In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To S.k.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In Re Dependency of S.R.K., a Minor
Child.
No. 87347-4-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FELDMAN, J. — J.S. appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental
rights to his child, S.R.K. Because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
findings of fact and the findings support its conclusions of law, we affirm.
I
J.S. is the biological father of S.R.K., who was born in March 2018. In June
2019, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (the Department) received
an intake from Children’s Hospital with concerns that S.R.K. had several fractured
bones in multiple stages of healing. 	Because the parents and other family
caregivers 	could 	not 	provide 	a 	plausible 	explanation 	for 	the 	injuries, 	the
Department removed S.R.K. from his parents’ custody and placed him with his
paternal grandmother. 	Shortly thereafter, J.S. underwent a psychological and
parenting evaluation. 	He received a diagnosis of chronic and complex post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a recommendation for counseling and
possible medication management.

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On February 4, 2021, the court entered an agreed order of dependency and
disposition 	as 	to 	J.S.1 	The 	disposition 	required 	J.S. 	to 	participate 	in 	a
psychological assessment with a parenting component and follow through with
mental health counseling, medication management, parenting coaching, and all
treatment recommendations. J.S. underwent additional psychological assessment
in 	September 	2021. 	According 	to 	the 	assessment, 	J.S. 	was 	“unable 	to
demonstrate use of consistent mental health in order to deal with his multiple
issues,” and “needs help and does not have the maturity and skills to parent his
son at this time.”
In May 2022, S.R.K. returned to J.S.’s care for a trial return home. He was
removed from J.S.’s care in October 2022 due to concerns about J.S.’s mental
health challenges and use of physical discipline. 	After J.S. completed court
ordered services, engaged in additional services and mental health treatment, and
had successful overnight visits, the Department agreed to a second trial return
home in February 2023. S.R.K. was removed from J.S.’s care again in September
2023 because of allegations of physical and psychological abuse. 	At that time,
S.R.K. was placed with his maternal grandparents, who expressed an interest in
adopting him.
S.R.K. was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
and PTSD. J.S. “does not believe that [S.R.K.] has either of these diagnoses” and
encouraged S.R.K. to discontinue his medication. 	After the second failed return
home, S.R.K. began exhibiting confrontational and aggressive behavior at home
1 S.R.K. was also found dependent as to his biological mother, and her parental rights were
subsequently terminated. She is not a party to this appeal.

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and at school, as well as night terrors and bedwetting. He has episodes where he
becomes extremely emotional and upset, destroying property and becoming
physically violent. 	These episodes mostly occur after visits with J.S. 	J.S. visits
regularly, and the two enjoy activities together. 	The visits have progressed from
supervised to monitored, but have not progressed to unsupervised since the
second failed return home.
The Department filed a petition for termination of J.S.’s parental rights in
December 2023 and the termination trial occurred in September 2024. At the time
of trial, S.R.K. had spent a total 31 months out of his father’s care since entry of
the agreed order of dependency and disposition. 	The court entered an order
terminating J.S.’s parental rights on October 14, 2024. This timely appeal followed.
II
Under Washington law, the termination of parental rights is a two-step
process. In re Welfare of A.B., 168 Wn.2d 908, 911, 232 P.3d 1104 (2010). The
first step focuses on the adequacy of the parents and requires proof of six statutory
elements by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 	Id. 	The three elements at
issue here are:
(d) That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have
been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all
necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the
parental 	deficiencies 	within 	the 	foreseeable 	future 	have 	been
expressly and understandably offered or provided;
(e) 	That 	there 	is 	little 	likelihood 	that 	conditions 	will 	be
remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near
future. . . .
(f) That continuation of the parent and child relationship
clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a
stable and permanent home. . . .

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RCW 13.34.180(1)(d)-(f).2 	Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence exists when
the ultimate fact at issue is shown by evidence to be “highly probable.” 	In re
Dependency of K.R., 128 Wn.2d 129, 141, 904 P.2d 1132 (1995). 	If the
Department satisfies the first step, the court proceeds to the second step, which is
“determining if termination is in the best interest of the child.” In re Dependency of
K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d 568, 577, 257 P.3d 522 (2011). 	The Department must show
that termination is in the best interests of the child by a preponderance of the
evidence. A.B., 168 Wn.2d at 911.
Because of the highly fact-specific nature of termination proceedings, we
defer 	to 	the 	trial 	court’s 	determinations 	of 	witness 	credibility 	and 	the
persuasiveness of the evidence. In re Matter of K.M.M., 186 Wn.2d 466, 477, 379
P.3d 75 (2016). The trial court’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence does not exist in the record. 	Id. We review de
novo whether the court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law. 	Id.
“[U]nchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal.” In re Estate of Jones, 152
Wn.2d 1, 8, 93 P.3d 147 (2004).
A
Addressing the first step of the termination analysis, J.S. argues the
Department failed to prove elements (d), (e), and (f) of RCW 13.34.180(1) (quoted
2 The three other elements are: 	“(a) That the child has been found to be a dependent
child,” “(b) That the court has entered a dispositional order pursuant to RCW 13.34.130,” and “(c)
That the child has been removed or will, at the time of the hearing, have been removed from the
custody of the parent for a period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency.” RCW
13.34.180(1)(a)-(c).

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above) by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. 	We address each element in
turn.
1
Regarding element (d), J.S. contends that the Department did not expressly
and understandably offer or provide a neurological evaluation. According to J.S.,
the Department did not ensure that he had a primary care doctor to make the
referral or that he understood how to access a neurological evaluation and its
importance. We disagree.
The Department must offer or provide “all necessary services, reasonably
available, capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable
future.” RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). “A service is ‘necessary’ if it is needed to address
a condition that precludes reunification of the parent and child.” 	In re Parental
Rights to I.M.-M., 196 Wn. App. 914, 921, 385 P.3d 268 (2016) (citing In re Welfare
of C.S., 168 Wn.2d 51, 56 n.3, 225 P.3d 953 (2010)). Prior to terminating parental
rights, the Department must “identify a parent’s specific needs and provide
services to meet those needs.” I.M.-M., 196 Wn. App. at 924. At a minimum, the
Department must “provide a parent with a list of referral agencies that provide
those services.” In re Dependency of D.A., 124 Wn. App. 644, 651, 102 P.3d 847
(2004). 	If the Department has reason to believe that a parent may have an
intellectual disability, it must make reasonable efforts to determine whether the
parent 	has 	a 	disability 	and 	ensure 	its 	offer 	of 	services 	is 	reasonably
understandable. In re Parental Rights to M.A.S.C., 197 Wn.2d 685, 689, 486 P.3d
886 (2021).

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J.S. underwent a domestic violence evaluation in January 2024. 	The
evaluation recommended 12 months of domestic violence treatment and noted
J.S. would benefit from continued mental health services and exploration of
“trauma therapy (EMDR) options.”3 Additionally, the assessment stated J.S. “may
benefit from further medical assessment, due to reports of repeated trauma to the
head during physical assaults, falls, and facial injuries.” 	After learning of this
history of head trauma, the Department social worker discussed with J.S. that he
would need to obtain a referral to see a neurologist and offered her assistance. At
the time of the termination trial in September 2024, J.S. had not yet received a
referral from his primary care physician.
J.S. alleges that the Department “did not take actual steps to expressly and
understandably 	offer” 	neurological 	evaluation. 	As 	to 	the 	steps 	taken, 	the
Department social worker testified without contradiction that she offered to call
J.S.’s primary care provider or accompany J.S. to see the provider to explain the
need for a referral to a neurologist. She also provided J.S. with a list of neurologists
near his residence and called offices to inquire about waitlists for appointments.
These efforts—the provision of names of local neurologists and offers of help to
obtain a referral from the primary care physician—equate to “a list of referral
agencies” established as the minimum requirement for adequate provision of
services. See D.A., 124 Wn. App. at 651.
J.S. also argues that the record fails to establish that the Department
understandably 	offered 	a 	neurological 	evaluation. 	According 	to 	J.S., 	the
3 EMDR refers to “eye movement desensitization and reprocessing” therapy. See Roake
v. Delman, 189 Wn.2d 775, 785, 408 P.3d 658 (2018).

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Department knew he had complex PTSD and a possible brain injury which “could
impact his ability to access services, remain in compliance with services as well as
understand the importance of those services,” and the record does not show that
the Department properly tailored its services such that J.S. understood how to
access a neurological evaluation. But the unchallenged findings of fact state that
the two social workers and two psychological experts who engaged with J.S. never
reported concerns about possible cognitive or intellectual impairment. 	J.S. does
not argue and the record does not demonstrate that he struggled to understand
any of the other services offered by the Department, including referrals for
domestic violence assessment, substance use assessment, and mental health
treatment. 	Given the lack of evidence that J.S. suffered from a cognitive or
intellectual impairment, as well as his ability to utilize other services offered,
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the Department
provided services tailored to meet J.S.’s needs.
2
Regarding element (e), J.S. argues that the Department failed to prove by
clear, 	cogent, 	and 	convincing 	evidence 	“[t]hat 	there 	is 	little 	likelihood 	that
conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the
near future,” as required by RCW 13.34.180(1)(e). We disagree.
RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) focuses on whether parenting deficiencies have been
corrected. 	In re Welfare of E.D., 195 Wn. App. 673, 689, 381 P.3d 1230 (2016).
“What 	constitutes 	‘near 	future’ 	depends 	on 	the 	age 	of 	the 	child 	and 	the
circumstances of the child’s placement.” In re Welfare of C.B., 134 Wn. App. 942,

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954, 143 P.3d 856 (2006). Here, the trial court found that S.R.K.’s “near future” is
“six months or less.” 	Because J.S. does not challenge this finding, a near future
of “six months or less” is a verity on appeal. See Estate of Jones, 152 Wn.2d at 8.
The trial court found that J.S. could not complete his domestic violence
services or “address his complex PTSD” in the six-month time frame. 	J.S.
concedes 	that 	he 	cannot 	complete 	his 	domestic 	violence 	services 	in 	that
timeframe, but challenges the finding as to his ability to address his PTSD.
According to J.S., “finishing mental health treatment (or substance abuse or DV
treatment) isn’t necessarily required in order to get to a safe standard for parenting”
and “[t]he record does not reflect that given 6 more months, J.S. couldn’t make
substantial progress . . . to the point where he could safely parent S.R.K. in an in-
home dependency.”
But J.S. does not challenge several findings of fact that support the trial
court’s determination. The court found that J.S. “has not obtained adequate control
of his mental health symptoms” and “[a]bsent appropriate treatment for his mental
health, [J.S.’s] prognosis for parenting ability is poor.” 	With respect to the
anticipated timeline for J.S.’s mental health treatment, the court found that the
psychological expert credibly testified “[f]or a person ready and willing to engage
in treatment with high motivation, it can take five years to achieve optimal control
of PTSD symptoms, with the shortest time being three to four years.” 	Yet, at the
time of the trial, J.S. had not engaged in mental health treatment for more than six
months and had only just had an introductory session for EMDR. 	The trial court
also found J.S. “does not believe he requires mental health services. He does not

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believe he should adhere to any prescription medication recommendations. 	He
believes he is being coerced into seeking care for his mental health concerns.”
Finally, the court found “[J.S.] has not evidenced high motivation or a commitment
to consistently and diligently engage in treatment.”
Because J.S. does not challenge the above findings, they are verities on
appeal. See Jones, 152 Wn.2d at 8. Based on these verities, J.S. requires years-
long mental health treatment to successfully parent but continues to deny the need
for such treatment. Given the long timeline for treatment, J.S.’s demonstrated lack
of motivation to engage in that treatment, and S.R.K.’s near future of “six months
or less,” the trial court’s finding that “[t]here is little likelihood that conditions will be
remedied so that the child can be returned to his father within the near future” is
supported by substantial evidence.
3
Lastly, 	regarding element (f), J.S. asserts that the Department failed to
prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that guardianship was not an
available 	option for S.R.K. 	and 	that termination of 	his 	parental 	rights 	was
necessary for permanency. We disagree.
The issue of guardianship arises under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) because it
requires the Department to prove that continuation of the parent-child relationship
clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and
permanent home. 	To this end, the trial court “must consider the efforts taken by
the department to support a guardianship and whether a guardianship is available
as a permanent option for the child.” RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). “Whether guardianship

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is a viable alternative to termination is a case-specific determination, considering
factors relevant to the best interests of the child.” In re Dependency of G.C.B., 28
Wn. App. 2d 157, 173, 535 P.3d 451 (2023).
Here, the trial court stated that it “considered the efforts taken by the
Department to support a guardianship and whether a guardianship is available as
a permanent option for the child. 	Guardianship is not an available plan for the
child.” J.S. assigns error to this finding and contends that the testimony as to the
Department’s support of a guardianship was limited and did not demonstrate that
the Department affirmatively supported or encouraged guardianship as an option.
While we agree with J.S. that the Department provided limited testimony about its
efforts toward a guardianship, “the Department need not disprove the availability
of a guardianship placement to satisfy its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).” Id.
Rather, the trial court must “consider the viability of guardianship as a factor when
assessing whether the Department has shown that ‘continuation of the parent and
child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into
a stable and permanent home.’” Id. (quoting RCW 13.34.180(1)(f)).
The above requirements are satisfied here. The trial court heard testimony
from the Department social worker who attended a permanency consultation
meeting with the caregivers during which a Department staff member discussed
“the differences between adoption and guardianship and answer[ed] any and all
questions that they may have.” The social worker testified that after providing this
information, 	the 	Department 	did 	not 	have 	anyone 	willing 	to 	enter 	into 	a
guardianship rather than adopt S.R.K. The court appointed special advocate also

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testified that the caregivers did not intend to offer a guardianship to either parent.
This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that a guardianship was not a viable
option for S.R.K.
Moreover, the trial court considers the issue of guardianship within the
context of the impact of parental rights on the child’s integration into a permanent
home. RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). Several unchallenged findings of fact establish the
harm of continuing the parent-child relationship between S.R.K. and J.S. The court
found that “[t]he need for stability for this particular child is great” and that “[J.S.]
has demonstrated that he cannot maintain placement of [S.R.K.] in his care. 	He
has had two opportunities to do so but failed to exceed seven months of
independent parenting. Each placement change is a disruption to [S.R.K.] which
detrimentally impacts him.”
Further, the trial court found, “[w]hile [J.S.] retains parental rights, [S.R.K.]
cannot 	be 	adopted 	into 	his 	caregivers’ 	home, 	subjecting 	him 	to 	continued
dependency proceedings.” The evidence shows that S.R.K. is adoptable and is in
a relative placement and pre-adoptive home with his half-brother who is in the
process of being adopted. 	A Department social worker testified that continuing
J.S.’s parental rights clearly diminished S.R.K.’s prospects for early integration.
With parental rights intact, S.R.K. “can’t achieve permanency and be adopted and
get that stability that he needs.” 	In short, the trial court properly found that the
Department did not have a willing guardian and that continuation of J.S.’s parental
rights diminished S.R.K.’s prospects for early integration into a stable home.

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B
Turning to the second step of the termination analysis, J.S. argues the
Department failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination
was in S.R.K.’s best interests. We disagree.
J.S. challenges several of the findings of fact that support the trial court’s
conclusion that termination is in S.R.K.’s best interests. 	But J.S. again fails to
challenge a significant finding of fact that provides the necessary support for the
trial court’s determination. The court found:
The physical violence and emotional/psychological harm due to
verbal abuse and exposure to domestic violence and angry behavior,
perpetrated by [J.S.] to [S.R.K.] outweigh any harm associated with
diminished contact with the father or break in bond with the father.
The physical violence and emotional/psychological harm to this child
support finding termination is in [S.R.K.’s] best interest.
J.S. does not refute this finding, nor does he attempt to negate its implications for
the best interests analysis. 	This unchallenged finding shows, and the record
confirms, that the trial court properly determined that termination of J.S.’s parental
rights was in S.R.K.’s best interests regardless of their positive relationship.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: