Gene Busroe And Sue Busroe, Apps. V. Dreamers Rod, Res.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
GENE BUSROE and SUE BUSROE,
husband and wife,
Appellants,
DREAMERS ROD, CUSTOM &
PICK-UPS N.W., INC.,
Respondents.
No. 74212-4-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	January 17, 2017
Leach, J. — Gene Busroe appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit against a
business that did some restoration work on his classic pickup truck. 	Because
substantial evidence supports the trial court's challenged findings of fact and
those findings support its conclusions of law, we affirm.
FACTS
According to unchallenged findings of fact entered after a 2015 bench trial,
Gene Busroe purchased a 1955 Chevrolet pickup truck, planning to restore it as
a 	retirement project. 	When 	he purchased the truck, 	it had a 	heavily rusted
exterior body and needed virtually all parts and mechanical systems replaced.
Busroe enrolled 	in classes on 	body and 	electrical work at a 	local technical
college.

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Dreamers Rod, Custom & Pick-ups N.W. Inc. operates two shops where it
performs restoration work and fabricates vehicle parts. 	Its owners agreed to
allow Busroe to store his vehicle and to use shop space to do his own restoration
work. 	Busroe did this for several years. 	During the same time, he also hired
Dreamers to perform specific tasks. 	The arrangement with Dreamers amounted
to a series of oral contracts.
During this period, Busroe took the disassembled body of the truck to
another 	business, 	Alternative 	Blasters, 	for 	"bead 	blasting," 	a 	process 	that
prepares metal for painting by removing existing paint, primer, and rust, leaving
only bare 	metal. 	When 	Alternative Blasters 	completed 	that 	work, 	Busroe
transported the body pieces on a flatbed trailer to Dreamers' shop. 	Later, an
employee 	of 	Dreamers 	prepared 	them 	for 	painting, 	and 	a 	Dreamers'
subcontractor painted the truck.
The restoration work was complete in 2009. 	Busroe then participated in
car shows and other events, winning some awards.
In 2011, Busroe noticed defects in the paint. 	On some areas of the truck
body, small bubbles and blisters appeared on the surface of the paint. 	Since
then, the bubbling and blistering has 	spread and become increasingly more
pronounced.

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In August 	2013, 	Busroe 	and 	his 	spouse 	(collectively "Busroe") 	sued
Dreamers.1 	Busroe contended that Dreamers' employees failed 	to "properly
paint the vehicle" and that he incurred damages as a result. 	His complaint did
not identify a specific legal cause of action.
During a two-day trial, the court considered the testimony of ten witnesses
and several exhibits. 	The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Dreamers that
dismissed Busroe's complaint with prejudice. 	Busroe appeals.
ANALYSIS
Busroe challenges finding of fact 6 insofar as it specifies September 28,
2006, 	as the date he delivered the truck parts from Alternative Blasters after
bead blasting to Dreamers' shop. 	He also challenges the finding, included in
both findings of fact 11 and 17, that a "three year gap" occurred between the
bead blasting process and the eventual priming and 	painting of the vehicle in
2009.
Busroe contends no evidence in the record supports the finding that the
bead blasting took place in 2006. 	He further claims that without this finding, the
record 	contains no factual 	support for several conclusions of law. 	In these
conclusions, the court explained that Busroe failed to establish that Dreamers'
conduct proximately caused the deterioration of the paint:
1 The 	record 	on 	review includes only the amended 	complaint filed in
November 2013.
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NO. 74212-4-1/4
3. 	Plaintiff's general theory of the case is that Defendant took
some action, which they did not specify, that caused rust to
form on the truck, thereby causing Plaintiff damage. 	Here
the Court concludes that the metal body of the truck was in a
rusted condition at the time it was purchased by Plaintiff as
shown 	by the 	photos 	introduced 	into 	evidence. 	Plaintiff
sought 	to 	remove 	that 	rust 	by 	having 	the 	metal 	pieces
beadblasted by a third party. 	This work was ineffective to
remove all of the rust as shown by Defendant in Invoice
1428. 	(Exhibit 	52). 	The 	Plaintiff 	did 	not 	prove 	that 	it
contracted with Defendant to remove any, let alone all of the
rust on the truck. 	Further, the evidence showed the Plaintiff
introduced water on the truck parts in delivering [them to the]
Defendant. Defendant was not responsible for causing the
metal to be in a wet condition. 	The evidence proved that
Defendant was not responsible for causing the metal parts to
rust. 	The Plaintiff failed to show that Defendant proximately
caused the rust damage to the truck. 	Accordingly, the Court
finds in favor of the Defendant as to this claim and dismisses
the complaint with prejudice.
4. 	As an alternative theory of liability, viewing the Complaint
more 	narrowly, 	it 	is 	possible 	that 	Plaintiff's 	complaint,
although not specifically [pleaded], 	refers to the particular
oral contract in which he hired Defendant [to] apply sealant
to the truck after the beadblast work, and that Defendant's
action in sealing the truck while it was in a wet and/or rusted
condition breached a duty to Plaintiff to perform the sealant
work in a "workmanlike manner." 	There is no dispute that
this work was performed in 2006. 	However, the court finds
that this argument must fail as well. 	Defendant put Plaintiff
on 	notice of 	its actions 	("removed the 	rust as 	best they
could"), in Invoice 1428. 	Plaintiff had actual knowledge or
should have known from the notation on the invoice that he
had a 	rust problem under the sealant. 	Plaintiff seems to
argue 	that 	he 	was 	ignorant 	to 	the 	significance 	of 	that
problem because he was a novice. 	He claims he discovered
the truck had a rust problem in 2011, when it became visible
due to the bubbling of the paint job.
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NO. 74212-4-1/5
5. 	Even if one could argue Plaintiff lacked actual knowledge of
the spreading rust until 2011, the 2006 invoice at least put
him on 	"inquiry notice" 	and 	he 	should 	have done further
investigation about the rust issue at that time. 	This was not
done. 	Assuming 	arguendo that Plaintiff had 	a 	cause of
action for breach, it accrued on the date when he could have
sought 	relief 	from 	the 	courts. 	Here, 	that 	date 	was 	on
October 5, 2006. 	According to RCW 4.16.080, the statute of
limitations 	ran 	on 	the 	oral 	contract 	three 	years 	later 	in
October of 2009. 	The Complaint in this case was not filed
until August of 2013, four years after the statute of limitations
ran. 	Accordingly, under this theory, the Court finds in favor
of the 	Defendant and dismisses the 	Plaintiffs claim with
prejudice.
We review a trial court's decision after a bench trial to determine whether
substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the
findings of fact adequately support the conclusions of law.2 	Substantial evidence
is the quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational, fair-minded person
that the premise is true.3 	We treat unchallenged findings of fact as verities on
appeal.4
The 	record 	amply 	supports the 	court's finding that the 	bead 	blasting
occurred in 2006. 	The testimony at trial established that Dreamers' employees
recorded tasks performed, time spent on each task, and parts used on a daily
basis. 	Dreamers used this information to generate customer invoices. 	Dreamers
2 Endicott v. Saul, 142 Wn. App. 899, 909, 176 P.3d 560 (2008).
3 Endicott, 142 Wn. App. at 909.
4 Kitsap County v. Kitsap Rifle & Revolver Club, 184 Wn. App. 252, 267,
337 P.3d 328 (2014), review denied, 183 Wn.2d 1008 (2015).
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presented evidence of an invoice it created for Busroe that included the following
entry dated September 28, 2006:
Steve helped Gene unload the bare metal from the trailer, into the
shop. 	(Note) Some of the parts that were exposed to the morning
moist air. 	These parts were wet with morning fog and water spray
off the tires. 	Steve tried to dry those areas he could see and get to
with a torch and a rag.
The next entry on the same invoice, dated October 5, 2006, also records
work performed by the same Dreamers' employee, Steve Strabeck. 	The entry
states,
Lay out parts and mask areas to be metal worked by owner at later
time, 	one stepped deep pits that still had rust in them after the
blast. 	One stepped the frame as best as we could, there was deep
rust pits and heavy rust was laying in the shallowed parts of these
areas.
The final entry on this invoice, dated the following day, October 6, 2006, again
records work performed by Strabeck: 	"Seal frame/fenders/doors and steps with
D.P. Sealer materials."
These entries support the court's finding that the bead blasting took place
in 2006. 	The entry describes the parts that Busroe delivered to the shop in
September 2006 as "bare metal," indicating that the delivery occurred after bead
blasting. 	Busroe's testimony also corroborates this inference. 	Although he did
not specify a date, Busroe said that after bead blasting he transported the parts
to Dreamers' shop on a flatbed trailer and covered them with only a tarp. 	He

NO. 74212-4-1/7
acknowledged that the parts "very well" may have become wet in transit. 	The
September 2006 entry also reflects Strabeck's concern that the bare metal parts
had been exposed to moisture and water.
Strabeck testified that he remembered the delivery because the metal was
exposed to water, which caused him to be concerned about rust. 	Busroe also
confirmed that Strabeck helped him unload the parts and performed the sealing
work to prepare the truck body for painting. 	Strabeck left his employment at
Dreamers sometime around 2006. 	The October 5 entry further indicates that the
bead 	blasting 	occurred 	on 	or 	before 	September 	28 	because 	it describes
Strabeck's attempt to seal the metal despite rust remaining "after the blast."
Still, Busroe claims 	that 	he 	brought the vehicle 	parts 	to 	the shop 	in
September 2006 before they had been bead blasted. 	He points to the testimony
of one of the owners of Dreamers who indicated that the September 2006 entry,
also 	designated 	as 	work 	order 	number 	1 	("WO#1"), was 	the 	first 	invoice
Dreamers generated for Busroe and therefore reflected the "first time that the
project showed 	up at the shop." 	But this testimony does 	not undermine or
contradict the court's finding that bead blasting occurred on or before September
28, 2006. 	Busroe also relies on his own testimony that he believed two weeks to
a month elapsed between bead blasting and painting. 	But the court was not
required to credit Busroe's unsubstantiated and vague recollection 	instead of
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NO. 74212-4-1/8
documents containing 	information recorded simultaneously with the events in
question.
Busroe does not challenge the court's finding that according to several
experts who testified at trial, "the truck should have been primed and painted
within 2-3 days after the sealant was applied, to protect the metal." 	Busroe's
testimony about timing fails to establish compliance with this protocol. 	Perhaps
more importantly, Busroe's argument fails to appreciate that there were multiple
reasons why the court determined that Dreamers was not responsible for the
eventual deterioration of the paint under either a tort of contract theory of liability.
The court found that the proper procedure before painting is to "blast the parts to
bare metal with all rust removed, and then to apply sealer as soon as possible
without allowing any moisture onto the metal." 	Regardless of when the bead
blasting took place,'the court found that the process failed to remove all rust and
Busroe allowed the metal 	parts to be exposed to moisture and 	become wet.
These findings alone provide sufficient support for the court's conclusion that
Dreamers' conduct did not proximately cause the damage to the paint.
Substantial evidence supports the court's finding about the timing of the
bead blasting work. 	This finding, 	together with other unchallenged findings,
supports the court's conclusions of law. 	Because Busroe's challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings fail, we need not
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NO. 74212-4-1/9
address his alternative arguments about the former "economic loss rule" and the
statute of limitations.5
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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5 See Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc.. 	170 Wn.2d 380, 393-94,
241 P.3d 1256 (2010).
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