Personal Restraint Petition Of Jennifer L. Morris

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of:
JENNIFER LEAANNE MORRIS,
Petitioner.
No. 54209-9-II
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SUTTON, A.C.J. — Jennifer Morris seeks relief from personal restraint imposed as
a result of her 2019 plea of guilty to two counts of second degree rape of a child. She now
seeks to withdraw that plea.1 First, Morris contends that her plea was not knowing,
voluntary and intelligent because she was not advised of the direct consequences of her
plea. State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d 148, 155-56, 607 P.2d 845 (1980). But she does not
identify what direct consequences she was not advised of. Morris notes that the defendant
must be advised of any mandatory minimum or possible maximum sentence for the
offense. But Morris signed a statement on plea of guilty that described the direct
consequences of her plea, including the standard sentence range and the maximum sentence
of life. Br. of Respondent, App. F (Amended Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty to
Sex Offense, filed Feb. 19, 2019).
1 Morris filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea in the trial court. That court transferred her
motion to us under CrR 7.8(c) to be considered as a personal restraint petition.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
January 5, 2021

54209-9-II/2
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Morris also argues that she was pushed into pleading guilty by a “threatening
statement” made to her by a jail supervisor.2 But in her Amended Statement on Plea of
Guilty, Morris stated that “[n]o one has threatened harm of any kind to me or to any other
person to cause me to make this plea.” Br. of Respondent, App. F at 10. Where a defendant
has signed a statement on plea of guilty, the voluntariness of her plea is presumed. State
v. Smith, 134 Wn.2d 849, 852, 953 P.2d 810 (1998). And when, as occurred here, the trial
court conducts a plea colloquy with the defendant regarding voluntariness, that
presumption is “well nigh irrefutable.” State v. Perez, 33 Wn. App. 258, 262, 654 P.2d
708 (1982). Morris does not refute the presumption of the voluntariness of her plea.
Finally, Morris argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel by her
first counsel telling her that she was going to prison regardless of how much proof she had
and by her second counsel not moving to withdraw her plea at sentencing after she told
him that she had found out that things that her first attorney had told her were not true. We
disagree that counsel was either ineffective or shows prejudice.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Morris must demonstrate that her
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that as a
result of that deficient performance, the result of her case probably would have been
different. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). This court
presumes strongly that trial counsel’s performance was reasonable. State v. Grier, 171
2 Although her petition is unclear, it appears Morris claims that being told that she had been
placed in the female section of the jail because she was a post-surgical transgender person
was “very threatening” Petition at 12. But she does not describe how this statement or this
accommodation was threatening.

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Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011). Morris does not show either deficient performance
or resulting prejudice. In the context of the withdrawal of a guilty plea, the petitioner must
show a “reasonable probability” that but for the attorney’s deficient performance, the
petitioner would not have pleaded guilty. State v. Buckman, 190 Wn.2d 51, 62-64, 409
P.3d 193 (2018). Given that the plea agreement reduced the prison time Morris was facing,
and the evidence against her, Morris does not make such a showing that a rational person
in her position would not have pleaded guilty. Buckman, 190 Wn.2d at 69-70. Thus,
Morris does not present evidence that she received ineffective assistance of counsel that
would have rendered her plea involuntary.
Morris does not show any grounds for relief from personal restraint. We therefore
deny her petition and her request for appointment of counsel.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
SUTTON, A.C.J.
We concur:
MAXA, J.
GLASGOW, J.