State Of Washington, Respondent V. Larry Eugene Mulanax, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
LARRY EUGENE MULANAX,
Appellant.
NO. 68467-1-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	February 18, 2014
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Leach, C.J. — Larry Mulanax appeals his convictions for possession of
cocaine with intent to manufacture or deliver, with a firearm allegation; assault in
the 	second 	degree 	with 	intent 	to 	commit 	unlawful 	imprisonment; 	unlawful
imprisonment; and intimidating a witness. 	He claims that the trial court erred by
imposing a firearm enhancement when the jury found only that he possessed a
deadly 	weapon. 	He 	also 	contends 	that 	his 	convictions 	for 	both 	unlawful
imprisonment 	and 	second 	degree 	assault 	with 	intent 	to 	commit 	unlawful
imprisonment violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. 	He challenges
the admission of evidence of his prior misconduct to show modus operandi under
ER 404(b) 	and 	the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 	his 	conviction for
intimidating a witness. 	Finally, he alleges prosecutorial misconduct. 	We find no

NO. 68467-1-1/2
merit in Mulanax's arguments about ER 404(b), sufficiency, and prosecutorial
misconduct. 	However, the State concedes error in the firearm enhancement,
and Mulanax's convictions for both unlawful imprisonment and assault with intent
to 	commit 	unlawful 	imprisonment 	put 	him 	in 	double 	jeopardy. 	We 	affirm
Mulanax's convictions for 	possession, 	assault with 	intent to 	commit unlawful
imprisonment, 	and 	intimidating 	a 	witness. 	But 	we 	vacate 	the 	firearm
enhancement and 	the 	conviction for 	unlawful 	imprisonment and 	remand 	for
resentencing.
FACTS
In July 2011, Kaylynn Swanson, Richard Ace Brown, Mary Schuman, and
Jennifer Bertalan were staying 	with 	Larry 	Mulanax at his 	home. 	Swanson,
Bertalan, Brown, and Schumann all used illegal drugs. 	Mulanax provided and
allowed the use of cocaine in his house.
Around noon on July 30, 2011, Schumann gave Swanson permission to
borrow her car. 	Swanson agreed to have it back by 5:00 p.m. but did not return
until after midnight. 	Brown, Schuman, Bertalan, and Mulanax discussed "what
kind of revenge should happen." 	Mulanax, Brown, and Bertalan wanted to cut
her hair; Schuman wanted to beat her up.
When Swanson returned, she went back to Schuman's bedroom to return
her 	keys 	and 	explain 	her 	absence. 	Brown 	came 	into 	the 	bedroom 	and
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NO. 68467-1-1/3
confronted Swanson. 	He ordered her to undress and used his pocketknife to cut
off her ponytail. 	Mulanax entered the room and told Swanson that she "had a
choice to either have the rest of her hair cut off or get beat up really bad." 	Brown
and Bertalan cut and shaved the rest of Swanson's hair. 	Brown told Swanson
not to move or he would hurt her. 	Bertalan told Swanson, "Don't worry honey,
this happened to me too." 	Mulanax watched and told Brown and Bertalan when
to stop cutting Swanson's hair. 	Mulanax said to Swanson, "God, don't be so
distressed. You are lucky 	[T]he last two girls I seen this happened to, they
beat the living hell out of too, and you ain't got a mark on you." 	Then Mulanax
took pictures of Swanson naked with her head shaved and told Swanson that the
pictures were for his own use and benefit.
Swanson testified that she knew what was going to happen because she
was present some time earlier when Mulanax ordered others to shave Bertalan's
head and beat her up after she stole from him.1 	Swanson was present when the
two individuals returned and when Mulanax paid them with crack cocaine. 	She
later saw a photo of Bertalan with a shaved head and black eyes.
After Mulanax took photos, Brown and 	Mulanax drove Swanson to a
friend's house at her request. Swanson said, "Ace first threatened me that if they
were to think for any reason I was going to call anyone or call the police, that
1 Bertalan testified at trial that this occurred while she was staying at a
motel in Everett in May 2011.
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NO. 68467-1-1/4
they wouldn't let me go" and that Mulanax said, "[l]f he thought for any reason I
was going to be telling anyone, that he wouldn't let me go." 	Two days later,
Swanson reported the incident to police. 	In a subsequent search of Mulanax's
home, 	police 	found 	22 	small 	"baggies" 	of 	cocaine, 	digital 	scales, 	drug
paraphernalia, and two firearms. 	They also found the photographs of Swanson
and Swanson's ponytail in Mulanax's safe. 	Mulanax had the keys to the safe in
his 	pocket. 	Police 	recovered 	a 	photograph 	of 	Bertalan's 	shaved 	head 	on
Mulanax's computer hard drive.
The State charged Mulanax with possession of a controlled substance
with intent to manufacture or deliver, with a firearm allegation; second degree
assault with intent to commit unlawful imprisonment; unlawful imprisonment; and
intimidating a witness. 	Mulanax moved to exclude the evidence associated with
the attack on Bertalan, but the trial court admitted the evidence under ER 404(b)
for the purpose of showing a modus operandi.
The jury found 	Mulanax guilty as charged and 	also found in a special
verdict that Mulanax was armed with a deadly weapon when he committed the
crime of possession with intent to deliver. 	Mulanax appeals.
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NO. 68467-1-1/5
ANALYSIS
ER 404(b)
Mulanax argues that the trial court improperly admitted under ER 404(b)
the "brutally prejudicial" evidence associated with the uncharged assault against
Bertalan. 	He contends that "[t]he purported 'modus operandi' was insufficiently
proven and not probative where identity was not an issue." 	He argues further
that the prosecutor misused the evidence by urging the jury to convict Mulanax
for both incidents, though one was uncharged.
Interpretation of a 	rule of evidence presents a question of law that we
review de novo.2 	If the trial court correctly interpreted the rule, this court reviews
the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.3
A trial court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on untenable grounds or
reasons.4
"ER 404(b)5 is a categorical bar to admission of evidence for the purpose
of proving a person's character and showing that the person acted in conformity
2 State v. Foxhoven. 161 Wn.2d 168, 174, 163 P.3d 786 (2007).
3 Foxhoven. 161 Wn.2d at 174; State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405, 419,
269 P.3d 207 (2012).
4 State v. Vv Thanq. 145 Wn.2d 630, 642, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002).
5 ER 404(b) provides, in full:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove 	the 	character of a 	person 	in order to 	show 	action 	in
conformity therewith. 	It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, 	such 	as 	proof 	of 	motive, 	opportunity, 	intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
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NO. 68467-1-1/6
with that character."6 	Though "there are no 'exceptions' to this rule,"7 the rule
permits a court to admit prior misconduct for certain other purposes, such as
proof of motive, plan, or identity.8 To admit such evidence, the trial court must (1)
find 	by a 	preponderance of the evidence 	that the 	misconduct occurred, (2)
identify the 	purpose for which 	the 	evidence 	is offered, (3) determine 	if the
evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime charged, and (4) weigh the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.9 	The court must
conduct its analysis on the record.10
Evidence of prior bad acts introduced to establish a modus operandi is
relevant to the charged crime "only if the method employed in the commission of
both crimes is 'so unique' that proof that an accused committed one of the crimes
creates a high probability that he also committed the other crimes with which he
is charged"11 and "when the focus of the inquiry is the identity of the perpetrator,
not whether the charged crime occurred."12 	The modus operandi alleged "'must
6 Gresham, 173 Wn.2d at 420.
7 Gresham, 173 Wn.2d at 421.
8 Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d at 175; State v. Evervbodvtalksabout, 145 Wn.2d
456, 465-66, 39 P.3d 294 (2002).
9 In re Pet, of Coe. 175 Wn.2d 482, 493, 286 P.3d 29 (2012) (quoting
Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d at 175).
^"Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d at 175.
11 Thang, 145 Wn.2d at 643 (quoting State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 66-
67, 882 P.2d 747 (1994)).
12 State v. DeVincentis, 150Wn.2d 11, 21, 74 P.3d 119 (2003).
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NO. 68467-1-1/7
be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.'"13 	A sufficiently unique
method does not require each feature of the crime to 	be unique; 	seemingly
common features, especially when combined with a lack of dissimilarities, can
combine to create a unique signature.14 	But when too many dissimilarities exist,
the evidence should be excluded.15 	"'Whether the prior offenses are similar
enough to the charged crime to warrant admission is left to the discretion of the
trial court.'"16
Following 	the 	State's 	offer 	of 	proof, 	the 	trial 	court 	(1) 	found 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence that the 	prior 	misconduct 	involving 	Bertalan
occurred; (2) identified the purpose for the evidence as modus operandi; (3)
determined 	that the evidence was 	relevant to 	prove 	Mulanax's 	identity and
involvement in the charged crime; and (4) found that the evidence of the prior
act, though 	undoubtedly prejudicial, was not 	more heinous than the charged
crime, and consequently that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.
13 Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 772, 777, 684 P.2d 668 (1984)).
14 Coe, 175 Wn.2d at 494 (citing Thanq. 145 Wn.2d at 644); see also
State v. Bradford. 56 Wn. 	App. 464, 468-69, 	783 P.2d 	1133 (1989) (finding
sufficient similarities where 	burglaries committed 	by two 	black males driving
small blue pickup truck, one or both wearing baseball caps, at night in mobile
home display lots, 	using 	channel lock pliers to twist off doorknobs); State v.
Jenkins, 	53 	Wn. 	App. 	228, 	237, 	766 	P.2d 	499 	(1989) 	(finding 	sufficient
similarities where burglaries committed by offender driving brown Camaro, at
only ground floor units, with partner, using pipe wrench to open door).
15 Coe, 175 Wn.2d at 494 (citing Thanq, 145 Wn.2d at 645).
16 Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d at 177 (quoting Jenkins. 53 Wn. App. at 236).
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NO. 68467-1-1/8
The court found "strong" similarities between the prior act and the charged crime
and that they supported the ruling.
Mulanax first contends that because he does not dispute his presence at
the assault on Swanson, evidence of a prior act has little or no probative value to
prove identity. 	The defendant in State v. 	Fualaau17 argued that because the
State had two live witnesses who would testify that he committed the current
offenses, the evidence of prior crimes was not necessary to prove identity and
should be excluded. 	Because Fualaau's alibi defense "placed the question of
identity squarely at issue," however, the trial court admitted the evidence, and we
affirmed the trial court's ruling.18
In State v. Vv Thanq.19 the trial court admitted evidence of the defendant's
prior assault conviction for the purpose of proving identity at his murder trial. 	Like
Mulanax, Thang denied committing the crime but admitted he was present at the
scene.20 	The Washington 	Supreme Court held 	that the trial 	court erred 	in
admitting 	evidence 	of the 	prior crime, 	but 	not 	because Thang's 	undisputed
presence destroyed 	the evidence's 	relevance to 	show identity. 	Rather, 	the
admission was erroneous because the merely general similarities between the
17 155 Wn. App. 347, 353-54, 228 P.3d 771 (2010).
18 Fualaau. 155 Wn. App. at 354, 356.
19
20 Thanq. 145 Wn.2d at 640-41
145 Wn.2d 630, 640-41, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002).
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NO. 68467-1-1/9
two crimes were not sufficiently signature-like to constitute modus operandi.21
Whether the defendant presents an alibi defense or concedes he was present,
denial of all involvement in a crime admittedly committed puts the identity of the
perpetrator at issue. 	In each instance, the defendant necessarily asserts that
someone else committed the crime. 	Thus, evidence of a prior bad signature-like
act by the defendant becomes relevant. 	The trial court properly interpreted ER
404(b) to 	conclude that Mulanax's 	undisputed 	presence did 	not destroy the
relevance of evidence of his prior act offered to show modus operandi.
Our 	inquiry does 	not end 	with relevance, 	however. 	As we 	noted 	in
Fualaau. "The critical determination for the trial court to make is whether there
are sufficient similarities between the crimes to make evidence of the prior crime
probative of the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime charged."22
In Fualaau. both the currently charged and prior assaults shared a number of
similar features 	consistent with a 	ritual punishment. 	We concluded that the
distinctive ritualistic qualities shared by the two crimes made evidence that the
21 	Thanq, 145 Wn.2d at 643-45 (concluding that theft of a purse and
jewelry, elderly victims who were kicked, perpetrator's allegedly similar remarks
were not probative of modus operandi, especially where there was no geographic
or temporal proximity, and collecting cases showing absence or presence of
modus operandi).
22 Fualaau. 155 Wn. App. at 357.
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NO. 68467-1-1/10
defendant committed the first "strongly probative of his identity as the perpetrator
of the second, notwithstanding any dissimilarities between the two events."23
Though 	it does 	not demonstrate 	a 	particular tradition 	or 	ritual 	as 	in
Fualaau, the record here reveals distinctive and unusual similarities between the
earlier 	uncharged 	assault against 	Bertalan 	and 	the 	charged 	assault against
Swanson. 	Both involved young women with drug addictions who appeared to be
under Mulanax's patronage and/or control. 	Others carried out both assaults,
allegedly at Mulanax's direction, to punish the unauthorized taking or holding of
property. 	Both involved the cutting and shaving of the victim's hair, accompanied
by a beating or the threat of a beating. 	Both women said they were warned not
to go to the police. 	Mulanax admitted photographing both women sometime after
their heads were shaved, 	and 	police seized evidence of both incidents from
Mulanax's safe and computer hard drive. 	Moreover, there was temporal and
geographic proximity between the incidents: 	Bertalan's took place in Everett,
sometime around 	May 2011; Swanson's occurred 	in Stanwood, a city in the
same county, at the end of July 2011.24 	Having found by a preponderance ofthe
evidence that the assault on Bertalan occurred, the trial court did not abuse its
23 Fualaau, 155 Wn. App. at 358.
24 See also Russell. 125 Wn.2d at 68 (allowing joinder of two signature
like murders occurring a few weeks apart in Bellevue-Kirkland area). 	Contra
Thanq. 	145 Wn.2d at 644 (finding proximity factor not satisfied when crimes
committed 18 months apart, on opposite sides of state).
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NO. 68467-1-1/11
discretion in concluding that the peculiar similarities between the two incidents
warranted admission of the prior act under ER 404(b).
We reject Mulanax's assertion that the 	prosecutor's references to this
evidence 	in 	closing 	argument 	were 	improper 	and 	"tainted 	the 	trial." 	The
prosecutor argued in closing that Mulanax "ruined lives with his assaults. 	He
ruined lives with his threats." 	The prosecutor then urged the jury to "take control
away from him" and "find him guilty of all four crimes." 	Mulanax argues that this
was 	reversible error because the 	prosecutor "urge[d] a 	conviction 	based on
Mulanax's propensity or potential for dangerous behavior," violating ER 404(b)'s
"categorical bar" against propensity evidence.
During closing argument, the prosecutor has "wide latitude in drawing and
expressing 	reasonable 	inferences 	from 	the evidence."25 	The 	prosecutor's
comments here were tied to the properly admitted evidence at trial. 	"[A]ll four
crimes" 	referred 	to 	the four 	charged 	crimes. 	Mulanax fails 	to 	demonstrate
prosecutorial misconduct.
Sufficiency: 	Intimidating a Witness
Mulanax also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for intimidating a witness. 	He contends that his remarks to Swanson
after the 	incident 	were 	"about 	past 	events, 	where 	[he] 	described 	his 	prior
25 State v. Gentry. 125 Wn.2d 570, 641, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995).
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NO. 68467-1-1/12
thoughts" and do not show an intent to 	prevent Swanson from 	reporting the
crimes. 	He also argues that the remarks are vague and "do not express the
required intent to inflict harm in the future essential for a true threat."
Courts review constitutional questions de novo, and in a case involving
pure 	speech 	engage 	in 	an 	independent 	review 	of the 	record 	to 	ensure 	a
conviction is not a "'forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.'"26 	RCW
9A.72.110(1) defines the offense of intimidating a witness as the use of a threat
against a 	current or prospective witness to 	influence testimony, 	induce the
witness to 	elude 	legal 	process or 	absent herself, 	or 	not report the offense.
"Importantly, only threats that are 'true' may be proscribed."27 	Our Supreme
Court has adopted an objective test of what constitutes a "true threat": 	"'[A]
statement made in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted ... as a serious
expression of intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life' of another
person."28 	This 	objective standard focuses on the speaker, who 	need not
26 State v. Schaler. 169 Wn.2d 274, 282, 236 P.3d 858 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Kilburn. 151 Wn.2d 36, 49-50, 84 P.3d
1215(2004)).
27 Schaler. 169 Wn.2d at 283.
28 Kilburn. 151 Wn.2d at 43 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting State v. Williams. 144 Wn.2d 197, 207-08, 26 P.3d 890 (2001)).
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NO. 68467-1-1/13
actually intend to carry out the threat: 	"It is enough that a reasonable speaker
would foresee that the threat would be considered serious."29
Sufficiency of the 	evidence also 	presents a 	question 	of constitutional
magnitude that a defendant may raise for the first time on appeal.30 	Sufficient
evidence supports a conviction if, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
State, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the
crime 	beyond 	a reasonable 	doubt.31 	A challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence admits the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences
from 	that 	evidence.32 	A 	reviewing 	court need 	not be 	convinced 	of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but only that substantial evidence
supports 	the State's 	case.33 	We do 	not 	review 	issues of credibility 	or
persuasiveness of the evidence.34
To define the element of threat in the offense of intimidating a witness, the
trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Threat 	means 	to 	communicate, 	directly 	or 	indirectly, 	the
intent to cause bodily injury to the person threatened or to any other
person ....
29 Schaler. 169 Wn.2d at 283.
30 State v. Alvarez. 128 Wn.2d 1,10, 904 P.2d 754 (1995).
31 	State v. Green. 	94 Wn.2d 	216, 	221, 	616 P.2d 628 (1980) 	(quoting
Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 	2d 560 (1979)).
32 State v. Salinas. 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
33 State v. Fiser. 99 Wn. App. 714, 718, 995 P.2d 107 (2000).
34Fiser, 99Wn.App. at 719.
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NO. 68467-1-1/14
Threat also means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the
intent immediately to use force against any person who is present
at the time.
To be a threat, a statement or act must occur in a context or
under 	such 	circumstances 	where 	a 	reasonable 	person, 	in the
position of the speaker, would foresee that the statement or act
would be interpreted as a serious expression of intention to carry
out the threat rather than as something said in jest or idle talk.
Mulanax 	relies 	on State 	v. 	Brown.35 where the defendant said in 	a phone
conversation that he "had thought about shooting" the judge who sentenced him
for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. 	Mulanax argues that, like Brown's
remarks, his words were not true threats but only past thoughts, which the State
may not criminalize.36
Brown is inapposite. 	Mulanax was not describing his past thoughts about
an earlier event to an uninvolved third party. 	While Brown forced Swanson to
submit to head-shaving and nude photographs, Mulanax told her that "the last
two girls" he'd seen this happen to, "they beat the living hell out of too." 	Swanson
had seen a photograph of Bertalan with a shaved head and black eyes. 	Mulanax
also said that "if he thought for any reason [she] was going to be telling anyone,
that he wouldn't let [her] go." 	Given the context of the statements, a reasonable
person in the speaker's position would foresee that Mulanax's statements would
be interpreted not as past thoughts but as a serious expression of intention to
35 137 Wn. App. 587, 589-90, 154 P.3d 302 (2007).
36 See Brown. 137 Wn. App. at 591-92.
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NO. 68467-1-1/15
carry out a threat of bodily harm. 	A reasonable juror could have found that
Mulanax made the statements to influence Swanson against reporting the crime.
Sufficient evidence supports Mulanax's conviction.
Finally, Mulanax argues that by not including the words "true threat" in the
"to-convict" 	instructions, 	the trial 	court omitted 	an 	"essential element" of the
offense, thereby diluting the State's burden of proof. 	But the definition of an
element is not the element itself. 	"No Washington court has ever held that a true
threat is an essential element of any threatening-language crime or reversed a
conviction for failure to include language defining what constitutes a true threat in
a charging document or 'to convict' instruction."37 	In its jury instructions, the trial
court correctly stated the requirement of a serious expression of intention to inflict
bodily harm. We affirm Mulanax's conviction for intimidating a witness.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
In 	her 	closing 	argument, 	the 	prosecutor 	characterized 	the 	law 	of
accomplice liability as "the easiest way to think of this is sort of in for a penny, in
for a pound." 	Mulanax contends that this statement misrepresents the law and
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.38 	Because Mulanax did not object to the
37 State v. Tellez. 141 Wn. App. 479, 483, 170 P.3d 75 (2007); see also
State v. Allen. 176 Wn.2d 611, 628, 294 P.3d 679 (2013).
38 See In re Pers. Restraint of Wilson. 169 Wn. App. 379, 392, 279 P.3d
990 (2012) (finding prejudicial cumulative error that included the prosecutor's use
of the "now-discredited argument of 'in for a 	penny, in for a 	pound'"), review
denied. No. 87901-0 (Wash. Mar. 1, 2013).
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NO. 68467-1-1/16
alleged 	misconduct at trial, he cannot raise 	this issue on appeal unless the
misconduct was "so flagrant and ill intentioned" as to cause enduring prejudice
that could not have been cured by instruction to the jury and had a substantial
likelihood of affecting the verdict.39
Though 	we 	have 	characterized 	the 	"in 	for 	a 	penny" 	explanation 	as
"discredited," these remarks are not the type of comments that the Washington
Supreme Court has found to be inflammatory.40 	In the two cases Mulanax cites
in support of his 	position, 	In 	re 	Personal 	Restraint of Wilson41 	and 	State v.
Cronin.42 the prejudicial error that this court and the Supreme Court found was
not primarily the "in for a penny" remark, 	but rather the improper arguments,
erroneous 	instructions,43 	and "meager evidence" supporting 	the accomplice
convictions.
Here, the prosecutor followed the general "in for a penny" illustration with
a specific application of the law:
39 State v. Emery. 174 Wn.2d 741, 760-61, 278 P.3d 653 (2012).
40 	Emery. 	174 	Wn.2d 	at 	763 	(collecting 	cases 	where 	prosecutor's
inflammatory comments prejudiced defendant); see also State v. Monday. 171
Wn.2d 667, 678-79, 257 P.3d 551 (2011) (holding prosecutor's appeal to racial
bias was improper and prejudicial).
41 	169 Wn. 	App. 	379, 392, 279 P.3d 990 (2012), 	review denied. No.
87901-0 (Wash. Mar. 1, 2013).
42 142 Wn.2d 568, 578-79, 14 P.3d 752 (2000).
43 Prosecutors in both cases stated that accomplice liability attaches when
the defendant knows that he or she is aiding in the commission of any crime, not
"the" crime charged, 	as 	the 	statute 	requires. 	In 	Wilson, the 	obsolete jury
instruction likewise said "a crime." 	169 Wn. App. at 390.
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NO. 68467-1-1/17
The defendant is legally accountable for the actions of Ace and for
the actions of Jennifer because he helped plan this. 	He directed
their actions. 	He supervised it. 	He stood by ready to lend them
aid. 	And he finished it up by taking pictures and telling [Swanson]
that if she told anyone what happened there, they weren't going to
let 	her go. 	That makes the defendant an 	accomplice to 	what
happened 	in that 	room . . . because 	it all 	happened 	under 	his
supervision.
This stated the law of accomplice liability correctly. 	The jury also received
proper 	instruction 	from 	the 	trial 	court. 	We 	reject 	Mulanax's 	prosecutorial
misconduct claim.
Double Jeopardy
Mulanax asserts that his convictions for both unlawful imprisonment and
assault in the second degree with intent to commit unlawful imprisonment violate
the prohibition against double jeopardy. 	According to Mulanax, "The unwanted
touching necessary to prove the assault charge was the same evidence used to
prove the restraint element of the unlawful imprisonment allegation."
A double jeopardy claim presents a question of law reviewed de novo.44
The guaranty against double jeopardy in the United States and Washington State
Constitutions protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.45 	A
defendant may raise a double jeopardy challenge for the first time on appeal.46
Multiple 	convictions 	may 	constitute 	a 	double 	jeopardy violation 	even 	when
44 State v. Frodert. 84 Wn. App. 20, 25, 924 P.2d 933 (1996).
45 State v. Calle. 125 Wn.2d 769, 776, 888 P.2d 155 (1995).
46 State v. Adel. 136 Wn.2d 629, 631-32, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998).
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NO. 68467-1-1/18
sentences 	run 	concurrently 	because 	separate 	convictions 	implicate 	other
adverse collateral consequences.47
Within constitutional limits, a legislature has the power to define prohibited
conduct and to assign punishment.48 	To analyze a double jeopardy claim, a
court must determine what punishments the legislative branch has authorized
and if it intended to impose separate punishments for the acts that led to the
defendant's convictions.49 	This court applies a three-part test to determine if the
legislature 	intended 	to 	impose 	multiple 	punishments 	for the 	same 	criminal
conduct.50 	First, the court examines the statutory language to determine if it
expressly 	authorizes 	multiple 	convictions for 	a single 	act.51 	Second, 	if the
relevant statutes do not reveal an express intent to impose multiple punishments,
Washington courts apply a "same evidence test" that is similar to the rule set
forth in Blockburger v. United States:52 offenses are the "same offense" for
47 Calle. 125 Wn.2d at 773-74.
48 Calle. 125Wn.2dat776.
49 Calle. 125 Wn.2d at 776 (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,
688, 100 S. Ct. 1432, 63 L. Ed. 	2d 715 (1980)); State v. Baldwin. 150 Wn.2d
448, 454, 78 P.3d 1005 (2003).
50 State v. Martin. 149 Wn. App. 689, 698, 205 P.3d 931 (2009); see also
Calle. 125 Wn.2d at 776-80.
51 	Calle. 	125 	Wn.2d 	at 	776; 	Martin, 	149 	Wn. App. 	at 	698. 	RCW
9A.52.050, where the legislature explicitly provided for cumulative punishments
for 	crimes 	committed 	during 	a 	burglary, 	is 	an 	example 	of 	this 	express
authorization.
52 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932).
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NO. 68467-1-1/19
purposes of double jeopardy when the crimes are the same in fact and in law.53
"Offenses are the same in fact when they arise from the same act or transaction.
They are the same in law when 	proof of one offense would 	also prove the
other."54 	The Washington Supreme Court has emphasized that when courts
apply the Blockburger-"same evidence" test, they must compare elements of the
offenses not in the abstract, but as charged and proved at trial.55
Third, when two offenses satisfy the Blockburger-"same evidence" test,
courts look for any evidence of contrary legislative intent that would rebut the
presumption that multiple convictions are appropriate.56 	Where the degree of
one offense depends on 	conduct constituting a separate offense, the merger
doctrine may help determine legislative intent, and the court will examine if the
commission of the "included" crime had an independent purpose or effect from
the other crime.57 	"[W]hen 	separately 	criminalized 	conduct raises another
offense to a higher degree, we presume that the legislature intended to punish
53 State v. Vladovic. 99 Wn.2d 413, 423, 662 P.2d 853 (1983).
54 Martin, 149 Wn. App. at 699 (citing Calle. 125 Wn.2d at 777-78).
55 In re Pers. Restraint of Orange. 152 Wn.2d 795, 818, 100 P.3d 291
(2004); see also Martin. 149 Wn. App. at 699-700.
56 Calle. 125 Wn.2d at 780.
57 State v. Freeman. 153 Wn.2d 765, 778-79, 108 P.3d 753 (2005); Martin.
149 Wn. App. at 699.
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NO. 68467-1-1/20
both offenses only once, namely, for the more serious crime with the greater
sentence."58
The State relies heavily on State v. Frohs.59 in which this court considered
a challenge to separate convictions for assault in the fourth degree and unlawful
imprisonment and affirmed both convictions. 	Important facts in Frohs distinguish
it. 	The assault was in the fourth degree and was therefore the lesser offense. 	It
was not predicated on the unlawful imprisonment; the court emphasized that the
defendant had already assaulted and injured the victim before he told her she
would be shot if she tried to leave.60
We consider State v. Leming61 more analogous. 	There, the jury found
defendant Leming guilty of multiple charges that included felony harassment and
second degree assault "predicated on felony harassment."62 	The court noted
that to prove the felony harassment charge, "the State had to prove that Leming
(1) threatened to kill [the victim] and (2) that she feared he would carry out the
threat."63 	To prove the assault in the second degree charge, the State had to
58 State v. Leming. 133 Wn. App. 875, 882, 138 P.3d 1095 (2006) (citing
Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 772-73).
^S Wn. App. 803, 804-05, 924 P.2d 384 (1996).
60 Frohs, 83 Wn. App. at 815. 	The court continued, "We doubt that [the
victim] would agree that she suffered no separate injury from the assault that was
distinct from the injury of unlawful restraint." Frohs, 83 Wn. App. at 815.
61 133 Wn. App. 875, 138 P.3d 1095 (2006).
62 Leming, 133 Wn. App. at 880.
63 Leming, 133 Wn. App. at 889.
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NO. 68467-1-1/21
prove that Leming assaulted his victim "by intending to place her in fear that he
would carry out his threat to kill her. 	In short, the State had to prove the same
facts for both crimes, namely, that Leming committed felony harassment."64 	The
court held that these two convictions "predicated on the same acts of felony
harassment" resulted in multiple punishments for the same offense and thereby
violated Leming's federal and state constitutional rights by putting him in double
jeopardy.65 	The court reversed Leming's conviction for felony harassment, the
lesser offense, because "the felony harassment conviction was incidental to the
second degree assault conviction."66
The State charged Mulanax with an assault that was raised to the second
degree by intent to commit unlawful imprisonment. 	The lesser offense is not the
assault, as in Frohs, but the unlawful imprisonment.67 An abstract examination of
the elements of assault and of unlawful imprisonment does satisfy the "same
evidence" 	test; 	proof 	of 	an 	assault 	is 	not 	necessary 	to 	prove 	unlawful
imprisonment.68 	But as in Leming, where the two convictions were predicated on
the same acts of felony harassment, here the two convictions are predicated on
the same act of unlawful imprisonment. 	This violates the prohibition against
64 Leming, 133 Wn. App. at 889.
65 Leming, 133 Wn. App. at 889.
66 Leming. 133 Wn. App. at 887.
67 Assault in the second degree is a class B felony. 	RCW 9A.36.021 (2)(a).
Unlawful imprisonment is a class C felony. 	RCW 9A.40.040(2).
68 Frohs, 83 Wn. App. at 814. -21-

NO. 68467-1-1/22
double jeopardy. 	We 	affirm 	Mulanax's 	conviction for 	assault with 	intent to
commit 	unlawful 	imprisonment 	but 	vacate 	his 	conviction 	for 	unlawful
imprisonment as the lesser offense.69
Firearm Enhancement
The jury found that Mulanax was armed with a deadly weapon at the time
of the commission of the crime of possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance. 	The trial court imposed a firearm enhancement of 36 months. 	The
State concedes that this was erroneous. 	When the trial court instructs the jury on
a specific enhancement, the court is bound by the jury's finding.70 	Here, the jury
verdict authorized only a 	deadly weapon enhancement, 	not the more severe
firearm enhancement. 	We remand for resentencing consistent with the jury's
finding of a deadly weapon enhancement.71
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court properly admitted ER 404(b) evidence to show
modus 	operandi, 	sufficient 	evidence 	supported 	Mulanax's 	conviction 	for
intimidating a witness, and Mulanax fails to show any 	prejudicial error in the
prosecutor's 	closing 	argument, 	we 	affirm 	his 	convictions 	for 	possession 	of
cocaine with intent to deliver, assault in the second degree with intent to commit
69 See Martin, 149 Wn. App. at 701.
70 State v. Williams-Walker, 167 Wn.2d 889, 899, 225 P.3d 913 (2010).
71 Williams-Walker, 167 Wn.2d at 897.
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NO. 68467-1-1/23
unlawful imprisonment, and 	intimidating a witness. 	But we vacate Mulanax's
conviction for unlawful imprisonment and the firearm enhancement and remand
for resentencing.
/^Oudt 	O,
WE CONCUR:
6zn{i 	J^
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