State Of Washington, Appellant V. Alta C. Hunter, Respondent

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Appellant,
v.
ALTA CORINNE HUNTER,
Respondent.
No. 85792-4-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HAZELRIGG, C.J. — The State of Washington appeals from an order granting
Alta Hunter’s CrR 7.8 motion for relief under our Supreme Court’s opinion in State
v. Blake,1 and argues she was not entitled to a refund of fees paid under a
preconviction therapeutic court agreement and, more broadly, that CrR 7.8 does
not apply to dismissed charges. Consistent with our holding in a companion case,
State v. Peterson,2 we conclude that the trial court lacked authority to retain and
grant the motion and reverse.
FACTS
On January 18, 2012, the State charged Alta Hunter with one count of
possession of a controlled substance, suboxone, under former RCW 69.50.4013(1)
(2003). On March 2, 2012, while the charge was pending, Hunter entered the Adult
Drug Treatment Court (ADTC) program in Snohomish County Superior Court, also
1 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021).
2 No. 85791-6-I (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2025), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/857916.pdf.

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commonly known as “drug court.” 	To participate in the program, Hunter signed a
set of stipulations and waivers of various constitutional rights and paid a mandatory
$900 participation fee. 	The State agreed to dismiss the charge against her with
prejudice upon her satisfaction of the terms of the drug court program. Payment of
the participation fee, in full, was one of the requirements for successful completion
of the program. On September 16, 2013, after Hunter complied fully with treatment,
paid the fee and otherwise satisfied the terms of ADTC, the State moved to dismiss
the charge, and the court granted the motion.
In 2021, our Supreme Court held in State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d
521 (2021) that former RCW 69.50.4013 (2017), the state’s strict liability drug
possession statute, was unconstitutional. Following that opinion, Hunter filed a CrR
7.8 motion to vacate her dismissed possession of a controlled substance charge
and to recover the drug court participation fee she had paid. 	She argued that,
pursuant to Blake, the State lacked authority to charge her with possession of a
controlled substance in 2012, rendering the criminal charge void from inception.
Therefore, she asserted, vacatur was required under the plain language of Blake.
Hunter averred that she was entitled to relief under CrR 7.8(b) and her motion
was timely under RCW 10.73.100(6). 	She also raised a due process argument
based on Nelson v. Colorado3 and State v. Curtis,4 despite acknowledging that the
cases involved refunds of legal financial obligations (LFOs) after criminal convictions
3 581 U.S. 128, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 197 L. Ed. 2d 611 (2017).
4 No. 36803-3-III (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2021) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/
opinions/pdf/368033_unp.pdf. 	Under GR 14.1(c), we may discuss unpublished opinions as
necessary for a well-reasoned opinion. Curtis is included here only because Hunter offered it as
authority.

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were overturned. Hunter contended that she had an interest in the return of the fees
she paid for drug court because she entered the program solely due to the threat of
criminal prosecution under an unconstitutional statute. 	Following Blake, she
asserted, drug court fees constituted an improper deprivation of property that should
be refunded. She emphasized that the State had no legitimate claim to retain the
fees since her sole criminal charge in this case was based on a void statute.
The State opposed Hunter’s motion, along with two other identical motions
filed in cases of similarly situated defendants,5 and argued that CrR 7.8 does not
provide a remedy for vacating dismissed charges. It averred that Hunter voluntarily
agreed to participate in drug court and her agreement toward that end fell outside
the scope of CrR 7.8. 	The State further argued that due process claims under
Nelson apply only to fees stemming from convictions and, since Hunter was not
convicted, her due process arguments were unavailing. 	Although the State
conceded that CrR 7.8 is the appropriate mechanism for seeking refunds of Blake-
related LFOs under Civil Survival Project v. State,6 it maintained that the drug court
fees were not LFOs that resulted from a criminal conviction and, thus, not subject to
CrR 7.8.
The State next contended that Hunter’s motion should be dismissed and
refiled as a civil claim for unjust enrichment. It also averred that Hunter had already
received the remedy of dismissal upon successful completion of the program and
5 Hunter’s attorney on this matter in the trial court also represented two other Snohomish
County drug court graduates and all of their motions were heard in the same week, two of them on
the same docket. The State appealed from all three orders, which were nearly identical as they
were apparently drafted by defense counsel, and presented similar arguments in each case. The
companion cases are State v. Peterson, No. 85791-6-I and State v. Fjerstad, No. 85790-8-I.
6 24 Wn. App. 2d 564, 520 P.3d 1066 (2022), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1011 (2023).

No. 85792-4-I/4
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therefore could not make a substantial showing that she was entitled to the further
remedy of “vacating” a charge. As such, the State asserted, her motion should be
transferred to the Court of Appeals as a personal restraint petition (PRP).
On August 8, 2021, the trial court conducted a hearing and heard from both
parties before it granted Hunter’s motion and entered the following findings and
rulings:
1. The defendant’s motion is properly raised under CrR 7.8 and
is hereby granted.
2. The defendant’s motion shall not be transferred to the Court
of Appeals as a Personal Restraint Petition because the defendant’s
motion is not time barred by RCW 10.73.090, and she has made a
substantial showing that she is entitled to relief.
3. 	The 	charge 	of 	POSSESSION 	OF 	A 	CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE contained in the Information filed on January 6, 2012,
against the above-named defendant, is constitutionally defective
pursuant to CrR 7.8(2) [sic] and State v. Blake and is hereby vacated;
4. Due process requires that Ms. Hunter be refunded the $900
Drug Court fee previously paid pursuant to the vacated charge. The
State of Washington shall determine the method of any refund herein
with all deliberate speed.
4. [sic] The Clerk of the court shall immediately transmit a copy
of this order vacating the charge to the Washington State Patrol
Identification Section and to the local police agency, if any, which
holds criminal history information for the person who is the subject of
the charge. The Washington State Patrol and any such local police
agency shall immediately update their records to reflect the vacation
of the charge, and shall transmit the order vacating the charge to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation as required by RCW 9.96.060(7).
The State timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Similar to its companion cases, State v. Peterson7 and State v. Fjerstad,8 this
7 No. 85791-6-I (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2025), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/857916.pdf.
8 No. 85790-8-I (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/
opinions/pdf/857908.pdf.

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case addresses whether the trial court may retain and decide a post-Blake CrR 7.8
motion 	for 	relief 	where 	the 	criminal 	charge 	was 	dismissed 	after 	successful
completion of a therapeutic court program. 	At the outset, Hunter asserts that the
State lacks standing, its appeal is moot, and the trial court’s order is not appealable.
Consistent with our conclusion in Peterson, the State has standing with respect to
the Snohomish County drug court because it has a present, substantial interest in
the funding and operation of therapeutic courts. 	No. 85791-6-I, slip op. at 9 n.10.
However, the State fails to demonstrate that it has the authority to bring this claim
on behalf of the Washington State Patrol. Id. Further, like the questions presented
in Peterson, this appeal is not moot because we can still provide Hunter’s requested
relief, vacatur of a dismissed criminal charge and, separately, because it satisfies
the exception to the mootness doctrine as it involves a matter of continuing public
interest with a likelihood of recurrence. Id. at 5-6 n.6. Additionally, the trial court’s
order is appealable as it qualifies as a final decision under RAP 2.2(b)(1). See id.
at 6-7. 	Consistent with our holding in Peterson, the trial court similarly erred here
when it retained and decided Hunter’s CrR 7.8 motion.
As we determined in Peterson, the trial court erred when it ordered vacatur
of a dismissed criminal charge; this is true because nonconviction data as defined
by RCW 10.97.030(8)9 is not subject to that particular mechanism for relief. 	Id.
9 RCW 10.97.030(8) defines nonconviction data as follows:
all criminal history record information relating to an incident which has not led to a
conviction or other disposition adverse to the subject, and for which proceedings
are no longer actively pending. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that
proceedings are no longer actively pending if more than one year has elapsed
since arrest, citation, charge, or service of warrant and no disposition has been
entered.
(Emphasis added.)

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at 10-12. 	Signing nearly identical orders in Hunter’s, Peterson’s, and Fjerstad’s
cases,10 the trial court here nonetheless directed that,
3. 	The 	charge 	of 	POSSESSION 	OF 	A 	CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE contained in the Information filed on January 6, 2012,
against the above-named defendant, is constitutionally defective
pursuant to CrR 7.8(2) [sic] and State v. Blake and is hereby vacated;
. . . .
4. The Clerk of the court shall immediately transmit a copy of
this 	order 	vacating 	the 	charge 	to 	the Washington 	State 	Patrol
Identification Section and to the local police agency, if any, which
holds criminal history information for the person who is the subject of
the charge. 	The Washington State Patrol and any such local police
agency shall immediately update their records to reflect the vacation
of the charge, and shall transmit the order vacating the charge to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation as required by RCW 9.96.060(7).
This is a clear abuse of discretion as it is a misapplication of the vacatur statute to
nonconviction data, which renders the order in paragraph 4 similarly improper as the
vehicle for the removal of nonconviction data as provided by the legislature is set
out in chapter 10.97 RCW. See id. at 18.
So, too, was the court’s legal conclusion in the first paragraph 4,11 premised
on Hunter’s argument under Nelson, that “[d]ue process requires that Ms. Hunter be
refunded the $900 Drug Court fee previously paid pursuant to the vacated charge.”
Again, as we held in Peterson, Nelson is inapposite here because Hunter was never
convicted of a crime that was later reversed, and the drug court fee she paid was
not an LFO imposed pursuant to a criminal conviction. Id. at 12-13.
10 All three defendants in these companion cases were represented by the same defense
counsel, who appears to have prepared the final orders signed in each case as they contain
identical typographical errors.
11 The order contains two consecutive paragraphs identified as “4,” the first of which
addresses Hunter’s due process claim regarding the refund of her fee, while the second directs the
clerk and law enforcement to act on the order vacating the criminal charge.

No. 85792-4-I/7
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To reiterate, our opinion in this case merely addresses the legal questions
presented based on the procedural posture of the case and arguments of the parties
on appeal. 	Neither this opinion nor Peterson should be misconstrued to suggest
that other similarly situated persons who successfully completed a drug court or
other therapeutic court alternative solely on simple drug possession charges are
outside the scope of relief offered under Blake. 	The policy reasons articulated by
our Supreme Court in Blake as to its intended outcome, to restore those defendants
to the same position prior to their prosecution under an unconstitutional statute, must
apply equally to those who opted to pursue rigorous substance use disorder
treatment, pay participation fees, and comport with conduct requirements and
sanction protocols for long periods of time in order to earn dismissal of their drug
possession charges. It is possible, as the State has suggested, that civil claims or
pursuit of a PRP upon demonstration of the nonconviction data or payment of
participation fees as forms of restraint, may be the proper path under our statutes,
but that question remains for another day. On this record, we conclude that CrR 7.8
motions are simply not the proper avenue for that relief.
Reversed.
WE CONCUR: