County of Columbia v. Alex C. Wilson

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS
110 EAST MAIN STREET, SUITE 215
P.O. BOX 1688
MADISON, WISCONSIN 53701-1688
Telephone (608) 266-1880
TTY: (800) 947-3529
Facsimile (608) 267-0640
Web Site: www.wicourts.gov
DISTRICT IV
November 5, 2026
To:
Hon. W. Andrew Voigt
Circuit Court Judge
Electronic Notice
Julie Kayartz
Clerk of Circuit Court
Columbia County Courthouse
Electronic Notice
Adam P. Nero
Electronic Notice
John M. Ruzzin
Electronic Notice
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
2025AP2115 County of Columbia v. Alex C. Wilson (L.C. # 2025TR2987)
Before Nashold, J.1
Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or
authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
The circuit court issued an order that adopted the terms of a plea agreement pursuant to
which Alex Wilson pleaded no contest to the charge of operating a motor vehicle with a
prohibited alcohol concentration. The order also, however, included a requirement that was not
part of the parties’ plea agreement: that an ignition interlock device (IID) be installed on any
vehicle that Wilson operates, which the court stated, without explanation, was “mandatory under
the circumstances.” Wilson argues that the court did not have the authority to impose the IID.
1 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(c) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

No. 2025AP2115
2
Having reviewed the briefs and record, I conclude that this case is appropriate for summary
disposition. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21. Because the court did not demonstrably exercise its
discretion in imposing the IID, I reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Wilson was cited for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration as
a first offense, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(b). In separate cases arising from the same
course of conduct, he was also cited for the following offenses: operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of an intoxicant as a first offense, in violation of § 346.63(1)(a); following
too closely, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.14(1m); and deviation from designated lane, in
violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.13(3). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wilson and the County
agreed that Wilson would plead no contest to the charge of operating with a prohibited alcohol
concentration, and that the other charges would be dismissed. The parties jointly recommended
that: Wilson’s operating privileges be revoked for seven months, Wilson pay a $1,146.30
forfeiture, Wilson undergo an alcohol-and-other-drug assessment, and six demerit points be
assessed against Wilson’s driving record. The parties’ agreement was submitted to the court as a
stipulation.
The circuit court accepted Wilson’s plea and the parties’ joint recommendations but
additionally required that for a period of one year, any vehicle that Wilson operate have an IID
installed. Specifically, the court stated the following in its written order:
The attached stipulation is hereby adopted as [the] Order of
the Court, with one addition. It is the opinion of this Court that an
ignition interlock device is mandatory under the circumstances
presented. As a result, in addition to the consequences included in
the stipulation, the Court will impose a 12-month IID requirement.

No. 2025AP2115
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The court thus imposed the IID because it believed that doing so was mandatory, but it did not
state why it believed that imposing the IID was mandatory.
On appeal, Wilson argues that the circuit court did not have the authority to impose the
IID, and that this court must reverse the part of the circuit court’s order imposing the IID, but
otherwise affirm the court’s adoption of the parties’ stipulation.2 The County, for its part, argues
that the court “could not validly approve the stipulation” because the court had a reasonable basis
to believe that Wilson’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was .15 or more based on how the
charge was described in documents submitted to the court—“Operating w/ PAC >= 0.15(1st).”
The County further observes that, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 343.301(1g)(a)2.a., a court “shall”
install an IID if a defendant violates WIS. STAT. § 346.63 and has a BAC of .15 or more. The
County agrees, however, that the record is insufficient to establish that Wilson had a .15 BAC or
more. Accordingly, the County asks that this court vacate the judgment and remand to the circuit
court so that the circuit court can confirm whether Wilson’s BAC was .15 or more, either by
holding a hearing on the issue or by having the parties stipulate to that fact.
I conclude that when the circuit court imposed the IID, it did not demonstrably exercise
its discretion. Accordingly, I reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Sentencing involves a circuit court’s exercise of its discretion. State v. Taylor, 2006 WI
22, ¶17, 289 Wis. 2d 34, 710 N.W.2d 466. Similarly, the approval of a plea agreement is left to a
circuit court’s discretion. State v. Waldman, 57 Wis. 2d 234, 237, 203 N.W.2d 691 (1973). “A
2 In arguing that this court must reverse the part of the circuit court order imposing the IID but
otherwise affirm, Wilson relies, as persuasive authority, on an unpublished one-judge decision: State v.
Green, No. 2024AP1104, unpublished slip op. (WI App Mar. 5, 2025). This court need not address
unpublished opinions. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b). Here I do not discuss Green other than to
observe that, although the Green court reversed the part of the judgment imposing the IID after
concluding that the circuit court did not have authority to impose the IID, whether a remand for further
proceedings was appropriate was apparently not at issue in that case.

No. 2025AP2115
4
circuit court properly exercises its discretion when it examines the relevant facts, applies a
proper standard of law, and uses a demonstrably rational process to reach a conclusion that a
reasonable judge could reach.” American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Golke, 2009 WI 81, ¶43, 319
Wis. 2d 397, 768 N.W.2d 729. A court’s exercise of discretion “‘contemplates a process of
reasoning’” that “‘must depend on facts that are of record or that are reasonably derived by
inference from the record and a conclusion based on a logical rationale founded upon proper
legal standards.’” Taylor, 289 Wis. 2d 34, ¶17 (quoting McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277,
182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)). “‘There should be evidence in the record that discretion was in fact
exercised and the basis of that exercise of discretion should be set forth.’” Holbrook v.
Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 339-40, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1981) (quoted source omitted).
Here, the circuit court imposed the IID because it concluded that doing so “was
mandatory under the circumstances presented.” However, the court did not explain the legal or
factual basis for its conclusion that it was required to impose an IID, and the court therefore did
not demonstrably exercise its discretion. Relatedly, even if the County is correct that the court
imposed the IID because certain documents, including the citation, suggested that Wilson’s BAC
was .15 or higher, the County also correctly concedes that such documents are insufficient to
establish a .15 BAC or more. Accordingly, I reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion and order. The court’s options on remand include the following:
removing the IID requirement from the judgment, rejecting the parties’ stipulation, or holding
further proceedings on the issue of whether there is a legal or factual basis for including the IID
requirement. See King v. King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 253-54, 590 N.W.2d 480 (1999) (stating that
when an appellate court concludes that the circuit court failed to properly exercise its discretion,
the proper remedy is to remand so that the circuit court may properly exercise its discretion); see
also LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 43, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987) (concluding that the
reviewing court “cannot and should not exercise the discretion which is properly the circuit
court’s”).

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IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the circuit court is summarily reversed and the
cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and
order. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.
Samuel A. Christensen
Clerk of Court of Appeals