Dr. John Stamatoyannopoulos, Appellant V. University Of Washington, Respondent

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JOHN
STAMATOYANNOPOULOS,
Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent.
No. 	87706-2-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FELDMAN, 	J. 	— 	Dr. 	John 	Stamatoyannopoulos, 	previously 	a 	tenured
professor of genome sciences and medicine at the University of Washington (the
University), seeks relief under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
chapter 34.05 RCW, from the University’s termination of his employment based on
violations 	of 	its 	rules 	and 	policies 	regarding 	outside 	consulting 	work 	for
compensation. Because Stamatoyannopoulos fails to establish any basis for relief,
we affirm.
I
Stamatoyannopoulos served as a tenured professor at the University from
2005 until his termination in 2022. University faculty are subject to Executive Order
57 (EO 57), the University’s “Outside Professional Work Policy,” and “Grants
Information Memorandum 10” (GIM 10), the University’s “Financial Conflict of
Interest Policy.” Critical here, the University requires faculty to “obtain prospective

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approval” when they wish to “engage in outside activities for compensation” by
completing an approved Form 1460, which discloses information about the faculty
member’s involvement with an outside organization.
During his employment at the University in 2014, Stamatoyannopoulos
incorporated the Institute for Translational Biosciences, later known as the Altius
Institute for Biomedical Sciences (Altius), as a non-profit organization. Weeks after
the incorporation, Stamatoyannopoulos met with the University to discuss his
planned research at Altius. Following the meeting, the University documented the
conditions with which Stamatoyannopoulos would need to comply to participate in
the Altius research while employed by the University, including “disclosure of
financial interests . . . and obtaining prior approval for all outside professional
work.” The University also recommended that Stamatoyannopoulos’ proposal for
outside work be reviewed according to EO 57’s criteria for “involvement with
commercial enterprise, deeper than consulting.”
In January 2015, Stamatoyannopoulos disclosed $5,000 of compensation
he received from Altius in December 2014. He later revised the amount upwards
to $50,000 and then $500,000 for the same time period. 	In February 2015, the
University requested that he complete Form 1460 describing the nature of his
efforts at Altius to obtain approval before engaging in the outside work, but he did
not do so. Noting concerns with Stamatoyannopoulos’ compliance with its policies,
the University repeatedly asked him in March and April for information about his
relationship 	with 	Altius 	and 	demanded 	he 	seek 	approval. 	In 	May 	2015,
Stamatoyannopoulos belatedly submitted Form 1460, stating that he received

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$60,000 from Altius between July 2014 and June 2015. 	The following week,
Stamatoyannopoulos explained he was to be the President of Altius, which is “not
a conventional institute with independent faculty, etc. 	Rather, it will essentially
function as [a] large single laboratory that I will direct.” 	Shortly thereafter,
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) announced the launch of Altius in a press release noting
its “$95 million in cash and other resources” to fund Altius’ research. 	The
University denied Stamatoyannopoulos’ request to approve outside work for
compensation under EO 57.
The following month, the University reiterated its position that outside work
with Altius could not be approved. 	Thus began a lengthy dispute regarding
Stamatoyannopoulos’ 	determination 	to 	continue 	working 	for 	Altius 	and 	the
University’s concern there was “significant overlap and intertwinement between
your existing role as a full-time regular faculty member of the University of
Washington and your current and proposed role with Altius as founding corporate
member, board member, president, scientific director, [and] lab director of a
proposed 40-80 person lab . . . .” The University continued to demand compliance
with its policies while proposing alternate arrangements that would comply with
University 	policy. 	Unknown 	to 	the 	University 	at 	the 	time, 	Altius 	hired
Stamatoyannopoulos 	with 	an 	annual 	base 	salary 	of 	$750,000 	per 	year,
retroactively effective January 1, 2015. 	In October 2015, Stamatoyannopoulos
submitted a new Form 1460 requesting approval of outside work, which was again
denied.

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Early the following year, the University relinquished Stamatoyannopoulos’
research grants because accepting them was not compliant with federal law due
to his “continued engagement in outside work for Altius,” which did not comply with
University policy. In March 2016, Stamatoyannopoulos’ department chair e-mailed
him, “several months have passed since your request to perform outside work for
Altius failed to gain approval, and now your lab has been relocated to Altius. It’s
time you and I discussed your role at Altius and your faculty appointment in the
department, so that we have clarity on moving forward.” In June 2016, the Dean
of the School of Medicine (the Dean) sent Stamatoyannopoulos a letter to “discuss
your noncompliance with UW Executive Order (EO) 57, UW outside work and
conflict of interest policies,” and the subsequent meeting still did not resolve the
issue.
Resolution 	efforts 	having 	failed, 	the 	University 	appointed 	a 	special
investigating 	committee 	to 	formally 	investigate 	Stamatoyannopoulos’ 	alleged
violations of EO 57 and GIM 10. In June 2017, the committee returned its findings,
which indicated Stamatoyannopoulos had violated portions of both EO 57 and GIM
10 by working for Altius prior to receiving approval, that his involvement with Altius
was “deeper than consulting irrespective of the designation of this venture as a
non-profit organization,” thus requiring a more extensive disclosure and approval
process, and that his “activities with Altius conflict with his responsibilities as a full-
time 	University 	professor.” 	In 	February 	2018, 	the 	Dean 	offered
Stamatoyannopoulos “one more opportunity to meet with me to see if we can reach
a resolution to this matter” before initiating a formal adjudication relating to the

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special investigating committee’s finding that he had violated University policy.
The parties did not resolve their conflict.
In April 2018, the Dean requested a formal adjudication from the Provost of
the University. The Provost, in turn, initiated an adjudication to determine whether
Stamatoyannopoulos should “be removed from his faculty position and dismissed
from 	employment 	at 	the 	University.” 	The 	University 	appointed 	a 	faculty
adjudication chair (the Chair), and the Chair provided notice to all parties that she
would be selecting a three-person hearing panel to adjudicate the matter in
approximately two months. 	On September 17, 2018, the Chair informed the
parties of the identities of three faculty members appointed to serve on the hearing
panel.
The adjudication took place over ten days in 2019 and included testimony
from numerous witnesses, more than 150 exhibits, and the participation of the
parties and their retained counsel. 	Following the adjudication, the hearing panel
issued its “Findings, Conclusions and Order” (the Order). 	The Order concluded
that 	the 	“most 	serious 	remedy” 	of 	dismissal 	“is 	appropriate 	under 	these
circumstances” 	because 	“[t]he 	strategy 	pursued 	by 	Stamatoyannopoulos 	in
disregarding University policy and rules led directly to significant negative impact
on students, researchers and employees who desired to continue working with and
learning from Stamatoyannopoulos.” Stamatoyannopoulos appealed the Order to
the 	President 	of 	the 	University. 	The 	President 	affirmed 	the 	Order.
Stamatoyannopoulos filed a petition for an immediate stay of the action to
terminate his employment and for reconsideration. 	The President denied his

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petition 	for 	a 	stay 	and 	reconsideration, 	and 	the 	University 	terminated 	his
employment.
Stamatoyannopoulos then filed a petition for review in King County Superior
Court. 	The superior court upheld the University’s decision. 	This timely appeal
followed.
II
Where, as here, a litigant seeks relief under the APA from an agency order
in an adjudicative proceeding, “we ‘look to the administrative record, not the
superior court’s findings or conclusions, when conducting judicial review of an
agency decision.’” Mariani v. Dep’t of Fin. Inst., 34 Wn. App. 2d 361, 368, 568 P.3d
689 (2025) (quoting Rios-Garcia v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 18 Wn. App. 2d
660, 667, 493 P.3d 143 (2021)). Applying the APA, “we may grant relief from an
agency order for any one of nine reasons set forth in RCW 34.05.570(3)(a)-(i).”
Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 1950 v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 18 Wn. App.
2d 914, 921, 493 P.3d 1212 (2021). As the party challenging the agency action,
Stamatoyannopoulos bears the burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the
agency’s decision. RCW 34.05.570(1)(a).
Stamatoyannopoulos argues we should grant relief under four subsections
of RCW 34.05.570(3): subsection (c), which authorizes relief if “[t]he agency has
engaged in unlawful procedure or decision-making process”; subsection (d), which
authorizes relief if “[t]he agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law”;
subsection (e), which authorizes relief if “[t]he order is not supported by evidence

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that is substantial”; and subsection (i), which authorizes relief if “[t]he order is
arbitrary or capricious.” We address each in turn.
A
Citing RCW 34.05.570(3)(c), Stamatoyannopoulos argues he was denied
due process when the University “failed to follow its own procedures” by convening
a three-person hearing panel instead of a five-person hearing panel. We disagree.
As noted, this court may grant relief from an agency order under RCW
34.05.570(3)(c) where “[t]he agency has engaged in unlawful procedure or
decision-making process.” We review allegations that an agency has engaged in
unlawful procedure or failed to follow a prescribed procedure de novo. 	K.P.
McNamara Nw., Inc., v. Dep’t of Ecology, 173 Wn. App. 104, 121, 292 P.3d 812
(2013) (citing Stevens County v. Loon Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n, 146 Wn. App.
124, 129, 187 P.3d 846 (2008)). 	The University’s Faculty Code Chapter 28
governs adjudicative proceedings for the resolution of disputes between the
University and faculty members. 	Section 28-33E provides in relevant part,
“adjudications shall be heard by a hearing officer and a hearing panel of three
faculty members, except that upon the request of at least one of the parties, the
hearing panel shall be increased to five faculty members . . . .” 	The policy does
not contain a deadline for when such a request must be made.
As mentioned above, on June 26, 2018, the Chair sent all parties a
memorandum that included the timeline for convening the adjudication. 	The
memorandum stated in relevant part:

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Postponement of Adjudication and Appointment of the Panel
Faculty Code Section 28-33I does not require panels to meet during
the period of June 16 through September 15. Therefore, the work of
this panel will commence on September 15, 2018.
In addition, under FCG 28-33E, the presumed size of the hearing
panel is three members. However, any party on his own may request
to enlarge the panel to five members. In addition, the Faculty Code
also allows all parties to agree to waive the faculty panel and proceed
with the hearing officer alone.
Given that this adjudication is paused until September 16, 2018, it
seems prudent to allow the parties time to confer with counsel and
each other to determine how they wish to proceed.
Therefore, if the Faculty Adjudications Chair does not hear
otherwise from the parties, she will begin the search for a three-
person panel on August 15, 2018 and will appoint the panel no
later than September 14, 2018.
Stamatoyannopoulos did not request a five-person panel prior to August 15, 2018
(nor prior to September 14, 2018) despite the reminder that he may do so. 	On
September 17, 2018, having not heard otherwise as to panel size in accordance
with the above memorandum, the Chair informed the parties of the identities of
three faculty members appointed to serve on the hearing panel. Eleven days after
the three faculty members were identified and appointed, Stamatoyannopoulos
requested that the panel be increased from three to five members. The Chair did
not appoint any additional panel members. 	This, Stamatoyannopoulos avers,
violated his due process rights.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” Due process is a flexible concept and should
be applied based on the demands of the particular situation. Morris v. Blaker, 118

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Wn.2d 133, 144, 821 P.2d 482 (1992). At its core, it is a right to be meaningfully
heard, but its minimum requirements depend on what is fair in a particular context.
In re Det. of Stout, 159 Wn.2d 357, 370, 150 P.3d 86 (2007) (citing Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976)). To determine
what due process requires in a particular context, we employ the Mathews test,
which requires us to consider (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of that interest through existing procedures and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the
governmental interest, including costs and administrative burdens of additional or
substitute procedural requirements. Fields v. Dep’t of Early Learning, 193 Wn.2d
36, 45, 434 P.3d 999 (2019) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
Before applying the Mathews factors, it is important to correctly identify the
precise due process issue before us. Stamatoyannopoulos focuses his argument
on whether a three-person hearing panel—as opposed to a five-person panel—is
constitutionally deficient. This argument misses the mark because the University
did not (and does not) unilaterally impose a three-person hearing panel. Rather, it
presumptively imposed a three-person panel and permitted Stamatoyannopoulos
to request a five-person panel so long as he did so by a prescribed deadline. Thus,
the dispositive due process issue is whether the prescribed deadline for requesting
a 	five-person 	panel—as 	opposed 	to 	a 	longer 	deadline 	or 	no 	deadline—is
constitutionally deficient. 	Stamatoyannopoulos does not meaningfully address
that issue.

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Turning to the merits of Stamatoyannopoulos’ contention that he was denied
due process, application of the Mathews factors does not support his argument.
Examining 	the 	first 	Mathews 	factor, 	the 	University 	does 	not 	dispute 	that
Stamatoyannopoulos’ employment as a tenured professor is a legitimate private
interest. Wash. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 97 Wn.2d 899, 908, 652 P.2d 1347 (1982).
As to the second Mathews factor, there is no significant risk that a person’s interest
will be erroneously deprived if they are given written notice of the adjudication
deadlines, including the deadline for requesting a five-person panel and the date
of the hearing, participate in that hearing while represented by counsel, and are
afforded the opportunity to call witnesses, as Stamatoyannopoulos did here. 	Cf.
In re Det. of Ross, 30 Wn. App. 2d 930, 945, 547 P.3d 278 (2024) (finding no due
process violation despite “singular decision-maker” based on attendant procedural
safeguards). 	As to the third factor, there is a strong agency interest in having
parties comply with reasonable written deadlines provided with sufficient notice,
particularly given the risk (present here) that a litigant will request a larger hearing
panel only if they are dissatisfied with the disclosed panel members. That interest
outweighs Stamatoyannopoulos’ interest in receiving a larger panel after the
lengthy period to request one had lapsed. 	Thus, while the first Mathews factor
weighs in favor of Stamatoyannopoulos, the second and third factors are fatal to
his argument. On this record, there was no due process violation.
Stamatoyannopoulos’ argument to the contrary is unavailing. He contends
that “The Panel’s decision violated [Faculty Code] 28-33(E), which provides that
upon request of any party, the panel shall be increased to five faculty members.”

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But the University is not required under procedural due process principles to
accommodate such a request forever—without regard to reasonably imposed
deadlines. 	Here, Stamatoyannopoulos was afforded several weeks to request a
five-person panel. 	Courts have rejected due process challenges to significantly
shorter deadlines. See, e.g., Payne v. Mount, 41 Wn. App. 627, 635, 705 P.2d 297
(termination letter citing statute containing applicable ten-day deadline for appeals
to the civil service commission satisfied due process requirements); Wash. Educ.
Ass’n, 97 Wn.2d at 908-11 (rejecting procedural due process claim to bill that
required dismissed faculty members to request a hearing within ten days). Indeed,
Stamatoyannopoulos does not argue—nor could he—that the several weeks’
notice he received to request a larger panel size was constitutionally deficient. On
this record, the University did not violate due process by establishing a reasonable
deadline to request a five-person panel and failing to increase the panel size based
on Stamatoyannopoulos’ untimely request, particularly given the deference we
accord agencies in administering their own policies. See Port of Seattle v. Pollution
Control Hrgs. Bd., 151 Wn.2d 568, 593, 90 P.3d 659 (2004).
Stamatoyannopoulos also argues he was prejudiced by the decision of a
three-person panel rather than a five-person panel. But his argument misses the
point; while Stamatoyannopoulos claims the four-to-one majority required to
terminate his employment with a five-person panel would have been advantageous
in comparison to the two-to-one majority applied here, the issue on appeal is
whether the adjudicative process violated due process. 	Here, the University’s
process 	appropriately 	guarded 	against 	the 	erroneous 	deprivation 	of

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Stamatoyannopoulos’ 	interest 	by 	affording 	both 	notice 	of 	the 	deadline 	for
requesting a five-person panel and the opportunity to be heard on all issues
relating 	to 	the 	University’s 	termination 	decision. 	Accordingly, 	we 	reject
Stamatoyannopoulos’ argument that the hearing panel engaged in an unlawful
procedure or decision-making process.
B
Relying on RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), Stamatoyannopoulos argues the hearing
panel’s conclusion that he did not comply with EO 57 was an error of law. 	RCW
34.05.570(3)(d) allows for relief from an agency order when “[t]he agency has
erroneously interpreted or applied the law.” Applying de novo review, Mariani, 34
Wn. App. 2d at 368, we reject this argument.
As noted above, EO 57 governs outside consulting work for compensation.
It was adopted in accordance with Washington’s Ethics in Public Service Act (the
Act), chapter 42.52 RCW, which provides:
Consistent with the state policy to encourage basic and applied
scientific research by the state’s research universities . . . and
consistent with the expectations of university faculty to produce,
publish, and disseminate research and scholarship, each university
. . . may develop, adopt, and implement one or more written
administrative processes that shall apply in place of the obligations
imposed on institutions of higher education, faculty, and university
research employees under [the Act].
RCW 42.52.220(1) (emphasis added). Because EO 57 was adopted pursuant to
RCW 42.52.220(1) and approved by the Governor, it applies in place of the Act as
the applicable policy here.
EO 57 states, “The first obligation of members of the faculty and staff is the
preparation for and carrying out of official University duties. Full-time faculty and

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staff are expected to devote full-time effort . . . to their institutional responsibilities.”
The policy thus establishes rules for faculty members seeking to “engage in
outside consulting activities for remuneration.” 	Relevant here, the policy states,
“[o]utside consulting work for compensation must be approved in advance.” As the
hearing panel correctly noted, “Stamatoyannopoulos was required to obtain
approval for the outside work. This never happened.”
As 	Stamatoyannopoulos 	observes, 	EO 	57 	also 	recognizes 	some
exceptions to the policy which are “not considered outside consulting and prior
approval is not required.” The policy provides:
Members of the University faculty . . . are encouraged to participate
in the work of nonprofit professional associations and societies, to
contribute their expertise to scholarly, editorial, and advisory bodies
including governmental bodies related to their academic work, and
to 	serve 	on 	public 	commissions 	or 	boards 	of 	philanthropic
organizations. 	These 	involvements 	are 	most 	appropriately
characterized 	as 	University 	and 	community 	service 	and 	are
complementary to University responsibilities. Such activities are not
considered outside consulting and prior approval is not required.
It continues, “Faculty members . . . are also encouraged to accept invitations by
nonprofit organizations, colleges and universities, and governmental agencies for
purposes of presenting guest lectures, delivering papers, serving on review panels,
and participating in accreditation activities.”
In contrast to the exceptions noted above that do not require approval, EO
57 includes a section that sets forth rules for “Involvement with Commercial
Enterprise, Deeper than Consulting.” 	That section provides, “The likelihood of
such 	involvement 	has 	increased 	as 	the 	potential 	to 	develop 	commercial
enterprises to market university research-based technology has increased.” It also

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states, “Involvement with commercial enterprise also offers the potential for
conflicts of interest and commitment . . . and for interference with the employee’s
primary allegiance to the University and its teaching, research, and public service
missions.”
It then continues:
[E]ssential elements of the University’s commitment to encouraging
appropriate technology transfer are the protection of the University’s
integrity and primary goals of education and open inquiry, and the
management of potential conflicts of interest. 	Careful attention to
avoiding such conflicts ultimately serves the interests of both the
employee 	and 	the 	University. 	Toward 	this 	end, 	this 	section
prescribes a disclosure and approval process for involvements with
commercial enterprise deeper than usual professional affiliations or
outside consulting. The policy recognizes the need for flexibility and
the difficulty of anticipating all situations that may arise by leaving
discretion to an employee’s supervisor to interpret the policy and
evaluate the activity proposed in the context of the unit in question.
The policy further states, “the University has the responsibility to evaluate carefully
the benefits and costs of its employee’s deeper involvement with commercial
enterprise. 	All employees[] must disclose to their supervisors involvements with
such enterprise where there is potential for conflict of interest, commitment, or
allegiance with their University position.”
Especially relevant here, the policy also provides:
The following activities trigger a more in-depth review:
a) 	Extensive consulting with a for-profit business venture, with a
start-up company, with a company in a developmental phase,
or with prospective investors in any of these;
. . . .
c) 	Holding of a line management position in a commercial
enterprise;

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d) 	Participation in the day-to-day operations of a commercial
enterprise; or
e) 	Assumption of a key, continuing role in the scientific and
technical effort of a commercial enterprise.
Thus, while some activities do not require University approval, certain activities—
those 	that 	involve 	extensive 	involvement 	or 	participation 	in 	a 	commercial
enterprise—must be approved by the University following an in-depth review.
Applying EO 57 here, the hearing panel concluded:
There is no question that Stamatoyannopoulos had deeper than
consulting involvement with the ITB/Altius entities. 	He became the
principal 	person 	responsible 	for Altius’ 	activities 	as 	President,
Scientific Director and board member with half the board votes. As
a result, Stamatoyannopoulos was required to obtain approval for the
outside work. This never happened.
This conclusion, Stamatoyannopoulos avers, erroneously interprets or applies EO
57 and therefore entitles him to relief under RCW 34.05.570(3)(d).
Contrary to Stamatoyannopoulos’ argument, the hearing panel did not
erroneously interpret or apply EO 57. 	It is undisputed that Stamatoyannopoulos
was engaged in outside work as the President of a research laboratory without
approval 	from 	the 	University. 	His 	extensive 	involvement 	overseeing Altius
presented a clear time commitment challenge in conflict with his responsibilities as
a full-time professor at the University. 	Potential for a serious conflict of interest
was present due to the depth of his relationship with Altius concurrent with his role
as a faculty member of the University. 	As the hearing panel concluded, “As a
faculty member whose ‘first obligation’ was to carry out his official University duties,
Stamatoyannopoulos was required to obtain approval for this outside work.”
Because Stamatoyannopoulos failed to obtain such approval, the hearing panel

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did not err in concluding his “intentional failure” to do so was “manifest neglect of
a faculty member’s duty.”
Moreover, Stamatoyannopoulos’ work was different from the exceptions to
EO 	57, 	wherein 	faculty 	“participate 	in 	the 	work 	of 	nonprofit 	professional
associations and societies,” “contribute their expertise to scholarly, editorial, and
advisory bodies,” and “serve on public commissions or boards of philanthropic
organizations.” 	Unlike those professional, scholarly, public, or philanthropic
organizations which may be exempt from EO 57 where a faculty member’s
involvement is limited and not in conflict with their obligations to the University,
Altius is more analogous to the commercial enterprises that pose special risk of a
conflict 	of 	interest 	and 	are 	subject 	to 	“deeper 	involvement 	review.” 	As
Stamatoyannopoulos himself explained, “[a]lthough [Altius is] organized as a
public 	charity, 	the 	Institute 	does 	not 	plan 	to 	engage 	in 	any 	philanthropic
fundraising.” His activities were similar to those that trigger a deeper involvement
review because he held “a line management position” overseeing the “day-to-day
operations” of Altius and assumed “a key, continuing role in the scientific and
technical 	effort 	of 	[Altius],” 	as 	contemplated 	by 	EO 	57. 	Accordingly,
Stamatoyannopoulos has not established an entitlement to relief on this basis.
Notwithstanding the above, Stamatoyannopoulos argues the University
erred by applying EO 57’s “deeper involvement review” to him because it applies
only to “commercial entities” whereas Altius is registered as a “non-profit.”
Stamatoyannopoulos misreads the University’s policy. EO 57’s description of the
“deeper involvement review” emphasizes the purpose of the review is to scrutinize

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the depth of an employee’s involvement with an outside entity, not the classification
of the entity itself. The deeper review applies “when the requesting member of the
academic community has an ongoing scientific, technology transfer, or deeper
involvement with the organization for whom the request is being made,” just like
the one Stamatoyannopoulos had with Altius. (Emphasis added.)
Despite Stamatoyannopoulos’ assertion that Altius is registered as a non-
profit, which he avers excuses his activity from scrutiny, his disclosures belie how
different his relationship with Altius was from the kinds of activities exempt from
EO 57. 	Altius’ federal tax filings indicate Stamatoyannopoulos worked there 40
hours per week and received nearly $750,000 in compensation in 2015 alone. He
described his role as “president and scientific director” of Altius while “oversee[ing]
. . . 40-50 scientific personnel and a small administrative unit” for Altius. 	Such
extensive efforts for an outside entity are not similar to the EO 57 exclusions
(quoted above) for limited participation in professional, scholarly, public, and
philanthropic organizations. 	Nor were his activities at Altius similar to another
exception wherein “Faculty members . . . are also encouraged to accept invitations
by nonprofit organizations, colleges and universities, and governmental agencies
for purposes of presenting guest lectures, delivering papers, serving on review
panels, and participating in accreditation activities.”
In any event, whether Stamatoyannopoulos’ direct employer is registered
as a non-profit organization is not wholly dispositive. 	As the hearing panel
explained, “The deeper involvement review required by EO 57 is not narrowly
limited to direct employment by, investment in or contracting with a commercial

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enterprise. 	Rather, the rules apply to ‘deeper involvement with a commercial
enterprise’ where 	‘there 	is 	potential for 	conflict of 	interest, commitment, 	or
allegiance with their University position.’” 	Here Stamatoyannopoulos’ extensive
involvement with GSK—a large commercial entity—poses the risk of conflict the
University was entitled to review under its policy. 	As Stamatoyannopoulos
explained, GSK “is currently the sole funder of the Institute, and there are no plans
for additional corporate funders at this time.” As the hearing panel noted, GSK’s
public announcement stated that Altius would be ‘“pioneering new technologies
and approaches,” which GSK expected to “capitalize” on. To that end, “expecting
Altius to be a catalyst of innovation, GSK . . . retained first rights to option the
Institute’s inventions, and to invest in commercialization of its discoveries via
spinout companies.” 	Such activities are precisely the kinds of conflict the
University sought to manage through EO 57 where research otherwise conducted
to the University’s benefit may be instead “capitalized on” by a commercial entity.
Because the hearing panel did not erroneously interpret or apply the law, we reject
Stamatoyannopoulos’ claim for relief under RCW 34.05.570(3)(d).
C
Next, 	citing 	RCW 	34.05.570(3)(e), 	Stamatoyannopoulos 	asserts 	the
hearing panel’s “direct and mixed findings on pages 3 through 9 of the Panel
Decision lack substantial evidence” and that the finding as to his “neglect of duty”
is not supported by substantial evidence. His argument is unavailing.
RCW 34.05.570(3)(e) allows for relief from an agency order when “[t]he
order is not supported by evidence that is substantial.” 	“The appellant must

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present argument to the court why specific findings of fact are not supported by
the evidence and must cite to the record to support that argument.” Inland Foundry
Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 106 Wn. App. 333, 340, 24 P.3d 424 (2001). A
separate assignment of error for each finding of fact a party contends was
improperly made must also be included with reference to the finding by number.
RAP 10.3(g). 	“Where a party “fail[s] to provide argument addressing why
. . . findings are not supported by substantial evidence,” we “treat the findings as
verities on appeal.” Gibson v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 185 Wn. App. 42, 53, 340 P.3d
882 (2014) (citing Tapper v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 122 Wn.2d 397, 407, 858 P.2d 494
(1993)).
Here, Stamatoyannopoulos’ assignments of error indicate he will “describe[]
more fully in the Statement of Facts” what the allegedly unsupported findings are,
but the facts section of his brief does not contest specific factual findings by the
hearing panel. 	The closest Stamatoyannopoulos comes to making such an
argument is his assertion that “[t]here simply was no testimony from any witness
that Dr. Stamatoyannopoulos’ work at [Altius] adversely affected any students, the
University, or interfered with his duties.” But the hearing panel was not required to
hear specific testimony to that effect to find the University was harmed based on
the 	overwhelming 	evidence 	that 	the 	University 	lost 	Stamatoyannopoulos’
laboratory, its research, and the attendant learning opportunities for its students as
a 	result 	of 	Stamatoyannopoulos’ 	extensive 	work 	for 	Altius. 	At 	bottom,
Stamatoyannopoulos fails to establish any entitlement to relief under RCW
34.05.570(3)(e).

No. 87706-2-I
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D
Lastly, 	citing 	RCW 	34.05.570(3)(i), 	Stamatoyannopoulos 	argues 	the
hearing panel’s decision terminating his employment was arbitrary or capricious.
He is not entitled to relief on these grounds.
RCW 34.05.570(3)(i) allows for relief when “[t]he order is arbitrary or
capricious.” Review of this issue is de novo. Linville v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 11 Wn.
App. 2d 316, 327, 452 P.3d 1269 (2019). Agencies act in an arbitrary or capricious
manner when their action is “willful and unreasoning and taken without regard to
the attending facts or circumstances.” 	Hillis v. Dep’t of Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373,
383, 932 P.2d 139 (1997). “Where there is room for two opinions, and the agency
acted honestly and upon due consideration, this court should not find that an action
was arbitrary and capricious, even though this court may have reached the
opposite conclusion.” 	Port of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 589. 	Because the record
shows the hearing panel considered the “attending facts and circumstances” and
its decision is not “willful and unreasoning,” we reject Stamatoyannopoulos’
argument that the decision is arbitrary or capricious under RCW 34.05.570(3)(i).
Stamatoyannopoulos does not argue the University acted in a manner that
was unreasoning or “taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.”
He instead claims the University treated other professors’ distinguishable requests
for various approvals differently than his. 	Such allegations, even if true, are not
sufficient to suggest the University acted arbitrarily or capriciously in reviewing the
facts 	and 	circumstances 	of Stamatoyannopoulos’ particular 	compliance 	with
University policy. This argument is unavailing.

No. 87706-2-I
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Finally, to the extent Stamatoyannopoulos claims that the hearing panel’s
decision was arbitrary or capricious because the University “disregarded its duty
to manage any potential conflicts of interest under GIM 10,” this argument is
likewise unavailing. 	Fatal to Stamatoyannopoulos’ claim, his appellate briefing
does not identify with citation to the record the actions the University purportedly
failed to take that are, as he contends, arbitrary or capricious. Nor does he provide
decisional authority or analysis supporting a conclusion that the hearing panel’s
decision was arbitrary or capricious based on the University’s alleged complicity.
We therefore reject this claim. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v.
Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
III
In sum, Stamatoyannopoulos has not established any of the asserted
grounds for relief from an agency order: 	the hearing panel did not violate his
procedural due process rights, it did not err in applying the law, its findings are
verities on appeal because Stamatoyannopoulos did not establish otherwise, and
it 	did 	not 	act 	arbitrarily 	or 	capriciously 	in 	deciding 	to 	terminate
Stamatoyannopoulos’ employment. 	We therefore affirm the University’s final
decision and, accordingly, affirm the trial court’s decision on judicial review.
WE CONCUR: