State Of Washington, Respondent V. Terveyon Curtis, Appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
TERVEYON T. CURTIS,
Appellant.
No. 80183-0-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SMITH, J. — Terveyon Curtis appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. Curtis contends that the trial court abused its discretion because
he did not enter his guilty plea voluntarily and with an understanding of the
consequences of the plea. Specifically, Curtis asserts that he did not understand
that two mandatory deadly weapon sentence enhancements would run
consecutively to each other.
We conclude that because the totality of the circumstances demonstrates
that Curtis understood the applicable sentencing range—and therefore, the
consequences of his plea—the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Curtis’ motion. However, we hold that the trial court erred in imposing
discretionary community supervision fees. Therefore, we affirm but remand to
the trial court with directions to strike the community supervision fees.

No. 80183-0-I/2
2
FACTS
On March 7, 2017, the State charged Curtis with robbery in the first
degree (count 1) and burglary in the first degree (count 2). And on April 1, 2019,
Curtis pleaded guilty to both counts. The State’s sentence recommendation for
the plea specified that the standard sentencing range for count 1 was 46 to 61
months and count 2 was 31 to 41 months to be served concurrently.
Additionally, each count carried a mandatory deadly weapon sentence
enhancement of 24 months, which would run consecutively to the standard range
and to each other.
On April 1, 2019, the day of the scheduled trial, the State announced to
the court that the parties had reached a plea agreement. During the hearing that
followed, the State ran through a series of questions intended to ensure that
Curtis understood the terms of his plea agreement. The State summarized the
sentence enhancements and provided the State’s recommended sentence. But
when the State asked Curtis to confirm his understanding, Curtis asked the
State, “What’d you say? Can you repeat that?” Curtis’ attorney then spoke to
Curtis—part of which was on the record—stating, “It’s the 94 to 109.” Following
Curtis’ attorney’s explanation, the State again asked whether Curtis understood,
and Curtis said, “Yeah.” The court later accepted Curtis’ guilty plea.
Pursuant to Curtis’ plea of guilty, the parties submitted three documents to
the court: (1) Curtis’ statement of defendant on plea of guilty, (2) the State’s
sentencing recommendation, and (3) the plea agreement. Curtis’ statement,
which he and his attorney signed and initialed, specified that both counts

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included a sentence enhancement of 24 months each. The statement also
included a chart, which provided the sentence enhancements that would be
added to the standard range and the standard sentencing range for both of the
charges. Similarly, the State’s sentence recommendation specified that the
sentence would include two consecutive 24-month sentence enhancements and
that the State recommended the high end of the sentence range, 109 months.
The signed felony plea agreement included a check box for the sentence
enhancements. However, the parties failed to check the box or write in the
amount of time for each enhancement.
Following the plea hearing but prior to sentencing, Curtis filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied
Curtis’ motion. The trial court found that the record provided sufficient evidence
to demonstrate that Curtis knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. The
trial court further determined that the unchecked box on the plea agreement was
a harmless clerical error.
Thereafter, the court sentenced Curtis to 101 months in custody, and 18
months of community supervision. The trial court found Curtis indigent and
waived all discretionary legal financial obligations. However, appendix H to the
felony judgment and sentence required Curtis to pay fees to the Department of
Corrections for community supervision.
Curtis appeals.

No. 80183-0-I/4
4
ANALYSIS
Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea
Curtis asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that
he entered into his guilty plea voluntarily and with an understanding of the direct
consequences of his plea. We disagree.
On appeal, we review “[a] trial court’s order on a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea . . . for abuse of discretion.” State v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 127, 285
P.3d 27 (2012). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is
“‘manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons.’” Lamb,
175 Wn.2d 127 (quoting State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615
(1995)). A decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is “‘outside the range of
acceptable choices given the facts and applicable legal standard’” and is
untenable if its “‘factual findings are unsupported by the record.’” Lamb, 175
Wn.2d at 127 (quoting In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d
1362 (1997)).
“Due process requires that a guilty plea may be accepted only upon a
showing the accused understands the nature of the charge and enters the plea
intelligently and voluntarily.” State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 790, 263 P.3d
1233 (2011) (citing State v. A.N.J., 168 Wn.2d 91, 117, 225 P.3d 956 (2010)).
“[T]he record of the plea hearing must affirmatively disclose a guilty plea was
made intelligently and voluntarily, with an understanding of the full consequences
of such a plea,” Wood v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 501, 503, 554 P.2d 1032 (1976),
“determined from a totality of the circumstances.” State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d

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635, 642, 919 P.2d 1228 (1996). And under CrR 4.2(f), a defendant is allowed to
withdraw a guilty plea “whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” A manifest injustice is an “‘injustice that is obvious,
directly observable, overt, not obscure.’” Branch, 129 Wn.2d at 641 (quoting
State v. Sass, 118 Wn.2d 37, 42, 820 P.2d 505 (1991)). A per se manifest
injustice occurs when the defendant makes an involuntary plea. State v. Paul,
103 Wn. App. 487, 494, 12 P.3d 1036 (2000). “A guilty plea is considered
involuntary if the State fails to inform a defendant of a direct consequence of his
plea.” State v. Turley, 149 Wn.2d 395, 398-99, 69 P.3d 338 (2003) (citing State
v. Ross, 129 Wn.2d 279, 284, 916 P.2d 405 (1996)). And “the length of the
sentence is a direct consequence of pleading guilty.” State v. Mendoza, 157
Wn.2d 582, 590, 141 P.3d 49 (2006).
The record demonstrates that Curtis entered his guilty plea voluntarily and
knowingly and that he understood the full consequences of his plea. The plea
agreement stated that the standard sentencing ranges for both counts were
included as an appendix and specified that there were special deadly weapon
findings. While the parties failed to check the box and fill out the text of the
sentence enhancement section of the plea agreement, the agreement did
provide the sentence range for each count based on Curtis’ offender score.
Furthermore, the State’s sentence recommendation specified the standard
sentence range for each count and provided that the State would recommend,
“including all counts and enhancements,” 109 months. And while the total
sentence range did not break down the calculations, Curtis’ statement indicated

No. 80183-0-I/6
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he had obtained a 12th grade education, and he therefore could have determined
that, with a total of 109 months, the enhancements were to be served
consecutively. Moreover, in the recommendation, the State did check the box for
weapons enhancements and provided that each sentence enhancement would
require 24 months and would be “served consecutive to any other term of
confinement.” Both the plea agreement and the State’s sentence
recommendation were incorporated into Curtis’ statement of defendant on plea of
guilty.
In Curtis’ signed statement, there was a table that included the standard
sentencing range for both counts, 46 to 61 months for count 1 and 31 to 41
months for count 2, and indicated that an enhancement of 24 months would be
added to the sentence for both counts. It also specified that both counts included
deadly weapon sentence enhancements of 24 months each and that “[t]his
additional confinement time is mandatory and must be served consecutively to
any other sentence and any other enhancement.”
At the plea hearing, the State confirmed that Curtis had gone over the plea
agreement with his counsel and that Curtis’ counsel had answered all of his
questions. The State told Curtis that it would recommend a 61-month sentence
for count 1 to be served concurrently with a 41-month sentence for count 2.
Curtis stated that he understood. In addition, the State asked Curtis:
[STATE]: Do you also understand that there is a mandatory
enhancement that will be added to the standard range of 24 months
for each count?
[CURTIS]: Yeah.

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Thereafter, the following exchange took place:
[STATE]: . . . There’s also a weapons enhancement which
I’ve discussed, 24 months for count 1 and 24 months for count 2,
which are served consecutively. Those are mandatory.
I said what the State’s going to recommend, the 61 months
and the 41 months. However, your attorney is free to ask for less
time within the standard range. Do you understand that?
[CURTIS]: What’d you say? Can you repeat that?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s the 94 to 109. That’s based
[inaudible].
[CURTIS]: Alright. Whatever.
[STATE]: So you understand that?
[CURTIS]: Yeah.
Therefore, at the hearing, Curtis affirmatively stated that he understood both the
enhancements and the standard sentencing range.
During the hearing, the trial judge “did not perceive the defendant to be
confused during the hearing.” The trial judge presided at both the plea hearing
and the hearing on Curtis’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea and was in the best
position to determine Curtis’ demeanor during the hearings. See, e.g., State v.
Osborne, 102 Wn.2d 87, 98, 684 P.2d 683 (1984) (sustaining the trial court’s
denial of the petitioner’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea because the trial court
“had ample opportunity to observe petitioner’s conduct, appearance and
demeanor” to determine her competency). And the trial court determined that the
failure to indicate the sentence enhancements on the plea agreement was a
harmless scrivener’s error, and we agree. See State v. Adcock, 36 Wn. App.
699, 701-02, 676 P.2d 1040 (1984) (holding that when the State left the standard

No. 80183-0-I/8
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sentencing range blank on one form, but defendant’s counsel provided the
standard sentencing range on numerous other occasions, the failure to indicate
the sentencing range was a technical error and did not require reversal).
In short, the record affirmatively demonstrates that Curtis understood that
the sentence enhancements would be served consecutively to one another
because he understood the potential length of his sentence. Based on the
numerous written references, Curtis’ oral confirmation of his understanding, and
the trial court’s characterization of Curtis’ demeanor during the hearing, the
totality of the circumstances establishes that Curtis made the plea knowingly,
intelligently, and with an understanding of the direct consequences of his plea.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Curtis’ motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Curtis disagrees and contends that his question, “What’d you say? Can
you repeat that?,” demonstrated that he did not understand the sentence
enhancements or the direct consequences of his plea. However, as discussed
above, both the State’s sentence recommendation and Curtis’ statement on his
guilty plea specified the correct sentencing range, and Curtis confirmed both
orally and through his signature that he read and understood the plea
documents. Therefore, we are not persuaded. Cf. State v. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1,
4, 8-9, 17 P.3d 591 (2001) (holding that where the State and the plea agreement
specified an incorrect standard range for the defendant’s sentence, the
defendant entered into the plea involuntarily and without full knowledge of the
consequence of his plea).

No. 80183-0-I/9
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Additionally, Curtis cites Mendoza for his proposition that the State’s
failure to check the box on the plea agreement adjacent to the sentence
enhancement evinces that he misunderstood the sentencing consequences of
his plea. But Mendoza is distinguishable. There, the State erred in calculating
Hector Mendoza’s offender score, which provided the standard sentencing range
that the State used in Mendoza’s plea agreement. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 584-
85. Mendoza agreed to the plea agreement with the incorrect standard range.
Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 584. And during the sentencing proceeding, the State
acknowledged that it erred. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 584-85. Mendoza did not
withdraw his plea at the hearing but attempted to withdraw his plea later.
Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 585. Our Supreme Court noted that “[w]hen a guilty
plea is based on misinformation . . . the defendant may move to withdraw the
plea based on involuntariness.” Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 592. However, the
court concluded that Mendoza could not withdraw his guilty plea because he
failed to move for a withdrawal prior to sentencing. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d at 592.
Here, unlike Mendoza, the State did not misinform Curtis of his standard
sentencing range. And the failure to check the sentence enhancement box was
a clerical error on the plea agreement form. Thus, Curtis’ reliance on Mendoza is
misplaced.
Community Supervision Fees
Curtis asserts that because the trial court found him indigent, the court
erred when it ordered him to pay community supervision fees. The State
concedes that the court erred. Because community supervision fees are

No. 80183-0-I/10
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discretionary and because the court found Curtis indigent, we accept the State’s
concession.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Curtis’ motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. But we remand to the trial court to strike the community supervision fees.
WE CONCUR: