In Re The Marriage Of: Elizabeth Parker, Respondent V James Parker, Appellant

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COURT OF APPEALS D;V :
STATE OF WASHING"! CM
2013 APR 29 	AH 10= 03
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: 	) 	No. 69896-6-1
)
ELIZABETH MARIE PARKER, 	) 	DIVISION ONE
)
Petitioner, 	) 	UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
v. 	)
)
JAMES BRIAN PARKER, 	)
)
Respondent. 	) 	FILED: April 29. 2013
Spearman, A.C.J. — James Parker appeals the trial court's determination that he
failed to remove his ex-wife's name from their mortgage "forthwith," as was required by
an amendment to their Decree of Dissolution. Because the trial court's findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence in the record, and those findings in turn support
the court's conclusions of law, we affirm.
FACTS
James and Elizabeth Parker divorced in February 2007. The decree of
dissolution of marriage awarded the family home to the parties as tenants in
common, 	and the 	home was to remain on the market until sold. James was
required to pay the mortgage, taxes, and insurance until sale. James became

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delinquent in support obligations under the decree, eventually resulting in three
separate judgments against him.
The house did not sell for over a year. 	In December 2008, the parties
agreed to amend the decree. The amended decree provided that James was to
purchase Elizabeth's interest in the home and cause her name to be removed
from the mortgage "forthwith."1 He was also to transfer ownership of his 401 (k) to
Elizabeth. 	Elizabeth 	was to 	forgive 	James' 	obligation 	to 	pay 	the judgments
against him. The amended decree also provided that should James not comply
with its provisions, "the judgments will be reinstated pursuant to a motion on the
court's motion docket." CP 55.
At trial, a lender testified she had agreed to provide James with a loan to
purchase 	Elizabeth's 	interest, 	but 	that 	she 	required 	a 	quitclaim 	deed.
Additionally, she testified she told James the opportunity for financing would
expire in mid-January 2009. According to James, this is why he asked Elizabeth
to sign a quitclaim deed. The parties disputed whether Elizabeth understood the
deed was necessary for James to obtain the loan.
1The amended decree provides:
The title to the home shall be transferred to the husband in "as is" condition and
he shall forthwith cause the wife's name to be removed from the underlying
mortgage, freeing her from responsibility therefrom, and in any event he shall
hold her harmless from such obligations, including but not limited to any costs,
attorneys fees and any other loss or damage as a result of any default on the
obligation.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 55.

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Elizabeth provided James with a quitclaim deed in April 2009, although the
deed was inadvertently defective. James did not obtain financing and did not
purchase Elizabeth's interest. As such, James did not cause Elizabeth's name to
be removed from the mortgage until the house was sold on the market two years
later, in June 2011.
After the house sold, James moved to have funds from the sale of the
house disbursed to him. On grounds that James had failed to comply with the
amended decree, Elizabeth moved for entry of judgment for back support and
attorney fees, 	i.e., 	the judgments against James specified 	in 	the amended
decree. The trial court conducted hearings on the motions, and concluded a trial
was necessary. The trial occurred on August 8, 2012. The trial court ruled in
favor of Elizabeth, reinstating the judgments against James, to be paid out of the
proceeds of the sale of the house. James appeals the trial court's findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
DISCUSSION
We review challenged findings of fact for substantial evidence, defined as
quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded 	person the
premise is true. Sunnvside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879, 73
P.3d 369 (2003); Wilson v. Wilson. 165 Wn. App. 333, 340, 267 P.3d 485 (2011).
This court's 	review is deferential. We view the evidence and 	all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Korst v. McMahon.

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136 Wn. App. 	202, 206, 148 P.3d 1081 	(2006). When a trial court bases its
findings 	of fact on 	conflicting evidence and 	there 	is substantial evidence to
support the findings entered, we do not reweigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment even though we might have resolved the factual dispute differently.
Wilson. 165 Wn. App. at 340; In re Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714,
986 P.2d 144 (1999); Brown v. Superior Underwriters, 30 Wn. App. 303, 305-06,
632 	P.2d 	887 	(1980). 	Regarding 	challenged 	conclusions of 	law, we 	review
whether they are supported by the findings of fact. Hegwine v. Longview Fibre
Co.. Inc., 132 Wn. App. 546, 555, 132 P.3d 789 (2006).
The central 	issue 	in this 	appeal 	is whether James removed 	Elizabeth
"forthwith" from 	the 	mortgage 	on 	the 	family home 	as 	was 	required 	by the
amended decree. Although James challenged three findings of fact and five
conclusions of law covering a range of issues, the sole argument in his briefing is
that he did, in fact, remove Elizabeth "forthwith" because the parties intended for
Elizabeth to provide a quitclaim deed 	before he was required to remove her
name from the mortgage. Thus according to James, the two-year delay in finally
removing 	her name from 	the mortgage was caused by her failure to timely
provide a quitclaim deed, and the trial court's findings and conclusions to the
contrary were erroneous.
An appellant must provide "argument in support of the issues presented
for review, together with citations to legal authority and references to relevant

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parts of the record." RAP 10.3(a)(6). As such, we decline to review those findings
that James did not brief, and instead review only those portions of the findings
that bear upon the issue James briefed, 	i.e., 	whether the parties intended a
quitclaim deed to be a condition precedent to James removing Elizabeth from the
mortgage:
3. 	While the Respondent claims that he had secured refinancing
for 	the 	above-referenced 	mortgage, 	the 	Petitioner 	was 	not
effectively notified of that fact in such a fashion that would cause
her 	to 	timely 	execute 	a 	Quit 	Claim 	Deed 	to 	the 	property,
allowing the refinance to close. The Petitioner should not have
been expected to deliver a Quit Claim Deed to the Respondent
without some sort of mechanism to 	insure the simultaneous
release of her obligation on the mortgage, such as by delivery]
of the deed to an escrow agent.
5. As between the parties, the Respondent had a duty to make
certain that a Quit Claim Deed could be delivered in a fashion
that also resulted in the simultaneous relief from the mortgage
for the Petitioner. Despite his attempts to do that, he failed.
CP at 36-37.
We conclude that these findings are supported by substantial evidence in
the record. 	Elizabeth testified that from the time she agreed to the Amended
Decree, 	she 	was 	"ready 	to 	deliver" 	the 	deed, 	and 	that 	she 	would do 	so
"simultaneously" with 	being 	removed from the mortgage. 	Verbatim 	Report of
Proceedings (VRP) (8/8/11) at 108. She also testified she would 	have given
James a quitclaim deed, 	but only if she 	knew her 	name "was going to be
simultaneously coming off the mortgage." ]d. at 111-12. She further testified she
received no communication from the lender on the topic of the loan or quitclaim

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deed. |d. at 109. Viewed in a light most favorable to Elizabeth, this testimony is
sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational trier of fact that Elizabeth did not
intend that the Amended 	Decree would 	require her to 	provide James with a
quitclaim deed before he removed her name from the mortgage.
James contends other portions of Elizabeth's testimony, as well as his
own testimony, indicates the parties intended otherwise. 	But again, this court
does not re-weigh the evidence or assess credibility, nor do we substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court; 	rather, our purview 	is simply to examine
whether, 	viewed 	in a 	light most favorable 	to 	the 	prevailing 	party, 	there 	is
evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings. Sunnvside Valley, 149
Wn.2d at 879; Wilson. 165 Wn. App. at 340; Korst, 136 Wn. App. at 206; Brown.
30 Wn. App. at 305-06.
James also cites Williams v. Continental Sec. Corp.. 22 Wn.2d 1, 	153
P.2d 847 (1944), where the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of "forthwith"
as it was used in Rem.Rev.Stat. § 590, a statute which related to a sheriff's sale
of real property. In that case, the court held the term generally "'does not mean
'instantaneously,' 	or 	'without any 	interval of 	time,' 	but, 	rather, 	means 	'as
expeditiously as under the circumstances is reasonably possible.'" Williams, 22
Wn.2d at 13. James makes no argument, however, as to why a two year delay in
complying with the amended decree is a reasonable period of time. Indeed, in

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Williams, the delay held reasonable by the court was merely forty-three minutes
for a bidder to produce $33,000. Id. at 13-14. Williams is of no help to James.
Finally, the trial court's findings of fact support the challenged conclusions
of law: that James' obligation to remove Elizabeth from the mortgage "forthwith"
meant he had a duty to ensure "she would be simultaneously relieved from the
underlying mortgage" (Conclusion of Law 2, 	CP at 36); that James "had the
primary duty to make certain that the mortgage relief was done simultaneously
with the delivery of the Quit Claim Deed" (Conclusion 3); that because James'
failed 	to 	remove 	Elizabeth 	"forthwith," 	the 	Amended 	Decree 	required
reinstatement of the judgments against James (Conclusion 4); that in light of the
reinstated judgments, James owed Elizabeth $18,970 plus $5803.89 in interest
(Conclusion 5); and that Elizabeth was entitled to be paid this money from the
funds held in escrow from the sale of the house (Conclusion 6).
Elizabeth has requested attorney fees on appeal. We have the discretion
to order a party to pay the other party's attorney fees and costs associated with
the appeal of an action arising out of RCW 26.09. RCW 26.09.140. "In exercising
our discretion, we consider the arguable merit of the issues on appeal and the
parties' financial resources." In re Marriage of C.M.C.. 87 Wn. App. 84, 89, 940
P.2d 669 (1997) (citing In Re Marriage of King, 66 Wn. App. 134, 139, 831 P.2d
1094 (1992)). The trial court awarded Elizabeth attorney fees below, and she has
filed a financial declaration attesting that she does not have the ability to pay her

No. 66538-3-1/8
attorney fees. 	In light of the trial court's award, 	Elizabeth's declaration, 	and
James' failure to respond on this issue, we grant Elizabeth's request for attorney
fees on appeal, upon her timely compliance with RAP 18.1(d)
Affirmed.
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WE CONCUR:
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