* State of Washington v. Jaclyn Rae Sleater

NOTICE: SLIP OPINION
(not the court’s final written decision)
The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the
written opinions that are originally filed by the court.
A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions
can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an
order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential
purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits
(for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the
opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court
decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An
opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of
the court.
The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it
has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official
text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes
of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the
language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of
charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports.
For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential
(unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.

FILED
June 14, 2016
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
JACLYN RAE SLEATER,
Appellant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 33149-1-111
PUBLISHED OPINION
KORSMO, J. - 	An arrest warrant issued for Jaclyn Sleater when she did not
schedule an appearance in court to explain why she had not made a payment on her
outstanding legal financial obligations (LFOs ). 	We conclude that a warrant should not
have issued absent a court directive to appear at a specific hearing. 	We therefore reverse
the conviction for possession of methamphetamine discovered when she was arrested on
the outstanding warrant.
FACTS
The relevant facts primarily involve Ms. Sleater's earlier felony convictions for
various drug offenses. As of April 2014, Ms. Sleater owed LFOs on three cause numbers
and was making a combined monthly payment of$75 toward the three cases. She was
entered into Benton County's "pay or appear" program. It required her to make her LFO
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 	33149-1-111
State v. Sf eater
payments every month or appear to schedule a hearing to explain why she could not
make the payments. 	The program agreement also stated that if the defendant did not
make a payment and failed to schedule a hearing, "a warrant will be issued for the
Defendant's arrest." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 39.
Payments were being made on her behalf by Ms. Sleater's mother. Her mother
made a $150 on-line payment on April 17, 2014. The computer did not apportion the
sum among the three accounts, but applied all of the money to the one cause number
identified with the payment. 1 The other two counts were four and seven months in
arrears. The clerk's office sought and obtained arrest warrants on April 22, 2014 for Ms.
Sleater on those two cause numbers since she had not made payments and had not
scheduled a hearing to explain the lack of payments.
Officers arrested Ms. Sleater on the two warrants on May 16, 2014. 	She was in
possession of methamphetamine at the time of her arrest. Four days later the prosecutor
filed one count of possession of a controlled substance. 	Her appointed counsel moved to
suppress the evidence, arguing that the arrest was invalid on multiple bases, including a
claim that the warrants were wrongly issued. 	The trial court denied the motion. Ms.
1 The mother testified that she was told by clerk's office employees that the money
would be apportioned and only one cause number needed to be listed. 	The clerk's office
provided testimony that they had no record of speaking with the mother. The payment
history showed that in most months the electronic payment would be applied to a single
cause number, but the cause number would vary from month to month.
2
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 	33149-1-III
State v. Sfeater
Sleater was subsequently convicted at a bench trial on stipulated facts. 	She timely
appealed to this court.
ANALYSIS
Ms. Sleater argues that the arrest warrants were invalidly issued without
consideration of alternatives to arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 2 We agree. The LFO aspect of this case presents a twist on typical
Fourth Amendment analysis because enforcement of LFOs is a civil action, rather than a
criminal one. The issuance of an arrest warrant in this situation therefore requires
consideration of the Fourth Amendment's application in the civil arena.
The Fourth Amendment provides protection against "unreasonable ... seizures."
A seizure is reasonable if it serves a "governmental interest which is adequate to justify
imposition on the liberty of the individual." State v. Fisher, 145 Wn.2d 209, 232, 35 P.3d
366 (2001 ). That determination is made "on the basis of the particular interests
involved." Id.; accord, State v. Klinker, 85 Wn.2d 509, 519-20, 537 P.2d 268 (1975).
The principles governing LFOs, having been the subject of much litigation in
recent years, are well understood. It is permissible to impose court costs on a defendant
2 In the trial court, Ms. Sleater pursued a theory that the warrants wrongly were
issued because she had paid in accordance with the clerk's directions. As a result of that
argument, the facts concerning the payment history and the pay or appear program were
developed. 	Accordingly, we conclude that this particular argument is a manifest
constitutional claim with sufficient evidence in the record to justify our consideration under
RAP 2.5(a)(3). See State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333-34, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
3
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 	33149-1-III
State v. Sleater
upon conviction as long as certain constitutional safeguards are in place. Fuller v.
Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 45-54, 94 S. Ct. 2116, 40 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974) (upholding
Oregon's costs statute). It also is constitutional to impose costs "upon those with a
foreseeable ability to meet it" and to enforce them "against those who actually become
able to meet it without hardship." Id. at 54. However, it violates due process to revoke
probation for failure to pay fines if the defendant is unable to pay due to indigence.
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 76 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1983).
Nor can a state impose a fine and convert it to jail time solely because a defendant has no
ability to pay the fine. 	Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398, 91 S. Ct. 668, 28 L. Ed. 2d 130
( 1971 ). The State must afford the defendant a hearing before jailing him for failing to
pay his obligations. Smith v. Whatcom County Dist. Court, 147 Wn.2d 98, 112, 52 P.3d
485 (2002). 	While the court can put the burden to prove inability to pay on the
defendant, it still has a duty to inquire into a defendant's ability to pay fines prior to
jailing him. Id.
Washington's processes for imposing costs and sanctioning those who do not pay
comply with the demands of the constitution. See generally, State v. Blank, 131 Wn.2d
230, 930 P.2d 1213 (1997). Enforcement ofLFOs is a civil proceeding. RCW
10.01.180(1); 147 Wn.2d at 105 (recognizing that RCW 10.01.180(1) 3 authorizes a civil
3 "A defendant sentenced to pay a fine or costs who defaults in the payment
thereof or of any installment is in contempt of court . . . . The court may issue a warrant
4
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 33149-1-III
State v. Sleater
contempt proceeding). 	The statute authorizes issuance of an arrest warrant for a person
who fails to pay her costs. RCW 10.01.180(1) ("The court may issue a warrant of arrest
for his or her appearance."). Ms. Sleater argues, therefore, that an arrest warrant in the
LFO context must comport with the Fourth Amendment's requirements for civil cases.
She places her argument squarely on the back of Klinker.
Klinker involved a filiation statute that allowed a justice of the peace to issue a
warrant for arrest of a putative father upon receipt of a complaint from an unmarried
woman, who was pregnant or already had a child, alleging a particular individual is the
father. 	Former RCW 26.24.010 (1919), repealed by LAWS OF 1975-76, 2d Ex. Sess., ch.
42, § 41). 4 In Klinker, a complaint was submitted, a warrant issued, and Mr. Klinker was
arrested on the warrant. 	85 Wn.2d at 510. He successfully moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that the statute violated general due process principles. Id. at 510-11.
Our court, however, ruled that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment's requirement
that "arrests be reasonable." Id.
of arrest for his or her appearance." RCW 10.01.180(1).
4 "When an unmarried woman shall be pregnant or delivered of a child which shall
not be the issue of lawful wedlock, complaint may be made in writing by said unmarried
woman ... to any justice of the peace ... accusing, under oath, a person with being the
father of such child, and it shall be the duty of such justice forthwith to issue a warrant
against the person so accused and cause him to be brought forthwith before such justice."
(Emphasis added.)
5
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 	33149-1-III
State v. Sleater
The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment applied equally in a civil situation
as in a criminal one. Id. at 515. In the criminal context, the situation is straightforward:
reasonableness means probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. Id. at
520-21. However, in the civil context, the issue is more complicated. Id. at 521. The
court first looked to the governmental interest involved: "the need to insure that the
burden of supporting illegitimate children will be equitably shared by both of its parents
and will not be unnecessarily placed on the state." Id. 	While this interest was
substantial, it did not justify arrest. Id. at 521-22. Arrest usually is only justified "when a
person may flee from legal process, or where he may constitute a danger to the public if
allowed to remain at large." Id. at 522. Ultimately, the court reasoned that in a civil
situation, a court should issue a summons prior to an arrest warrant: "Where there is no
special need for arrest, where some other means exists by which the governmental
interest can be satisfied without such infringement on individual liberties, the issuance of
an arrest warrant is not only unwise but constitutionally impermissible." Id. 	The court
held, that, unless "there is probable cause to believe ... he will flee the jurisdiction if
given more conventional notice," "the justice may approve only a standard summons."
Id. at 523. The statutory arrest process was ruled unconstitutional. Id. at 524.
Klinker remains good law. See Fisher, 145 Wn.2d at 221-26 (declining to apply
Klinker to a defendant who violated the conditions of her release prior to sentencing).
More recently the court considered a due process challenge to an LFO collection
6
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 	33149-1-III
State v. Sleater
procedure in State v. Nason, 168 Wn.2d 936, 233 P.3d 848 (2010). There a defendant
was repeatedly sanctioned for willfully failing to pay his LFOs. As a result of one
hearing, the defendant was ordered to serve jail time for his violation and directed to
make his next payment on a specific date. If he did not make the payment, he was
required to report to jail to begin serving a 60 day sanction or file a motion to stay the
obligation. Id. at 942. 	The court concluded that the provision violated due process of
law because it required him to report to jail without a hearing on his ability to pay. Id. at
946.
We think that Klinker and Nason compel the result here. 	The effect of the arrest
warrants was to require Ms. Sleater to go to jail for failing to pay her LFOs without first
conducting an inquiry into her ability to pay them. 	The facts of this case demonstrate the
need for such an inquiry. 	Ms. Sleater's mother did make a payment toward her
daughter's LFOs, but through some type of error the payment was not reflected in all
three files. 	A hearing before the warrants issued would have allowed the court to resolve
the problem without the necessity of an arrest.
It is important to emphasize what we do not decide. 	Courts can still issue warrants
for the arrest of defendants who do not appear in court to discuss their LFOs. However,
Nason tells us that the courts cannot place the onus on the defendant to schedule her own
hearing. Instead, we perceive that a summons or prior court order requiring the defendant
7
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 33149-1-III
State v. Sfeater
to attend a specific hearing is necessary before a warrant can issue to arrest someone for
not appearing to explain why she is (apparently) not meeting her payment obligations.
Here, a warrant should not have issued for defendant's failure to pay without first
determining the willfulness of that violation. Accordingly, the trial court erred in
denying the suppression motion. 	The conviction is reversed.
WE CONCUR:
\
Pennell, J.
8