State Of Washington, Respondent V. Christopher Booth, Appellant

87265-6Washctapp2 de fev. de 2026

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER M. BOOTH,
Appellant.
No. 87265-6-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MANN , J. — Christopher Booth challenges the revocation of his special sex
offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) and reinstatement of his suspended sentence.
The evidence establishes that Booth violated several conditions of community custody
despite specific instructions from his community corrections officer (CCO). Because the
trial court had ample grounds to revoke the SSOSA, we affirm.
I
In 2004, Booth pleaded guilty to two counts of child molestation in the first degree
and one count of child molestation in the second degree. At that time, the trial court
imposed a SSOSA and suspended the terms of confinement of 75 months for child
molestation in the second degree and 130 months to life for the two counts of child
molestation in the first degree. The SSOSA also included several relevant conditions of
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community custody: (1) obey all rules of the Department of Corrections (DOC); (2) “[n]ot
frequent or loiter in areas where children congregate”; (3) notify your employer of your
conviction and rules of supervision and treatment; and (4) geographical restrictions as
ordered by the CCO.
Booth has a history of lapses in compliance with these community custody
conditions. Booth admitted to several violations in 2006. At that time, the trial court
declined to revoke the SSOSA, instead sentencing him to 80 days in jail. In 2012, a
CCO notified the court about concerns with Booth’s compliance with his sentence but
did not report any violations.
During a home visit in April 2023, a CCO discovered evidence that a young child
lived in the residence, despite restrictions on Booth’s contact with minors. When
questioned, Booth originally claimed that the items belonged to a neighbor but
eventually admitted that he and his girlfriend had a three-year-old daughter. The CCO
took Booth into custody for violations of his court order. After additional investigation,
DOC reported Booth for multiple violations of his sentence: (1) having direct contact
with a minor child without approval from his CCO; (2) holding a position of authority or
trust involving minors; (3) frequenting or loitering in areas where children congregate;
(4) possessing and consuming alcohol; (5) failing to abide by geographical conditions;
and (6) residing with a minor child.
Because of these violations of the conditions of his sentence, the State moved to
revoke Booth’s SSOSA. In March 2024, the court held a lengthy hearing, during which
Booth stipulated to 6 of the violations and requested 12 months of detention, rather than
revocation of the SSOSA, based on his performance while on supervision and the
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context of the violations. The court found that Booth had violated the terms and
conditions of his sentence but noted that Booth had many years of success prior to the
birth of his child and opined that revocation of the SSOSA was not beneficial to Booth,
his child, or the community. However, the court believed Booth had “some thinking
errors” that he needed to address and ordered 360 days of confinement, a new sexual
deviancy evaluation, and any recommended treatment. The court also amended
Booth’s judgment and sentence to allow supervised contact with his minor biological
child.
Booth received good time and credit for time served, resulting in his release only
two months later. After his release from confinement, Booth reported to Thurston
County DOC. On May 3, 2024, Booth met his new CCO. Booth claimed that he had
previously been allowed to visit parks, malls, farmers markets, and travel outside his
county of residence without prior permission. Booth specifically asked to go to the
Olympia Farmers Market. The CCO, who had not yet received Booth’s supervision file,
informed Booth that he could not engage in those activities or visit the farmers market
because he likely had specific conditions preventing travel and visiting parks and places
where children congregate.
The CCO met with Booth on May 9. At that time, they engaged in a line-by-line
review of court and DOC-imposed conditions, and the CCO “offered him the opportunity
to ask any clarifying questions, if there was anything he had confusion about or
scenarios that he wasn’t sure, if he was allowed to do.” Booth asked about visiting
parks and the Olympia Farmers market. The CCO again denied the request, reminding
Booth of the condition preventing him from frequenting areas where minors congregate
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and explaining that the family-centered farmers market often has specific events for
children resulting in a high likelihood that he would encounter families and minors.
During that conversation, the CCO inquired as to whether Booth had informed his
employer of his conviction status and conditions of supervision as required by the
community custody condition. Booth admitted that he had not informed his employer, a
family restaurant, and was worried about losing his job. The CCO advised Booth to tell
his employer before the employer discovered the information from another source.
On May 14, the CCO checked the data for Booth’s wearable GPS monitoring
device which showed that Booth had spent approximately two hours walking through a
city park and the Olympia Farmers market over the weekend. When asked, Booth
originally denied that he had gone to the farmers market but admitted his presence after
the CCO confronted him with the data from the monitoring device. Booth acknowledged
that the CCO had informed him that he could not visit parks and the farmers market, as
well as the reason for the prohibition.
A few days later, the CCO called Booth’s employer to inquire whether Booth had
disclosed his conviction and supervision conditions. Booth had not informed his
employer as directed. The CCO issued a notice of violation alleging that Booth had
failed to notify his employer and had frequented or loitered in areas where minors
congregate by visiting the farmers market and city park.
The State moved to revoke Booth’s SSOSA, noting that he committed the current
violations less than two months after the court denied the previous motion for
revocation. The State argued that Booth “is a substantial risk to the community, has
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demonstrated numerous times that he will try to avoid following his SSOSA conditions if
he can get away with it, and should have his SSOSA revoked.”
Rather than deny the facts of the violations, Booth raised legal challenges to the
community custody conditions. He argued that three of the conditions he allegedly
violated—do not frequent or loiter in areas where children congregate, obey all DOC
rules, and comply with geographical restrictions as ordered by the CCO—are
unconstitutionally vague as they are vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement. As to the
requirement that he inform his employer of his conviction and supervision status, Booth
claimed that the condition did not establish a timeframe in which the employer was to be
notified and that he engaged in a conversation with his employer about his criminal
history.
The State conceded, and the trial court agreed, that the condition prohibiting
Booth from frequenting or loitering in areas where children congregate has been found
unconstitutional. As a result, the trial court concluded, “this condition is not enforceable
due to being void for vagueness and cannot be the basis for finding a violation.”
However, the court held that “the conditions that the Defendant comply with geographic
boundaries and DOC rules, as applied to Defendant under the facts and circumstances
presented, which formed the basis for the first SSOSA violation, are not void for
vagueness,” because “[a] person of ordinary intelligence would have understood them.”
Moreover, on the two separate occasions that Booth asked his CCO if he could visit the
farmers market and parks, his CCO denied the request both times and ensured that
Booth understood the decision. The trial court found that Booth was on notice about the
prohibited conduct yet chose to engage in the conduct. Similarly, the trial court
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determined the requirement that Booth inform his employer of his conviction and
supervision was not vague “[a]s applied to the Defendant under these facts and
circumstances.”
The trial court found that the State had “clearly” proved both violations of the
SSOSA conditions by a preponderance of the evidence. Noting the importance of
“honest, open, and full disclosure” in the context of sex offender treatment, the trial court
had “grave concern” about Booth’s conduct. “[A]fter being told no when asked if he
could engage in certain conduct, the Defendant committed said conduct and denied
doing so until confronted with objective evidence.” He also failed to notify his employer
after being expressly told to do so. The court concluded that the SSOSA was no longer
appropriate for Booth. The court revoked the SSOSA and reinstated the suspended
sentence.
Booth appeals.
II
Booth contends that his violation of the geographical restriction imposed by his
CCO was not a sufficient basis to revoke his SSOSA. We disagree.
The trial court may revoke a SSOSA and reinstate the sentence at any time
during the period of community custody if there is sufficient evidence to convince the
trial court that the offender has either “violated a condition of the suspended sentence or
failed to make satisfactory progress in treatment.” State v. McCormick, 166 Wn.2d 689,
705, 213 P.3d 32 (2009); RCW 9.94A.670(11). “Revocation of a suspended sentence
due to violations rests within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion.” McCormick, 166 Wn.2d at 705-06. A court abuses its
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discretion if the decision is manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable
grounds, or for untenable reasons. McCormick, 166 Wn.2d at 706.
First, we note that the trial court determined that Booth violated multiple
conditions of community custody, but Booth’s arguments on appeal only challenge the
geographic restriction. Booth does not dispute that he violated the custody condition
requiring him to inform his employer of his conviction and supervision status. This
violation alone supports revocation of his SSOSA. RCW 9.94A.670(11)(a).
Booth argues that the community custody condition requiring him to abide by
geographical boundaries as established by the CCO is unconstitutionally vague
because it relied on the unconstitutional prohibition against frequenting areas where
children congregate. As correctly acknowledged by both the State and the trial court,
the community custody condition prohibiting Booth from frequenting areas where
children congregate is unconstitutionally vague absent an illustrative list. See State v.
Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d 234, 243-44, 449 P.3d 619 (2019). Therefore, the court properly
determined that this provision could not support a violation.
However, recent case law has held that a community custody condition requiring
a defendant to abide by geographic limitations as imposed by a CCO is not
unconstitutionally vague. State v. Lundstrom, 34 Wn. App. 2d 977, 981, 572 P.3d 1243
(2025). RCW 9.94A.704(2)(a) requires DOC to assess the offender’s risk of reoffense
and modify conditions of community custody based on the risk to community safety,
including prescribed geographical boundaries. The CCO-imposed geographical
limitation must be reasonably related to the crime of conviction, the risk of reoffending,
or community safety, and a defendant may request administrative review of the
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condition. Lundstrom, 34 Wn. App. 2d at 981; RCW 9.94A.704. These “sufficiently
ascertainable standards protect against arbitrary enforcement.” Lundstrom, 34 Wn.
App. 2d at 981.
As applied to Booth, the geographical restriction was ascertainable and not
arbitrary. The CCO imposed the restriction on visits to the farmers market and parks
due to the presence of families and minors and the restriction was reasonably related to
the child molestation convictions, Booth’s risk of reoffending, and community safety.
Moreover, the CCO directly communicated the geographical restriction—twice—in
response to a specific request from Booth. Both times, the CCO ascertained that Booth
understood the prohibition. Therefore, the facts establish that Booth was aware of and
understood the explicit prohibition on visiting the Olympia Farmers Market and city
parks. The condition was not vague.
Booth contends that he did not “frequent” any parks but spent many days in
downtown Olympia near the parks without issue. He also claims that the park he was
accused of frequenting was not open the weekend he visited. Additionally, Booth notes
that he successfully completed treatment and “there has never even been so much as
one issue or complaint in over 20 years.”
Despite these claims, the State introduced sufficient evidence to establish
Booth’s violation of conditions of his suspended sentence. His treatment history and
previous actions do not negate the current violations. Booth knew of the specific
geographical restriction and the community custody condition that he comply with DOC
rules. Booth also knew of the requirement that he inform his employer of his conviction
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and supervision status. He violated these conditions. Thus, the trial court’s decision to
revoke his SSOSA was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:

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