* State Of Washington, Respondent V Michael A. Cobb, Appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59459-5-II
Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY COBB, PUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
GLASGOW, J.—Michael Cobb was convicted of 1 count of possession of methamphetamine
with intent to deliver. The trial court ordered a mental health sentencing alternative and 18 months
of community custody. The trial court imposed several conditions of community custody,
including a mandatory condition that Cobb “[r]emain within geographic boundary, as set forth in
writing by the Community Corrections Officer.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 84.
Cobb appeals his sentence, challenging this condition of community custody as
unconstitutionally vague. We affirm.
ANALYSIS
“Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
3 of the Washington State Constitution, [a person] must have fair warning of proscribed conduct.”
State v. Lundstrom, 34 Wn. App. 2d 977, 979, 572 P.3d 1243 (2025). A community custody
condition “is unconstitutionally vague if it either fails to give fair warning of what is forbidden or
fails to give ascertainable standards that will prevent arbitrary enforcement.” State v. Johnson, 197
Wn.2d 740, 747, 487 P.3d 893 (2021).
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
February 24, 2026
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No. 59459-5-II
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Cobb argues that the condition requiring him to comply with geographic limitations set by
a community corrections officer fails to adequately warn him of forbidden conduct because the
term “geographic boundary” is not defined. He also argues the condition “lacks ascertainable
standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement” because it grants discretion to a community
corrections officer. Br. of Appellant at 8. We disagree.
“Sentencing courts have the power to delegate some aspects of community placement to
the [Department of Corrections]” because the execution of a sentence and rehabilitation of the
defendant are “‘administrative in character’” when properly exercised as prescribed by the
legislature. State v. Sansone, 127 Wn. App. 630, 642, 111 P.3d 1251 (2005) (quoting State v.
Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 628, 66 P.2d 360 (1937)). However, trial courts “‘may not wholesaledly
abdicate . . . judicial responsibility for setting’” community custody conditions. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 266 (3rd Cir. 2001)). In
other words, a trial court cannot give a probation officer “‘an unfettered power of interpretation’”
over a community custody condition. Id. (quoting Loy, 237 F.3d at 266).
Here, the trial court did not impose a specific geographic boundary. Instead, it clearly and
unambiguously required Cobb to comply with a boundary to be set by the Department. Under
RCW 9.94A.703(1)(b), the sentencing court must require the defendant “to comply with any
conditions imposed by the [D]epartment under RCW 9.94A.704.” And the legislature requires the
Department to set geographic restrictions for people it supervises based on an assessment of the
person’s risk to community safety. RCW 9.94A.704(2)(a), (3)(b). Thus, given that the legislature
granted the Department the authority to impose these geographic boundaries and provided
guidelines for deciding how to impose them, the trial court did not improperly give the Department
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No. 59459-5-II
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an unfettered power of interpretation. See Lundstrom, 34 Wn. App. 2d at 980-81. Additionally,
this community custody condition contemplates that the defendant will have sufficient notice of
what the geographic boundaries are, and this clarity also protects against arbitrary enforcement.
See CP at 84 (requiring that the geographic boundary be set forth in writing). Finally, the defendant
can seek administrative review of the geographic boundaries that the Department sets and can raise
a lack of clarity at that time if necessary. Lundstrom, 34 Wn. App. 2d at 981.
Cobb relies on three unpublished Court of Appeals decisions that found the challenged
community custody condition to be unconstitutionally vague.1 We conclude that Lundstrom is
better reasoned. In Lundstrom, Division One held that the community custody condition regarding
geographic restrictions was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 983. The Lundstrom court relied
in part on the legislature’s clear requirement that the Department must set geographic restrictions
for the offenders it supervises based on an assessment of the individual’s risk to community safety.
Id. at 980-81. Like the Lundstrom court, we conclude the condition is not unconstitutionally vague.
CONCLUSION
We affirm Cobb’s sentence.
1 In re Pers. Restraint of Bratcher, No. 39758-1-III (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2024) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/397581_unp.pdf; In re Pers. Restraint of Alaniz, No.
39631-2-III (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2024) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/396312_unp.pdf; State v. Weeden, No. 85648-1-I (Wash.
Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/856481.pdf.
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No. 59459-5-II
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GLASGOW, J.
We concur:
LEE, J.
VELJACIC, A.C.J.
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