State v. Joel R. Davis

2021 WI App 65

COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
PUBLISHED OPINION

Case No.: 2020AP731-CR

Complete Title of Case:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

JOEL R. DAVIS,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Opinion Filed: August 19, 2021
Submitted on Briefs: February 18, 2021

JUDGES: Blanchard, P.J., Fitzpatrick, and Graham, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:

Appellant
ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was submitted on the
briefs of John A. Blimling, assistant attorney general, and Joshua L.
Kaul, attorney general.

Respondent
ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the
brief of Roberta A. Heckes, Thorp.
2021 WI App 65

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 19, 2021
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2020AP731-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF112

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

JOEL R. DAVIS,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Vernon County:
DARCY JO ROOD, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Blanchard, P.J., Fitzpatrick, and Graham, JJ.

¶1 GRAHAM, J. The State appeals an order suppressing evidence
found during a traffic stop of Joel R. Davis. The circuit court suppressed the
evidence because it determined that law enforcement impermissibly prolonged the
stop by asking dispatch to inquire into the conditions of Davis’s release on bond in
No. 2020AP731-CR

a pending criminal case. It is undisputed that the officer who stopped Davis sat in
his squad car and conducted no recognized tasks incidental to the mission of the
stop while he waited for a response to his inquiry about Davis’s bond conditions.
The State primarily directs us to Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015),
to support its argument that, when police check the conditions of a motorist’s release
on bond, this is an “ordinary inquiry” that is incidental to the mission of a lawful
stop, rather than an “unrelated investigation” that constitutes an impermissible
detour from the mission of the stop.

¶2 We conclude that checking for bond conditions is not an “ordinary
inquiry” as that term is used in Rodriguez. Therefore, based on the circuit court’s
undisputed findings of fact, we conclude that law enforcement unconstitutionally
prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to address the stop’s mission.
Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶3 On July 29, 2019, Officer Tilmer Thompson of the Viroqua Police
Department conducted the traffic stop that resulted in Davis’s arrest. Because the
issue on appeal is whether Thompson unconstitutionally prolonged that stop, we
relate the chronology of events in detail. The following summary is derived
primarily from the circuit court’s findings of fact, as supplemented by our
observations from the video footage that was admitted into evidence during the
suppression hearing. The State does not dispute these facts except as noted below.

2
No. 2020AP731-CR

¶4 Thompson stopped Davis’s vehicle at approximately 7:40 p.m.1 He
told Davis that he had initiated the stop because Davis’s vehicle did not have a
passenger-side mirror. Likewise, in his initial report of this incident, Thompson
wrote that he stopped Davis because Davis was operating a vehicle without a
passenger-side mirror contrary to WIS. STAT. § 347.40(1) (2019-20).2 The
following day, Thompson updated his report to indicate that he also stopped Davis
because he observed that Davis was not wearing a seat belt.

¶5 At 7:43:44, Thompson learned from dispatch that Davis’s driver’s
license was suspended. Thompson returned to Davis’s car and advised him that he
should call someone for a ride on account of his suspended license.

¶6 Thompson returned to his squad car at 7:48:40. According to
Thompson, he intended to write a citation for the missing mirror and to “run [Davis]
to see if he’s on bond.”

¶7 At some point, Thompson learned from dispatch that Davis had a
pending criminal case in La Crosse County in which he had been charged with
possession of methamphetamine and carrying a concealed weapon. At 7:50:06,
Thompson radioed dispatch and asked another officer to look into whether Davis
was out on bond, and whether there were any conditions to that bond. Thompson

1
During the suppression hearing, the parties introduced video from Thompson’s body
camera and from the camera on his squad car. The digital clocks on those two cameras were not
synchronized. The circuit court used the time stamps from the body camera in its decision granting
the motion to suppress, and, with one exception noted below, we use the time stamps set forth in
the circuit court’s order.
2
The State has conceded that a passenger-side mirror is not required by WIS. STAT.
§ 347.40(1), and the circuit court later determined that Thompson was wrong about the
requirements of that statute.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.

3
No. 2020AP731-CR

later testified that he wanted information concerning Davis’s bond conditions to
determine whether they required him to submit to random urinalysis testing by law
enforcement.

¶8 It is undisputed that, as of 7:50:06, Thompson did not have reasonable
suspicion of anything other than driving with a suspended license, and perhaps a
seat belt violation. It is also undisputed that, from that point forward, Thompson
took no action in furtherance of writing a citation for any traffic offense. Instead,
the circuit court found that, as reflected by the body camera footage, Thompson sat
in his squad car doing nothing as he waited for dispatch to call someone in La Crosse
County to inquire about Davis’s bond conditions.

¶9 Shortly after Thompson radioed dispatch about the bond conditions,
Officer Robert Raasch arrived on the scene. At 7:50:45, Raasch told Thompson that
Davis is a “big-time dealer” who “carr[ies] his meth in his sock area.” Raasch
approached Davis’s vehicle and attempted to engage Davis in conversation. He
remained at or near Davis’s vehicle for the duration of the stop.

¶10 At approximately 8:02 p.m., Thompson learned from dispatch that
Davis’s bond conditions were not related to driving and did not permit random drug
testing by law enforcement.

¶11 Raasch later testified that, at some point while he stood by Davis’s
vehicle, he observed “bulges” in Davis’s socks and his right pants pocket. Nothing
in the record reflects when, precisely, Raasch made this observation. According to
the State, Raasch developed reasonable suspicion that Davis had drugs in his
possession based on this observation. For purposes of this appeal, we assume
without deciding that the State’s assertion about reasonable suspicion is correct.

4
No. 2020AP731-CR

¶12 A third officer arrived on the scene with a police dog at approximately
8:10 p.m.3 It is not clear from the record which of the officers requested the presence
of the canine unit, nor is it clear when that request was made. After the dog alerted
to the presence of drugs, the officers ordered Davis out of the vehicle and searched
him, finding a large amount of cash and a bag containing methamphetamine.

¶13 Davis was charged with possession with intent to deliver
methamphetamine and felony bail jumping. He filed a motion to suppress all
evidence obtained from the traffic stop. He argued, first, that the traffic stop was
unconstitutional from the outset because it was not supported by reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, and second, that even if the initial stop was
constitutional, Thompson unconstitutionally prolonged the stop to wait for a canine
unit to conduct a dog sniff.

¶14 After briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted
Davis’s motion. The State appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶15 The review of an order granting or denying a suppression motion
presents an issue of constitutional fact. State v. Johnson, 2013 WI App 140, ¶6,
352 Wis. 2d 98, 841 N.W.2d 302. We uphold the circuit court’s findings of fact

3
Although the circuit court opinion states that the canine unit arrived at 8:18 p.m., this is
not accurate. Based on the footage from Thompson’s squad car, the police dog first approached
Davis’s vehicle at approximately 8:10 p.m. It appears that the circuit court’s mistake was due to
mistranslation of the asynchronous time stamps—the event was captured on the squad car camera
at approximately 19:18, which corresponded to approximately 8:10 p.m. on Thompson’s body
camera.

5
No. 2020AP731-CR

unless they are clearly erroneous, and we independently review the application of
constitutional principles to those facts. Id.

¶16 “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
unreasonable seizures.”4 State v. Wright, 2019 WI 45, ¶23, 386 Wis. 2d 495, 926
N.W.2d 157. This prohibition applies to traffic stops, which are considered seizures
for constitutional purposes. Id. “The reasonableness of a traffic stop involves a
two-part inquiry: first, whether the initial seizure was justified and, second, whether
subsequent police conduct ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
that justified’ the initial interference.” State v. Smith, 2018 WI 2, ¶10, 379 Wis. 2d
86, 905 N.W.2d 353 (quoted source omitted). If the initial traffic stop was
unconstitutional, or if the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged beyond the time it
should have taken to complete it by “unrelated investigations,” a defendant may be
entitled to suppression of evidence obtained during that stop. See Rodriquez, 575
U.S. at 354-55.

¶17 Here, the circuit court did not make any explicit determination about
the constitutionality of the initial traffic stop.5 Instead, the court’s order suppressing
4
The Wisconsin Constitution contains similar protections. State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78,
¶19, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560.
5
Despite not making any explicit determination, the circuit court made a number of
statements expressing skepticism about the credibility of Officer Thompson’s testimony. Among
other things, the court appeared to question Thompson’s testimony that Davis was not wearing a
seat belt. The court commented that Thompson told Davis and both officers on the scene that he
stopped Davis for a mirror violation, that Thompson never mentioned any seat belt violation, and
that the video from Thompson’s body camera showed that Davis’s seat belt was securely fastened
when Thompson first approached Davis’s car. Additionally, the court did not appear to credit
Thompson’s testimony that Davis was “shaking” and “sweating heavily in a manner that’s not
normal behavior.” According to the court, “Davis’s behavior as seen in the body cam did not
support Thompson’s observations.” Finally, the court’s apparent skepticism about Thompson’s
testimony appeared to be based in part on his demeanor when testifying.

6
No. 2020AP731-CR

the evidence was based on an alternative argument advanced by Davis that does not
depend on the constitutionality of the initial stop. Davis’s alternative argument is
that Officer Thompson unconstitutionally prolonged the stop during the period of
time in which he was waiting for dispatch to report back on whether Davis was
subject to bond conditions. The court agreed with Davis’s alternative argument and
determined that Thompson unconstitutionality prolonged the stop by conducting a
bond condition check. As the appellant, the State tells us that the sole question on
appeal is a narrow one: whether checking for bond conditions is an “‘ordinary
inquiry’ related to the mission of a traffic stop.”6

¶18 We pause to comment on the circuit court’s atypical approach to
resolving Davis’s suppression motion. Typically, when addressing a defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence obtained in a traffic stop, a circuit court will determine
whether there was reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. In this case, there do not
appear to have been any facts missing from the record before the circuit court that
would have prevented it from determining whether the initial stop was
constitutional. We considered whether we should remand the case for the circuit
court to make definitive findings on this topic. However, neither party asks that we
remand to the circuit court without resolving the question of law about ordinary
inquiries that was raised by the State. If we were to remand, and if the circuit court
were to conclude on remand that the stop was constitutional and did not provide a
basis for suppressing the evidence, that determination would not resolve the
question currently presented in this appeal about whether the evidence should be

6
The State concedes that, if we were to conclude that Thompson’s actions in checking for
bond conditions did not unconstitutionally prolong the stop, we would have to “remand to the
circuit court for a determination on the legality of the stop” and a determination as to “whether
police had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop once they learned Davis was not subject to any
relevant bond conditions.”

7
No. 2020AP731-CR

suppressed because Thompson unconstitutionally prolonged the stop. Therefore, a
remand for a determination about the constitutionality of the initial stop would likely
result in an additional expenditure of judicial and party resources. Accordingly,
under these circumstances, we assume without deciding that Officer Thompson had
reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop, and we proceed to review the court’s
conclusion that checking for bond conditions is not an ordinary inquiry that can be
used to constitutionally prolong a stop.

¶19 In the analysis that follows, we begin with a discussion of case law
pertaining to ordinary inquiries. We then evaluate the State’s argument that
checking for bond conditions is an ordinary inquiry, and we conclude that it is not.
Finally, we conclude that the State has forfeited any alternative arguments during
the circuit court proceedings or on appeal.

I

¶20 In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court explained that a
routine traffic stop “‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’” of issuing a ticket for the violation.
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354-55 (quoted source omitted). “Authority for the seizure
... ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have
been—completed.” Id. at 354; see also State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶15, 377 Wis.
2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560 (“A motorist is lawfully seized during the proper duration
of a traffic stop, but unlawfully seized if it lasts longer than necessary to complete
the purpose of the stop.”).

¶21 The Rodriguez Court further explained that, “[b]eyond determining
whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries
incident to [the traffic] stop.’” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (quoted source omitted).

8
No. 2020AP731-CR

As the Court explained, such inquiries “[t]ypically … involve checking the driver’s
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and
inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. These checks
“serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles
on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Id.7

¶22 In Smith, our supreme court was presented with a situation in which
an officer continued to detain a motorist in order to check his driver’s license, an
ordinary inquiry, even though there was no longer any other justification for the
traffic stop. Smith, 379 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶11, 21. It was undisputed in Smith that the
initial vehicle stop was constitutional, but the reasonable suspicion that justified it
dissipated as soon as the officer approached the vehicle. Id., ¶14. The officer
nevertheless continued the seizure to ask Smith for his driver’s license, and during
the exchange that followed, the officer developed probable cause to arrest Smith for
intoxicated driving. Id., ¶¶4-6. Smith argued that the officer unconstitutionally
prolonged the seizure to ask for his license, but the court disagreed. Id., ¶11. It
concluded that the officer was allowed to complete the mission of checking Smith’s
license—even though the officer no longer had reasonable suspicion to seize him—
because checking a driver’s license is an ordinary inquiry that is “part of the original
mission” of a lawful stop. Id., ¶2; see also id., ¶¶10, 11, 21.

¶23 The Smith court explained that “[t]he justification for the ordinary
inquiries is two-fold: (1) these checks serve to enforce the traffic code by ‘ensuring

7
In addition, Rodriguez states that the “officer’s safety interest stems from the mission of
the stop itself.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356 (2015) (citing United States v. Holt,
264 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (recognizing an officer safety justification for
criminal record and warrant checks), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by United States
v. Stewart, 473 F.2d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 2007).

9
No. 2020AP731-CR

that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly’; and (2) for officer
safety.” Id., ¶19 (quoted source omitted).

¶24 The Smith court distinguished between “ordinary inquiries,” which
are “part of” the mission of a traffic stop, and “unrelated inquiries,” which are not.
Id., ¶10 n.9. Officers may engage in unrelated inquiries during the course of a traffic
stop—but, unless reasonable suspicion develops to support such inquiries, they
cannot prolong the duration of the stop beyond the time that it reasonably should
take to complete the mission. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354; see also id. at 356 (“On-
scene investigation into other crimes” are “unrelated inquiries” which
impermissibly “detour” from the mission of the stop.). On the contrary, “[a]n
expansion in the scope of the [initial] inquiry, when accompanied by an extension
of time longer than would have been needed for the original stop, must be supported
by reasonable suspicion.” See State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, ¶35, 364 Wis. 2d 167,
183, 868 N.W.2d 124.

II

¶25 With this legal framework in mind, we now turn to the sole question
presented in the State’s appellate briefing—whether a check for bond conditions is
an ordinary inquiry, as that term is used in Rodriguez. In this case, the State
acknowledges that there was a gap of unknown duration in the timeline between
when Officer Thompson asked dispatch about Davis’s bond conditions and when
Officer Raasch purportedly observed bulges in Davis’s socks. The State does not
dispute that, during this time, Thompson was doing nothing but waiting to hear back
from dispatch about Davis’s bond conditions. And the State is unable to point to
any evidence in the record that specifies when Raasch purportedly obtained

10
No. 2020AP731-CR

reasonable suspicion that Davis was carrying drugs in his socks.8 To bridge this gap
in the timeline, the State asks us to conclude that a check for bond conditions is an
ordinary inquiry included in a traffic stop’s mission.

¶26 For the reasons we now explain, we reject the State’s arguments that
bond condition checks are ordinary inquiries.

¶27 First, as stated above, the “typical” ordinary inquiries—those
recognized in Rodriguez—are checking driver’s licenses, requesting proof of
vehicle insurance and registration, and checking for any outstanding warrants. Our
supreme court has balked at the suggestion that this list should be expanded to
include all tasks that could, in some indirect sense, be said to promote officer safety
or to ensure that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. In Smith,
the court explained that “[n]o court has expanded the ordinary inquiries incident to
a traffic stop to include headlight, horn, or exhaust performance because the Fourth
Amendment commands reasonableness.” Smith, 379 Wis. 2d 86, ¶32 n.18.
Likewise, in Wright, our supreme court determined that a records check to

8
On appeal, the State asserts that Raasch observed the bulges “shortly after” Thompson
radioed dispatch, “while the check for [Davis’s] bond conditions was still pending.” However, the
State points to nothing in the record that supports its assertions related to the timing of Raasch’s
observation.

Raasch’s observation of bulges is not mentioned in the police reports that were admitted
during the hearing, nor is it discussed in the criminal complaint. During the hearing, Raasch did
not testify as to when, specifically, he observed the bulges, and neither party offered footage from
his body camera as an exhibit. The footage from Thompson’s squad and body cameras contains
no clues—the footage from the squad camera shows Raasch standing close to the passenger door
of Davis’s vehicle more or less consistently from approximately 7:51 p.m. until a police dog started
to circle the vehicle. The circuit court did not make any findings about whether it credited Raasch’s
testimony, but even if it did, nothing in the record links Raasch’s observation to any point of the
chronology that is more specific than the approximately twenty-minute window between 7:51 p.m.,
when Raasch approached Davis’s vehicle, and 8:11 p.m., when Thompson ordered Davis out of his
car and conducted a pat-down search.

11
No. 2020AP731-CR

determine whether a motorist had a concealed carry permit was not an ordinary
inquiry incident to a traffic stop. Wright, 386 Wis. 2d 495, ¶36.

¶28 Second, the State does not point to any decision by any court that has
recognized bond condition checks as ordinary inquiries, and our independent
research has not revealed any such case. If we were to accept the State’s invitation
to expand the typical ordinary inquiries to include bond condition checks, we would
be the first court to do so. Yet, as discussed below, the State advances no persuasive
argument in favor of breaking new ground.

¶29 Third, despite asking us to expand the previously recognized ordinary
inquiries to include bond condition checks, the State provides little information
about what such checks would entail. The State does not direct us to any database
that is readily available to Wisconsin officers on patrol and that contains information
concerning a person’s bond conditions. Here, in response to Officer Thompson’s
inquiry, it appears that dispatch was required to call someone in La Crosse County—
presumably someone with access to court records—to determine whether Davis was
subject to any such conditions. In this case, it took dispatch twelve minutes—an
amount of time that is not negligible—to obtain an answer, and information about
bond conditions may not always be even that readily available during future traffic
stops.

¶30 Fourth, we reject the State’s argument that bond condition checks
should be considered ordinary inquiries because they promote officer and roadway
safety. Based on the pertinent case law, an officer may take “negligibly burdensome
actions relating to officer safety” during a traffic stop as part of the mission of the
stop. State v. Brown, 2020 WI 63, ¶¶1, 33, 392 Wis. 2d 454, 945 N.W.2d 584.
However, in Rodriguez, the Court determined that a dog sniff to detect the presence

12
No. 2020AP731-CR

of drugs was not part of the stop’s mission and could not be justified as relating to
safety concerns stemming from the mission of the stop. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355-
57. As the Court explained, “[h]ighway and officer safety are interests different in
kind from the Government’s endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking
in particular.” Id. at 357. A dog sniff “lack[ed] the same close connection to
roadway safety” as the recognized ordinary inquiries. Id. at 356.

¶31 As noted, the amount of time it takes to complete bond condition
checks may not be negligible. And the State makes no cogent argument as to how
such checks directly promote officer and roadway safety. Here, Officer Thompson
testified that he wanted to know whether the bond conditions provided authority to
administer a drug test to Davis—presumably to determine whether he could use the
results of a drug test to establish probable cause for an arrest for offenses including
bail jumping.9 To be sure, an officer’s subjective motivations are not dispositive,
and “we review law enforcement actions with an objective lens.” Brown, 392 Wis.
2d 454, ¶25. Even so, the State does not articulate any objectively reasonable basis
for concluding that an inquiry into bond conditions is needed to further any safety
interests that stem from a routine traffic stop for an equipment or seat belt violation.
Accordingly, we conclude that checks for bond conditions lack the “same close
connection” to officer and roadway safety as the recognized ordinary inquiries. See
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356.

¶32 Finally, we reject the State’s argument that bond condition checks
should be recognized as ordinary inquiries because they are analogous to a check
for outstanding warrants, which is recognized by case law as an ordinary inquiry.

9
See WIS. STAT. § 946.49 (providing that “[w]hoever, having been released from custody
under ch. 969, intentionally fails to comply with the terms of his or her bond is guilty of bail
jumping”).

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No. 2020AP731-CR

See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. According to the State, “checking a person’s bond
conditions can reveal—much like a warrant check—that the person should not be
driving, that he should be in custody, or that he might carry dangerous weapons.”
That may be so, but there are also significant differences between warrant checks
and bond condition checks. For reasons we now explain, we conclude that any
superficial similarity with warrant checks does not justify expanding the recognized
ordinary inquiries to include bond condition checks.

¶33 A check for outstanding warrants is equally applicable to all motorists.
When an officer runs a warrant check, the sole question is whether an existing order
authorizes the motorist’s arrest. The answer is either “yes” or “no,” and no
additional investigation is required. If there is an existing warrant, the officer can
immediately take the motorist into custody.

¶34 In contrast, unlike a warrant, the mere existence of bond conditions
does not necessarily provide preexisting authority to take the motorist into custody.
As the State acknowledges, circuit courts and court commissioners in Wisconsin
have broad discretion to impose various bond conditions, including, among others,
restrictions on the defendant’s travel, association, or place of abode; prohibitions
against possessing weapons; absolute sobriety; requiring the defendant to return to
custody at certain hours; and mandatory participation in mental health treatment.
Once an officer determines the conditions of a bond, the officer can take the motorist
into custody only if the officer compares those conditions to the observable facts
and determines that there is probable cause to believe that the motorist is currently
violating a bond condition and can be arrested for bail jumping.

¶35 For these reasons, bond condition checks are objectively understood
as the first step of an impermissible inquiry, unsupported by reasonable suspicion

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No. 2020AP731-CR

or probable cause, into whether the motorist is committing an additional crime of
bail jumping at the time of the stop. This runs afoul of the prohibition against
prolonging a stop to conduct unrelated investigations that detour from the stop’s
mission. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355-56 (providing that “ordinary inquiries” do
not include inquiries that focus on finding evidence of other criminal acts); Brown,
392 Wis. 2d 454, ¶29 (“unrelated investigative inquiries” may not “‘measurably
extend the duration of the stop’” (quoted source omitted)).

¶36 In sum, we conclude that checking for bond conditions is not an
ordinary inquiry incidental to the mission of a traffic stop. Officers may check bond
conditions while simultaneously performing other mission-related tasks, see
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, but they may not prolong a stop to inquire into a
motorist’s bond conditions without reasonable suspicion that the motorist is
violating a bond condition, see Hogan, 364 Wis. 2d 167, ¶35.

III

¶37 As stated above, the State explicitly requests that we take up a single
issue on appeal—whether the bond condition check was an ordinary inquiry. The
State does not make any alternative arguments. A party forfeits a potential argument
by not developing it in the circuit court and by not presenting it on appeal. See
Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶45 & n.21, 327 Wis. 2d 572,
786 N.W.2d 177. Here, we conclude that the State forfeited any argument—apart
from the argument about ordinary inquiries that we have rejected above—that law
enforcement did not unreasonably delay the stop beyond the time at which it should
have been completed consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

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No. 2020AP731-CR

CONCLUSION

¶38 Having determined that Thompson’s check for bond conditions was
not an ordinary inquiry, we affirm the order suppressing evidence obtained in the
traffic stop.10

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

10
Davis makes several additional arguments in support of affirming the circuit court. In
addition to his argument that the initial stop was unconstitutional, Davis also argues that the
evidence shows that the canine officer signaled his dog to give a positive “alert” to the presence of
drugs, and that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to search Davis’s person for drugs.
Because we uphold the circuit court’s order on the ground that a bond condition check is not an
ordinary inquiry, we need not address these arguments. “An appellate court need not address every
issue raised by the parties when one issue is dispositive.” Barrows v. American Fam. Ins. Co.,
2014 WI App 11, ¶9, 352 Wis. 2d 436, 842 N.W.2d 508.

16