State v. William C. MacDonald

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
October 14, 2021
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2020AP605-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CF55

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

WILLIAM C. MACDONALD,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Marquette County: BERNARD N. BULT and MARK T. SLATE, Judges. Order
reversed and cause remanded with directions.

Before Blanchard, P.J., Fitzpatrick, and Nashold, JJ.

¶1 NASHOLD, J. The issue in this appeal is how many images are
“associated with” William C. MacDonald’s crime of possession of child
pornography for purposes of assessing the statutorily mandated surcharge of $500
No. 2020AP605-CR

per image. See WIS. STAT. § 948.12 (2019-20)1 (criminalizing possession of child
pornography); WIS. STAT. § 973.042(2) (mandating surcharge on images or copies
of images “associated with the crime[s]” of possession of child pornography or
sexual exploitation of a child) (sometimes referred to in this decision as the
surcharge statute).2 The criminal information charged MacDonald with ten counts
of possession of child pornography, each based on a single image, and MacDonald
pled no contest to a single charge. Read in for sentencing purposes were the nine
dismissed charges and ninety additional uncharged images. The circuit court
imposed a total surcharge of $50,000 ($500 for each of the 100 images) and
denied MacDonald’s postconviction motion to reduce this total amount.3

¶2 MacDonald appealed, arguing that the sentencing court should have
assessed only $500, the surcharge amount for the single image supporting the
single count of conviction. At MacDonald’s request, this appeal was placed on
hold pending our supreme court’s decision in State v. Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, ___
Wis. 2d ___, 960 N.W.2d 888, decided on June 18, 2021. The Schmidt court held
that the surcharge statute applies not only to images forming the basis of the

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise
noted.
2
The child pornography surcharge applies to “each image or each copy of an image
associated with the crime[s]” of possession of child pornography and sexual exploitation of a
child. See WIS. STAT. § 973.042(2). Reflecting the facts of this case, and for ease of reading, we
discuss the “image” or “images” without referring to copies of images, and we discuss the crime
of possession of child pornography without referring to the crime of sexual exploitation of a
child. Our discussion of the terms “image” or “images” encompasses all copies of an image, and
our discussion of “the crime” at issue under § 973.042(2) encompasses both possession of child
pornography and sexual exploitation of a child.
3
The Honorable Bernard N. Bult (the sentencing court) presided over sentencing and
entered the judgment of conviction. The Honorable Mark T. Slate (the postconviction court)
entered the order that, as pertinent here, denied MacDonald’s postconviction motion for surcharge
reduction.

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No. 2020AP605-CR

counts of conviction but also to images forming the basis of read-in charges.
Although the court discussed “read-in charges” generally, it also explicitly stated
that it “d[id] not address … whether the circuit court must impose the child
pornography surcharge for images of child pornography that were not charged.”
Id., ¶49. Thus, the court did not address the applicability of the surcharge statute
to uncharged read-ins.

¶3 Following the issuance of Schmidt, MacDonald conceded in this
court that the circuit court properly imposed the statutory surcharge on ten images:
the one image forming the basis of the count of conviction and the nine images
forming the basis of counts that were charged, dismissed, and read in. MacDonald
maintains, however, that Schmidt does not control the remaining question on
appeal: whether the circuit court was required to assess the surcharge on the
ninety uncharged read-in images. We conclude that Schmidt does not directly
answer this question but that, consistent with its analysis, the surcharge applies to
read-in images regardless of whether there is an accompanying charge, so long as
those images are “associated with the crime.” See id., ¶4. On this record,
however, it is not evident that the sentencing court determined which, if any, of
the ninety uncharged read-in images were in fact associated with the count of
conviction. We agree with the State that the circuit court should revisit its ruling
in light of Schmidt’s guidance.

¶4 Thus, we accept MacDonald’s concession that the circuit court
correctly imposed a $5,000 surcharge, corresponding to the ten images that the
parties agree are the proper basis for assessment. We reverse, however, the court’s
order denying MacDonald’s postconviction motion for surcharge reduction as to
the remaining amount. We remand for a determination of whether any of the

3
No. 2020AP605-CR

ninety uncharged and read-in images are associated with the crime of possession
of child pornography (the single count of conviction in this case).4

BACKGROUND

¶5 The following facts are undisputed for purposes of this appeal. In
April 2018, MacDonald’s former roommate reported to the Marshfield Police
Department that she possessed a computer tablet previously belonging to
MacDonald and containing what she believed to be child pornography. Local and
state law enforcement agencies, including the Digital Forensic Unit (DFU) of the
Wisconsin Department of Justice, Division of Criminal Investigation, commenced
an investigation and executed a search warrant at MacDonald’s residence. During
the search, MacDonald voluntarily spoke with a detective. MacDonald said that
he owned multiple electronic devices and that there might be child pornography on
at least one of the devices. When “asked how many images of child pornography
[law enforcement was] going to find on the electronics inside his residence,”
MacDonald responded, “‘[L]et’s say 200 just to be safe.’” During the interview,
law enforcement determined that one of the devices found in MacDonald’s
residence contained suspected child pornography. MacDonald was then placed
under arrest. Pursuant to the warrant, law enforcement seized nine cell phones, a
compact disc, a tablet computer, and two computer hard drives.

¶6 According to the criminal complaint, “When DFU did a preview
search of one of [the] defendant’s cellular telephone[s] … they discovered

4
Although MacDonald appeals both the judgment of conviction and the postconviction
order, we reverse only the postconviction order and do not disturb the surcharge ordered in the
judgment. If, on remand, the circuit court orders a new surcharge amount, it should amend the
judgment.

4
No. 2020AP605-CR

numerous pornographic images and selected a sample 15 images that show child
pornography.” The complaint charged MacDonald with ten counts of possession
of child pornography, each based on a single image.

¶7 The parties negotiated a plea bargain, which the prosecutor
summarized at the plea hearing as follows:

MacDonald will be entering a plea of either guilty or no
contest to Count 1 of th[e] information, and then the State
would be moving to dismiss and read in the rest of the
charges in that information, in addition to any uncharged
image that was part of this investigation, so that the State
will not be filing any additional charges for any other
images, but we would be asking that they be read in as part
of the sentencing in this matter.

MacDonald entered a plea of no contest, and the court accepted the parties’
agreement on the read-ins, stating, “The charges in Counts 2 through 10 will be
dismissed at this time and will be available for read in, as well as any uncharged
images that might be outstanding.”

¶8 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor recommended that the
child pornography surcharge be assessed for 100 images, stating,

[T]he statute that we’re dealing with here [WIS. STAT.
§ 973.042(2)] requires the Court to make a finding
regarding the number of images. It requires a $500
surcharge, essentially, for each image. While I think that
the number could be much, much higher, the State would
be asking for the Court to find 100 images [on the basis of]
a supplemental report by Detective Jordan McCoy, [in
which McCoy] went through an extraction of, I believe,
two phones. [McCoy] laid out that[,] in one image report,
there [were] 85 images that were consistent with child
pornography. Another [report reflected] 15 images.

MacDonald, in contrast, asked that the surcharge be applied for “each of the
read[-]in counts and convictions and no more” (i.e., ten images total).

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No. 2020AP605-CR

¶9 The sentencing court sentenced MacDonald to four years’ initial
confinement and three years’ extended supervision. Turning to the number of
images supporting the mandatory surcharge, the court acknowledged that
MacDonald “has argued that I should find a limited number based upon the ability
of the defendant to pay any amount that the Court might impose.” The court
correctly observed, however, that under WIS. STAT. § 973.042(2), the ability of the
defendant to pay a surcharge “is not a consideration that the Court should be
involved with.” Rather, the court viewed its task as determining “exactly how
many images this particular defendant was involved with.” Noting that “it did
come out in my review of the case, that at certain times, [MacDonald]
acknowledged that there may be up to 200 images,” the court imposed the
surcharge on 100 images, stating that this was “the minimum number of images”
to which the surcharge statute applied.

¶10 MacDonald brought a postconviction motion to reduce the surcharge
from $50,000 to $500, to correspond to the surcharge amount for the single image
forming the basis of the count of conviction.5 MacDonald further asserted that the
imposition of a $50,000 surcharge constituted a constitutionally excessive fine.
See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686-87 (2019) (prohibition on excessive
fines in Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution is an “incorporated”

5
Before Schmidt was released, MacDonald raised the same argument to this court;
namely, that he should be assessed only for the single image supporting the count of conviction.
When MacDonald was before the sentencing court, however, he argued that the surcharge applied
to the ten images forming the bases of both the count of conviction and the read-in counts. It
does not appear that either party—either in postconviction proceedings or on appeal—has
addressed the potential legal consequences of this concession to the sentencing court. Given,
however, that MacDonald no longer contests the imposition of the surcharge on those ten images,
we need not address any potential issue of waiver, invited error, or forfeiture. See State v.
Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 960 N.W.2d 888.

6
No. 2020AP605-CR

protection applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause); see also State v. Boyd, 2000 WI App 208, ¶¶7, 11, 14, 238 Wis. 2d 693,
618 N.W.2d 251.

¶11 The postconviction court held a hearing on the motion. That court,
like the sentencing court, viewed the surcharge inquiry as concerning “how many
images there were” or “the total number of images that have occurred”—that is,
“the total number of images that were possessed by the defendant.” The
postconviction court therefore determined that a surcharge for 100 images was
warranted, given that the sentencing court “had already determined that there were
100 images.” The postconviction court further determined that the amount was
not unconstitutionally excessive, and upheld the $50,000 surcharge in full.

¶12 MacDonald appealed, and the case was submitted on briefs. As
stated, on MacDonald’s motion, we placed the appeal on hold pending our
supreme court’s decision in Schmidt, concerning the application and scope of
WIS. STAT. § 973.042(2). We directed the parties to submit letters addressing the
effect of Schmidt on this appeal, which we discuss below.

DISCUSSION

I. The Child Pornography Surcharge Statute and State v. Schmidt

¶13 Before the release of Schmidt, MacDonald’s position on appeal was
that the child pornography surcharge applies only to images forming the basis of
the count of conviction—here, a single image. Post-Schmidt, MacDonald
concedes that the surcharge was properly imposed for the nine images supporting
the nine dismissed and read-in counts in the information. Thus, the remaining
dispute is whether, consistent with WIS. STAT. § 973.042(2) and Schmidt, the

7
No. 2020AP605-CR

surcharge was properly imposed for the ninety images that were uncharged and
read in at sentencing. Before addressing the parties’ positions in more detail, we
discuss the child pornography surcharge statute and the Schmidt opinion.

¶14 As pertinent here, WIS. STAT. § 973.042(2) provides:

If a court imposes a sentence or places a person on
probation for a crime under s. 948.05 [“Sexual exploitation
of a child”] or 948.12 [“Possession of child pornography”]
and the person was at least 18 years of age when the crime
was committed, the court shall impose a child pornography
surcharge of $500 for each image or each copy of an image
associated with the crime. The court shall determine the
number of images or copies of images associated with the
crime by a preponderance of the evidence and without a
jury.[6]

(Emphasis added.) Prior to Schmidt, there was no binding authority discussing the
scope or application of the surcharge statute. And although Schmidt does not fully
answer the question before us, it provides our analytical framework.

¶15 The defendant in Schmidt pled guilty to six counts of possession of
child pornography, each based on a single image. See Schmidt, 960 N.W.2d 888,
¶¶6, 8. Consistent with the plea agreement, the State moved to dismiss and read in
eight additional charges, each also based on a single image. Id. The circuit court
imposed the child pornography surcharge on all fourteen images, finding, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that these fourteen images were associated with
the defendant’s counts of conviction for possession of child pornography. Id., ¶52
n.10. On appeal, the parties disputed whether images forming the basis of read-in

6
WISCONSIN STAT. § 973.042(1) defines “image” to “include[] a video recording, a
visual representation, a positive or negative image on exposed film, and data representing a visual
image.” MacDonald does not dispute that the images on his electronic devices meet this
definition of “image.”

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No. 2020AP605-CR

charges could ever be “associated with the crime,” as that phrase is used in the
surcharge statute—or, alternatively, whether the surcharge applies only to those
images forming the basis of the counts of conviction. Id., ¶¶48, 52.

¶16 Based on a plain-meaning interpretation of the phrase “associated
with the crime,” the court held that the surcharge does not apply only to those
images that form the basis of any count of conviction. Id., ¶¶48, 54. This
conclusion was based in part on dictionary definitions of “to associate” (“to
connect or bring into relation”) and “the crime” (simply, “the offenses of
conviction”). Id., ¶53 (internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted).
Thus, the court reasoned, the child pornography surcharge must be imposed on
“images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of …
possession of child pornography, so long as those images of child pornography are
connected to and brought into relation with the convicted individual’s offense of
… possession of child pornography.” Id., ¶¶54, 61.7

7
In places, Schmidt implies that the sole fact that an image was the basis of a charged
and read-in count establishes, as a matter of law, that the image is “associated with the crime.”
For example, Schmidt states, “[I]t is clear that a circuit court must impose the child pornography
surcharge for images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of sexual
exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography.” Schmidt, 960 N.W.2d 888, ¶54
(emphasis added); see also id., ¶48. Elsewhere, however, Schmidt concludes that additional fact-
finding is necessary pursuant to the surcharge statute, stating,

[T]he child pornography surcharge applies to images of child
pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of sexual
exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography, so
long as those images of child pornography are connected to and
brought into relation with the convicted individual’s offense of
sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child
pornography.”

See id., ¶4 (emphasis added); see also id., ¶61. We note that the “so long as” qualifier appears in
both of the “conclusion” paragraphs summarizing what we construe to be Schmidt’s holding. See
id., ¶¶4, 61. This indicates that the court did not intend to conclude that the surcharge must apply
(continued)

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No. 2020AP605-CR

¶17 The Schmidt court also discussed factors that might aid in the
sentencing court’s determination that a given image is “connected to and brought
into relation with” the count of conviction. Id., ¶¶54-55. The court deemed
relevant the very fact that the image formed the basis of a count that was
dismissed and read in, in that the image could “be considered for restitution or as a
factor at sentencing.” See id., ¶54 (citing State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶44, 369
Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659 (explaining effect of read-in charges)). Also
pertinent was whether the image was “collected at the same time and found on the
same devices as the images that formed the basis of [the defendant’s] conviction
of possession of child pornography.” Schmidt, 960 N.W.2d 888, ¶55.

¶18 As noted, the Schmidt court confined its analysis to the facts of that
case, observing,

[Because] the circuit court determined that only the 14
images that formed the basis of the charges were associated
with [the crime,] we do not need to address, and we do not
address in this case, whether the circuit court must impose
the child pornography surcharge for images of child
pornography that were not charged.

See id., ¶49 (emphasis added). We now turn to the parties’ positions regarding
this language and Schmidt’s broader effect on this appeal.

II. Application to MacDonald’s Appeal

¶19 As noted, the parties agree that, in light of Schmidt, the circuit court
correctly imposed a surcharge for the one image forming the basis of the count of

to every image forming the basis of read-in charges. We therefore construe Schmidt to treat as
pertinent, but not dispositive, the fact that a given image formed the basis of a dismissed and
read-in charge.

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No. 2020AP605-CR

conviction and the nine images that were charged but dismissed and read in.
Because there is no dispute regarding these ten images, we do not disturb that
$5,000 portion of the surcharge ($500 for each of the ten images). See State v.
Tillman, 2005 WI App 71, ¶18, 281 Wis. 2d 157, 696 N.W.2d 574 (our role is
generally limited to addressing the issues briefed by the parties). The remaining
issue is whether, under Schmidt, the surcharge must be imposed for the ninety
images that were read in but not charged.

¶20 MacDonald argues that Schmidt does not control, pointing to the
explicit statement in Schmidt that the court “d[id] not address in this case” the
application of the surcharge to images that were not charged. See Schmidt, 960
N.W.2d 888, ¶49. We construe MacDonald to further argue that the surcharge
may not be imposed on uncharged read-in images as a matter of law. We
acknowledge that Schmidt does not explicitly discuss uncharged images but, for
the reasons we now explain, we conclude that Schmidt supports the application of
the surcharge to uncharged read-in images, provided that the circuit court finds
that those images are “associated with the crime” for which the defendant was
convicted.

¶21 Read-in charges are not discussed in the surcharge statute itself. In
fact, the only statutory definition of read-in appears in the criminal restitution
statute, WIS. STAT. § 973.20, and was inserted “after the read-in procedure
developed in the Wisconsin courts.” State v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶81, 310
Wis. 2d 259, 750 N.W.2d 835. Section 973.20(1g)(b) defines “[r]ead-in crime” to
mean either charged or uncharged conduct:

“Read-in crime” means any crime that is uncharged or that
is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that the defendant
agrees to be considered by the court at the time of
sentencing and that the court considers at the time of

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No. 2020AP605-CR

sentencing the defendant for the crime for which the
defendant was convicted.

(Emphasis added.) And although § 973.20(1g)(b) defines “read-in crime,” as the
Straszkowski court notes, the phrases “read-in crime,” “read-in offense,” and
“read-in charge” are interchangeable, with the case law making no distinctions
among them. See Straszkowski, 310 Wis. 2d 259, ¶58 n.33.

¶22 Thus, “read-in charge” means both uncharged conduct, offenses, or
crimes as well as charged (and later dismissed) conduct, offenses, or crimes. A
read-in charge is, simply, an offense that the parties agree to “read in”—as
Straszkowski notes, to the following effects: (1) “a circuit court may consider the
read-in charge when imposing sentence but the maximum penalty of the charged
offense will not be increased”; (2) “a circuit court may require a defendant to pay
restitution on the read-in charges”; and (3) “a read-in has a preclusive effect in that
the State is prohibited from future prosecution of the read-in charge.” See id., ¶93;
see also Sulla, 369 Wis. 2d 225, ¶44 (citing plea questionnaire/waiver of rights
form setting forth these effects of a read-in charge). Schmidt adds to this list the
following rule: the sentencing court must impose the child pornography surcharge
on images associated with the crime and forming the basis of dismissed and read-
in charges of possession of child pornography. See Schmidt, 960 N.W.2d 888,
¶54.

¶23 Neither the case law concerning read-ins nor the statute defining
read-ins limits the definition of read-in to conduct that was charged and dismissed.
Moreover, a central rationale underlying Schmidt’s conclusion that the surcharge
applies to charged read-in images was that these images “can be considered for
restitution or as a factor at sentencing.” See id., ¶54. Consistent with WIS. STAT.
§ 973.20(1g)(b), read-ins may be considered for restitution and sentencing

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No. 2020AP605-CR

purposes regardless of whether they are uncharged or charged and dismissed.
Thus, we discern no basis in the statutes or case law for a sentencing court to treat
uncharged and read-in images differently from charged and read-in images for
purposes of applying the surcharge. Following the Schmidt court’s rationale, we
conclude that the surcharge applies to images forming the basis of both charged
and uncharged read-ins, “so long as” the sentencing court finds that those images
are actually associated with “the convicted individual’s offense of ... possession of
child pornography.” Id., ¶4.

¶24 Although we reject MacDonald’s position that the surcharge cannot
apply to uncharged read-in images, we agree with both parties that the surcharge
does not apply in a self-executing fashion. Rather, the sentencing court must find,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that a given image is associated with the
count of conviction. WIS. STAT. § 973.042(2); Schmidt, 960 N.W.2d 888, ¶61.
For example, as stated above, it is relevant when and from which device the read-
in image was collected, in relation to the image or images forming the basis for the
count of conviction. Schmidt, 960 N.W.2d 888, ¶55.

¶25 Here, it does not appear that the sentencing court engaged in any
fact-finding to determine the association, if any, between the ninety uncharged
images and the image forming the basis of the count of conviction. At sentencing,
the prosecutor implied—and the circuit court appeared to agree—that the factual
inquiry was complete once the court determined how many total images law
enforcement obtained from MacDonald, which the court concluded was 100. As
Schmidt instructs, however, the inquiry must center on whether those images were
actually associated with the count of conviction. The State now acknowledges
that we lack a sufficient record to uphold the surcharge and that we must remand
for a circuit court determination, consistent with Schmidt, as to which, if any, of

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No. 2020AP605-CR

the ninety uncharged and read-in images are associated with MacDonald’s
conviction for possession of child pornography.8 Given the analysis of Schmidt,
we agree that this is the proper course.

¶26 In concluding that remand is appropriate, we have considered
MacDonald’s position that the State should not get “a second opportunity to
introduce evidence related to uncharged read-ins.” But MacDonald’s sentencing
and the postconviction hearings were conducted prior to Schmidt’s interpretation
and discussion of the surcharge statute. With the benefit of Schmidt, the parties
and the circuit court may now rely on that case’s discussion of the relevant
considerations for determining whether the ninety images at issue are “associated
with the crime” for which MacDonald was convicted.9

CONCLUSION

¶27 For the reasons stated, we reverse the order of the postconviction
court and remand for the circuit court to determine, consistent with WIS. STAT.
§ 973.042(2) and Schmidt, which, if any, of the ninety remaining uncharged and
read-in images are associated with MacDonald’s offense of possession of child
pornography.10

8
For example, the State notes that eighty-five images were recovered from one phone
and fifteen images from another but that it was not made clear at sentencing which images were
recovered from which phone. The State further notes that it was unclear when MacDonald
downloaded, and law enforcement recovered, each of the images.
9
Given that we are remanding for a potential redetermination of the surcharge, we do not
decide MacDonald’s Eighth Amendment excessive fines claim.
10
We emphasize that the inquiry on remand concerns only the ninety images that the
State has already argued are associated with the offense of conviction. The State represents that it
does not seek a total surcharge above $50,000 but, to be clear, given the State’s position
(continued)

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No. 2020AP605-CR

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded with directions.

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.

throughout this litigation, the State may not argue on remand that the surcharge applies to any
images other than the ninety at issue.

15