Rodney J. Baker, Appellant V. Pierce County Public Transportation Benefit Area, Respondent

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
RODNEY J. BAKER, No. 49720-4-II
Appellant,
v.
PIERCE COUNTY PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION BENEFIT AREA
CORPORATION,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent.
SUTTON, J — Rodney J. Baker appeals the superior court’s order granting summary
judgment to Pierce County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation (Pierce Transit) on his
claims of wrongful termination and breach of contract. Baker argues that there are genuine issues
of material fact that preclude summary judgment because Pierce Transit could only discharge him
“for cause” and it did not discharge him “for cause.” We hold that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, that Pierce Transit discharged Baker for cause, and we affirm the superior court’s
order granting summary judgment and dismissal of his wrongful termination and breach of contract
claims.
FACTS
I. PIERCE TRANSIT’S PERSONNEL MANUAL
Pierce Transit is a municipal corporation that provides public transit in Pierce County.
Pierce Transit has a personnel manual. Section 8.0 of the personnel manual governs discipline and
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
April 24, 2018

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lists several causes that are grounds for Pierce Transit to discipline or terminate an employee. The
discipline section states that “[t]hese guidelines will be used in determining discipline. [Pierce
Transit] reserves the right to decide specific actions based upon individual circumstances and facts
of each case.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 728. In Section 8.1.3, the personnel manual states that “[i]f
the hiring authority believes a situation exists requiring the immediate termination or suspension
of an employee, the hiring authority should carefully document the reasons for such a decision.”
CP at 728. Lastly, section 8.5 states that “the hiring authority may discharge a regular employee
for disciplinary reasons including but not limited to those set forth above.” CP at 730. There is
no reference to “progressive discipline” in the discipline section or in the personal manual.
II. BAKER’S DUTIES
In 2000, Pierce Transit hired Baker. In 2006, Baker’s position at Pierce Transit was Chief
of Public Safety and Transit Police. In this position, Baker reported that his job duties included
monitoring and authorizing expenditures in accordance with budgetary limitations and
coordinating the community policing effort with other law enforcement agencies. To coordinate
the community policing effort, Pierce Transit contracted with the Tacoma and the Lakewood
Police Departments to hire off-duty officers. Pierce Transit also contracted with the Tacoma Police
Department to provide one full-time liaison officer position. Tacoma Police Department Officers,
Mark Feddersen and James Smith, signed a contract with Pierce Transit to become liaison officers
and they split the 40 hour per week liaison officer position. The contracts specified that the liaison
officers and the off-duty officers for the community policing effort were to be paid on an hourly
basis. Baker knew that both the liaison officers and the off-duty officers were to be paid hourly
and that it was his responsibility, as the supervisor, to review and approve their timecards.

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In 2012, Officer Feddersen approached Baker and proposed that he and Officer Smith be
paid a flat rate instead of an hourly rate, effectively making them salaried employees of Pierce
Transit. Baker agreed to change the contracts and convert them to salaried employees without
notifying the Finance Department, his chain of command, or the person who was authorized to
sign these contracts for Pierce Transit. Baker then implemented a new billing system that allowed
Officers Feddersen and Smith to individually report ten hours of work every Saturday and Sunday,
even though they worked sporadically throughout the week. At times, they both reported over 20
hours of time worked per week for the 40 hour per week liaison position that they shared.
III. AUDIT OF TIME REPORTED BY LIAISON OFFICERS
Liz Passmore is a Finance Assistant Manager at Pierce Transit. On September 12, 2013,
Baker’s assistant reported to Passmore that the liaisons’ and off-duty officers’ timecards were not
reviewed by anyone and it appeared that the officers were reporting excessive hours. She also
reported that Baker instructed her to “rubber stamp” his signature to approve the timecards,
Because of these allegations, Pierce Transit conducted an internal audit of the timecards.
On October 21, Passmore completed an initial draft audit report. Her draft audit report
raised the following issues related to the pay for the liaison and off-duty officers:
 Timecards are not being reviewed by [Baker] . . . and a signature stamp is being
used [for Baker’s signature]. The result is that timecards do not have the
required approval.
 The Daily Field Activity Report (DFAR) for [Officers Feddersen and Smith]
do not match the hours reported and paid on the timed card.
 The hours actually reported as worked for the pay period for [Tacoma and
Lakewood Police Departments] were significantly higher than the hours
scheduled by Pierce Transit.

No. 49720-4-II
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CP at 195. The draft audit report also noted that both Officers Feddersen and Smith had reported
between 40 to 75 hours every pay period in 2013. That same day, Baker met with Kathy Sullivant,
Pierce Transit’s Finance Manager, and Wayne Fanshier, Pierce Transit’s Chief Financial Officer,
to discuss Passmore’s draft audit report. In that meeting, the managers discussed the number of
hours that the liaison and off-duty officers had been reporting and Baker’s “rubber stamp” process.
They agreed to meet again after Baker discussed the draft audit report with Officers Feddersen and
Smith. On October 23, Passmore emailed her draft audit report to Baker, who then sent the report
to Officers Feddersen and Smith. On October 26, Officer Feddersen emailed Baker and explained
that he and Officer Smith considered themselves to be “de facto salaried employees” of Pierce
Transit. CP at 227.
On October 31, Baker met with Passmore, Sullivant, Fanshier, and Officers Feddersen and
Smith to discuss their responses to the draft audit report. Sullivant’s notes from that meeting state
that the liaison officers filled out their time cards by individually reporting 10 hours of work on
Saturday and Sunday because Baker had told them to do so, and that Baker “indicated that he
considered them to be salaried employees.” CP at 215. On November 7, Passmore again met with
Baker’s assistant. Baker’s assistant described her discomfort with the “rubber stamp” process
created by Baker, and she alleged that one of the liaison officers appeared to have misreported his
hours.
IV. THE INVESTIGATION AND BAKER’S ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE
Pierce Transit hired outside counsel, Jeff Coopersmith, to conduct an investigation. On
November 19, Pierce Transit placed Baker on paid administrative leave pending completion of the
investigation. Coopersmith interviewed Baker twice during his investigation. Baker

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acknowledged that he was familiar with the Pierce Transit personnel manual and that he had relied
on Section 8.0 when he had considered disciplining subordinates that he supervised.
On February 5, 2014, Coopersmith released a report. It stated that “Baker likely exceeded
his authority under the Pierce Transit Code1 when he authorized [Officer Feddersen and Officer
Smith] to work ‘on salary,’ without obtaining approval from the CEO or the Board.” CP at 258.
Coopersmith stated that he had “not found evidence establishing that [Baker, Officer Feddersen,
or Officer Smith] . . . over-reported, falsified, or improperly approved hours for off-duty officers.”
CP at 258. He noted that there was no evidence of malfeasance because there was no tracking
information that could confirm or deny the veracity of the approved hours. Coopersmith concluded
that Baker had abdicated his responsibility to review the timecards and ensure that they were
accurate, and that, as a result, no one was reviewing the liaison officers’ hours to ensure that their
timecards were accurate.
On February 13, Baker and his personal attorney met with Baker’s Supervisor, Doug
Middleton and Alberton Lara. Doug Middleton was Pierce Transit’s Chief Operating Officer
(COO) and Alberton Lara was Pierce Transit’s Chief Administration Officer and the head of
Human Resources. During the meeting, they discussed Baker’s actions and provided him an
opportunity to respond to the Coopersmith investigation.
1 All references are to the version of the Pierce Transit Code in effect at the time of Baker’s
termination. CP at 33 n.22. The current Pierce Transit Code can be located here:
https://library.municode.com/wa/pierce_transit/codes/code?nodeId=PIERCE_TRANSIT_WASH
INGTONCO.

No. 49720-4-II
6
V. PIERCE TRANSIT NOTICE TO BAKER AND PRE-TERMINATION MEETING
On February 25, Middleton sent a letter to Baker advising him that Pierce Transit was
considering taking disciplinary action against him, up to and including dismissal.
1) While being aware of the hourly pay basis of the contracts with Tacoma Police
officers working for Pierce Transit as off-duty police and the need for daily time
keeping, without authority, you changed the terms of such contracts without
notifying Finance or anyone else in your chain of command or who was authorized
to sign such contracts.
2) Failure to follow directions regarding payroll issues for Transit Security Officers.
3) Lack of understanding of the limits of your administrative or other authority for
contracting and otherwise; lack of awareness of [Pierce Transit] contracting
authority under the Pierce Transit Code; and lack of awareness of the binding nature
of contract terms.
4) Your authorization of the use of your rubber-stamped signature by your
administrative staff to sign payroll records that you did not verify yourself. Some
of the time records differed from scheduled hours.
5) The Investigation revealed some instances of conduct that do not reflect well on
a Chief of Police, such as failure to exercise appropriate judgment and leadership.
6) All issues addressed in the [Coopersmith] Investigation impact my assessment
of potential disciplinary action
CP at 273-74. The letter also encouraged Baker “to take advantage of the opportunity to respond
to the allegations and evidence” by March 4. CP at 274.
On March 7, Pierce Transit held a pre-termination meeting with Baker and his attorney.
Baker submitted written responses to the allegations and stated that he believed that he had the
authority to change the contracts and convert the liaison officers to a salary system. Baker did not
rebut the bases for the disciplinary action that Pierce Transit was considering taking.
VI. BAKER’S TERMINATION AND LAWSUIT
On March 20, Pierce Transit terminated Baker and notified him by letter. The termination
letter cited violations of the following three provisions: section 8.2.2 (Willful violation of the

No. 49720-4-II
7
provisions or policies of the Agency.), section 8.2.5 (General incompetency or inefficiency in the
performance of your duties.), and section 8.2.15 (Mishandling of employer revenues.). CP at 261.
In the termination letter, Middleton wrote that he “heard nothing that justified [Baker’s] decision
to give up oversight of the payroll and unilaterally change terms of [Pierce Transit’s] contracts.
Additionally, [Baker] did not seem to understand or appreciate that the scope of [his] authority is
limited.” CP at 571.
Baker filed a complaint against Pierce Transit for sex discrimination under the Washington
Law Against Discrimination (WLAD),2 and for wrongful termination and breach of contract
allegedly based on “the Pierce Transit Code and the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant by
terminating Plaintiff without cause.” CP at 3-4. Pierce Transit filed a motion for summary
judgment and dismissal. After considering the motion and Baker’s response, the superior court
granted the motion. Baker appeals the superior court’s order granting summary judgment and
dismissal of his wrongful termination and breach of contract claims.3
ANALYSIS
Baker argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Pierce Transit
discharged him “for cause.” Br. of Appellant at 15. Pierce Transit argues that based on its internal
audit and investigation, it reasonably concluded that Baker willfully violated the terms of its
2 Ch. 49.60 RCW.
3 Baker does not appeal the superior court’s dismissal of his claim for sex discrimination.

No. 49720-4-II
8
personnel manual, and thus, Pierce Transit discharged him “for cause.” We agree with Pierce
Transit that Baker was discharged for cause.4
We review a summary judgment ruling de novo, viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scrivener v. Clark
Coll., 181 Wn.2d 439, 444, 334 P.3d 541 (2014). A superior court properly grants summary
judgment where the pleadings, declarations, or affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). If
reasonable minds could reach different conclusions about a fact, a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Youker v. Douglas County, 178 Wn. App. 793, 796, 327 P.3d 1243 (2014). A material fact
is one that controls the litigation’s outcome. Youker, 178 Wn. App. at 796.
“In a summary judgment motion, the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the
absence of an issue of material fact.” Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d
182 (1989). If the moving party meets his or her initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. Young, 112 Wn.2d at 225.
If the nonmoving party “‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,’ then
the trial court should grant the motion.” Young, 112 Wn.2d at 225 (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)).
4 Baker also argues that the personnel manual created an implied contract, that the manual only
allows Pierce Transit to discharge him “for cause,” and that Pierce Transit did not effectively
disclaim any implied contract. Because we hold that Pierce Transit discharged Baker “for cause,”
we do not reach these arguments.

No. 49720-4-II
9
“Just cause” is defined as a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith on the
part of the party exercising the power. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc., 112
Wn.2d 127, 139, 769 P.2d 298 (1989). A discharge “for cause” is based on facts supported by
substantial evidence, reasonably believed by the employer to be true, and not for any arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal reason. Gaglidari v. Denny’s Restaurants, Inc., 117 Wn.2d 426, 438, 815
P.2d 1362 (1991) (quoting Baldwin, 112 Wn.2d at 769). Whether someone was discharged “for
cause” is a question for the trier of fact, unless there is no genuine issue of material fact. See
Baldwin, 112 Wn.2d at 132.
Baker does not dispute the facts relied on by Pierce Transit to support his termination.
Instead, he defends his conduct by claiming that he believed he had the authority to change the
contracts and convert the liaison officers to a salary system. But Baker’s “reasonable belief” that
he had the authority to change the way the liaison and off-duty officers reported their time is not
legally relevant. In evaluating just cause, it is the employer’s belief that is relevant, not the
employee’s belief. Gaglidari, 117 Wn.2d at 438.
In terminating Baker, Pierce Transit cited sections 8.2.2, 8.2.5, and 8.2.15 of the personnel
manual. Section 8.2.2 states that it is a cause for discipline if an employee willfully violates the
provisions or policies of Pierce Transit. In the termination letter, Pierce Transit described why it
believed that Baker had willfully violated the provisions or policies. Specifically, the letter stated
that the willful violation
occurred when you changed the terms of [Pierce Transit]-issued contracts without
approval or authorization. While being aware of the hourly pay basis of the
contracts with officers working for Pierce Transit as off-duty police and the need
for daily time keeping, without authority, you changed the terms of such contracts

No. 49720-4-II
10
without notifying Finance or anyone else in your chain of command or who was
authorized to sign such contracts.
CP at 261.
Section 8.2.5 states that it is a cause for discipline if an employee is generally incompetent
or inefficient in the performance of his or her duties. In the letter, Pierce Transit described why it
believed Baker was generally incompetent or inefficient in his duties. Specifically, the letter stated,
Throughout this process you have insisted that you have the power and control to
make the kind of decisions you made related to contracts in your area of
responsibility, though you have never had this authority. Additionally, the decision
to change the liaisons’ status to “salaried” in order to allegedly save [Pierce Transit]
money appears to be without valid basis and reflects poor decision-making and
judgment.
CP at 261.
Section 8.2.15 states that it is a cause for discipline for an employee to mishandle Pierce
Transit’s revenue. In the letter, Pierce Transit described why it believed Baker mishandled Pierce
Transit’s revenue. Specifically, the letter stated,
You directed your staff to use a rubber stamp with your signature and without your
review to process payroll, giving up oversight and verification of the hours being
billed by off-duty police officers. Assigning administrative staff the task of rubber
stamping time keeping records shows a severe lack of good judgment.
CP at 261.
Pierce Transit conducted an internal audit, an investigation, and had numerous in-person
meetings with Baker where he did not deny his actions, and provided him an opportunity to defend
himself and explain his actions. Pierce Transit’s termination of Baker was based on violations of
three personnel manual provisions and was supported by substantial evidence. Pierce Transit
reasonably believed these facts to be true, and the termination was not done for any arbitrary,

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capricious, or illegal reason. Thus, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to Baker, Pierce Transit discharged Baker “for cause.”
Because there are no genuine issues of material fact, the superior court properly granted
Pierce Transit’s motion for summary judgment and dismissal of Baker’s wrongful termination and
breach of contract claims. Therefore, we affirm the superior court’s order granting summary
judgment and dismissal.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
SUTTON, J.
We concur:
JOHANSON, P.J.
BJORGEN, J.