State Of Washington, Respondent V. Lorenzo Pratt, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
LORENZO PRATT,
Appellant.
No. 79467-1-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ANDRUS, A.C.J. — Lorenzo Pratt entered into a plea agreement to resolve
multiple felony charges. 	Several months after he was sentenced in accordance
with the parties’ joint recommendation, Pratt filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 	Following two years of
litigation surrounding discovery issues, the trial court denied the motion. Because
Pratt 	fails 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	counsel’s 	representation 	was 	constitutionally
inadequate, we affirm.
FACTS
The State charged Lorenzo Pratt with first degree murder while armed with
a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm, arising from the April 2014 shooting
and death of 20-year-old Deszaun Smallwood. 	In a separate case, the State
charged Pratt with assault in the second degree based on the allegation that he

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pointed a firearm at an oncoming motorist a few days before the shooting. 	The
court granted the State’s motion to join the two causes for trial.
According to police reports, both incidents occurred in the immediate
aftermath of the murder of Kevin Brown, a close friend of Pratt’s. The first incident
took place on the day of Brown’s death. Pratt pointed a firearm at the occupant of
an oncoming vehicle, in apparent frustration at being unable to pass the vehicle on
a narrow street. Pratt later admitted that he brandished a firearm, explaining that
he was “jumpy” and distraught, and that he initially thought the approaching vehicle
was associated with the person who killed Brown.
The shooting that resulted in Smallwood’s death occurred five days later,
two blocks from Flo Ware Park, in the Central District neighborhood of Seattle,
where a memorial for Brown took place earlier in the day. 	Police reports and a
prosecutor summarized the evidence leading to Pratt’s arrest for murder: At the
memorial, Pratt approached a group that included Smallwood and his friend,
Laumont Lancaster. Pratt challenged Lancaster, and Lancaster “sucker punched”
Pratt in the face. 	Smallwood initially tried to diffuse the conflict and was not
involved in the violence. Lancaster reportedly prevailed in the fight and Pratt fled
in a vehicle. Word quickly spread that Pratt was defeated in a fight.
A few hours later, Pratt arrived at a residence near the park where several
people, including Smallwood, were milling around in the yard and in the street.
Apparently still angry about the earlier fight with Lancaster, Pratt immediately
initiated a confrontation with Smallwood. 	Pratt punched Smallwood in the head,
and Smallwood fought back. The fight moved into the street and when Smallwood

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appeared to be gaining the upper hand in the fight, Pratt disengaged and moved
toward a parked vehicle. He produced a firearm and fired approximately six shots
at Smallwood. Bullets struck Smallwood in the arms and back. First responders
pronounced Smallwood dead on the scene. 	Several people witnessed the
shooting, but most were extremely reluctant to cooperate with law enforcement.
About six weeks after Smallwood’s murder, police officers arrested Pratt in
Portland, Oregon. 	During a lengthy interview with Seattle detectives, Pratt
eventually admitted that he was involved in the fight at Flo Ware Park. 	He said
that 	during 	the 	fight, 	Smallwood 	threatened 	to 	“air 	[him] 	out,” 	which 	Pratt
understood to mean that Smallwood intended to shoot him. 	Pratt also admitted
that he confronted Smallwood when he saw him again and made statements
implying that he shot Smallwood out of self-defense, because although he did not
see a firearm, he believed Smallwood was about to retrieve one.
In July 2015, approximately two months before the evidentiary portion of the
trial was scheduled to begin, the court held pretrial proceedings. 	On July 7, the
court conducted the first portion of a hearing to determine the admissibility of
Pratt’s recorded statements to Seattle police officers. A substantial portion of his
statement was played in court. Following that hearing, Pratt decided to accept the
State’s plea offer to allow him to plead guilty to reduced charges: second-degree
murder and second-degree assault, without a firearm enhancement as to either
charge, and unlawful possession of a firearm.
On the evening before he changed his plea, Pratt made several telephone
calls from the jail to family and friends. During those recorded calls, Pratt laid out

No. 79467-1-I/4
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his reasons for accepting the State’s plea offer. Pratt said that he felt terrible when
he saw the victim’s mother and uncle in court. 	He mentioned the significant ties
between his family and the victim’s family and said he wanted to avoid subjecting
either family to a difficult and traumatic trial. In the recorded custodial statements
that were the subject of the pretrial hearing, Pratt had made unflattering remarks
about his family and the victim, and, at one point, suggested that he could provide
information to law enforcement about other cases, in exchange for his release.
Pratt expressed dismay at hearing some of his own statements replayed in court
that he was not “proud” of. Pratt also explained that by accepting the State’s offer
to recommend a 20-year sentence, he would avoid facing a substantially longer
sentence if he lost at trial, and expressed a desire to put the shooting “behind” him.
Pratt pleaded guilty the next day. 	Shortly after, the court accepted the
recommendation of the parties and sentenced Pratt to 20 years’ of confinement.
Approximately two months after he was sentenced, in October 2015, Pratt
filed a pro se motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel, Kevin Donnelly. 	Several months later, assisted by new
counsel, Cathy Gormley, Pratt filed a more specific motion with supporting
documents.1 	Pratt alleged that although he told Donnelly about Smallwood’s
earlier threat and consistently maintained that he acted in self-defense, Donnelly
told him he would be unable to prove self-defense. 	According to Pratt, Donnelly
failed to explain that the State had the burden of disproving self-defense at trial.
1 Gormley later withdrew and a third attorney represented Pratt at the hearing on his motion
to withdraw.

No. 79467-1-I/5
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Pratt also alleged that Donnelly failed to interview two witnesses who would
have supported his defense. 	Pratt said that he specifically urged Donnelly to
contact Donnie Adams,2 who was present during the fight at Flo Ware Park and
overheard Smallwood threaten him. 	Pratt claimed Donnelly refused to do so,
insisting that Adams was a gang member who would refuse to talk to him.
According to Gormley’s declaration, she easily located Adams in March 2016 and
he acknowledged that he overheard Smallwood threaten Pratt. Pratt also claimed
that Donnelly should have interviewed a confidential informant identified in one of
the police reports as having “heard” that Pratt acted in self-defense.
Finally, 	Pratt 	contended 	that 	Donnelly’s 	representation 	was 	deficient
because he failed to “investigate any mental health defenses,” even though
counsel was aware of the defendant’s difficult upbringing and exposure to violence.
Pratt relied on Donnelly’s admission in a 2016 declaration, that prior to discussions
with Gormley, he was not aware of the potential link between post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) and “perception of risk in a stressful situation.” 	He also relied
on a 2016 report obtained by Pratt’s new counsel, following a psychological
evaluation 	conducted 	by 	Dr. 	Jason 	Prinster.3 	Dr. Prinster 	concluded 	that,
according to Pratt’s description of the events, he was experiencing symptoms
consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD at the time of the shooting. 	Dr. Prinster
concluded it was likely that, when Pratt shot Smallwood, he was “hypervigilantly
2 The witness’s first name is also spelled Donny in the record.
3 The report filed as an attachment to Pratt’s 2016 motion to withdraw his plea is missing
multiple pages. The State maintains that the trial court considered the complete report, and Pratt
does not argue otherwise. The record on appeal includes the entire report.

No. 79467-1-I/6
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reacting to a perceived threat.” In addition, Pratt provided the declaration of a law
professor and expert in legal ethics, who opined, based on the assumption that all
facts stated in Pratt’s motion to withdraw were correct, Donnelly performed
deficiently.
More than two years of litigation followed. 	In the interim, Pratt filed two
unsuccessful interlocutory appeals related to the extent of discovery the State
could conduct into conversations Pratt had with his attorney. The State conducted
an initial interview of Donnelly, and the defense objected to several lines of
questioning. 	After the discovery issues were resolved, the State scheduled a
second interview, but Donnelly passed away before the interview took place.
In January 2019, following an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the
motion to withdraw. 	The court entered numerous factual findings and concluded
that Pratt failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice. 	The court also
found that Pratt’s claim that he would have proceeded to trial had Donnelly
performed differently was not credible. Pratt appeals.
ANALYSIS
Pratt challenges the court’s denial of his motion to withdraw. He contends
that counsel’s representation was deficient because he failed to (1) provide
accurate information as to the burden of proving self-defense; (2) interview
witnesses who would have corroborated his claim of self-defense; and (3) request
an evaluation to determine whether he had PTSD. 	Pratt also claims that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty.

No. 79467-1-I/7
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Under CrR 4.2(f), the trial court “shall allow a defendant to withdraw the
defendant’s plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” 	Where, as here, a criminal defendant moves to
withdraw his guilty plea after entry of judgment, the motion must also meet the
requirements of CrR 7.8(b).4 CrR 4.2(f); State v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 128, 285
P.3d 27 (2012). A defendant who demonstrates he received ineffective assistance
of counsel meets the burden of establishing a manifest injustice under CrR 4.2(f)
and a basis for allowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea under CrR 7.8(b)(5). State
v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 597, 521 P.2d 699 (1974); State v. Martinez, 161 Wn.
App. 436, 440-41, 253 P.3d 445 (2011).
The test under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during
the plea process. State v. Stowe, 71 Wn. App. 182, 186, 858 P.2d 267 (1993). A
defendant must show that (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced him.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 	In the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must
show that counsel failed to substantially assist him in deciding whether to plead
guilty. 	State v. McCollum, 88 Wn. App. 977, 982, 947 P.2d 1235 (1997). 	We
4 CrR 7.8(b) provides, “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve
a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) Mistakes, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or irregularity in obtaining
a judgment or order;
(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under rule 7.5;
(3) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) The judgment is void; or
(5) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

No. 79467-1-I/8
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review de novo a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that is
based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 	State v. A.N.J., 168 Wn.2d 91, 109,
225 P.3d 956 (2010).
There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.
State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33-34, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011). This presumption may
be 	overcome 	only 	if, 	under 	the 	circumstances 	of 	the 	case, 	there 	was 	no
conceivable tactical reason for counsel’s decisions. Id.
When analyzing prejudice related to effective assistance of counsel during
plea negotiations, the focus is on “whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective
performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). “[T]he defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id.; State v. Buckman,
190 Wn.2d 51, 62, 409 P.3d 193 (2018). A bare assertion that the petitioner would
not have pleaded guilty but for the alleged deficiency is not sufficient to establish
prejudice. 	In re Pers. Restraint of Elmore, 162 Wn.2d 236, 254, 172 P.3d 335
(2007). Where a defendant alleges a failure to conduct an adequate investigation,
the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the failure to
investigate potentially exculpatory evidence, counsel would have made a different
plea recommendation. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; State v. Garcia, 57 Wn. App. 927, 933,
791 P.2d 244 (1990). This assessment turns on whether the evidence likely would
have changed the outcome of a trial. In re Pers. Restraint of Clements, 125 Wn.
App. 634, 646, 106 P.3d 244 (2005).

No. 79467-1-I/9
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Where a trial court weighs evidence following a CrR 7.8 hearing, we review
its factual findings for substantial evidence. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 647, 870
P.2d 313 (1994). Substantial evidence exists when the record contains sufficient
evidence to persuade a “fair-minded, rational person that the declared premise is
true.” In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 679-80, 101 P.3d 1 (2004).
But we defer to the trial court on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of
witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d
60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990).
Law of Self Defense
Pratt first contends that he pleaded guilty, in large part, because counsel
provided inaccurate and misleading information as to the law of self-defense.
Specifically, Pratt argues that Donnelly told him he could not “successfully raise
self-defense.” 	But the trial court made findings to the contrary, findings that are
supported by substantial evidence.
Based on counsel’s declaration and interview statements, the trial court
found that Donnelly sufficiently understood the law of self-defense to properly
inform and advise Pratt. The court found that Donnelly explained the law in “terms
that 	the 	defendant 	could 	understand.” 	Even 	if 	Donnelly 	used 	the 	term
“preponderance,” instead of “’some evidence’” to describe Pratt’s burden of
production, the court determined that Donnelly’s advice was not misleading
because he did not tell Pratt that he could not satisfy that burden or that he would
bear the burden of proving self-defense at trial. Donnelly simply conveyed to Pratt
his belief that Pratt “would have to testify in order to persuade the jury that he acted

No. 79467-1-I/10
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in self-defense.” The court determined that Donnelly’s strategic assessment was
reasonable and his concerns about “the defendant’s ability to withstand an attack
on his credibility during cross-examination were also reasonable in context with
the other evidence that would have been admitted at trial.”
When interviewed by the State, Donnelly stated that he discussed self-
defense with Pratt on “a number of occasions.” 	He explained to Pratt that there
had to be some evidence of an imminent danger and “a strong reason to believe
that [he was] subject to a threat and then the force used must be reasonable.”
When asked if he explained to Pratt that the State had to disprove self-
defense, Donnelly stated:
[T]he problem with clients is, is you’re trying to explain the—
the legal standard. You raise the issue by a preponderance, then it
has to be disproved by a reasonable doubt. 	But you also have to
acknowledge that I’m not trying this to a judge. I’m probably gonna
try it to a jury. So uh I—I don’t know if I got that technical with him,
but I would have communicated that he would have had to testify and
would have had to convince a jury.
Pratt points to Donnelly’s use of the word preponderance here to argue that he
must have misunderstood the defense burden of production and must have
suggested to Pratt that he had to prove he acted in self-defense on a more
probable than not basis in order to shift the burden of proof back to the State.
The trial court certainly did not interpret Donnelly’s statement in this manner,
nor do we. Donnelly made it clear that when he spoke to Pratt about self-defense,
he did not focus on the legal standard but on how it would play out practically at
trial. Donnelly clearly stated that he would not have told Pratt he had the burden
of proving self-defense; instead, he told Pratt that, for all practical purposes, he

No. 79467-1-I/11
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would have to testify and “[h]e would have to be persuasive,” because when you
“assert self-defense, it’s gonna have to be persuasive to a jury ‘cause I don’t think
a jury understands . . . that legal standard.”
Although counsel is expected to understand the applicable law when
advising a client, counsel is also expected to communicate with a client in language
that client is able to understand. ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense
Function, Standard 4-3.1(d) (2017).5 	We conclude, as did the trial court, that
Donnelly’s 	use 	of 	the 	word 	“preponderance,” 	when 	read 	in 	the 	context 	of
Donnelly’s complete interview, did not prove Donnelly misunderstood the law of
self-defense or reached an erroneous conclusion on the viability of a self-defense
claim based on some misunderstanding of the law.
Donnelly did advise Pratt that, in his opinion, the self-defense claim would
not be successful at trial. 	Donnelly’s advice was based on several evidentiary
concerns. First, Donnelly thought Pratt’s statement to police gave the prosecutor
a lot of ammunition to undercut and discredit him. While Pratt raised self-defense
in his police interview, Donnelly described this statement as a sort of “hypothetical
statement.” 	Second, Pratt’s flight from Washington, with cell phone records
showing he had traveled to California after the shooting, would lead to an inference
that he did not act in self-defense. Third, Pratt told police he did not see Smallwood
with a gun. This raised a question as to the reasonableness of Pratt’s use of force.
Finally, the other witnesses at the scene of the shooting did not support self-
5 Available at
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition/

No. 79467-1-I/12
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defense. 	In light of this evidence, it was not unreasonable to tell Pratt he would
likely have to testify and that his testimony would have to be found credible by the
jury to succeed at trial.
Even if Pratt testified, Donnelly’s concerns about the viability of the defense
were well-founded. According to testimony from the lead prosecutor, had the case
gone to trial, the State had evidence that on April 24, 2014, Pratt initiated the verbal
and physical altercation at Flo Ware Park and several eye witnesses saw Pratt
being 	aggressive, 	hostile, 	provocative, 	and 	the 	instigator 	of 	the 	fight 	with
Lancaster. 	These witnesses believed Smallwood was trying to diffuse the
situation. The State also had evidence that Pratt then retrieved a firearm, returned
to a location he knew people involved in the Flo Ware fight would be located, and
started another fight.
The prosecutor further testified that the State had eye witnesses who were
expected to testify that Smallwood was unarmed, that he demonstrated to Pratt he
was unarmed, and Pratt pulled his gun and shot Smallwood only when Smallwood
appeared to get the upper hand in a fist fight with Pratt. Pratt admitted in a police
interview that 	he did not 	actually see a firearm 	in Smallwood’s hand 	and
Smallwood was shot in a manner suggesting that he was moving away from the
shooter, including a gunshot wound in the middle of his back. 	And, as Donnelly
noted, Pratt fled the State following the shooting. It was reasonable for Donnelly
to conclude that this evidence would be sufficient for the State to prove Pratt had
not acted in self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

No. 79467-1-I/13
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Based on the trial court’s findings of fact, all of which are supported by
substantial evidence, we conclude Pratt has failed to demonstrate that Donnelly’s
representation was deficient with respect to his understanding and explanation of
the law of self-defense.
Failure to Interview Witnesses
Pratt next argues that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness because he failed to interview Donnie Adams. 	He
contends the failure to interview Adams cannot be justified on any strategic basis.
The trial court found that Donnelly considered interviewing Adams and
asked his investigator to locate him. 	At the time Pratt entered his plea, Donnelly
“had not foreclosed the possibility of interviewing Mr. Adams” before trial.
The record supports this finding. When Pratt pleaded guilty, the evidentiary
portion on the trial was not scheduled to begin for approximately two months. Pratt
does not challenge the court’s finding that before pretrial proceedings began,
Donnelly had already conducted numerous interviews and “[a]dditional interviews
were in the process of being scheduled and investigation was ongoing.” 	The
record shows that Donnelly had twice attempted to contact Adams, to no avail.
There is no evidence to suggest that Donnelly would have made no further
attempts. The evidence in the record does not, therefore, establish that Donnelly
would not have interviewed Adams had Pratt proceeded to trial.
And, perhaps more importantly, the trial court also found that Donnelly was
concerned Adams might provide information helpful to the State—Adams had told
Smallwood’s mother that he did not witness the shooting, that Smallwood had not

No. 79467-1-I/14
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threatened Pratt, and that Pratt had instigated the confrontation. On this basis, the
court found there were reasons to doubt that Adams would have provided
“favorable testimony in support of the defendant’s claim of self-defense at trial in
2015.”
The record supports these findings. 	Although Adams apparently told
attorney Cathy Gormley that he overheard Smallwood threaten to “air out” Pratt at
Flo Ware Park, this statement was inconsistent with the statements of others who
witnessed the fight at the park and with Adams’s own prior statements. 	The
victim’s mother told police officers that, immediately after the shooting, Adams told
her that Pratt had been “bullying” people at Flo Ware Park and that Smallwood
said nothing to Pratt. Adams’s initial statement aligns with the statements of other
witnesses who reported that Pratt was aggressive and hostile at the park and that
Smallwood tried to diffuse the situation. According to Smallwood’s mother, Adams
also told her that Pratt initiated the later confrontation that led to the shooting.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Adams would have been
willing to testify at trial in 2015. 	Expressing extreme reluctance and hostility,
Adams provided a 2-minute statement to Gormley in 2016, but he provided no
context or details and she did not ask him whether he would testify. Even if he had
been willing to do so, Adams’s testimony would have been undoubtedly subject to
impeachment, based on his prior statements and numerous letters that Pratt
authored in jail. In his letters, Pratt directed his family and friends to put pressure
on Adams to provide a statement to support his claim of self-defense, outlining the
exact words he wanted Adams to say. 	Based on this evidence, Pratt cannot

No. 79467-1-I/15
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establish that Donnelly performed deficiently by failing to interview Adams before
he entered his plea or that discovery of the evidence would have led Donnelly to
recommend against accepting the State’s plea offer.
Pratt also claims that Donnelly performed deficiently by failing to interview
a confidential informant who was identified in one of the police reports and
apparently “heard on the streets” that Pratt acted in self-defense. 	While Pratt
contends that it is “plainly necessary” to seek out all potential witnesses, the record
here indicates that the confidential informant had no direct knowledge of the
shooting, heard this information only “one time,” and could not identify the source
of information. 	Absent any indication that the informant could have provided
admissible, material evidence in support of Pratt’s defense, the record supports
the court’s finding that the failure to interview the informant was not objectively
unreasonable.
Failure to Obtain a Mental Health Evaluation
Finally, Pratt maintains that counsel was deficient in failing to understand
the legal relevance of Pratt’s mental status to his claim of self-defense. 	Pratt
contends a mental evaluation would have revealed he suffers from PTSD, a
condition that would have affected his subjective belief that he was in danger of
being shot when fighting with Smallwood.
Donnelly explained in his declaration and interview that he did not seek to
obtain a psychological evaluation because, based on his interactions with Pratt, he
“could not articulate a reason to have such an evaluation performed.” Donnelly
also 	believed 	that 	such 	an 	evaluation 	could 	be 	“counterproductive 	to 	[the]

No. 79467-1-I/16
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defense.” The trial court concluded that, in view of the information Donnelly had,
his failure to obtain an evaluation to determine whether Pratt suffered from PTSD
did not amount to deficient performance. 	The court determined that Donnelly’s
course of action was strategically sound, since a report stemming from a mental
health evaluation would have potentially included information detrimental to the
defense and the State would have had the opportunity to procure its own
evaluation. 	The court found that Donnelly’s statement that he would have
“followed up” on the potential PTSD issue after speaking with Gormley and reading
Dr. Prinster’s 2016 evaluation was nothing more than “hindsight.”
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings. 	Whether or not
Donnelly’s understanding of the potential relevance of a PTSD diagnosis to a self-
defense claim evolved over time, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
Donnelly had a reason to suspect Pratt suffered from PTSD at the time of the plea.
Even though Gormley sought an evaluation, the record does not indicate that she
did so because she knew or suspected that Pratt had PTSD.6 There is no support
for the defense’s position that counsel was required to pursue a mental health
evaluation simply based on general knowledge of Pratt’s upbringing and because
he was “grief stricken” and “anxious” at the time of the crime. 	And because it is
not clear that the benefits of obtaining a mental health evaluation outweighed the
potential risks, the decision was clearly a matter of strategy.
6 According to Dr. Prinster’s report, Gormley sought an evaluation because she believed
Pratt might have a “mood, cognitive, anxiety, or other disorder in addition to his known ADHD.”

No. 79467-1-I/17
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Pratt cites State v. Fedoruk, 184 Wn. App. 866, 339 P.3d 233 (2014), to
support his position that the failure to request a mental health evaluation was
objectively unreasonable. 	In Fedoruk, the defendant had an extensive and well-
documented history of serious mental illness and had previously been found not
guilty by reason of insanity on several felony charges. Id. at 885. This background
information was available to the defense from the beginning of the case. 	Id. at
881. 	Yet, defense counsel did not retain a mental health expert or otherwise
pursue a mental health condition evaluation until the day before jury selection. Id.
In these circumstances, we concluded that defense counsel was ineffective. Id. at
882.
Pratt, on the other hand, has no documented history of serious mental
illness or of raising mental illness as a defense to prior criminal charges. There is
no basis to conclude that counsel knew or should have known that Pratt likely had
PTSD. And, in view of the potential negative consequences of pursuing a mental
health evaluation, defense counsel’s failure to investigate a potential PTSD
diagnosis did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Pratt’s reliance on State v. A.N.J., 168 Wn.2d 91, 225 P.3d 956 (2010), is
also misplaced. 	In A.N.J., our Supreme Court held that “a defendant’s counsel
cannot properly evaluate the merits of a plea offer without evaluating the State's
evidence.” 	Id. at 109. There, the court allowed a juvenile defendant to withdraw
his plea because defense counsel’s deficient representation constituted a manifest
injustice. Id. at 113-14. It based its ruling on several key facts not present here:
A.N.J.’s counsel met with his client for as little as 55 minutes total before the plea

No. 79467-1-I/18
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hearing, did not talk to any witnesses or use an investigator, and admitted he
probably did not explain the consequences of the plea, and that his client never
saw the plea documents until immediately before the plea hearing.
In contrast, by the time Pratt accepted the State’s plea offer, counsel had
numerous discussions with Pratt, had retained at least two investigators, and
interviewed approximately 30 witnesses. Pratt does not allege that counsel failed
to 	explain 	the 	consequences 	of 	the 	plea 	or 	inadequately 	review 	the 	plea
documents with him. A.N.J. provides no basis for relief under these facts.
Prejudice
Pratt argues that the outcome of this case would have been dramatically
different but for counsel’s errors.
However, the trial court found that Pratt’s claim that he would have insisted
on going to trial if Donnelly had performed differently was not credible. The court
specifically found that the transcripts of the telephone calls Pratt made on the night
before he changed his plea “persuasively” established that his decision to plead
guilty was motivated by several factors, none of which related to counsel’s
performance. Pratt expressly related the following considerations: 1) his desire to
avoid putting his family, the victim’s family, and his community through a difficult
and divisive trial, 2) his desire to prevent further public airing of his statements to
the police, 3) his feelings of guilt, 4) his knowledge that even if acquitted, he would
face adverse consequences in his community, and 5) a desire to avoid a
significantly longer sentence.

No. 79467-1-I/19
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Pratt contends the trial court erred in relying on these statements because
“this decision was [made] in [the] context of a case where he had no hope, because
no one was investigating the one witness who could help him, and the court had
refused his only other alternative—seeking a new lawyer.” 	This argument,
however, is solely based on Pratt’s testimony at the CrR 7.8 hearing where he
explained that while he told his brother in a phone call that he did not want to put
the family through trial, he actually felt like “my lawyer [was] not educating me on
the laws of self-defense,” and his lawyer was “not doing his job.” 	He stated that
had Donnelly interviewed Adams and called him to testify at trial, and had Donnelly
obtained a mental health evaluation and discovered Pratt suffered from PTSD, and
had Donnelly told Pratt of the relevance of this condition to the defense of self-
defense, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have instead gone to trial.
The trial court found this testimony not credible. 	Pratt is essentially asking this
court to disregard the trial court’s credibility finding. 	The trial court had the
opportunity to hear Pratt’s testimony, observe his demeanor, and adjudge the
veracity of his testimony. We will not review this credibility determination.
The trial court concluded that Pratt failed to show that he was prejudiced by
anything Donnelly failed to do or by the advice he gave in anticipation of the guilty
plea. 	This conclusion is supported by the trial court’s findings of fact and its
findings of fact are supported by the record below.
Because Pratt failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice, his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. The trial court did not err in denying
his motion to withdraw his plea.

No. 79467-1-I/20
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Statement of Additional Grounds
Pratt raises several claims in a statement of additional grounds for relief.7
He reiterates the arguments raised by appellate counsel challenging the denial of
his motion to withdraw his plea. He also claims that he would have been acquitted
at trial on the murder charge because the State would not have been entitled to a
first-aggressor instruction, there was significant evidence available to support his
claim of self-defense, and he could have raised other viable defenses, such as
voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity.
But when he pleaded guilty, Pratt specifically admitted that on April 24,
2014, he shot Smallwood with a firearm, Smallwood died as a result, and that he
fired the weapon with intent to cause Smallwood’s death. 	There was a sufficient
factual basis for the plea. And by pleading guilty, Pratt waived his right to challenge
the sufficiency or strength of the State’s evidence. 	See State v. Carrier, 36 Wn.
App. 755, 756–57, 677 P.2d 768 (1984) (a guilty plea waives any right to appeal
from a deficiency in state's proof of the crime). 	We decline to further review the
issues related to Pratt’s motion to withdraw his plea that were adequately
addressed by counsel. See RAP 10.10(a); State v. Thompson, 169 Wn. App. 436,
492-93, 290 P.3d 996 (2012) (the court need not address allegations of error that
have been adequately addressed by counsel).
Pratt also challenges the trial court’s denial of a motion to discharge counsel
he raised prior to his plea. 	He contends that the trial court denied his motion
7 Pratt filed two separate statements of additional grounds on the same date. We address
both statements.

No. 79467-1-I/21
21
without conducting a proper inquiry into the factual basis for his request. But, the
court invited Pratt to orally explain the basis for his motion. Pratt said counsel was
not listening to him, adequately communicating with him, or working diligently on
his case. The court gave counsel the opportunity to respond, heard from both the
State and the defense with regard to the trial preparations that would take place in
the coming weeks, and denied the motion. Pratt fails to demonstrate that the court
abused its discretion. See State v. Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179, 200, 86 P.3d 139 (2004)
(decisions 	on motions to discharge counsel are reviewed for 	an abuse of
discretion)
Finally, Pratt contends that the court erred by accepting his “equivocal”
plea. But as explained, there was a factual basis to support Pratt’s plea. He
expressed no confusion, reluctance, or equivocation in his guilty plea statement
or during the formal plea colloquy. Pratt fails to establish a basis for relief.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: