Solomon M. Mekuria, App. vs. Aster Menfesu, Resp.

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of
No. 70590-3-I

SOLOMON MEKURIA,

)
)
) rms
) DIVISION ONE =
Appellant, ) pal
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION =
and ) ww
) =
ASTER MENFESU, ) oe
) FILED: March 31, 2014 LO
Respondent. ) ~
Grosse, J. — In order to obtain a major modification of a parenting plan, a

petitioner must demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances. Here, the superior
court found that there was no substantial change in circumstances or that modification
would be in the best interests of the child, as required under RCW 26.09.260(1). We
affirm.

Aster Menfesu and Solomon Mekuria were married on May 5, 2007. Their
daughter E.M. was born on April 23, 2008. The parties separated in 2009 when
Menfesu filed an order for protection. The dissolution was finalized at trial in August
2010. At the dissolution trial, Menfesu testified to her medical condition and the
limitations to her sight. An amended final parenting plan was entered on September 27,
2010. It provided weekly visitation of three days with the father and four days with the
mother with exchanges taking place at a police department. When E.M. entered school,
primary residence was with the mother, with the father having every other weekend and
one day a week.

On March 5, 2013, Mekuria petitioned for major modification of the parenting

plan. Mekuria claimed that Menfesu’s sight deteriorated so that she was no longer able

No. 70590-3-1 / 2
to care for E.M. 	He also submitted several pictures of E.M., showing what he described
as 	injuries. 	Mekuria 	sought 	to 	change 	the 	primary 	residence 	of 	E.M. 	and 	limit
Menfesu's residential time to supervised visits in Everett, Washington. 	Menfesu moved
to 	dismiss 	Mekuria's 	petition 	and filed 	a 	counter-petition for 	a 	minor modification.
Adequate cause for that petition was established on May 10, 2013.
Meanwhile, Mekuria filed a motion for finding of adequate cause and entry of a
temporary parenting plan giving him immediate primary custody. 	On April 24, 2013,
Commissioner Bonnie Canada-Thurston granted adequate cause for Mekuria's petition,
but denied any change in custody and appointed a guardian ad litem. 	Menfesu filed a
motion for revision for the commissioner's finding of adequate cause.
On 	May 30, 	2013, 	Judge 	Regina 	Cahan 	determined 	that 	Menfesu's 	sight
impairment did not constitute a change of circumstances because Menfesu's medical
condition was considered during the dissolution trial. 	Additionally, Judge Cahan found
the minor injuries depicted in the five photographs submitted by Mekuria did not amount
to anything more than childhood mishaps and were insufficient to warrant a modification
of the parenting plan.
Mekuria appeals, 	arguing 	the 	court erred 	in denying 	his modification 	of the
parenting plan, considered extraneous evidence not before the commissioner, and that
the trial judge was biased. We find no merit to any of Mekuria's arguments.
The court's primary concern in establishing a parenting plan is the best interests
of the child.1 	The legislature has recognized that the best interests of a child are
normally served "when the existing pattern of interaction between a parent and child is
1 RCW 26.09.002; In re Marriage of Stern, 57 Wn. App. 707, 712, 789 P.2d 807 (1990).
2

No. 70590-3-1 / 3
altered only to the extent necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents or as
required 	to 	protect 	the 	child 	from 	physical, 	mental, 	or 	emotional 	harm." 	RCW
26.09.002. 	Because changes 	in custody are viewed 	as 	"highly disruptive for the
children" there is "a strong presumption in favor of custodial continuity and against
modification."2
To 	obtain a 	modification of a 	parenting 	plan, 	the 	petitioner must submit an
affidavit showing adequate cause.3 RCW 26.09.270 provides:
A party seeking a temporary custody order or a temporary parenting plan
or modification of a custody decree or parenting plan shall submit together
with 	his 	or 	her motion, 	an 	affidavit 	setting 	forth 	facts 	supporting 	the
requested order or modification and shall give notice, together with a copy
of his or her affidavit, to other parties to the proceedings, who may file
opposing affidavits. The court shall deny the motion unless it finds that
adequate cause for hearing the motion is established by the affidavits, in
which case it shall set a date for hearing on an order to show cause why
the requested order or modification should not be granted.
The 	trial 	court will 	allow a 	hearing 	on the 	motion only if the 	affidavit establishes
adequate cause.4 	"The primary purpose of the threshold adequate cause requirement
is to prevent movants from harassing nonmovants by obtaining a useless hearing."5
Adequate cause requires something more than prima facie allegations that, if proven,
would permit a court to modify the parenting plan.6 	At a minimum, adequate cause
2Stern, 57 Wn. App. at 712.
3 In re Marriage of Ziqler, 154 Wn. App. 803, 809, 226 P.3d 202 (2010).
4 RCW 26.09.270; In re Custody of T.L.. 165 Wn. App. 268, 275, 268 P.3d 963 (2011).
5 In re Marriage of Adler, 131 Wn. App. 717, 724, 129 P.3d 293 (2006).
6 Grieco v. Wilson, 144 Wn. App. 865, 875, 184 P.3d 668 (2008), affd sub nom. ln_re
Custody of E.A.T.W., 168 Wn.2d 335, 227 P.3d 1284 (2010) (quoting In re Marriage of
Mangiola, 46 Wn. App. 574, 577, 732 P.2d 163 (1987)).
3

No. 70590-3-1 / 4
means evidence sufficient to support a finding on each fact that the moving party must
prove to modify the parenting plan.7
Here, 	the trial 	court 	properly determined 	that adequate 	cause was 	lacking.
Mekuria's affidavit alleged Menfesu's worsening eyesight as a substantial change in
circumstances. 	But this medical condition was known to the trial court at the time it
established 	the 	parenting 	plan. 	There was 	no evidence of any worsening 	of the
condition. 	Thus, there was no change in circumstances. 	Further, the photographs
Mekuria submitted regarding his daughter's alleged "injuries" showed nothing more than
common scrapes that a child might acquire while playing. 	And there was no evidence
that these scrapes occurred even while in the mother's care.
Mekuria next argues that the trial court improperly considered the motion for
revision of the commissioner's finding of adequate cause. 	Mekuria argues that Menfesu
attached e-mails to and from the guardian ad litem (GAL) that were written after the
commissioner had reached her decision. 	He relies on the court's decision in In re
Marriage of Moody, which held that a superior court's review of a court commissioner's
ruling "is limited to the evidence and issues presented to the commissioner."8 	But in this
instance, the GAL was appointed by the commissioner and the e-mails were nothing
more than scheduling issues. 	Further, had the court not dismissed the commissioner's
finding of adequacy, the scheduling of the GAL and her report would have had to be
addressed. 	Moreover, it is clear from the ruling of the trial court that these e-mails were
not considered or relied on in its decision.
7 In re Marriage of Lemke, 120 Wn. App. 536, 540, 85 P.3d 966 (2004).
8 137 Wn.2d 979, 992-93, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999).

No. 70590-3-1 / 5
Mekuria next argues that the statement of facts recited in Menfesu's motion for
revision was new evidence. 	Those facts included pleadings, memoranda, declarations,
and exhibits that were submitted to the commissioner and the court file. 	There was no
new testimony or reference to evidence that was not before the commissioner.
Finally, Mekuria argues that the trial court was biased against him. 	The law
does not presume prejudice on the part of the judicial officer.9 	Mekuria fails to show
actual bias, potential bias, or the probability of unfairness. 	The mere fact that Judge
Cahan ruled adversely does not demonstrate prejudice.10 	The fact that Judge Cahan
may 	have volunteered 	in the 	past for the 	Northwest Women's 	Law Center is not
sufficient to establish bias in favor of opposing counsel who works for the Northwest
Justice Project.
The Northwest Justice Project requests attorney fees under RCW 26.09.140. 	A
nonprofit, publically funded, legal services corporation that successfully wins an appeal
on behalf of an 	applicant is entitled to attorney fees, 	notwithstanding 	the 	client's
obligation to pay a fee.11 	Determining whether a fee award is appropriate under RCW
26.09.140 requires the court to consider the parties' relative ability to pay and the
arguable merits of the issues raised on appeal.12 	Having considered the merits of
Mekuria's appeal 	as 	well 	as 	the 	financial 	resources available 	to both parties, 	we
exercise our discretion and grant Menfesu her attorney fees and costs on appeal under
RCW 26.09.140, provided that she complies with RAP 18.1(d).
9 In re Borchert, 57 Wn.2d 719, 722, 359 P.2d 789 (1961).
10 See Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 51 Wn. App. 561, 579-80, 754 P.2d 1243 (1998).
11 Tofte v. Washington State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 85 Wn.2d 161, 531 P.2d
808(1975).
12 Leslie v. Verhev, 90 Wn. App. 796, 807, 954 P.2d 330 (1998).

No. 70590-3-1 / 6
Affirmed.
Glone -
WE CONCUR:
Schindlerg COX, J.
6