Platinum Property Management v. Eric Estes

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS
110 EAST MAIN STREET, SUITE 215
P.O. BOX 1688
MADISON, WISCONSIN 53701-1688
Telephone (608) 266-1880
TTY: (800) 947-3529
Facsimile (608) 267-0640
Web Site: www.wicourts.gov
DISTRICT III
October 20, 2026
To:
Hon. John B. Rhode
Circuit Court Judge
Electronic Notice
Tina Wild
Clerk of Circuit Court
Langlade County Courthouse
Electronic Notice
Eric Estes
Electronic Notice
Platinum Property Management
Suite 100
1424 Schofield Ave.
Schofield, WI 54476
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
2024AP818 Platinum Property Management v. Eric Estes
(L. C. No. 2023SC205)
Before Stark, P.J.1
Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or
authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
Eric Estes, pro se, appeals from a judgment, in the amount of $379.50, entered against
him in this small claims action. Estes argues that the circuit court erred by finding that he was
liable for certain fees pursuant to the terms of his lease agreement. Based on our review of the
briefs and record, we conclude that this case is appropriate for summary disposition. See WIS.
STAT. RULE 809.21. For the reasons that follow, we reject Estes’ arguments and affirm the
judgment.
1 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

No. 2024AP818
2
Estes leased a residential property in Antigo, Wisconsin, from Platinum Property
Management (PPM) in April 2022, and his lease was automatically renewed in April 2023 for
one year. Estes received housing assistance with his rent and some related expenses through the
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Housing Choice Voucher Program.
On June 26, 2023, PPM filed a small claims summons and complaint, seeking Estes’
eviction and money damages in the amount of $370.20. PPM’s complaint was later dismissed
without prejudice by the circuit court after PPM filed a stipulation for dismissal, which was not
signed by Estes, and then failed to appear at a hearing.
Despite the entry of the dismissal order, PPM subsequently filed an amended small
claims summons and complaint in the same case on October 11, 2023, seeking Estes’ eviction
and money damages of $590.91. PPM filed a second amended complaint on February 27, 2024,
which again demanded Estes’ eviction and damages in the increased amount of $828.47.
After settlement efforts and mediation failed, the circuit court held a bench trial on
April 8, 2024. PPM no longer sought to have Estes evicted. However, PPM continued to seek
money damages in the amount demanded in the second amended complaint for past due landlord
liability insurance (LLI), utilities, and late fees as itemized on a rent ledger that PPM maintained
in an “online portal” and that was accessible to Estes.
Estes, for his part, denied liability in any amount, arguing that the lease provisions and
PPM’s ledger were confusing. Estes claimed that he did not understand until July 2023 that,
pursuant to the terms of his lease agreement, he was responsible for paying a monthly fee for LLI
if he did not have renter’s insurance, and he stated that he obtained renter’s insurance in
August 2023. In addition, Estes denied that he had failed to timely pay any utility bills, and he

No. 2024AP818
3
further argued that he was not responsible for late fees that were incurred as a result of HUD’s
failure to make timely payments or the filing fee and service fees incurred by PPM to commence
this small claims action and to serve him with the pleadings.
In response, PPM’s representative testified that PPM’s rent ledger system calculates the
balance that tenants owe as a running total. Therefore, because Estes failed to pay the monthly
LLI fee from the inception of the lease, any amounts Estes paid for rent and utilities were applied
to the outstanding balance first, rather than the expenses for which Estes actually remitted
payment. As a result, Estes was continuously in default on his payments and incurring late fees.
After hearing the evidence and reviewing the parties’ exhibits, the circuit court granted
judgment against Estes and in favor of PPM in the amount of $379.50. The court agreed with
Estes that the lease and the records provided by PPM were “deplorable” and “confusing.” It
found, however, that the original lease, which Estes acknowledged he had signed, required Estes
to obtain renter’s insurance and stated that if he failed to show proof of coverage, he was
required to pay $9.50 each month for LLI. Since Estes did not have renter’s insurance for
14 months, the court found that he owed $133.00, plus the filing fee of $94.50, $20.00 in other
costs, and service fees in the amount of $132.00. Estes appeals.
On appeal, Estes does not deny that the lease required that he pay a monthly fee for LLI
if he did not maintain renter’s insurance, and he does not question whether the circuit court
correctly determined that he owed $133 for the unpaid LLI fees. Further, he does not question
the court’s order requiring him to pay the filing and service fees.

No. 2024AP818
4
Instead, Estes raises four unrelated claims that we conclude are undeveloped and without
merit.2 Overall, beyond a few statute citations, Estes’ arguments on appeal lack citations to legal
authority and/or developed arguments in support of his positions. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d
627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the court of appeals need not address
undeveloped arguments or arguments unsupported by references to legal authority). While we
acknowledge that Estes is a pro se litigant for whom “some leniency may be allowed,” pro se
litigants “are bound by the same rules that apply to attorneys on appeal,” Waushara County v.
Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 452, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992), and “we will not abandon our neutrality to
develop arguments” for the parties, Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng’g Testing, Inc.,
2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82. Nevertheless, in the interest of
completeness, we will address Estes’ arguments as best we are able to discern them.3
Estes first asserts a due process claim, contending that the circuit court erred by entering
a judgment against him based upon PPM’s “altered and unverified rent ledger.” He further
argues that PPM’s failure to provide the statutorily required five-day notice to cure his default
deprived him “of a fair opportunity to address and contest the charges.” A copy of the initial
2 Estes did not file a counterclaim or make a separate claim for damages in the circuit court, but
he did file a position statement during the trial that contained the same arguments he now raises on
appeal. The circuit court gave Estes the opportunity to argue his case and to question the PPM
representative at trial, but Estes failed to properly question the witness. As a result, Estes’ claims were
not discussed by the parties or the court during the trial. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must
raise the issue “with sufficient prominence such that the [circuit] court understands that it is called upon
to make a ruling.” Schwittay v. Sheboygan Falls Mut. Ins., 2001 WI App 140, ¶16 n.3, 246 Wis. 2d 385,
630 N.W.2d 772.
3 PPM did not file a response brief. On December 5, 2024, we issued an order giving PPM five
additional days to either file a brief or request an extension. We warned PPM that in the absence of a
response, we could summarily reverse the circuit court’s order under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2). PPM
did not submit a brief or request an extension; therefore, on January 14, 2025, we took “this appeal under
submission … for review based upon the record and appellant’s brief.”

No. 2024AP818
5
five-day notice provided to Estes by PPM, which identifies the basis for Estes’ claimed
delinquency and the amount required to cure his default, is included in the record on appeal.
Further, Estes admitted during the bench trial that PPM “ha[d] sent [him] more than five—or
more than a dozen, five-day notices to pay or quit, alleging that [he] owe[d] late fees and past
due rent.” Estes also acknowledged having access to PPM’s online rent ledger at all times prior
to the trial. Therefore, Estes had notice of the amounts that he was obligated to pay, and he had
the opportunity to be heard at the trial on the amount that PPM claimed was due. His due
process rights were not violated.
Estes next contends that PPM engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation by failing to verify
the amount it claimed was due, failing to provide him with a copy of the LLI policy, and
concealing the true cause of the late fees charged. See Batt v. Sweeney, 2002 WI App 119, ¶13,
254 Wis. 2d 721, 647 N.W.2d 868 (“The elements of fraud are a false representation made with
intent to defraud and reliance by the injured party on the misrepresentation.”). As the circuit
court found, Estes acknowledged that he signed the lease and that a term in the lease required
that he pay a fee of $9.50 for each month that he did not maintain renter’s insurance on the
leased premises. The fact that he also claimed he did not understand what that term meant does
not relieve him of this contractual obligation. See Raasch v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI App
54, ¶10, 310 Wis. 2d 230, 750 N.W.2d 492 (“[E]ither not reading a contract or not being aware
of its unambiguous terms does not relieve a party from being bound by a contract he or she has
signed.”). The PPM rent ledger evidenced, and Estes acknowledged, that he did not pay the LLI
fee for 14 months. Further, Estes fails to identify any language in the lease requiring PPM to
provide a copy of the LLI policy to Estes. And, finally, Estes fails to show how PPM’s failure to
verify the total amount it claimed he owed caused him damage.

No. 2024AP818
6
Estes also argues that PPM engaged in abuse of process by filing multiple lawsuits
without valid grounds, intending to harass, intimidate, and coerce him into paying
unsubstantiated fees. To prevail on an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the
defendant had a purpose other than that which the process was designed to accomplish; and
(2) the defendant misused the process to accomplish a purpose other than that it was designed to
accomplish. WIS JI—CIVIL 2620. Estes presented no evidence to attempt to prove either of
these elements. Further, Estes’ abuse of process claim is without merit because the circuit court
found that Estes failed to pay the LLI fee for several months, i.e., the fees were not
unsubstantiated.
Finally, Estes asserts that PPM’s multiple lawsuits were filed to discriminate and retaliate
against him, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 106.50 and 42 U.S.C. § 3604, for requesting
verification of fees and filing complaints with the Public Housing Authority. Again, beyond
making this statement, Estes neither cites evidence in the record in support of these claims nor
explains how the facts in this case (where the circuit court initially dismissed the case based on a
mistaken understanding about a stipulation) would constitute harassment or coercion.4
We conclude that the circuit court did not err by entering judgment against Estes for the
amount he was contractually obligated to pay as well as statutory costs and disbursements
incurred by PPM in bringing this small claims action.
4 To the extent that Estes mentions additional issues in his brief or raises arguments that we have
not addressed, those issues are deemed insufficiently developed to warrant individual discussion.
See State v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 555, 564, 261 N.W.2d 147 (1978) (“An appellate
court is not a performing bear, required to dance to each and every tune played on an appeal.”).

No. 2024AP818
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Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that the judgment is summarily affirmed. WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.
Samuel A. Christensen
Clerk of Court of Appeals