* Personal Restraint Petition Of Santos W. Orantes

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 	^
In the Matter of the Personal
Restraint of
SANTOS W. ORANTES,
Petitioner.
No. 71082-6-1
CO
DIVISION ONE i
en
PUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	February 6, 2017 	C'-'
Leach, J. — For the second time, Santos Orantes collaterally challenges
his 2006 judgment and sentence based on his guilty plea. 	He asks to withdraw
this plea because his trial counsel did not accurately advise him about the plea's
consequences for his immigration status. 	The State claims that this challenge is
untimely and should have been included in Orantes's first challenge.
Because the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky1 made
a "significant change in the law" 	"material to" Orantes's conviction, Orantes's
petition 	is timely.2 	And 	because 	this 	court's 	2012 	decision 	finding 	Padilla
retroactive 	was 	an 	"intervening 	change[ ] in case 	law" after 	Orantes's first
challenge, his second challenge can proceed.3 	We remand for the trial court to
conduct a reference hearing on the merits of Orantes's claim.
1 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010).
2 RCW 10.73.100(6).
3 In re Pers. Restraint of Turav, 153 Wn.2d 44, 49, 101 P.3d 854 (2004);
see In re Pers. Restraint of Jaqana, No. 66682-7-I, slip op. at 25 (Wash. Ct. App.
Aug. 	13, 	2012), 	http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/666827.pdf, 	withdrawn
Aug. 21,2013.
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No. 71082-6-1/2
FACTS
Orantes is a Salvadoran national with temporary protected status (TPS) in
the United States.4 	He has been convicted of two misdemeanors. 	Federal law
makes a 	person 	with 	these convictions ineligible for TPS 	renewal and thus
subject to deportation.5
Orantes received his second conviction in 2006, when he pleaded guilty to
unlawfully issuing a bank check. 	The sentencing court imposed a deferred
sentence of 364 days of confinement. Orantes's attorney did not advise him that
pleading guilty would affect his immigration status. 	Orantes did not learn that his
plea would jeopardize his immigration status until the federal government denied
his application to renew his TPS. 	In 	2008, he moved to amend the 2006
judgment and sentence. 	Acting on counsel's advice, Orantes believed that his
immigration 	problem 	would 	be 	resolved 	if 	the 	court 	reduced his term 	of
confinement from 364 to 180 days. 	The court granted this relief. 	Orantes later
learned that his criminal history still made him ineligible for TPS. 	He is currently
in deportation proceedings.
4 	This 	court 	summarized 	the 	factual 	background 	at 	length 	in 	an
unpublished opinion dismissing Orantes's first petition. 	In re Pers. Restraint of
Orantes, noted at 170 Wn. App. 1006, 2012 WL 3264956. 	TPS establishes a
temporary safe haven in the United 	States for foreign 	nationals where their
country's conditions prevent them from returning safely. 	El Salvador is such a
country. Orantes, 2012 WL 3264956, at *1.
5 See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i).
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No. 71082-6-1/3
In 2011, Orantes moved to vacate his 2006 conviction, asserting that the
trial 	court 	had 	violated 	his 	due 	process 	rights. 	He 	claimed 	his 	plea 	was
involuntary and the judgment and sentence void because the trial court failed to
advise 	him 	of the 	immigration 	consequences. 	Orantes 	based 	his 	argument
on Padilla, which the United States Supreme Court decided after his plea and
sentence. 	But he expressly denied making any claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective. 	The trial court dismissed the petition, and we affirmed. 	We rejected
Orantes's due process claim because both Padilla and the Washington Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Sandoval6 decided ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, not claims based on a denial of due process.7
Orantes again moved for relief from his 2006 conviction in 2013. 	The trial
court transferred 	his 	motion to this court to 	consider as a 	personal restraint
petition 	(PRP). 	Orantes 	claimed 	that 	his 	trial 	counsel's 	performance 	was
constitutionally deficient. 	This court dismissed the petition. 	The Supreme Court
granted discretionary review and remanded to this court for reconsideration in
light of its intervening decision, In re Personal Restraint of Yung-Cheng Tsai.8
6 171 Wn.2d 163, 249 P.3d 1015 (2011).
7 Orantes. 2012 WL 3264956, at *5.
8183Wn.2d91, 351 P.3d 138(2015).
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No. 71082-6-1/4
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court may transfer a motion for relief from judgment under CrR 7.8
to this court for consideration as a PRP "'to serve the ends of justice.'"9 A PRP is
not a substitute for direct appeal, and availability of collateral relief is limited.10
To 	obtain 	relief, 	the 	petitioner must first 	overcome statutory and 	rule-based
procedural bars.11 	We review de novo questions of law that a PRP raises.12
ANALYSIS
Orantes's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is a collateral attack on his
2006 conviction.13 	He now makes an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,14
asserting that "his attorney failed to inform him that [pleading guilty] would cause
him to 	lose his immigration status and render him deportable . . . and instead
assured him that his immigration status would not be affected."
9 State v. Robinson. 153 Wn.2d 689, 696, 	107 P.3d 90 (2005) (quoting
former CrR 7.8(c)(2) (2003)).
10 In re Pers. Restraint of Grasso, 151 Wn.2d 1, 10, 84 P.3d 859 (2004).
11 Grasso, 151 Wn.2d at 10; see RCW 10.73.090; RAP 16.4(d).
12 In re Pers. Restraint of Wolf, 196 Wn. App. 496, 503, 384 P.3d 591
(2016), petition for review filed, No. 93993-4 (Wash. Jan. 3, 2017).
13 RCW 10.73.090(2).
14 To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show that
(1) counsel provided representation so deficient that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced him.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
(1984); 	State 	v. 	Thomas, 	109 	Wn.2d 	222, 	226, 	743 	P.2d 	816 	(1987). 	A
defendant shows prejudice when there is a reasonable probability that but for
counsel's errors, 	the result of the trial 	would 	have 	been different. 	State v.
Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996).
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No. 71082-6-1/5
The trial court did not decide the merits of Orantes's claim because it
decided that the general one-year statute of limitations for PRPs applied and
barred it. We disagree.
RCW 10.73.100(6) Exception to Statute of Limitations
In 	general, 	a 	defendant 	cannot 	collaterally 	attack 	a 	judgment 	and
sentence more than one year after it becomes final.15 	RCW 10.73.100 provides
several exceptions to this rule. 	One exception allows a defendant to collaterally
attack a judgment after the one-year deadline if the defendant establishes three
things: 	(1) a significant change in the law occurred, (2) that change is material to
the defendant's conviction, and (3) that change applies retroactively.16
Orantes asserts that this exception applies to 	his 	request because the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Padilla was a "significant change in
the law" that is material to his claim and applies retroactively. 	We agree.
In Yung-Cheng Tsai, the Washington Supreme Court decided that Padilla
made a significant change in our state's law about collateral attacks based on
ineffective assistance claims17 and that Padilla "applies retroactively to matters
on collateral review."18 	Thus, Orantes's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
15 RCW 10.73.090(1).
16 RCW 10.73.100(6).
17 Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d at 107.
18 Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d at 103.
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No. 71082-6-1/6
satisfies the first and third requirements of the exception. 	This leaves for our
decision whether Padilla's change in law is "material to" Orantes's conviction.
The State asserts that 	Padilla 	is 	not material to 	Orantes's conviction
because Washington courts accepted claims like Orantes's before Padilla. 	It
posits that before Padilla Washington courts distinguished between claims that
an attorney failed to offer any advice on the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea 	and 	claims that an 	attorney offered 	"mis-advice" 	regarding 	immigration
consequences. 	The State asserts that the second type was already available to
Orantes before Padilla. We disagree.
First, Padilla itself belies the State's argument. 	The State's argument that
"non-advice" claims were not available until Padilla, whereas "mis-advice" claims
were available all along, 	ignores the obvious: 	Padilla involved 	a 	misadvice
claim.19 	Padilla's trial counsel incorrectly informed him that he "'did not have to
worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.'"20 The
State mistakenly asserts that Padilla changed the law with respect to nonadvice
claims but not with respect to the type of claim at issue in that case. 	Also, the
Padilla Court did not make the distinction the State promotes.
Second, a close reading of the pre-Padilla cases shows that Washington
courts likely would have rejected Orantes's claim before Padilla.
19 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.
20 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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No. 71082-6-1/7
The State cites only one pre-Padilla decision finding ineffective assistance
of counsel, 	and 	that case did 	not 	involve 	immigration 	consequences. 	The
defendant in State v. Stowe21 was concerned about the consequences of a guilty
plea on his military career. 	His attorney told him that entering an Alford22 plea
would 	not 	affect 	his 	career. 	After 	his 	conviction, 	the 	Army 	immediately
discharged him.23 	In considering Stowe's ineffective assistance claim, Division
Two 	distinguished 	counsel's 	failing 	to 	inform 	from 	providing 	affirmative
misinformation.24 	It concluded that Stowe's counsel's wrong advice "fell below
the 	objective 	standard 	of 	reasonableness" 	and 	constituted 	deficient
performance.25
Dicta from Division Two's decision the next year in State v. Hollev26 also
support the distinction the State makes. 	A statement in the plea of guilty form
that Holley signed informed him that his plea could be grounds for deportation.
Holley's attorney mistakenly thought Holley was a U.S. citizen and told him that
he could skip that statement because it did not apply to him.27 	Division Two held
21 71 Wn. App. 182, 184, 858 P.2d 267 (1993).
22 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L Ed. 2d 162
(1970).
23 Stowe, 71 Wn. App. at 184-85.
24 Stowe, 71 Wn. App. at 187.
25 Stowe, 71 Wn. App. at 188-89.
26 75 Wn. App. 191, 195, 876 P.2d 973 (1994).
27 Hollev, 75 Wn. App. at 195.
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No. 71082-6-1/8
that Holley was entitled to a 	hearing to 	rebut the 	presumption that he 	was
properly advised.28
Although the court decided the case on statutory grounds, it addressed
Holley's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in dicta.29 	It would have rejected
that claim by distinguishing the "faulty advice" Holley received from "the type of
affirmative misinformation at issue in Stowe."30 	But the court did not explain how
to distinguish faulty advice from affirmative misinformation; both phrases would
seem to apply when counsel informs a client that he can sign the plea without
reading the immigration advisory because the advisory does not affect him.
Similar dicta in In re Personal Restraint of Yim31 also support the State's
argument. 	A petitioner, Samphao, was advised at the time of his guilty plea that
his plea might subject him to deportation.32 	A verbal exchange at sentencing
showed that the prosecutor and trial judge misunderstood the law and thought
Samphao would not be deportable and that Samphao's attorney did not know if
he 	would 	be.33 	Samphao asserted 	that the 	prosecutor, 	trial court, 	and 	his
attorney affirmatively misrepresented the consequences of his plea, making that
28 Hollev, 75 Wn. App. at 200.
29 Hollev, 75 Wn. App. at 198-99; see Yung-Cheng Tsai. 183 Wn.2d at
105-06 (characterizing Division Two's ineffective assistance analysis as dicta).
30 Hollev, 75 Wn. App. at 198-99.
31 139 Wn.2d 581, 588, 989 P.2d 512 (1999).
32 Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 588-90.
33 Yim, 139Wn.2dat589.
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No. 71082-6-1/9
plea involuntary.34 	The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that deportation is
a 	mere 	collateral 	consequence of pleading 	guilty.35 	Thus, 	it held, 	defense
counsel 	had 	no obligation 	to 	advise 	Samphao that 	his 	plea 	might 	result 	in
deportation. 	The court also stated that an affirmative misrepresentation "might"
be a basis for setting aside the plea, but it found that the record did not show
such a misrepresentation.36 	The court concluded that the trial court's advice to
Samphao at the time of his plea was enough to make that plea voluntary.
While dicta in Hollev and Yim thus support the State's position, the State
cites no decision, nor is this court aware of any, where a Washington court has
held that a defendant can obtain relief for ineffective assistance of counsel based
on incorrect advice about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. 	The
line drawn in pre-Padilla Washington cases was not between misadvice and
nonadvice but between collateral and direct consequences. 	Padilla rejected that
distinction.37
34 Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 587-88.
35 Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 588; see also State v. Jamison. 105 Wn. App. 572,
591, 20 	P.3d 	1010 (2001) (noting that ineffective assistance claim would 	fail
because deportation is only collateral consequence but finding in any case that
"Jamison was advised categorically by counsel that he would 	be deported");
State v. 	Martinez-Lazo, 	100 Wn. 	App. 	869, 	877-78, 	999 	P.2d 	1275 	(2000)
(holding defense counsel not ineffective for failing to warn of deportation because
deportation is collateral consequence); In re Pers. Restraint of Peters, 50 Wn.
App. 702, 705-06, 750 P.2d 643 (1988) (noting same distinction).
36 Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 588-90.
37 Sandoval. 171 Wn.2d at 170 n.1. 	The Supreme Court of Kentucky had
held in Padilla "that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of
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No. 71082-6-1/10
Rather than support the State's misadvice-nonadvice distinction, the facts
and holdings of pre-Padilla cases indicate that Washington courts would have
rejected Orantes's claim before Padilla. 	Orantes stated in a declaration that his
trial counsel advised him that pleading guilty would lead to the best outcome of
his case: 	"[Counsel] mistakenly advised me that pleading guilty would not affect
my TPS as long as I was sentenced to less than 365 days of confinement. 	She
never told 	me that 	pleading guilty would 	cause 	me to 	lose my 	immigration
status." 	Counsel's declaration did not mention these affirmative statements but
confirmed that while counsel discussed some of the consequences of Orantes's
plea with him, she never advised him that the plea would make him ineligible for
TPS and probably cause him to lose his immigration status.
These facts are similar to those that courts found insufficient to support
due process and ineffective assistance claims in Holley and Yim. 	As in Hollev,
the petitioner's attorney advised him to plead guilty while giving him inaccurate
advice. 	Just as Holley's attorney advised him that the deportation advisory did
not apply to him, Orantes's attorney told him a guilty plea would not affect his
immigration status. 	Like the petitioner in Yim, Orantes knew that he was at risk
of deportation but received a false impression, both from his attorney and from
counsel does 	not protect a 	criminal defendant from 	erroneous advice about
deportation 	because it is merely a 	'collateral' consequence of his conviction."
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359-60 (emphasis added). 	This is the decision the United
States Supreme Court reversed.
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No. 71082-6-1/11
the trial court and prosecutor, about the particular consequences of his plea.
And just as the attorneys and trial court in Yim thought that Samphao would not
be deportable "unless he gets 60 months or more," the attorneys and trial court
here thought Orantes would not lose TPS unless he got 365 days or more.38
Orantes's 	case 	also 	resembles 	the 	petitioner's 	in 	Sandoval. 	There,
Sandoval's attorney advised him to accept a plea offer because he would not be
immediately deported and could obtain immigration counsel to "ameliorate any
potential 	immigration 	consequences."39 	Division 	Three, 	in 	an 	unpublished
opinion before Padilla, rejected Sandoval's due process claim, relying on Yim's
statement that deportation was "merely a collateral consequence."40 	In reversing
Division Three's decision, the Supreme Court held that "Padilla has superseded
Yim's analysis of how counsel's advice about deportation consequences (or lack
thereof) affects the validity of a guilty plea."41 	Notably, the Supreme Court did not
distinguish 	between 	bad 	advice 	and 	no 	advice. 	Like 	Sandoval's 	attorney,
Orantes's counsel advised him to accept a plea offer, 	basing that advice on a
misunderstanding of the consequences of a guilty plea. 	Sandoval's collateral
38 This is shown here by the initial, misguided agreement between the trial
court, 	defense 	counsel, 	and 	prosecutor 	to 	a 	364-day 	sentence 	and 	the
subsequent, also misguided agreement to reduce that sentence to 180 days.
See Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 589-90.
39 Sandoval. 171 Wn.2d at 167.
40 	Sandoval. 	171 	Wn.2d 	at 	170 	n.1 	(citing 	In 	re 	Pers. 	Restraint 	of
Sandoval, noted at 145 Wn. App. 1017, 2008 WL 2460282, at *2).
41 Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d at 170 n.1.
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No. 71082-6-1/12
challenge based on these facts failed before Padilla, then succeeded in light of
Padilla's changes to the law. 	Sandoval further demonstrates that Padilla made a
change material to Orantes's conviction.
Despite some unfortunate dicta, the Supreme Court's decision in Yung-
Cheng 	Tsai 	accords with 	this 	analysis. 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	held 	that one
petitioner, 	Jagana, was entitled to 	a 	reference hearing 	because his attorney
failed to give him any guidance about the potential immigration consequences of
a guilty plea. 	It observed that "Washington courts would have rejected Jagana's
claim 	before 	Padilla." 	Thus, 	the 	court 	held, 	Jagana's 	claim 	was 	not time-
barred.42 The other petitioner, Tsai, claimed his attorney "incorrectly advised him
about the immigration consequences" of his plea. 	Tsai had filed his first motion
to withdraw, claiming misadvice, in 2008. 	The trial court found that motion to be
untimely and 	rejected it accordingly, without considering the misadvice claim.
Tsai did not appeal. 	In his collateral attack, Tsai offered no reason to overturn
the trial court's procedure-based decision to dismiss his petition. 	The Supreme
Court therefore denied a reference hearing without needing to consider whether
Tsai's claim had merit before Padilla.43
These were the holdings in Yung-Cheng Tsai. 	The court also suggested
twice that misadvice claims were actionable before Padilla—statements the State
42 Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d at 107.
43 Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d at 107-08.
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No. 71082-6-1/13
relies 	on 	heavily here—but 	did 	not 	rely on 	these 	observations 	in reaching
different results for the two petitioners. 	In discussing Tsai's petition, the court
observed, 	"Washington courts 	have long recognized that where a 	defendant
relies 	on 	his 	or 	her 	attorney's 	incorrect 	advice 	about 	the 	immigration
consequences 	of 	pleading 	guilty, 	the 	defendant's 	plea 	may 	be 	rendered
involuntary and withdrawn."44 	The court cited only Yim for this observation. 	As
discussed above, the cited portion of Yim was dicta.45 	Moreover, the Tsai court's
statement itself was dicta since, as discussed above, the court rejected Tsai's
collateral challenge as untimely based on his failure to appeal the dismissal of his
original motion to withdraw.
In sum, case law shows that Washington courts likely would have rejected
Orantes's 	challenge 	before 	Padilla, just 	as 	they 	rejected 	claims 	based 	on
counsel's failure 	to 	advise. 	Padilla's change 	in the 	law is thus 	material to
Orantes's conviction.46
Because 	Orantes's 	claim 	satisfies 	the 	RCW 	10.73.100(6) 	"significant
change" exception, the one-year statute of limitations does not bar his ineffective
44 Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d at 107.
45 Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d at 107 (citing Yim, 139 Wn.2d at 588
("While an affirmative misrepresentation to a defendant regarding the possibility
of deportation might constitute a 'manifest injustice' and, thus, provide a basis for
setting aside a guilty plea, the record demonstrates that there was no such
misrepresentation here." 	(emphasis added))).
46 See Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d at 170 n.1.
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No. 71082-6-1/14
assistance of counsel claim. 	We need 	not address Orantes's request for a
hearing on whether his claim is one of misadvice or nonadvice. 	Nor do we need
to consider Orantes's argument that petitioners before Padilla could base their
ineffective assistance claims 	only on 	affirmative misrepresentations 	explicitly
regarding deportation.
Abuse of the Writ
The 	State also 	asserts that this 	court should 	dismiss 	this, 	Orantes's
second 	petition, 	as an 	"abuse of the writ" 	barred 	by RCW 	10.73.140. 	We
disagree.
A second or subsequent PRP is an "abuse of the writ" if it raises a new
issue that was available to the petitioner at the time of filing an earlier petition.47
If the petitioner's counsel was aware of facts supporting the "new" claim when the
petitioner filed the earlier petition and "'no pertinent intervening developments'"
occur, then the later petition is an abuse of the writ and barred.48 	No such abuse
occurs, 	however, 	when 	the 	petitioner 	bases 	a 	claim 	"on 	newly 	discovered
evidence or intervening changes in case law," as such a claim "would not have
been 'available' when the earlier petition was filed."49
47 Turav. 153 Wn.2d at 48.
48 Turay, 153 Wn.2d at 49 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Jeffries, 114
Wn.2d 485, 492, 789 P.2d 731 (1990)).
49 Turav. 153 Wn.2d at 48-49.
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No. 71082-6-1/15
The State points out that the United States Supreme Court decided Padilla
in 2010. 	The State contends that any "intervening changes in case law" thus
occurred before Orantes filed his first petition in 2011. 	We disagree.
This 	court's 	opinion in In re 	Personal 	Restraint 	of Jagana50 	was 	an
intervening 	change 	in case 	law. 	That decision, 	issued 	after Orantes's first
petition, 	recognized 	for 	the 	first 	time 	that 	Padilla 	applied 	retroactively 	in
Washington state courts to cases on collateral review.51 	This court noted that
Padilla had 	left open whether its rule should apply retroactively and that the
question was a subject of debate among federal and state appellate courts. 	In a
thorough analysis, this court agreed with the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts 	in finding 	that 	Padilla did apply retroactively.52 	Because
Jagana was thus an intervening change in case law relevant to Orantes, 	his
second petition's new claim based on Padilla is not an "abuse of the writ."
50 	No. 	66682-7-I, 	slip 	op 	at 	25 	(Wash. 	Ct. 	App. 	Aug. 	13, 	2012),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/666827.pdf, withdrawn Aug. 21, 2013.
51 See Jagana, slip op. at 25.
52 Jagana, slip op. at 12-25. 	Our Supreme Court remanded Jagana for
reconsideration in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chaidez
v. United States 	U.S. 	, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1110, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149(2013),
and this court withdrew its opinion. 	Later, in Yung-Cheng Tsai, our Supreme
Court agreed with this court's Jagana holding as a matter of Washington law.
Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d at 103.
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No. 71082-6-1/16
The State also contends that Orantes's petition is an abuse of the writ
because Orantes chose not to pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
in his first petition.
"[A]n applicant's deliberate withholding of grounds when he files his first
application for relief and his deliberate abandonment of a ground at an earlier
hearing are examples of conduct disentitling an applicant to relief."53 	This rule
prevents "'needless piecemeal litigation'" and petitions "'whose only purpose is to
vex, harass, or delay.'"54
As 	discussed 	above, "intervening changes in case law" occurred after
Orantes's first petition. 	Before these changes, it was reasonable for Orantes to
think that an ineffective assistance claim based on Padilla was not available to
him. His actions in bringing another petition after this court found Padilla to apply
retroactively were neither needless nor vexatious. 	Thus, his previous failure to
make an ineffective assistance claim does not bar his raising it in a second
petition.55
53 Jeffries, 114 Wn.2d at 500 (emphasis omitted).
54 Jeffries, 114 Wn.2d at 501 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S.
1, 18, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1963)).
55 "[Dismissal of a writ as abusive is based upon equitable principles."
Jeffries, 114 Wn.2d at 500; see Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17.
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No. 71082-6-1/17
CONCLUSION
Because the significant change in the law that Padilla made is material to
Orantes's ineffective assistance claim, the statute of limitations does not bar that
claim. 	And 	because this court's decision finding 	Padilla 	retroactive was an
intervening change in the law after Orantes's first petition, his second petition is
not an "abuse of the writ." 	We remand for a reference hearing on the merits of
Orantes's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
WE CONCUR:
yf^frf r^^/J.
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