State v. Alonzo Jeremiah Hall

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 11, 2022
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2020AP1290-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF4769

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

ALONZO JEREMIAH HALL,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee
County: DAVID C. SWANSON, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Brash, C.J., Donald, P.J., and White, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2020AP1290-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Alonzo Jeremiah Hall appeals his judgment of
conviction entered upon a jury verdict for possession of a firearm as a convicted
felon and possession of methamphetamine. Hall argues that the trial court erred
when it denied his motion to suppress evidence discovered during an investigative
stop because the police did not articulate reasonable suspicion for the stop. He
also argues that the trial court erred when it did not address his contention that his
vehicle had been illegally seized before the investigatory stop. Upon review, we
affirm.

¶2 Hall was charged with possession of a firearm as a convicted felon
and possession of methamphetamine, a controlled substance, as a second or
subsequent offense after the police arrested him while he was in his parked vehicle
on October 13, 2017, after they saw that his vehicle was missing its rear license
plate.1 Hall moved to suppress the evidence arguing it derived from an illegal
search and seizure. After testimony from two officers involved in the stop and
arrest, the trial court concluded that “the State has met its burden” to show that the
police had reasonable suspicion to stop Hall. The court then denied Hall’s motion.
The case proceeded to trial, at which the jury found Hall guilty of both counts.

¶3 Hall argues that the trial court erred when it found that the police had
reasonable suspicion to stop him and probable cause to arrest him and conduct an
inventory search of his vehicle. He asserts that the Milwaukee Police Department
officer’s testimony and body camera video footage showed that the officer was not
in a position to see the missing rear license plate; therefore, the trial court’s

1
During an inventory search of the vehicle after his arrest, police recovered a black
Springfield XDS .45 caliber pistol. When Hall was booked at the police station, a plastic bag
containing twenty-two methamphetamine pills were recovered from his coat pocket.

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No. 2020AP1290-CR

finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to approach the vehicle for an
investigatory stop was clearly erroneous. Second, he argues that the trial court did
not address Hall’s assertion that Hall’s vehicle was seized when the officer waved
“other squads in the area to block in the defendant’s vehicle so he could not leave
the area.” He contends that the police had no justifiable basis to believe that a
crime was being committed and no probable cause for detaining his vehicle by
blocking it in prior to investigating the officer’s suspicions.

¶4 The State argues that Hall has forfeited these challenges by not
raising these issues in his motion to suppress. A litigant who fails to raise a claim
to the trial court forfeits the right to raise the issue on appeal. See State v. Ndina,
2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612. When a litigant “seeks
review of an issue that it failed to raise before the [trial] court, issues of fairness
and notice, and judicial economy are raised.” State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597,
605, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997).

¶5 To determine whether Hall raised the issues of reasonable suspicion
to stop Hall or probable cause to seize the vehicle, we consider both his written
motion to suppress and the testimony and evidence at the suppression hearing. Id.
at 605-06, see WIS. STAT. § 971.30(2)(c) (2019-20)2 (providing that a motion must
“[s]tate with particularity the grounds for the motion”).

¶6 “A brief review of the law of search and seizure gives perspective to
our analysis.” Caban, 210 Wis. 2d at 606. The Fourth Amendment guarantees
individual security “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST.

2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise
noted.

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No. 2020AP1290-CR

amend. IV. A traffic stop, “even if only for a brief period and for a limited
purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.” State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶11, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d
569 (citations omitted). An investigatory stop “must be based on more than an
officer’s ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’” State v. Post, 2007
WI 60, ¶10, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
27 (1968) (one set of quotation marks omitted). The officer “‘must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the intrusion of the stop.” Post,
301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).

¶7 Our examination of Hall’s motion shows that he did not challenge
whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to approach his vehicle, and
specifically did not assert that the officers were not in a position to see the missing
rear license plate as they approached. However, he did argue that the criminal
complaint established the police “effected a seizure when they pulled in front of
[Hall’s] car” before they approached his vehicle for the investigatory stop.
Although Hall’s motion stated several Fourth Amendment issues with varying
degrees of particularity—including the seizure issue—he did not challenge
reasonable suspicion based on the missing license plate. See Caban, 210 Wis. 2d
at 606. Accordingly, we conclude that Hall’s written motion failed to raise a claim
of lack of reasonable suspicion to stop Hall with the particularity required by WIS.
STAT. § 971.30(2).

¶8 At the suppression hearing, trial counsel argued three issues:
(1) whether the police officer would have been able to see the firearm under the

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No. 2020AP1290-CR

driver’s seat even though the firearm did not appear in his body camera video
footage; (2) whether any of the police officers could identify marijuana shake3 on
Hall’s pants, car seat, or floorboard in the body camera video footage and
photographs; and (3) whether the vehicle was running at the time Hall was
stopped. In our review of the suppression hearing record, Hall did not raise the
issue of whether the vehicle was seized before the police approached, and did not
challenge whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on
when the officers looked at the rear of the vehicle and saw that the license plate
was missing.

¶9 Therefore, because in Hall’s suppression motion and at the
suppression hearing he failed to challenge whether there was reasonable suspicion
to stop his vehicle—specifically based on the officers’ position to observe his
missing license plates—we conclude that he forfeited his right to appeal this issue.
Caban, 210 Wis. 2d at 608. Further, we conclude that Hall has forfeited the issue
of whether the police “effected a seizure when they pulled in front of [Hall’s] car”
before they approached it for the investigatory stop because he did not challenge
the seizure at the suppression hearing.4

3
An officer testified at the suppression hearing that he had identified marijuana shake in
his prior experience and training, and explained it is “a green leafy plant-like substance usually in
small bits or chunks.”
4
Hall’s failure to pursue the seizure allegation at the suppression hearing, but instead
raising it here on appeal, raises the concern of fundamental fairness embedded in the forfeiture
rule. See State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (explaining that
the forfeiture rule “prevents attorneys from ‘sandbagging’ opposing counsel by failing to object
to an error for strategic reasons and later claiming that the error is grounds for reversal”). Just as
a party must “adequately, and with some prominence, argue an issue in order for this court to
decide it[,]” we decline to address an argument abandoned before the trial court when the
argument is resurrected on appeal. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475,
492, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998).

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No. 2020AP1290-CR

¶10 In sum, we conclude that because Hall did not raise the issue of
reasonable suspicion based on the missing rear license plate to the trial court, he
has forfeited his challenge to the trial court’s finding.5 Although Hall raised his
claim of illegal seizure in his motion to suppress, he failed to address the issue at
the suppression hearing and we also consider this claim forfeited. Accordingly,
we do not disturb the trial court’s decision denying his suppression motion and we
affirm his judgment of conviction.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

5
Further, we conclude upon our review of the record that there was reasonable suspicion
to temporarily detain Hall’s vehicle.

6