clearly erroneous—nor could he in good faith
make that argument, as the court’s findings are clearly supported by the evidence

8
No. 2023AP2314

presented at the final hearing. Instead, he appears to argue that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding of a “substantial probability of physical
impairment or injury to himself.” See WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

¶17 Contrary to Luke’s assertion, there was evidence that he had been
neglecting himself. Nelson testified that he spoke to Luke and confirmed that
Luke walked naked down the street, that Luke could not remember when he last
ate food or drank water and that Luke had not slept for two days.

¶18 The evidence was also sufficient to support the circuit court’s
finding that Luke’s exposure was dangerous. Officer Hermans testified that the
temperature was “between 25, 30 degrees” when Luke was walking naked, that
Luke stated he would “do this again” if he were let go, and that Luke had thrown
all of his medication away. Doctor Bales stated that there was endangerment, and
Bales’ report, which was received into evidence, clarified that the endangerment
was due to Luke’s obliviousness to the weather.

¶19 Regarding Luke’s argument that it is unclear how long he planned to
walk naked and that he walked to a location “where he was nearly certain to draw
public attention to [his] unclothed condition,” Luke did not present any evidence
that he only planned to be naked in the freezing temperatures for a short time or
that he consciously chose the location for the incident to limit his exposure. The
circuit court was not required to make those inferences. Rather, the court appears
to have inferred that Luke would have continued to remain unclothed in the cold to
the point where he would have suffered from hypothermia, and given Luke’s
statement that he would engage in the same activity again if not committed, this
inference was supported by the evidence.

9
No. 2023AP2314

¶20 Luke also challenges the sufficiency of the circuit court’s factual
findings as they relate to our supreme court’s mandate in D.J.W. Regarding
Luke’s dangerousness, the court stated

I’m going to find that there’s a substantial probability of
physical harm to himself due to impaired judgment as
manifested by a pattern of recent acts, because as
[Dr. Bales] said … there were similarities in terms of what
happened in 2019, when we’re talking about frostbite
conditions but also the thinking process is pretty much the
same, the lack of insight into the problems.

Luke argues that the court did not explicitly identify any of the standards of
dangerousness set forth in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. and that its failure to do so
violates D.J.W.

¶21 Luke misunderstands our supreme court’s D.J.W. mandate—D.J.W.
does not require the circuit court to explicitly recite the exact statutory subdivision
of dangerousness or to exactly quote the statutory language. See D.J.W., 391
Wis. 2d 231, ¶42 (Hagedorn, J., concurring); see also State v. Brown, 2020 WI 63,
¶27, 392 Wis. 2d 454, 945 N.W.2d 584 (observing that “[t]he law generally rejects
imposing ‘magic words’ requirements” (citation omitted)); Winnebago County v.
D.E.S., No. 2022AP251, unpublished slip op. ¶13 (WI App Aug. 31, 2022)
(concluding that, although the circuit court did not explicitly identify the standard
of dangerousness upon which the patient’s involuntary commitment was based,
the court’s actual words and the county’s closing arguments sufficiently identified
the relevant standard).9

9
Unpublished opinions authored by a single judge and issued on or after July 1, 2009,
may be cited for their persuasive value. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b).

10
No. 2023AP2314

¶22 Here, while the circuit court did not explicitly identify the standard
of dangerousness upon which Luke’s commitment was based or quote the
statutory language exactly, we are satisfied that the court’s actual words
sufficiently satisfy D.J.W.’s requirements. Of the five standards of
dangerousness, only WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. concerns a person evidencing
dangerousness from impaired judgment resulting in the substantial probability of
physical harm or injury to oneself. See § 51.20(1)(a)2. Indeed, even though the
court’s written order lists § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. as the standard of dangerousness upon
which Luke’s commitment is based,10 Luke himself correctly identifies the court’s
oral ruling as referring to § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. Further, the court tied this statutory
standard to specific factual findings, based on the evidence presented at the final
hearing, to Luke’s dangerousness. Accordingly, D.J.W. was satisfied.

¶23 Related to the circuit court’s factual findings is Luke’s argument,
raised in his postcommitment motion, that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel and that the court erred by failing to hold a hearing on his motion.
Specifically, Luke argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing to object to
“damaging hearsay” testimony from Dr. Bales regarding the events leading up to
his 2019 commitment, in which Luke was walking outdoors and completely naked
when “it was 30-below windchill” and Luke suffered from frostbite. Luke
contends that this testimony was damaging because it was not duplicative of other
properly admitted evidence, the “court utilized it as substantive evidence” when it
noted that “there were similarities [to the present case] in terms of what happened
in 2019,” and then relied upon it to find a pattern of similar dangerous activity.

10
See supra note 4.

11
No. 2023AP2314

Luke further argues that “[t]he [circuit] court should have conducted a hearing to
determine if [he] was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel by the
lack of objection to the 2019 evidence.”

¶24 Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20(3), the subject of an involuntary
commitment proceeding has a right to adversary counsel. The Strickland11
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel applies to WIS. STAT. ch. 51
commitment proceedings. Winnebago County v. J.M., 2018 WI 37, ¶45, 381
Wis. 2d 28, 911 N.W.2d 41. Strickland requires that Luke demonstrate that his
counsel performed deficiently and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced
Luke’s defense to the commitment. See J.M., 381 Wis. 2d 28, ¶47. We need not
address both Strickland prongs if we conclude that a defendant failed to prove one
prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; see J.M., 381 Wis. 2d 28, ¶50.

¶25 “To prove prejudice, a defendant must show the alleged errors of
counsel were ‘of such magnitude that there is a reasonable probability that, absent
the errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” State v.
Morales-Pedrosa, 2016 WI App 38, ¶17, 369 Wis. 2d 75, 879 N.W.2d 772
(citation omitted). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, ¶33, 381
Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89 (citation omitted). If a postcommitment motion
alleges sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief, the circuit
court must hold an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274
Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. We review de novo whether the motion alleges
sufficient material facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief. See id.

11
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694 (1984).

12
No. 2023AP2314

¶26 Here, even if we assume, without deciding, that Luke’s counsel
performed deficiently, we conclude that Luke’s postcommitment motion fails to
provide sufficient facts to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to
object to the alleged hearsay. In its written order denying Luke’s motion, the
circuit court, which also presided over Luke’s final commitment hearing, stated
that it “[did] not consider the 2019 incident very significant…. To the extent that
it is inadmissible hearsay, the court f[ound] it constitutes harmless error.”
According to the court, it “would have made the same findings independent of any
mention of the 2019 incident.” The record supports this decision.

¶27 We conclude that the record was sufficient, absent evidence
regarding the 2019 incident, for the circuit court to find, based upon a “pattern of
recent acts or omissions,” that Luke’s judgment was impaired such “that there is a
substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself.” See WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c. Luke’s continuing and inordinate lack of insight and
detachment from reality resulted in his failure to eat, drink water, sleep for two
days, and in his walking nude outside in freezing temperatures, which he
maintained he would do again if not committed. Further, Luke concedes that
given the passage of time, Dr. Bales’ hearsay testimony regarding the 2019
incident would have been minimally relevant to the current proceeding. Luke’s
postcommitment motion failed to allege sufficient facts for the court to find that he
was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object to Bales’ hearsay testimony. The
court therefore did not err by denying Luke’s motion without a hearing.

¶28 Finally, Luke argues that the County presented insufficient evidence
to support the circuit court’s order for his involuntary medication and treatment
pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g). Luke contends that Dr. Bales did not
provide a sufficient explanation regarding the advantages, disadvantages, and

13
No. 2023AP2314

alternatives to Luke’s medication. Accordingly, he claims, that the County failed
to show by clear and convincing evidence that he was incapable of applying an
understanding of his medication to his own condition.

¶29 “[A] person has the right to refuse medication unless a court
determines that the person is incompetent to make such a decision.” Melanie L.,
349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶53. A person is not competent to refuse medication if he or she
“is incapable of expressing an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages
of accepting medication or treatment and the alternatives,” or if he or she “is
substantially incapable of applying an understanding of the advantages,
disadvantages and alternatives to his or her mental illness, developmental
disability, alcoholism or drug dependence in order to make an informed choice as
to whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment.” WIS. STAT.
§ 51.61(1)(g)4.

¶30 To determine whether an individual is incompetent to refuse
medication, “the circuit court must first be satisfied that the advantages and
disadvantages of, and the alternatives to, medication have been adequately
explained to the patient.” Virgil D. v. Rock County, 189 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 524
N.W.2d 894 (1994). The explanation of the proposed medication “should include
why a particular drug is being prescribed, what the advantages of the drug are
expected to be, what side effects may be anticipated or are possible, and whether
there are reasonable alternatives to the prescribed medication.” Melanie L., 349
Wis. 2d 148, ¶67.

¶31 At the final hearing, Dr. Bales testified that during his examination
of Luke, he discussed the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to
medication with Luke. According to Bales, in response to this discussion, Luke

14
No. 2023AP2314

stated, “I am an innocent man in the name of the Lord,” “I want no medication,”
and that he “wanted to be free and did not want bondage.” 12 Bales then testified
that Luke is incompetent to refuse medication because his mental illness has
prevented him from understanding the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives
to medication.

¶32 In Dr. Bales’ report—which, again, was admitted into evidence—
Bales stated that he discussed Luke’s medication with him, including the specific
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives of that medication. Luke fails to
address the sufficiency of Bales’ explanation provided in his written report. We,
therefore, conclude that the County proved by clear and convincing evidence that
Luke was given a sufficient explanation of his medication and that Luke is
incompetent to refuse medication. See Outagamie County v. L.X.D.-O., 2023 WI
App 17, ¶38 407 Wis. 2d 17, 991 N.W.2d 518 (concluding that the doctor’s
general testimony in conjunction with the doctor’s written report—which
contained the specific advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication—
sufficiently satisfied the requirements of WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)4. and
Melanie L.).

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

12
Doctor Bales explained that Luke considered psychotropic medications to be
“bondage.” Again, we note that Luke was not opposed to taking testosterone, but also that
testosterone is not an antipsychotic medication.

15