* Renee Y. Lamb v. Willis Marvin Lamb, Jr.

NOTICE: SLIP OPINION
(not the court’s final written decision)
The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the
written opinions that are originally filed by the court.
A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions
can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an
order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential
purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits
(for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the
opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court
decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An
opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of
the court.
The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it
has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official
text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes
of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the
language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of
charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports.
For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential
(unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
RENEE Y. LAMB, an individual,
Respondent,
v.
WILLIS MARVIN LAMB, JR., an
individual,
Appellant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 40157-0-III
PUBLISHED OPINION
L AWRENCE -B ERREY , C.J. — Marvin Lamb appeals the trial court’s order denying
his motion to vacate a default order and judgment. He argues the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the default order and judgment because he appeared prior to default,
and Renee Lamb improperly obtained the order and judgment without notice to him.
We disagree with Marvin’s1 argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the default order and judgment. But because Renee should not have obtained the
order and judgment without notice to Marvin, we reverse the trial court’s order denying
Marvin’s motion to vacate.
1 Because the parties share a common last name, for clarity, we refer to them by
their first names. We mean no disrespect.
FILED
FEBRUARY 6, 2025
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 40157-0-III
Lamb v. Lamb
2
FACTS
Siblings Marvin and Renee each own a parcel of land that was subdivided from a
common parcel. Two roads cross Marvin’s parcel to reach Renee’s parcel—the northern
road, which is narrow, and the southern road, which is wider. Historically, the tenants
who farmed Renee’s parcel used the southern road to access the land, as it could better
accommodate their farming equipment. However, in 2023, Marvin locked and later
refused to open the gate through which Renee’s tenant could access the southern road.
On September 27, 2023, Renee served Marvin with a summons and complaint in
which she sought, among other relief, recognition of an easement by prior use over both
the northern and southern roads. On that same day, Marvin forwarded the summons and
complaint to attorney Rusty McGuire, who e-mailed the following to Renee’s attorney:
Marv was served today. Can you answer me back whether Renee will raise
a conflict since my partner represented her in an eviction. If she will waive
that is fine and if not I will get somebody on board today to get you an
answer.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 22. On that same day, Renee’s attorney e-mailed Mr. McGuire to
communicate Renee’s refusal to waive the conflict. Contrary to Mr. McGuire’s e-mailed
assurance, no attorney promptly answered the complaint, nor did any attorney file or
serve a notice of appearance for Marvin.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 40157-0-III
Lamb v. Lamb
3
On October 27, 2023, Renee, without notice to Marvin, filed a motion for
default and obtained a default order and judgment, the latter declaring the validity and
the locations of the northern and southern easements. Also on October 27, Marvin’s new
attorney, Megan Clark, e-mailed Renee’s attorney to inform her that she now represented
Marvin, and planned to answer the complaint. Having heard that a motion for default had
been filed, and not knowing that a default order and judgment also had been entered, Ms.
Clark asked Renee’s attorney to withdraw her motion. Renee’s attorney did not reply to
Ms. Clark.
On October 30, 2023, Ms. Clark discovered that Renee had obtained a default
order and judgment. On November 2, 2023, Marvin, through counsel, answered Renee’s
complaint.
On November 8, 2023, Marvin moved to vacate the default order and judgment,
arguing that his original attorney’s e-mail to Renee’s attorney constituted an informal
appearance such that Marvin was entitled to notice before Renee could enter a default
order and judgment. Among other alternative arguments, Marvin argued that good cause
existed to vacate the default judgment. The court denied Marvin’s motion, and Marvin
timely appealed to this court.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 40157-0-III
Lamb v. Lamb
4
LAW AND ANALYSIS
VACATING DEFAULT ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS
1. The trial court had jurisdiction to enter the default order and
judgment
Citing Servatron, Inc. v. Intelligent Wireless Products, Inc., 186 Wn. App. 666,
679, 346 P.3d 831 (2015), Marvin argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the
default order and judgment. We take this opportunity to correct Servatron, and perhaps
other of our cases that have incorrectly concluded that default judgments entered
erroneously are void, rather than voidable. This is an important distinction because there
are no time limits for setting aside void judgments. Id.
In Servatron, we wrote, “if a party otherwise entitled to notice [of default] under
CR 55 does not receive such notice, the trial court lacks the authority to enter [a default]
judgment.” Id. We, and perhaps other of our cases, have incorrectly concluded such
judgments are void. Id. This error derives from an incomplete reading of Dike v. Dike,
where our high court stated that “‘[a] judgment, decree or order entered by a court which
lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power
to make or enter the particular order involved, is void.’” 75 Wn.2d 1, 7, 448 P.2d 490
(1968) (quoting Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 536, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943)).
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 40157-0-III
Lamb v. Lamb
5
Read in its entirety, however, Dike refutes the notion that default judgments
entered in violation of the notice requirement of CR 55 are void. Specifically, the Dike
court further stated:
“‘[T]here is a vast difference between a judgment which is void and one
which is merely erroneous. In 31 Am. Jur., Judgments, section 401, p. 66
[(1940)], it is said: “‘. . . a void judgment should be clearly distinguished
from one which is merely erroneous or voidable. There are many rights
belonging to litigants—rights which a court may not properly deny, and yet
if denied, they do not render the judgment void. Indeed, it is a general
principle that where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter, no error in the exercise of such jurisdiction can make the judgment
void, and that a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
not void merely because there are irregularities or errors of law in
connection therewith. This is true even if there is a fundamental error of
law appearing upon the face of the record. Such a judgment is, under
proper circumstances, voidable, but until avoided is regarded as valid.”’”
Id. at 8 (third alteration in original) (quoting Robertson, 181 Va. at 536-37).
In keeping with Dike, we clarify now that only a jurisdictional defect can render
an order or judgment void. Accord Gates v. Homesite Ins. Co., 28 Wn. App. 2d 271, 280,
537 P.3d 1081 (2023). Because there was no evidence in Servatron that the court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the defendant or subject matter jurisdiction over the
controversy, our conclusion that the default judgment was void was incorrect. Freedom
Found. v. Teamsters Loc. 117 Segregated Fund, 197 Wn.2d 116, 141, 480 P.3d 1119
(2021) (jurisdiction requires only two elements: personal jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction).
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 40157-0-III
Lamb v. Lamb
6
In the current case, there likewise is no evidence that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over Marvin. Indeed, Marvin does not dispute the propriety of Renee’s
service of her summons and complaint, which gave rise to personal jurisdiction. Gates,
28 Wn. App. 2d at 279 (“Generally, a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a party-
defendant that receives lawful service of a summons and complaint.”). Marvin does not
argue that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an easement dispute in
Washington. Because the court had personal jurisdiction over Marvin and subject matter
jurisdiction over the controversy, no order or judgment it entered could have been void.
At most, the court’s orders were voidable.
2. The default order and judgment were voidable for lack of proper
notice and should have been vacated
Marvin’s central argument is that he substantially complied with the appearance
requirement of CR 55(a)(3) and therefore was entitled to notice prior to default. We
agree.
“When the facts surrounding the adequacy of a party’s appearance under CR 55
are undisputed, this court reviews de novo whether that party has established its
appearance as a matter of law.” Servatron, 186 Wn. App. at 673. “A party who has
appeared in an action is entitled to notice of a default judgment hearing and, if no notice
is received, is generally entitled to have judgment set aside without further inquiry.”
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 40157-0-III
Lamb v. Lamb
7
Morin v. Burris, 160 Wn.2d 745, 754, 161 P.3d 956 (2007) (construing the notice
requirement of CR 55(a)(3)).
Because default judgments are disfavored, our courts have required defendants
seeking to set aside a default order and judgment to establish only that they “substantially
complied” with the appearance requirement.2 Id. at 755. When assessing substantial
compliance, courts examine the defendant’s conduct “to see if it was designed to and, in
fact, did” apprise the plaintiff of the defendant’s intent to litigate the case. Id. While
courts have liberally construed the appearance requirement, only acts that occur after
service of process may constitute substantial compliance with the appearance
requirement.3 Id.
In Sacotte Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 143 Wn.
App. 410, 414, 177 P.3d 1147 (2008), the defendant’s attorney received process, and
telephoned the plaintiff’s attorney to establish an appearance. The attorney then sent two
e-mails confirming that, despite any conflict of interest, default could not be entered
without notice. Id. We held that the attorney’s actions constituted substantial
2 The liberal test of what constitutes an appearance for the purposes of CR 55(a)(3)
is “substantial compliance,” rather than “informal appearance.” Morin, 160 Wn.2d at
753, 757.
3 The civil rules allow a person to be served with civil process before filing the
summons and complaint with the court. CR 3(a). This is why we emphasize acts after
“service of process” rather than acts after filing the summons and complaint.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 40157-0-III
Lamb v. Lamb
8
compliance with the appearance requirement of CR 55(a)(3) such that the defendant was
entitled to notice prior to default. Id. at 416-17.
Here, the actions of Marvin’s first attorney, Mr. McGuire, likewise constituted
substantial compliance with CR 55(a)(3)’s appearance requirement. Mr. McGuire
e-mailed Renee’s attorney and informed her of Marvin’s intent to defend the lawsuit.
This action, after service of process, “was designed to and, in fact, did” apprise Renee of
Marvin’s intent to litigate the case. Morin, 160 Wn.2d at 755. For this reason, CR 55
required Renee to give Marvin notice before obtaining default. The trial court erred by
not granting Marvin’s motion to vacate the default order and judgment.
MARVIN’S ATTORNEY FEE AND EXPENSE REQUEST
Citing RAP 18.1 and RAP 14.6, Marvin initially requests “costs and expenses” on
appeal, and later requests “fees and costs.” Br. of Appellant at 24.
RAP 18.1 sets forth the procedure for a prevailing party to recover its reasonable
attorney fees and expenses on appeal. RAP 18.1(a) conditions recovery of those types of
costs on applicable law granting their recovery.
For the purposes of recovering fees and expenses, however, RAP 14.6 does not
constitute “applicable law.” Instead, RAP 14.6 merely explains which court officer
assesses cost bills, how an objection may be made, how this court transmits the award,
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 40157-0-III
Lamb v. Lamb
and how it is enforced. In short, RAP 14.6 discusses only procedures. For this reason,
we deny Marvin's request for reasonable attorney fees and expenses.
Reversed and remanded to vacate default order and judgment.
L,.,._,..,.,.,._._J!:,.......,._ '-1 ' C..~
Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
Fearing, J. 	>
Staab, J.
9
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.