Personal Restraint Petition of John Shields

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Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals

Division Two

December 16, 2025

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: No. 59026-3-II
JOHN SHIELDS,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner.

CRUSER, C.J.—In this timely personal restraint petition! John Shields seeks relief from his
December 14, 2022 convictions for one count of second degree possession of depictions of minors;
three counts of first degree voyeurism; and one count of communication with a minor for immoral
purposes, a gross misdemeanor. In this petition, Shields argues that both his district court and
superior court counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds, that the State
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and that law enforcement officers engaged in governmental
misconduct. These arguments fail or are too vague to address. Accordingly, this personal restraint
petition is denied.

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND, FELONY CHARGES, AND BAIL
The State originally charged Shields with misdemeanor offenses in district court.” The

State subsequently charged Shields in superior court with 10 felonies (four counts of second degree

‘RAP 16.4.

? It is not clear from the record exactly what these charges were.

No. 59026-3-II
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possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and six counts of
voyeurism) and 1 gross misdemeanor (communication with a minor for immoral purposes) and
dismissed the related misdemeanor charges. Each of the felony charges alleged that Shields had
violated his position of trust when committing these offenses.
The superior court determined that there was probable cause for the superior court charges.
Nothing in the record reveals whether Shields was represented at the probable cause hearing.
A week later, on Friday, August 26, the superior court set Shields’ bail at $100,000. The
superior court asked Shields if he wanted the court to appoint counsel or if he wanted to retain
counsel in this matter.
Shields responded that he had retained private counsel in district court but that 20 minutes
before a district court hearing on Monday of that week his counsel had advised him that he had
taken a new job and would no longer be able to represent him. Shields stated that because he had
already paid his district court counsel, he needed additional time to find the money to pay for new
counsel. The superior court stated that it would wait until the next hearing to see if Shields had
obtained private counsel.
The superior court then addressed Shields’ conditions of release. During this discussion,
the State advised the court that Shields had other charges pending in district court including a
charge for violating a protection order related to this case. Shields acknowledged that he had been
served with the “papers” regarding the violation of a protection order and that he had gone to court
on this matter on Monday. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. at 10. He reiterated that his district court counsel
had told him that he could no longer represent him because counsel had taken another job.

No. 59026-3-II
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The State responded that Shields had been aware “for the past couple months” that the
State would potentially charge him with the felony offenses. Id. at 13. And it commented that
Shields’ prior counsel had “represented him only in district court” and that the State understood
that Shields’ district court counsel had advised Shields that he would represent him on only the
misdemeanor charges. Id. The superior court set bail at $100,000.
Shields succeeded in retaining new counsel, who filed a notice of appearance on September
6 and appeared at Shields’ September 9 arraignment. At the arraignment, Shields pleaded not
guilty to the superior court charges. His counsel requested lower bail and permission for Shields
to reside in Florida. Counsel stated that Shields was willing to sign a waiver of extradition to
Washington to facilitate his release to Florida. The superior court accepted Shields’ waiver of
extradition, amended Shields’ release conditions, reset his bail at $50,000, and ordered that Shields
could reside at an address in Florida. Shields was unable to obtain a bail bond and remained in
custody.
II. PLEA
In mid-October, Shields’ superior court counsel advised the superior court that Shields had
recently received an offer from the State and that Shields needed additional time to consider the
offer. Counsel also commented that it had been difficult to examine the evidence due to the
retirement of a Washington State Patrol evidence technician. Counsel noted that although the
probable cause statement had stated that 80 child pornography images had been found on Shields’
computer, “that turns out to not be the case.” Id. at 33. But counsel did not state how many images
were in fact found.

No. 59026-3-II
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Counsel further advised the superior court that the offer’s deadline was in two weeks and
that Shields would likely need to hire an expert at the State’s expense. And counsel, whom Shields
had privately retained, stated that if Shields declined the offer it was “likely he will need a public
defender a[t] trial.” Id. at 34.
Two weeks later, Shields’ counsel asked the superior court to strike the trial date and to
extend the speedy trial period to allow Shields more time to consider the plea offer. Shields
expressly agreed with his counsel’s requests. Although the offer expired on the date of the hearing,
the State agreed to extend the offer for another week.
On November 22, Shields pleaded guilty to the amended charges of one count of second
degree possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, three counts of
voyeurism, and one count of communication with a minor for immoral purposes (a gross
misdemeanor). The amended charges did not include any abuse of trust allegations. The State also
agreed to dismiss several unrelated district court cases as part of a global resolution.
Prior to this hearing, Shields had submitted a letter to the superior court asserting that he
had been coerced into entering the plea and making other allegations that appeared to be claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. During this hearing, the superior court acknowledged that Shields
had filed a letter with the court, but the court stated that it had not reviewed the letter because it
was filed ex parte. Shields’ counsel told the court that he did not advise Shields to make the letter
part of the record or to ask that the court read the letter and that Shields sent the letter without
counsel’s knowledge.

No. 59026-3-II
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The trial court accepted Shields’ guilty plea, and it entered the judgment and sentence on
December 14, 2022. Shields did not appeal his convictions. He filed this timely petition on
December 11, 2023.3 See RCW 10.73.090(1), (3)(a).
ANALYSIS
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
We have three options when reviewing a personal restraint petition. We may: “(1) dismiss
the petition, (2) transfer the petition to a superior court for a full determination on the merits or a
reference hearing, or (3) grant the petition.” In re Pers. Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 17, 296
P.3d 872 (2013). To prevail in a personal restraint petition, a petitioner must establish (1) a
constitutional error that resulted in actual and substantial prejudice or (2) a fundamental defect of
a nonconstitutional nature that inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice. In re Pers.
Restraint of Meredith, 191 Wn.2d 300, 306, 422 P.3d 458 (2018).
The petitioner must show that he has competent, admissible evidence to establish facts that
would entitle him to relief. Yates, 177 Wn.2d at 18. Bald assertions and conclusory allegations are
insufficient. Id. And the factual allegations must be based on more than speculation and conjecture.
Id. A declaration from the petitioner can support a petition if the declaration is based on personal
knowledge. See In re Pers. Restraint of Pirtle, 136 Wn.2d 467, 481, 965 P.2d 593 (1998); In re
Pers. Restraint of Rice, 118 Wn.2d 876, 886, 828 P.2d 1086 (1992). And if the evidence supporting
a claim is based on knowledge in the possession of others, the petitioner must present their
affidavits with admissible statements or other corroborative evidence. Rice, 118 Wn.2d at 886.
3 This court appointed counsel pursuant to RCW 10.73.150(4). On February 28, 2025, counsel
filed a brief in support of the petition in which he addressed some of the issues raised in Shields’
initial petition and adopted Shields’ other arguments by reference.

No. 59026-3-II
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II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Shields argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from both his district
court counsel and his superior court counsel. These arguments fail.
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL LEGAL STANDARDS
A personal restraint petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel meets the burden
of showing actual and substantial prejudice if the petitioner shows both deficient performance and
that there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different absent the
errors of counsel. In re Pers. Restraint of Khan, 184 Wn.2d 679, 688, 363 P.3d 577 (2015). “There
is a strong presumption that counsel has rendered adequate assistance and has made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” State v. Benn, 120 Wn.2d 631, 665,
845 P.2d 289 (1993) (plurality opinion). Just as in a direct appeal, if a defendant fails to show
either prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test, our inquiry need go no further. In re Pers.
Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 673, 101 P.3d 1 (2004).
B. DISTRICT COURT REPRESENTATION
Shields asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his district court
counsel. This claim fails.
First, Shields was not convicted on his district court charges, so he cannot establish that he
was prejudiced by his district court counsel’s alleged deficient performance. Second, even if we
consider Shields’ various ineffective assistance of counsel claims against his district court counsel
they would fail.
Shields argues that his district court counsel’s performance was deficient because his
counsel failed to properly investigate the case. Specifically, Shields asserts that his counsel failed

No. 59026-3-II
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to follow up on information that Shields provided to him or to fully investigate the case, which
prevented counsel from showing that evidence was falsified or that the search warrant was illegal.
He also asserts that counsel’s failure to investigate resulted in counsel not being able to
competently advise Shields about the strength of the evidence against him.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel’s alleged failure to
investigate, Shields “must show a reasonable likelihood that the investigation would have
produced useful information not already known to defendant’s trial counsel” and that this deficient
performance was prejudicial “ ‘in light of the strength of the [State’s] case.’ ” Id.at 739 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 809 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Although Shields mentions a video tape and a “fictitious phone call confession,” Shields
does not identify the content of the video tape or the allegedly fictitious confession. Pers. Restraint
Pet. (PRP) at 14. Without additional information, we cannot evaluate whether further investigation
would have resulted in any information that was not already known to his district court counsel or
whether any alleged failure to investigate these things was prejudicial to Shields. Furthermore,
Shields’ district court counsel did not represent Shields at the time of his plea, so there was no
need to advise him about the strength of the evidence against him. Accordingly, Shields fails to
show ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.
Shields next argues that his district court counsel’s performance was deficient because he
failed to bring a speedy trial challenge. But Shields’ bare assertion that counsel failed to raise a
speedy trial issue without providing any additional facts is insufficient to permit review, so Shields
fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.

No. 59026-3-II
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Shields further argues that his district court counsel’s performance was deficient because
he failed to obtain or to submit the evidence Shields provided. But the district court charges did
not proceed to trial, so counsel had no obligation to present evidence and the failure to do so did
not amount to deficient performance. Accordingly, Shields does not establish ineffective assistance
of counsel on this ground.
Shields also argues that his district court counsel’s performance was deficient because he
failed to challenge the search warrant. It appears that Shields may be asserting that counsel should
have challenged the search warrant because it was based on facts that were proven false during the
discovery process or because the search warrant had expired. At best, Shields appears to assert that
the search warrant led to the discovery of a video, but Shields does not specify what evidence the
video provided. He does not discuss any other evidence that would have potentially been
suppressed if the search warrant had been successfully challenged. Nor does he provide facts
sufficient to determine whether the search warrant at issue in district court was relevant to the
charges to which he ultimately pleaded guilty. Without additional information we cannot
determine whether any failure to challenge the search warrant was prejudicial. Accordingly,
Shields fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this basis.
Shields may also be arguing that his district court counsel’s performance was deficient
because he failed to challenge the charges after the allegations were allegedly proven false in
discovery. But Shields’ district court counsel did not represent him on the superior court charges
that he is now challenging, so counsel could not have challenged the relevant charges.
Accordingly, Shields does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.

No. 59026-3-II
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Shields further argues that his district court counsel’s performance was deficient because
counsel “[a]bandoned” him by taking another job and no longer representing him despite taking
on cases for two other jail inmates. Id. Shields fails to state how changing counsel when the felony
charges were filed prejudiced him. Accordingly, he fails to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel on this ground.
Shields also argues that his district court counsel did not provide him with his file when
requested. But Shields does not state what information he was unable to obtain because of any
delay in obtaining his file or how the inability to obtain this information was prejudicial.
Accordingly, he does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.
Shields next asserts that his district court counsel’s performance was deficient because he
lied about a plea offer in the district court matter. Shields appears to allege that no plea deal existed.
But Shields does not explain how advising him of a plea offer that never existed was prejudicial if
he turned down the offer. Accordingly, Shields fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel
on this ground.
Shield asserts that his district court counsel’s representation was deficient because counsel
“[s]igned a Domestic Violence document on [his] behalf, days after he already dismissed himself
from [Shields’] case, and never made [him] aware of the hearing.” Id. at 15. But Shields does not
identify the document to which he refers. It is not even clear that the document Shields is referring
to relates to the proceedings that resulted in the convictions currently at issue. Because this
argument is not identified sufficiently to address, Shields does not establish ineffective assistance
of counsel on this ground.

No. 59026-3-II
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C. SUPERIOR COURT REPRESENTATION
Shields also argues that his superior court counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel on numerous grounds. This claim also fails.
Shields argues that his superior court counsel’s performance was deficient because he
refused to contact the State about the “false charges” and allegations and threatened to quit if
Shields mentioned the prosecutor’s name again. Id. at 16. But Shields does not identify the
allegedly false claims or allegations that he asserts counsel refused to communicate to the State.4
So, even assuming, but not deciding, that counsel failed to contact the prosecutor, there is no way
to determine if any potential error was prejudicial. Accordingly, Shield fails to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel on this ground.
Shields also argues that his superior court counsel’s performance was deficient because he
did not show Shields the search warrant that Shields wanted to contest. But Shields does not
explain how any failure to show him the search warrant was prejudicial. Accordingly, he does not
establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.
Shields next argues that his superior court counsel’s performance was deficient because
counsel did not obtain Shields’ file from his district court counsel. Shields alleges that this file
would have contained the “evidence to combat some of [his] charges.” Id. at 16. Shields further
argues that his counsel’s failure to obtain evidence or properly investigate the case even though
4 The only information about potentially false claims identified in the record appears to be superior
court counsel’s statement that the probable cause statement referred to 80 images found on Shields’
computer when there were in fact fewer images. Counsel disclosed this concern, at the latest, when
he requested additional time for Shields to consider the State’s plea offer. Counsel also did not
clarify how many images were found or how they were related to the charges, so we could not
evaluate whether any potential failure to disclose this information would have been prejudicial.

No. 59026-3-II
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Shields disputed the legality of the search warrant and counsel’s failure to challenge the search
warrant or move to suppress video evidence obtained by law enforcement was deficient
performance and was prejudicial because it prevented his counsel from advising Shields about the
strength of the evidence against him. But Shields does not explain the nature of the evidence that
he now asserts his counsel was unaware of, so we cannot determine whether this evidence was not
already known by counsel or if any failure to obtain this information was prejudicial. Accordingly,
Shields does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.
Shields further argues that his superior court counsel’s performance was deficient because
his counsel colluded with the bail bondsman and the prosecutor to keep Shields from being
released on bail, to prevent Shields from obtaining a reduction in bail after several charges were
dropped, and to keep him in Washington. In addition to his failure to provide any competent
evidence to support this claim, Shields does not explain how any potential issues with his bail or
lack of pretrial release was prejudicial. Accordingly, he fails to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel on this ground.
Shields next argues that his superior court counsel’s performance was deficient because he
did not argue that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Again, Shields fails to identify any
facts related to his speedy trial argument.5 Without more information we are unable to address this
issue. Accordingly, Shields does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.
Shields also argues that his superior court counsel’s performance was deficient because he
did not contest evidence from an allegedly expired search warrant or assert malicious prosecution,
5 The record does show that Shields’ superior court counsel agreed to waive speedy trial to permit
Shields to have more time to consider the State’s plea offer. But Shields agreed to this waiver. And
he does not explain how this waiver was prejudicial.

No. 59026-3-II
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prosecutorial misconduct, perjury, and charge stacking. But, as discussed above, the only evidence
Shields identifies as having been found as a result of the search warrant is a video, and he does not
discuss the content of the video so we cannot determine whether the failure to suppress the video
would have been prejudicial. Shields does not discuss any other evidence that would have been
suppressed if his counsel had successfully challenged the search warrant. Nor does he identify how
any alleged instances of malicious prosecution, prosecutorial misconduct, perjury, or charge
stacking prejudiced him. Without this additional information, we cannot determine whether
counsel’s performance was deficient or whether any potential deficient performance was
prejudicial. Accordingly, Shields does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this
ground.
Shields next argues that his superior court counsel’s performance was deficient because he
presented Shields with a plea offer and advised him that if Shields did not accept the plea offer the
State would “give [him] the maximum” but that counsel believed they could do better at trial. Id.
at 18. Shields appears to argue that this was an attempt to coerce him into accepting the plea offer.
But counsel was merely advising Shields of the possible consequences of refusing the plea offer
and giving his professional opinion that Shields might stand a better chance at trial. And Shields
does not present any facts demonstrating that counsel’s statement regarding the possible
consequences and likelihood of success at trial were not reasonable professional judgments.
Accordingly, Shields fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.
Shields further argues that his superior court counsel’s performance was deficient because
his counsel proposed pursuing a communication with a minor charge in district court. Shields
suggests that after discussing this with his counsel the communication with a minor charge was

No. 59026-3-II
13
added to the felony charges as an “aggravator.” Id. at 18. He also argues that the prosecutor
colluded with counsel to add the misdemeanor charge so counsel could make more money. But
Shields does not present any support for his bare assertion that his counsel or any collusion between
the prosecutor and his counsel caused the addition of the communication with a minor charge to
the plea offer. Accordingly, Shields does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel on this
ground.6
III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Shields next argues that the State engaged in misconduct because it (1) claimed to have
evidence or presented evidence that was gathered under an expired warrant, (2) claimed to have
forensic evidence that never appeared in a forensic report, and (3) presented fictitious evidence.
But Shields does not describe the evidence at issue, and his broad allegations are not specific
enough to permit us to review them. Accordingly, Shields does not establish prosecutorial
misconduct on this basis.
Shields also argues that the State colluded with his superior court counsel to prevent him
from being released on bail and lied or misrepresented facts at his bail or bail reduction hearings.
But, as discussed above, Shields does not show that he was prejudiced by any bail decisions.
Accordingly, he fails to establish that he is entitled to relief on this basis.
Shields next argues that the State engaged in misconduct because it did not “investigate”
the ex parte letter Shields sent to the superior court. Suppl. PRP (Jan. 12, 2024) at 1. This letter
was filed ex parte in the superior court and not considered as part of the record. There was no
6 For the same reasons, Shields does not establish prosecutorial misconduct based on any alleged
collusion between the prosecutor and counsel in adding a charge to his plea offer.

No. 59026-3-II
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requirement that the State investigate the allegations in an ex parte letter addressed to the court.
Accordingly, Shields fails to establish that he is entitled to relief on this basis.
In addition, in his supplemental petition Shields appears to assert that the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct and violated his speedy trial rights by allegedly executing the search
warrant in an untimely manner. But speedy trial issues arise only after charges have been filed and
the defendant has been arraigned. CrR 3.3(c)(1). Accordingly, this argument has no merit, and
Shields is not entitled to relief on this basis.
IV. GOVERNMENTAL MISCONDUCT
Shields further argues that the government engaged in misconduct.
He contends that law enforcement engaged in misconduct because a detective left him “for
dead” or “abandon[ed] him in a cold area with no vehicle, no medication or jacket following being
served a no trespass order.” PRP at 23; Counsel’s Br. at 9. But Shields does not explain how this
alleged misconduct was prejudicial to him in the litigation of his criminal case. Accordingly,
Shields does not establish governmental misconduct on this basis.
Shields further argues that the detective engaged in misconduct and violated his right to
privacy by entering his motel room when no one other than the motel personnel knew Shields was
there. But Shields does not say how this alleged unlawful entry into his motel room was prejudicial
to the litigation of his case, so this argument fails.
Shields appears to assert that the detective colluded with a court clerk to alter a stay, which
allowed the detective to retrieve some of Shields’ belongings and obtain a search warrant. But
Shields does not say what items were retrieved or how they contributed to the detective’s ability

No. 59026-3-II
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to obtain a search warrant, so we cannot determine if any potential collusion was prejudicial.
Accordingly, this argument fails.
Shields also raises issues related to his ability to obtain bail at a hearing in Forks. He
contends that the interference in his ability to obtain bail permitted the State to gather more
evidence against him. But it is mere conjecture that any delay in his release permitted the State to
obtain additional evidence. And without knowing what evidence was obtained, we cannot
determine if any potential error was prejudicial. Accordingly, this argument fails.
Shields next argues that a police report omits certain facts and includes false statements
regarding the day the search warrant was served. But Shields does not provide enough information
about what evidence was obtained to permit us to evaluate any prejudice. Accordingly, this
argument fails.
Shields further contends that the police reports are full of inconsistencies. But he does not
identify the inconsistencies in the police reports, so we cannot address this issue.
CONCLUSION
Shields’ ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and governmental
misconduct claims fail or are too vague to address. Accordingly, this petition is denied.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.

No. 59026-3-II

Cette, C-.T

CRUSER, C.J. *

We concur:

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