* John Doe, Respondent V. Department Of Corrections, Appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
No. 74354-6-1	JOHN DOE G, JOHN DOE I, and
JOHN DOE H, as individuals and on
behalf of others similarly situated,
Respondents,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Appellant,
DONNA ZINK, a married woman,
Appellant.
(Consolidated with
No. 74355-4-1)
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	January 23, 2017
Leach, J. — The Department of Corrections (Department) and Donna Zink
each appeal a trial court order enjoining disclosure of certain special sex offender
sentencing alternative (SSOSA) evaluations. 	Zink submitted a Public Records
Act (PRA)1 	request for all SSOSA evaluations since 1990. 	The respondents
(collectively 	Doe), 	a 	class 	of 	level 	I 	sex 	offenders, 	sued 	to 	prevent 	the
Department from 	disclosing 	their 	evaluations. 	The 	trial 	court enjoined 	the
Department from releasing SSOSA evaluations of level I sex offenders who, as
of the request date, had complied with their conditions of supervision. 	Because
each 	evaluation 	necessarily 	includes 	a 	diagnosis 	of 	the 	offender's 	mental
Ch. 42.56 RCW.
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conditions, it contains confidential health care information under Washington's
Uniform 	Health 	Care 	Information Act 	(UHCIA).2 	Without 	redaction 	of this
information, they are thus exempt from 	PRA disclosure. 	Because experience
and logic show that allowing plaintiffs to use pseudonyms in these circumstances
does not implicate the Washington Constitution, the trial court did 	not err in
allowing the plaintiffs to 	proceed under pseudonyms. 	And 	because the PRA
does not prohibit plaintiffs from suing as class representatives, the trial court did
not err in certifying the class here. We affirm.
FACTS
The Washington Legislature enacted SSOSA as part of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1981.3 SSOSA provides a sentencing alternative for first time sex
offenders.4 	It allows a trial court to suspend an offender's felony sentence if the
offender meets 	certain 	statutory criteria.5 	When 	doing 	this, 	the court 	must
impose 	certain 	conditions, 	including 	sex 	offender treatment 	and 	a 	term 	of
community custody.6
2 Ch. 70.02 RCW.
3 State v. Canfield, 154 Wn.2d 698, 701 	n.1, 116 P.3d 391 	(2005); ch.
9.94A RCW.
4 State v. Pannell. 173 Wn.2d 222, 227, 267 P.3d 349 (2011).
5 RCW 9.94A.670(2), (4); Pannell, 173 Wn.2d at 227.
6 RCW 9.94A.670(5)(a)-(d).
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To be considered for a SSOSA, an eligible offender must 	undergo an
evaluation to determine whether the offender is "amenable to treatment."7 	An
offender is amenable to treatment if the offender and the community will benefit
from community-based treatment given the offender's background, history, social
and 	economic 	circumstances, 	and 	psychological 	condition.8 	With 	narrow
exceptions, the evaluation must be performed by a health professional certified
by the Department of Health (DOH) to examine and treat sex offenders.9 	The
statute generally prohibits the same provider from treating the offender if the
offender receives a SSOSA.10
The SSOSA evaluation 	assesses "the offender's amenability to treatment
and 	relative 	risk to 	the 	community."11 	The 	evaluation 	must 	contain, 	at 	a
minimum, the offender's and the official versions of the crime, the offender's
criminal history, 	"[a]n assessment of problems 	in addition to alleged deviant
behaviors," information about the offender's employment and social life, and any
7 RCW 9.94A.670(3).
8 RCW 9.94A.670(3); State v. Oliva. 117 Wn. App. 773, 780, 73 P.3d 1016
(2003).
9 RCW9.94A.670(1)(a), .820(1); RCW 18.155.020.
10 RCW 9.94A.670(13) ("unless the court has entered written findings that
such treatment is in the best interests of the victim and that successful treatment
of the offender would 	otherwise 	be 	impractical"). 	The statute sets exacting
standards for eligible offenders: 	the offender had no prior sex crime convictions
or convictions for violent crimes in the previous 5 years; the offense did not result
in bodily harm; the victim was not a stranger to the offender; and the offender's
crime did not mandate a sentence of 11 years or more. 	RCW 9.94A.670(2).
11 RCW 9.94A.670(3)(b).
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other evaluation measures the provider used.12 	Based on these factors, the
provider must assess the appropriateness of community treatment, summarize
12 	RCW 	9.94A.670(3)(a). 	DOH 	regulations 	impose 	more 	specific
requirements, including:
(i) A description of the current offense(s) or allegation(s)
including, but not limited to, the evaluator's conclusion about the
reasons for any discrepancy between the official and client's
versions of the offenses or allegations;
(ii) A sexual history, sexual offense history and patterns
of sexual arousal/preference/interest;
(iii) 	Prior attempts to 	remediate 	and 	control 	offensive
behavior including prior treatment;
(iv) Perceptions of significant others, when appropriate,
including their ability 	and/or willingness to 	support treatment
efforts;
(v) Risk factors for offending behavior including:
(A) Alcohol and drug abuse;
(B) Stress;
(C) Mood;
(D) Sexual patterns;
(E) Use of pornography; and
(F) Social and environmental influences;
(vi) A personal history including:
(A) Medical;
(B) Marital/relationships;
(C) Employment;
(D) Education; and
(E) Military;
(vii) A family history;
(viii) History of violence and/or criminal behavior;
(ix) Mental health functioning 	including coping abilities,
adaptation 	style, 	intellectual 	functioning 	and 	personality
attributes; and
(x) The overall findings of psychological/physiological/medical
assessment if these assessments have been conducted.
WAC 246-930-320(2)(e).
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its 	"diagnostic 	impressions," 	assess factors 	affecting 	risk 	to 	the 	community,
assess the offender's willingness to participate, and propose a treatment plan.13
If the offender meets the statutory criteria and undergoes an evaluation,
the trial 	court then 	must consider a 	number of circumstances, 	including the
victim's opinion in particular, and decide if a SSOSA sentence is appropriate.14
The 	Department supervises offenders who receive a SSOSA.15 	Unlike
other mental health treatment information, the Department does not receive a
SSOSA evaluation from the provider. 	Rather, either the prosecutor or defense
attorney usually provides the evaluation to the community corrections officer
investigating the offender's history.
13 WAC 246-930-320(2)(f), (g). The plan must contain:
(i) Frequency and 	type of contact between 	offender and
therapist;
(ii) Specific issues to 	be addressed 	in the treatment and
description of planned treatment modalities;
(iii) Monitoring plans, including any requirements regarding
living conditions, lifestyle requirements, and monitoring by family
members and others;
(iv) Anticipated length of treatment; and
(v) Recommended crime-related prohibitions and affirmative
conditions, 	which 	must 	include, 	to 	the 	extent 	known, 	an
identification of specific activities or behaviors that are precursors
to 	the 	offender's 	offense 	cycle, 	including, 	but 	not 	limited to,
activities 	or 	behaviors 	such 	as 	viewing 	or 	listening 	to
pornography or use of alcohol or controlled substances.
RCW 9.94A.670(3)(b).
14 RCW 9.94A.670(4).
15RCW9.94A.501(4)(f).
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Doe submitted unrebutted expert testimony that SSOSA sentences are
effective. 	A 2005 study commissioned by the legislature found that offenders
who complete SSOSA sentences have the lowest recidivism rates for any type of
crime, 	including 	sex 	offenses—rates 	less 	than 	one 	third 	those 	of 	other
offenders.16 	Nonetheless, SSOSA sentences are increasingly rare in practice
even among eligible offenders. 	In 2005, 35 percent of offenders who met the
statutory criteria received SSOSA sentences, down from 59 percent in 1986. 	In
2012, only 95 offenders in the state received a SSOSA sentence.
In July 2014, Donna Zink made a PRA request for all SSOSA evaluations
"maintained, in the possession of or owned by the Washington State Department
of Corrections from January 1, 1990 to the present." The Department responded
that it would produce the evaluations after reviewing each one to determine if it
contained exempt information, including victims' names. 	Doe filed this action to
enjoin the Department from releasing evaluations of level I sex offenders.
The plaintiffs are current or former level I sex offenders who underwent
SSOSA evaluations. 	Level I offenders are those who the Department's end-of-
sentence review committee determines pose the lowest risk to the public.17
16 The recidivism rate for sex offenders sentenced to prison terms was
16.9 percent; the corresponding rate for sex offenders who received a SSOSA
sentence was 4.7 percent. 	These rates measure the percentage of offenders
convicted of a new felony within five years of their release.
17 RCW 72.09.345(6); RCW 13.40.217(3).
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The trial court first granted 	a 	temporary restraining 	order and then a
preliminary injunction against the Department.18 	It also allowed the plaintiffs to
use pseudonyms and to represent a certified class of compliant level I offenders
who have received SSOSA evaluations since 1990.19
Later, the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding
that RCW 71.05.445 and ch. 70.02 RCW exempt the evaluations from disclosure.
The court permanently enjoined the Department from fulfilling Zink's request.
Zink and the Department appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews de novo a trial court's PRA decisions about exemptions
and 	injunctions.20 	This court also reviews the record de novo in PRA cases
where "the 	record 	consists of only affidavits, 	memoranda 	of 	law, 	and 	other
documentary evidence, and where the trial court has not seen or heard testimony
requiring it to assess the witnesses' credibility or competency."21 	When a party
seeking summary judgment 	initially shows the absence of any material issue of
18 Because the 	restraining 	order applied 	only to level I offenders, 	the
Department began producing the evaluations of level II and III offenders per
Zink's request.
19 The plaintiff class is divided into two subclasses: 	offenders who actually
received a SSOSA sentence and those who did not.
20 Ameriquest Mortq. Co. v. Office of Att'v Gen., 177 Wn.2d 467, 478, 300
P.3d 799 (2013).
21 Bainbridqe Island Police Guild v. City of Puvallup, 172 Wn.2d 398, 407,
259 P.3d 190 (2011).
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fact for trial, the party opposing summary judgment must produce evidence of
specific facts sufficient to show a material issue.22
ANALYSIS
Health Care Information Exemption
The PRA requires state agencies to make records "available for public
inspection and copying" unless the records are exempt under the PRA or an
"other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or
records."23 	Doe asserts that both the PRA and two "other statute[s]" exempt the
records Zink requested. 	We agree with Doe that the unredacted evaluations that
the 	Department 	intended 	to 	release 	are 	exempt 	from 	the 	PRA's 	general
disclosure provision because they contain confidential health care information.
We do 	not decide if the 	records can 	be sufficiently redacted to 	protect this
information.
As a preliminary matter, and contrary to Zink's arguments, the Supreme
Court's decision 	in Koenig v. Thurston 	County24 does 	not dispose of Doe's
exemption arguments. 	The Supreme Court considered only whether the PRA
exemption for 	investigative records applies to 	SSOSA evaluations and victim
22 Hash v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp., 49 Wn. App. 130, 134-35, 741
P.2d 584 (1987), affd, 110 Wn.2d 912, 757 P.2d 507 (1988).
23 RCW 42.56.070(1).
24 175 Wn.2d 837, 287 P.3d 523 (2012).
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impact statements.25 	"In cases where a 	legal theory is not discussed in the
opinion, that case is not controlling on a future case where the legal theory is
properly raised."26
The PRA includes an exemption for patients' health care information.27
This 	exemption 	incorporates 	the 	confidentiality 	provisions 	of 	Washington's
UHCIA.28 This act protects health care information and information about mental
health services.
The 	UHCIA 	prohibits 	disclosure 	of 	"health 	care 	information 	about 	a
patient" without the patient's consent.29 	This prohibition applies to "a health care
provider, an individual who assists a health care provider in the delivery of health
care, 	or 	an 	agent and 	employee 	of a 	health 	care 	provider." 	"Health 	care
information" 	includes 	"any 	information. . . that 	identifies 	or 	can 	readily 	be
associated with the identity of a patient and directly relates to the patient's health
25 See RCW 42.56.240.
26 Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 124 Wn.2d
816, 824, 881 P.2d 986 (1994).
27 RCW 42.56.360.
28 	RCW 42.56.360(2). 	RCW 	42.56.360(1) 	lists 	types 	of 	health 	care
information that are exempt. 	RCW 42.56.360(2) states, "Chapter 70.02 RCW
[the UHCIA] applies to public inspection and copying of health care information of
patients." 	The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to incorporate RCW
70.02.020. 	Prison Legal News, Inc. v. Dep't of Corr., 154 Wn.2d 628, 644, 115
P.3d 316 (2005) (discussing former RCW 42.17.312, which is identical to current
RCW 42.56.360(2)).
29 RCW 70.02.020(1).
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care."30 Thus, information in SSOSA evaluations is confidential under the UHCIA
and 	exempt 	under 	the 	PRA 	if the 	offenders 	receiving 	the 	evaluations 	are
"patients," that 	information 	identifies 	"or can 	readily 	be 	associated 	with" 	an
offender's identity, and the evaluation "directly relates" to the offender's health
care.31 	Information in the evaluations satisfies each of these requirements.
First, 	offenders 	are 	"patients" 	under the 	UHCIA. 	The 	act defines 	a
"patient" as "an individual who receives or has received health care."32 	This
broad definition shows no intent for the term "patient" to limit what qualifies as
"health care information."33 	Instead, the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting
30 	RCW 	70.02.010(16). 	The 	UHCIA 	separately 	provides 	that 	"all
information 	and 	records 	compiled, 	obtained, 	or 	maintained 	in the 	course of
providing mental health services to either voluntary or involuntary recipients of
services at public or private agencies must be confidential." 	RCW 70.02.230(1).
But because the statute defines mental health records as "a type of health care
information," RCW 70.02.010(21), we do not need to decide whether SSOSA
evaluations 	also 	qualify 	as 	mental 	health 	records. 	If they are 	health 	care
information, they are exempt under RCW 70.02.020(1); if they are not health care
information, then they are not mental health records either.
31 RCW 70.02.010(16). 	Although RCW 70.02.020(1) applies only to "a
health care provider, 	an individual who 	assists a 	health care provider in the
delivery of health care, or an agent and employee of a health care provider"—
categories that 	likely would 	not 	include the 	Department—RCW 42.56.360(2)
incorporates RCW 70.02.020 into the PRA and thus restricts disclosures by the
Department. 	Prison Legal News, 154 Wn.2d at 644.
32 RCW 70.02.010(32).
33 Hines v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 127 Wn. App. 356, 366-67, 112
P.3d 522 (2005), is distinguishable. 	There, this court held that the predecessor
to the UHCIA did not apply to the results of an employee's contractually required
drug test, in part because the test was not given to the employee as a "patient."
Among other distinctions, 	unlike a 	mandatory drug test, a SSOSA evaluation
determines an offender's amenability to treatment and must include a treatment
plan.
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RCW 70.02.020 note only two requirements for "health care information": 	patient
identifiability and information about patient health care.34
Second, SSOSA evaluations identify offenders. 	A party opposing PRA
disclosure 	must 	show 	"each 	patient's 	health 	care 	information 	is 	'readily
associated' with that patient" for the exemption to apply.35 	"Where there is a
dispute over whether health care information is readily identifiable with a specific
patient even when that patient's identity is not disclosed, the trial court can use in
camera 	review 	should 	it 	need 	to 	examine 	unredacted 	records 	to 	make 	its
independent determination."36 	This review was not necessary here because the
Department does not intend to redact offenders' names from evaluations. 	The
evaluations are thus "readily associated" with offenders.
Finally, 	some 	information 	in 	SSOSA 	evaluations 	directly 	relates 	to
offenders' health care. 	"'Health care' means any care, service, or procedure
provided by a health care provider: 	(a) To diagnose, treat, or maintain a patient's
physical or mental condition; or (b) That affects the structure or any function of
the human body."37
34 Prison Legal News. 	154 Wn.2d at 645; see also Wright v. Jeckle, 121
Wn. App. 624, 630, 90 P.3d 65 (2004).
35 Prison Legal News, 154 Wn.2d at 645 (emphasis omitted).
36 Prison Legal News. 154 Wn.2d at 645-46.
37 RCW 70.02.010(14).
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The Department would interpret "to" in this definition to mean "for the sole
purpose of." 	It thus contends that the evaluations do 	not directly relate to
offenders' health care because the evaluations are not for the sole purpose of
treating offenders. 	It asserts that the evaluations are only "mandatory forensic
evaluation[s]" to assist a court in making a sentencing decision. 	Doe responds
that the evaluations can have more than one purpose. We agree with Doe.
Nothing in the statute supports the Department's narrow interpretation of
health 	care.38 	The 	SSOSA 	statute 	requires 	an 	evaluation 	to 	include 	"[a]n
assessment of problems in addition to alleged deviant behaviors," information
about 	the 	offender's 	employment 	and 	social 	life, and 	any 	other evaluation
measures 	the 	provider 	used.39 	DOH 	regulations 	further 	require 	that 	the
evaluation include, among other information, "[a] sexual history, sexual offense
history 	and 	patterns 	of sexual 	arousal/preference/interest," 	"[rjisk factors 	for
offending behavior," and medical, marital, relationship, and family histories. 	The
evaluations 	must 	also 	address 	"[mjental 	health 	functioning 	including 	coping
abilities, adaptation style, intellectual functioning and personality attributes" and
38 The relevant definition of "to" is "used as a function word to indicate
purpose, 	intention, 	tendency, 	result, 	or 	end." 	Webster's 	Third 	New
International Dictionary 2401 (2002).
39 RCW 9.94A.670(3)(a)(iii), (iv), (v).
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include 	"overall 	findings 	of 	psychological/physiological/medical 	assessment 	if
these assessments have been conducted."40
The evidence Doe submitted also indicates that the evaluations contain
medical, 	mental 	health, 	substance 	abuse, 	and 	sexual 	histories; 	results 	of
physical and psychological tests; amenability to treatment; and information about
the offenders' families, as well as their victims.41 	The Department introduced no
evidence to rebut the facts in these declarations.
Thus, 	governing 	law 	and 	our 	review of the 	record 	both 	indicate that
SSOSA evaluations include a "service[ ] or procedure provided by a health care
provider" to "diagnose ... a 	patient's . .. mental 	condition."42 	They 	therefore
directly relate to offenders' health care.
40 WAC 246-930-320(2)(e). 	To assess a medical condition is to diagnose
it. 	Black's Law Dictionary 548 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "diagnosis" as "[t]he
determination of a medical condition (such as a disease) by physical examination
or by study of its symptoms").
41 	Doe submitted 	declarations from 	two 	attorneys who 	represent sex
offenders, one of whom is a member of the Sex Offender Policy Board; from the
board of the Washington Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers; from
the executive director of the national Association for the Treatment of Sexual
Abusers; from two psychologists and certified sex offender treatment providers;
and from several plaintiffs. 	The declarations described the information offenders
disclose in the evaluations. 	Together they indicate, 	as the trial court found,
"SSOSA 	evaluations 	contain 	significant 	medical, 	mental 	health, 	and 	other
personal information, along with the evaluator's diagnostic assessment of that
information."
42 RCW 70.02.010(14).
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Because 	SSOSA 	evaluations 	contain 	health 	care 	information, 	if 	not
redacted, they are exempt from PRA disclosure under RCW 42.56.360(2) and
RCW 70.02.020(1). 	Because we hold that these statutes exempt the evaluations
that the 	Department proposed 	releasing, 	we 	do 	not 	reach 	Doe's alternative
arguments that RCW 71.05.445 and RCW 70.02.250 are "other statute[s]" that
exempt the evaluations from PRA disclosure.
We do not decide whether some portion of a SSOSA evaluation would fall
outside the exemption. 	"In general, 	the 	PDA 	does 	not allow an 	agency to
withhold exempt records in their entirety. 	Rather, agencies must withhold only
those portions of individual records which come under a specific exemption and
disclose the rest."43
Here, the Department's only declaration in opposition to the preliminary
injunction suggested that names of victims may be exempt. 	A footnote in the
Department's brief stated that the Department would also redact information that
"clearly 	qualifie[s] 	as 	medical 	information." 	But the 	Department takes the
position, which it stated firmly at oral argument, that the evaluations contain no
medical information. 	Similarly, 	Doe did not identify any information that would
not be exempt under his interpretation of the UHCIA. 	Both sides thus framed
exemption and disclosure as all or nothing propositions.
43 Tacoma Pub. Library v. Woessner, 90 Wn. App. 205, 224, 951 P.2d 357
(1998).
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Doe showed that the evaluations contain health care information. 	Our
record does not include any SSOSA evaluations. 	We have nothing before us
that would allow us to decide if any specific portions are not exempt. 	As a result,
because 	the 	evaluations 	contain 	exempt 	health 	care 	information 	that 	the
Department has refused to redact, we affirm the trial court.44
Pseudonyms
In Zink's separate appeal, she contends that the trial court improperly
sealed court records when it allowed the plaintiffs to 	use pseudonyms. 	She
asserts that the trial court had to hold a hearing in open court and apply the five
factors from Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa45 before allowing this. 	We disagree.
The Washington Constitution creates a presumption of openness in trial
court proceedings.46 	"Whether an Ishikawa analysis is necessary depends on
44 We leave open to Zink the opportunity to ask the trial court for an in
camera review of the evaluations to decide if they include nonexempt information
subject to disclosure.
45 97 Wn.2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982). 	Under Ishikawa,
(1) the proponent of closure must make a showing of compelling
need, (2) any person present when the motion is made must be
given an opportunity to object, (3) the means of curtailing open
access 	must 	be 	the 	least 	restrictive 	means 	available 	for
protecting the threatened interests, (4) the court must weigh the
competing interests of the public and of the closure, and (5) the
order 	must 	be 	no 	broader 	in 	application 	or 	duration 	than
necessary.
John Doe 1 v. Prosecuting Att'v, 192 Wn. App. 612, 617, 369 P.3d 166 (2016)
(citing Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d at 37-39).
46 Const, art. I, § 10 ("Justice in all cases shall be administered openly,
and without unnecessary delay.").
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whether article 	I, 	section 	10 applies."47 	And "[wjhether article 	I, 	section 	10
applies depends on application of the experience and logic test."48 Thus, we ask
whether, under the experience prong, "'the place and process have historically
been open to the press and general public.'"49 	We then ask whether, under the
logic prong, "'public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of
the particular process.'"50
The title of a complaint must "include the names of all the parties."51 	The
federal courts have a substantively identical rule.52
But plaintiffs' real names have not "historically been open to the press and
general public" when the nature of the action shows that compelling them to use
their real names would chill their exercise of their right to seek relief. 	Numerous
opinions 	from 	the 	Supreme 	Court53 	and 	this 	court54 	demonstrate 	this
47 State v.S.J.C, 183 Wn.2d 408, 412, 352 P.3d 749 (2015).
48 S.J.C., 183 Wn.2d at 412-13 (citing In re Pet, of Morgan. 180 Wn.2d
312, 325, 330 P.3d 774 (2014)).
49 S.J.C., 183 Wn.2d at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Morgan, 180 Wn.2d at 325).
50 S.J.C., 183 Wn.2d at 430 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Morgan, 180 Wn.2d at 325).
51 CR 10(a)(1).
52 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
53 John Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wn.2d 772, 819 P.2d 370
(1991) (recipient of HIV-infected (human immunodeficiency virus) blood sought
name of donor); John Doe v. Finch, 133 Wn.2d 96, 942 P.2d 359 (1997) (Doe
sued 	psychologist for 	outrage 	over 	psychologist's 	romantic 	relationship with
Doe's wife); John Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 143 Wn.2d 687, 24 P.3d 390 (2001)
(student sued university over investigation of sexual assault claims against him),
rev'd, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 153 L. Ed. 2d 309 (2002); Jane Doe v.
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longstanding 	and 	previously 	uncontroversial 	practice 	in 	Washington. 	The
experience prong thus shows that 	a routine and desirable practice exists among
Washington 	courts 	to 	allow 	parties, 	when 	appropriate, 	to 	proceed 	under
pseudonyms.
The 	logic 	prong 	also 	supports 	pseudonymity 	in 	this 	case. 	Certain
circumstances require pseudonymity at the time a 	complaint is filed to allow
Washington courts to provide any practical relief. 	While in general "[t]he people
Dunning, 87 Wn.2d 50, 549 P.2d 1 (1976) (unwed mother sued to obtain certified
copy of conventional birth certificate for child).
54 See, e.g., John Doe v. Grp. Health Coop, of Puget Sound, Inc., 85 Wn.
App. 	213, 	932 	P.2d 	178 (1997) 	(employee 	brought 	UHCIA and 	invasion 	of
privacy claims over health care provider's disclosure of name and consumer
numbering in training exercise on processing mental health claims); Jane Doe v.
Boeing Co., 64 Wn. App. 	235, 823 P.2d 1159 (1992) (transgender employee
sued employer for disability discrimination), rev'd, 121 Wn.2d 8, 846 P.2d 531
(1993); John Doe v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 55 Wn. App. 106,
780 	P.2d 	853 	(1989) 	(plaintiffs 	with 	AIDS 	(acquired 	immune 	deficiency
syndrome) brought class action suit against producers and distributors of blood
products); Jane Doe v. Fife Mun. Court, 74 Wn. App. 444, 874 P.2d 182 (1994)
(class of plaintiffs convicted of alcohol-related offenses sought to recover court
costs); John Doe v. Dep't of Transp., 85 Wn. App. 143, 931 	P.2d 196 (1997)
(sexual harassment suit by ferry worker); 	Jane Doe v. Corp. 	of President of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints, 141 Wn. App. 407, 167 P.3d 1193
(2007) 	(plaintiffs 	sued 	stepfather and 	church 	over alleged 	sexual 	abuse 	by
stepfather).
A number of unpublished opinions also reflect this practice. 	See Jane
Doe v. Pierce County, noted at 125 Wn. App. 	1017 (2005) (plaintiff requested
public records regarding employment office's investigation of her); John Doe v.
Wash. 	State 	Bd. 	of 	Accountancy, 	noted 	at 	150 	Wn. 	App. 	1036 	(2009)
(accountant sought declaration that he had mental health disability covered by
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 43 U.S.C. § 12101); John Doe v. Zvlstra.
No. 	71123-7-1, 	(Wash. 	Ct. 	App. 	Feb. 	9, 	2015) 	(unpublished),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinion/pdf/711237.pdf) 	(patients 	sued 	medical 	clinic
over employee's intentional conduct).
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have 	a 	right to 	know who 	is 	using 	their courts," "[tjhere 	are 	exceptions."55
Washington courts have explained their reasoning only briefly. 	The Supreme
Court has noted that "a plaintiff may proceed under a pseudonym to protect a
privacy interest."56 	In one case, it adopted a substitute case name "[t]o avoid
revealing the name of either the mother or child" when the mother was seeking a
birth certificate.57 Where an employee sued his employer for sexual harassment,
this court used a pseudonym "[bjecause of the nature of the allegations in th[e]
case."58 Our courts may not have analyzed this issue before because the use of
pseudonyms 	has 	gone 	unchallenged 	in these 	cases. 	They 	may 	not 	have
addressed the issue because the measure's practical necessity is obvious. 	For
example, in a case bearing some similarities to this one, an employee used a
pseudonym in bringing UHCIA and invasion of privacy claims where his health
care provider used his name and consumer number in a training exercise for
processing mental 	health claims.59 	There, as here, 	the 	plaintiff opposed the
disclosure of what he claimed was confidential 	health 	care information; 	and
55 John Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis.. 112 F.3d 869, 872
(7th Cir. 1997).
56 N. Am. Council on Adoptable Children v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs..
108 Wn.2d 433, 440, 739 P.2d 677 (1987) (holding that court could not appoint
organization as guardian ad litem for unnamed children whom the organization
did not know and could not describe).
57 Dunning. 87 Wn.2d at 50 n. 1.
58Dep'tofTransp.. 85 Wn. App. at 143 n.1.
59 Grp. Health. 85 Wn. App. at 214-15.
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there, as here, compelling the plaintiff to use his real name would have greatly
impaired the court's ability to provide relief.
The federal appellate courts that have considered this matter all agree
with this logic. 	Although federal law lacks a provision like Washington's article I,
section 10, federal courts recognize parallel rights under the First Amendment.60
We therefore 	look 	to 	those 	courts for 	guidance. 	The 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	has
explained that pseudonyms are appropriate where "the injury litigated against
would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity."61 	To this
end, federal courts have adopted balancing tests: 	the Eleventh, Tenth, and Fifth
Circuits allow a plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously where "the plaintiff has a
substantial 	privacy right which 	outweighs the customary and 	constitutionally-
embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings."62 	The Ninth and
Second Circuits ask whether "the party's need for anonymity outweighs prejudice
to the opposing party and the public's interest in knowing the party's identity."63
60 Thomas 	Doe v. 	Stegall. 	653 	F.2d 	180, 	185 (5th 	Cir. 	1981) ("First
Amendment guarantees are implicated when a court decides to restrict public
scrutiny of judicial proceedings.").
61 Bill W. Doe v. Frank. 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992).
62 Jane Roe II v. Aware Woman Ctr. For Choice. Inc.. 253 F.3d 678, 685
(11th 	Cir. 2001); 	see M.M. 	v. Zavaras. 	139 	F.3d 	798, 	803 (10th 	Cir. 1998)
(quoting Frank. 951 F.2d at 324); Stegall. 653 F.2d at 186 (applying substantively
similar standards).
63 Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp.. 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th
Cir. 2000); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant. 537 F.3d 185, 189-90 (2d Cir.
2008) (providing nonexhaustive list often factors).
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Experience and logic thus show that allowing plaintiffs to proceed under
pseudonyms does not implicate article 1, section 10 where the public's interest in
the plaintiffs' names is minimal and use of those names would chill their ability to
seek relief. 	Here, the trial court found that "[fjorcing [pjlaintiffs to disclose their
identities to bring this action would eviscerate their ability to seek relief; that the
plaintiffs demonstrated a significant risk of harm if their identities are disclosed;
that the individual names "have little bearing on the public's interest in the dispute
or its resolution"; that pseudonymity would not prejudice the Department; that the
plaintiffs' interests in anonymity outweighed the public's interest in knowing their
names; and that "no reasonably viable alternatives" existed. 	While Zink assigns
error to these findings, she does not explain how they are incorrect. 	Nor did she
submit evidence 	to 	contradict them. 	Our 	review of the 	record 	shows that
substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings and that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in applying the Ishikawa factors.64
Class Certification
Zink also asserts that the PRA prohibited the trial court from certifying a
class of level 	I sex offenders "who are either compliant with the conditions of
registration or have been relieved of the duty to register, and who underwent an
evaluation to determine if they were eligible for a 	[SSOSA] after January 1,
64 S.J.C.. 183 Wn.2d at 412-13.
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1990 "65 	v^ revjew statutory interpretation issues de novo66 and decisions to
certify classes of plaintiffs for abuse of discretion.67 	Here, the trial court properly
interpreted governing law and did not abuse its discretion in certifying a class.
Because "the PRA statutes do not create a special proceeding subject to
special rules," the normal civil rules apply to PRA proceedings.68 	Thus, the rule
governing class certification, CR 23, 	controls here. 	Courts interpret that rule
liberally.69
As Zink does not contend that the class certification did not comply with
CR 23, the trial court did not err in certifying the class of plaintiffs unless the PRA
prohibits class actions altogether. 	It does not.
Zink relies on the PRA's statement that a 	court can enjoin disclosure
"upon motion and affidavit by an agency or its representative or a person who is
named in the record or to whom the record specifically pertains."70 She does not
65 Considering the same argument from Zink, the Supreme Court recently
noted in John Doe A v. Washington State Patrol. 185 Wn.2d 363, 385-86, 374
P.3d 63 (2016), that "even if the class were improperly certified, a 	decision
decertifying the class or remanding to the trial [court] would serve no purpose
and would cost the litigants time and money, as the issue on which the class
members brought suit has been decided."
66 City of Spokane v. Rothwell. 166 Wn.2d 872, 876, 215 P.3d 162 (2009).
67 Miller v. Farmer Bros. Co.. 115 Wn. App. 815, 820, 64 P.3d 49 (2003).
68 Neigh. All, of Spokane County v. County of Spokane. 172 Wn.2d 702,
716,261 P.3d 119(2011).
69 Moeller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash.. 173 Wn.2d 264, 278, 267 P.3d
998(2011).
70 RCW 42.56.540.
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dispute that the class of plaintiffs are named in their SSOSA evaluations or that
the evaluations specifically pertain to them.
We 	construe 	the 	class 	action 	rule 	"liberally 	in 	favor 	of 	permitting
certification."71 	When a court certifies a class, the representative plaintiffs stand
in for all other members of the class; those members are treated as parties to the
litigation.72 	A decision in the case then binds all unexcluded members of the
class.73 	Because the plaintiffs represent an 	entire class, 	even statutes the
legislature phrases in individual terms allow for class actions.74 	The plaintiffs
here can thus form a class to bring this PRA action.75
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
Zink asks that we decide the proper standard for issuing a 	preliminary
injunction in a PRA case. 	That issue became moot when the trial court issued a
permanent injunction.76 We decline to address it.
71 Sitton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 Wn. App. 245, 256, 63
P.3d 198(2003).
72 Sitton, 116 Wn. App. at 250.
73 CR 23(c)(3).
74 See Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 113 Wn. App. 306, 346, 54 P.3d 665
(2002) 	(allowing 	relief for 	represented 	class 	members, 	not 	merely 	named
plaintiffs, even though the Consumer Protection Act, ch. 19.86 RCW, authorizes
relief for those who "bring a civil action," RCW 19.86.090); Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682, 700-01, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 61 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1979) (allowing for class
certification under federal rules even where statute refers to an "individual").
75 RCW 42.56.540.
76 See State ex rel. Carroll v. Simmons, 61 Wn.2d 146, 149, 377 P.2d 421
(1962).
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Fees and Costs
Finally, because Zink does not prevail in this appeal, we deny her request
for appellate costs under RAP 14.1. And because the respondents do not ask for
attorney fees, we do not award them any either.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court order enjoining disclosure of level I sex offenders'
SSOSA evaluations.
WE CONCUR:
C&%Y~3
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