* Seattle Housing Authority, Appellant V. City Of Seattle, Respondents

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FILED
5/9/2018
Court of Appeals
Division I
State of Washington
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SEATTLE HOUSING AUTHORITY, ) No. 75455-6-I
)
Appellant, )
) DIVISION ONE
v. )
)
CITY OF SEATTLE and SEATTLE ) ORDER GRANTING
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, on behalf) MOTION TO PUBLISH
of Ala Yudzenka, SEATTLE HUMAN )
RIGHTS COMMISSION, and SEATTLE)
HEARING EXAMINER, )
)
Respondents. )
)
Appellant, Seattle Housing Authority, filed a motion to publish the court's opinion
filed on March 5, 2018. Respondent, the City of Seattle, filed a response. The court has
determined that the motion should be granted.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that the opinion should be published. The opinion shall be published
and printed in the Washington Appellate Reports.
FOR THE COURT:
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FILED
COURT OF APPEALS OW I 1*.:Y
STATE OF WASHINGTON
201811AR -5 MI 8:2L
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SEATTLE HOUSING AUTHORITY, ) No. 75455-6-1
)
Appellant, • )
) DIVISION ONE
v. )
)
CITY OF SEATTLE and SEATTLE )
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, on behalf)
of Ala Yudzenka, SEATTLE HUMAN )
RIGHTS COMMISSION, and SEATTLE) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HEARING EXAMINER, )
)
Respondents. ) FILED: March 5, 2018
)
MANN, J. —The city of Seattle's Open Housing Ordinance, chapter 14.08
of the Seattle Municipal Code(SMC), promotes the availability and accessibility
of housing and real property to all persons. SMC 14.08.040D declares it an
unfair housing practice to prohibit reasonable modifications and accommodations
needed by a disabled tenant. The Seattle Housing Authority (SHA), an
independent municipal corporation, performs two distinct roles relevant to this
appeal. First, SHA owns and leases public housing to over 27,000 low income
people. Second, SHA provides financial assistance to about 8,300 low income
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'
No. 75455-6-1/2
households through rent vouchers in its role as administrator of the federal
Housing Choice Voucher Program, commonly known as Section 8.
SHA appeals from a decision of the city of Seattle hearing examiner
concluding that SHA violated.SMC 14.08.040D by failing to make a reasonable
accommodation for Ala Yudzenka, a Section 8 voucher recipient. Because under
its plain language,.SMC 14.08.040D only applies to landlords, and because SHA
is not acting as a landlord when it administers the Section 8 voucher program, we
reverse and vacate the hearing examiner's decision and order of August 19,
2015.
FACTS
SHA's Administration of the Section 8 Program
The SHA administers the federally funded Section 8 voucher program.
Through the Section 8 program,SHA provides vouchers for rent subsidy for
rental units selected by the voucher participants. The rent subsidy is the
difference between the market rent for the unit and 30 percent of the participant's•
income. The number of bedrooms that attach to a Section 8 voucher is based on
the household size of the participant, so that a one-person household is generally
eligible for a studio voucher. The voucher participant is not precluded from
choosing to rent a larger apartment than designated under the Section 8
program, but the maximum rent subsidized by voucher is controlled by the
participant's eligibility. If the participant chooses a larger apartment, they are
responsible for any extra rent. In 2013, the maximum allowed amount SHA
would pay for rent and utilities was $771 for a studio and $879 for a one-bedroom
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No. 75455-6-1/3
unit. As of December 2014, the maximum amount SHA paid for rent and utilities
was $810 for a studio and $879 for a one bedroom unit.
Underlying Facts
Ala Yudzenka has resided in a one-bedroom apartment in the Olive Ridge
apartment complex since 2011.1 The Olive Ridge apartments are owned by
SHA. Prior to living at Olive Ridge, Yudzenka lived in a one-bedroom unit in
another SHA building. As a victim of domestic violence, Yudzenka suffers from
posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression. She is unable to sleep in
studio apartments because "she would become afraid if she heard footsteps or
saw lights from the hallway under the studio apartment door."
In March 2013, while still leasing an apartment from SHA,Yudzenka was
called from the waiting list and allOwed to apply for a Section 8 voucher. As a
single-person household, Yudzenka qualified for a studio apartment Because of
her disability, Yudzenka submitted a request for accommodation seeking a
voucher for a one-bedroom apartment. Yudzenka supported her request with a
statement from her primary care physician.
In a letter dated April 23,2013, SHA advised Yudzenka that the request
"cannot be approved at this time" and that in accordance with SHA procedures
was being referred to SHA's "ADA/504" Committee for review. The committee
reviewed Yudzenka's request and in June 2013, denied the request after
I The facts are taken primarily from the unchallenged findings of the Seattle Human
Rights Commission and hearing examiner for the city of Seattle. Unchallenged hearing examiner
findings are verities on appeal. Getty Images v. City of Seattle, 163 Wn.App. 590, 599, 260 P.3d
926(2011).
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No. 75455-6-1/4
concluding that a "dark safe environment can be created in a studio unit."
Yudzenka requested and was granted an appeal hearing before the committee.
In July 2013, the appeal was denied, and on July 31, 2013, SHA issued a studio
voucher to Yudzenka.
Procedural History
Yudzenka filed a complaint with the Seattle Office of Civil Rights(SOCR)
on October 16, 2013. SOCR determined there was reasonable cause to believe
that violations of the Fair Housing'Amendments Act and SMC 14.08 were
committed. SOCR referred the matter to the city attorney. In April 2015,the City
and SOCR filed a complaint against SHA before the Seattle Human Rights
Commission and hearing examiner for the city of Seattle (hearing examiner).
Prior to the hearing, SHA moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that as a
Section 8 program administrator it was not a "landlord" within the meaning of
SMC 14.08.040D. The hearing 'examiner denied the motion.
On August 19, 2015, the hearing examiner concluded that SHA violated
SMC 14.08.040D "by failing to provide a reasonable accomModation" and
ordered SHA to pay Yudzenka $1,500 and issue her a one-bedroom voucher.
SHA petitioned the superior court for a writ of review. The trial court
affirmed the decision of the hearing examiner and denied SHA's writ of review.
SHA appeals.
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No. 75455-6-1/5
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
The parties agree that the only issue before us on appeal is whether SMC
14.08.040D "applies to SHA as Section 8 voucher program administrator." When
reviewing an appeal of a statutory writ, we review findings of fact for substantial
evidence and conclusions of law de novo. Getty Images v. City of Seattle, 163
Wn. App. 590, 599, 260 P.3d 926(2011). Because SHA did not assign error to
any of the hearing examiner's findings, they are verities on appeal. We therefore
determine whether the hearing examiner "erred in applying the law to the
unchallenged facts." Getty, 163 Wn. App. at 599. The construction of a city
ordinance is a question of law reviewed de novo. Sleasman v. City of Lacey, 159
Wn.2d 639,642-43, 151 P.3d 990(1997).
"The same rules of statutory construction-apply to the interpretation of
municipal ordinances as to the interpretation of state statutes." City of Seattle v.
Green, 51 Wn.2d 871, 874, 322 P.2d 842(1958). In interpreting a statute the
"fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature's intent."
Citizens All. v. San Juan County, 184 Wn.2d 428,435, 359 P.3d 753(2015)
(citation omitted). "[I]f the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court
must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent."
Citizens All., 184 Wn.2d at 435(quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn,
LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10,43 P.3d 4(2002)). When determining a statute's plain
meaning we consider "the ordinary meaning of words, the basic rules of
grammar, and the statutory context to conclude what the legislature has provided
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No. 75455-6-1/6
for in the statute and related statutes." In re Forfeiture of Ore 1970 Chevrolet
Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d 834, 839,215 P.3d 166(2009). We may look to a
idictionary to determine the plain meaning of an undefined term. HomeStreet,
Inc. v. Depit of Revenue, 166 Wn.2d 444, 451, 210 P.3d 297(2009). We
"construe a statute so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion
rendered meaningless or superfluous." City of Seattle v. Swanson, 193 Wn. App.
795, 810, 373 P.3d 342(2016)(internal quotations omitted). "Commonsense
informs our analysis, as we avoid absurd results in statutory interpretation."
'State v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 562, 192 P.3d 345(2008).
Seattle Municipal Code 14.08.040D
SHA contends that SMC 14.08.040D is expressly limited to landlords, and
libecause it is not acting as a landlord in its role as administrator of the Section 8
voucher program, the code is not applicable. We agree for at least three
reasons.
We start with the plain language of the ordinance. SMC 14.08.400
provides:
It is an unfair practice to prohibit reasonable modifications needed
by a disabled tenant. Whether or not the landlord permits tenants
in general to make alterations or additions to a structure or fixtures,
it is an unfair practice for a landlord to refuse to make reasonable
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when
such accommodations may be necessary to afford a disabled
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy any dwelling, or to
refuse to allow a person to make alterations or additions to existing
premises occupied or to be occupied by a disabled person which
are necessary to make the rental property accessible by disabled
persons, under the following conditions:
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No. 75455-6-1/7
1. The landlord is not required to pay for the alterations, additions,
or restoration unless otherwise required by federal law;
2. The landlord has the right to demand assurances that all
modifications will be performed pursuant to local permit
requirements, in a professional manner, and in accordance with
applicable building codes;
3. The landlord may, where it is reasonable to do so, condition
permission for Modification on the tenant's agreement to restore the
interior of the premises to its pre-existing condition, reasonable
wear and tear excepted.
SMC 14.08.040D (emphasis added).
While the term landlord is not defined within chapter 14.08 SMC, we look
to the ordinary meaning, or, in this case, the dictionary definition. HomeStreet,
Inc., 166 Wn.2d at 451. Landlord is defined as "one who lets land to another: the
owner or holder of land or houses which he leases or rents to another."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1269(2002). This definition is
premised on the relationship between the landlord and tenant as to the landlord's
property; the landlord is the owner or manager of property that it lets to a tenant.
SHA in its capacity as the Section 8 voucher program administrator is not acting
as the owner of the property being leased to the tenant—it is instead assisting
the tenant by subsidizing rental payment due to the landlord. SHA does not fit
within the dictionary definition of a landlord.
Second, the statutory context of SMC 14.08.040D indicates a legislative
intent to address unfair practices in the landlord-tenant relationship, not in the
Section 8 voucher program. SMC 14.08.040D references three actors:
"landlords," "tenants," and "disabled persons;" it does not reference Section 8
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No. 75455-6-1/8
program administrators or other third parties
ordinance is further focused on "accommod
"afford a disabled person equal'opportunity t
ordinance illustrates such accommodation to
"necessary to make the rental property acce
, such accommodation by ensuring that:(1)th
the alterations, additions, or restoration,(2) t
modifications are professionally done consis
permit requirements, and (3)the landlord ca
modifications on the tenant's agreement to r
condition. SMC 14.08.040D(1)-(3). Again,
voucher program, SHA is not the controlling
make or approve modifications..
Finally, while SMC 14.08:040D appea
relationship, other provisions within chapter
voucher holders to protect them from discn
example, SMC 14.08.020 defines"Section 8
"short or long term federal, state or local gov
assistance programs in which a tenant's rent
program (throu h a direct arran
providing a housing subsidy. The
tions" to the physical property that
use and enjoy any dwelling." The
include "alteration or additions"
sible." It then further conditions
landlord is nol required to pay for
e landlord may require the
ent with the building code and
condition permission for
store the property to its preexisting
s administrator of the Section 8
roperty owner with authority to
s limited to the'landlord-tenant
4.08 directly address Section 8
ination in obtaining housing. For
or other subsidy programs" as a
rnment, private nonprofit, or other
is paid either partially by the
ement betw en the •ro•ram and the owner or
lessor of the real Property), and partially by t e tenant or completely by the
program." SMC 14.08.020(emphasis adde ). Additionally,.SMC 14.08.040(F)
declared it an unfair practice to discriminate gainst Section 8 voucher holders in
-8-
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No. 75455-6-119
determining tenant eligibility. SMC 14.08.04
fail to cooperate with a Section 8 voucher ho
information for the voucher program or fail to
program to pay past due or current housing
demonstrate that the city council knew how t
and protect them from discrimination, and ye
program administration within SMC 14.08.04
The City raises a series of arguments
language of SMC 14.08.040D to include SH
voucher program administrator.: We addres
First, the City urges us not to rely too
SMC 14.08.040D. But a plain-meaning anal
ordinary meaning of words, the basic rules o
to conclude what the legislature' has provide
statutes." Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d at 839. Her-
meaning of SMC 14.08.040D limits its applic
its role as the Section 8 voucher program ad
Second, the City argues that the SHA
regulatory and statutory context. It argues t
14.08.040D—it is an unfair practice to prohi
by a disabled tenant"—applies universally.
mean that it is an unfair practice for anyone
needed by a disabled tenant.. Relatedly, the
-9-
H declares it an unfair practice to
der in completing required
accept a pledge from the Section 8
osts. These provisions
discuss Section 8 voucher holders
did not include the Section 8
D.
urging us to extend the plain
in its capacity as the Section 8
each in turn.
eavily on the word "landlord" in
sis requires that we look to the "the
grammar, and the statutory context
for in the statute and related
, as discussed above, the plain
bility to landlords, and not SHA in
inistrator.
s interpretation ignores the broader
at the first sentence of SMC
it reasonable modifications needed
he City reads this first sentence to
o prohibit reasonable modifications
City argues that the words "any
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No. 75455-6-1/10
dwelling" in SMC 14.08.040D do not mean a
dwelling. These arguments fail because the
meaning of SMC 14.08.040D. The first sent
"prohibit reasonable modifications needed b
specifying who may not prohibit reasonable
only be directed at landlords. To read the fir
makes the second sentence's first clause—"
tenants in general to make alterations or ad
meaningless because the second sentence
people than the first. Moreover, the word "t
references to landlords in the section's seco
creates an inference that the section only ap
And finally "modification" is different from "a
action of changing something without funda
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1452
sentence's mandate to a real-property conte
Third, the City argues that the plain
contrary to one of chapter 14.08's purposes:
accessibility of housing and real property to
Although the chapter's broad purpose conte
program administrator unreasonably denyin
.040D is written too narrowly to accomplish
on the Section 8 program or housing-subsid
-10
y particular, specific, or existing
are not in harmony with the plain
nce makes it an unfair practice to
a disabled tenant" without
odifications. But this mandate can
t sentence as applying to everyone
hether or not the landlord permits
itions to a structure or fixtures"—
efers to a narrower category of
nant" in the first sentence and the
d, third, fourth, and fifth sentences
lies to the landlord-tenant context.
commodation;" it means "the act or
entally altering it." WEBSTER'S
9002). This word further limits the
eaning of the word "landlord" is
"to promote the availability and
II persons." SMC 14.08.010(A).
plates protection from a Section 8
an accommodation request, section
is purpose. Section .040D is silent
programs, despite the fact that
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No. 75455-6-1/11
section .020 defines these programs and su
programs. See SMC 14.08.020 (defining "S
SMC 14.08.040(F)(1)(making it an unfair pr
participation in the Section 8 program in scr
Fourth, the City argues that a plain-m
defies the mandate in chapter 14.08 that "th
liberally construed to accomplish [the chapt
"A policy requiring liberal construction is a c
provisions be liberally construed and that its
Nucleonics All. v. Wash. Pub. Power Su..1
108(1984). Construing "landlord" liberally t
Section 8 program would override SMC 14.
8 or other subsidy program" by conflating tw
definition—a landlord and a Section 8 Progr
SMC 14.08.020("Section 8 or other subsidy
federal, state or local government... in whi
partially by the program (through a direct ar
the owner or lessor of the real property), an
by the program.").
Fifth, the City argues that because S
protected in parts of chapter 14.08, it follow
protections provided in SMC 14.08.040D to
in their interactions with Section 8 program
-11
section .040(F)(1) references these
ction 8 or other subsidy program");
ctice for a landlord to use
ening applicants' eligibility).
aning interpretation of landlord
provisions of this chapter shall be
r's] purposes." SMC 14.08.010(A)..
mmand that the coverage of an act's
exceptions be narrowly confined."
S s., 101 Wn.2d 24, 29,677 P.2d
include administrators of the
8.020's existing definition of"Section
separate things included in the
m administrator—into one. See
program' means short or long term
h a tenant's rent is paid either
ngement between the program and
partially by the tenant or completely
ction 8 voucher holders are
that the city council intended the
xtend to Section 8 voucher holders
dministrators. We disagree.IT the
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No. 75455-6-1/12
statute's meaning is plain on its face, then th court must give effect to that plain
meaning as an expression of legislative inte t." Citizens All., 184 Wn.2d at 435
(citation omitted). The language of SMC 14. 8.040D is clear: it does not address
Section 8 voucher holders or administrators if Section 8 housing programs.
Sixth, the City argues that limiting ap•lication of SMC 14.08.040D to
landlords leads to an absurd result: disabled voucher holders who are denied
their request for a voucher for a.larger rental unit have no recourse, a result that
contravenes the section's spirit and purpose Again, we disagree. "It is true that
we should not so interpret a statute as to re ch an absurd result, but neither
should we make an absurd interpretation to each a desired result? Cooper's
Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Simmons,94 Wn.2d 21, 326,617 P.2d 415(1980)
(internal citation omitted). Shoehorning a S ction 8 administrator into the term
"landlord" is "an absurd interpretation to rea h a desired result." Simmons,94
Wn.2d at 326.
Finally, the City urges us to consider he legislative history and similar
federal legislation, but because.the ordinanc 's plain language is not ambiguous,
i
we decline to do so. We hold that the plain neaning of SMC 14.08.040D shows
that the city council only intended the sectiori to apply to discrimination between
landlords and tenants in the city, not discrim nation between-Section 8 voucher
holders and administrators.
The City is not, however, without rec urse. As both the City and SHA
agreed during oral argument, if the City wis es to extend the unfair practice
requirement of SMC 14.08.040D to include requirement that Section 8 program
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No. 75455-6-1/13
administrators like SHA make reasonable a
vouchers for larger rental units than the curr
amend the Seattle Municipal Code accordin
court, is in the best position to effectuate thi
the legislature's intent, not rewrite the words
189 Wn.2d 334, 343,402 P.3d 254(2017).
Because SMC 14.08.040D only appli
administrator of the Section 8 program is no
capacity as a Section 8 program administrat
hearing examiner's decision and order of Au
WE CONCUR:
commodations including granting
nt guidelines require, then it can
ly. The Seattle City Council, not this
change. "It is our duty to effectuate
the legislature used." State v. Gray,
s to landlords, and since SHA as
a landlord when it acts in its
r, we reverse and vacate the
ust 19, 2015. •
-13
.esci<ef,2
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