State v. Stephanie A. Deaette

ENTRY ORDER
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2021-016
JANUARY TERM, 2021
State of Vermont v. Stephanie A. Deaette* } APPEALED FROM:
}
} Superior Court, Orleans Unit,
} Criminal Division
}
} DOCKET NO. 583-10-20 Oscr
Trial Judge: A. Gregory Rainville
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Defendant Stephanie Deaette appeals a superior court order imposing a pretrial condition
of release compelling her to open her door to law enforcement during reasonable times. Because
the record does not support the challenged condition, the order is reversed and the matter
remanded.
Defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, criminal
threatening, and obstruction of justice following an incident in which she allegedly struck her
neighbor on the head with a wrench in her apartment building in Newport, Vermont. See 13 V.S.A.
§§ 1024(a)(2), 1702(a), 3015. At arraignment, the superior court released defendant subject to
conditions of release, including residing with, and under the supervision of, her father and
stepmother under a twenty-four-hour curfew in Jericho, Vermont. Among other conditions,
defendant was not to possess firearms or other dangerous weapons, and she was not to contact
complainant or be within 300 feet of her, her home, work, or vehicle.
The living arrangement placing defendant, her three children, the father, and stepmother in
a home proved problematic, so the court granted defendant’s request to amend the conditions.
Under the new conditions, defendant could reside with her three children in a hotel room in
Williston, Vermont under curfew from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. She was placed under the
supervision of her father, who was obliged to monitor defendant “through electronic means” and
to “physically check on her.” Defendant was also prohibited from traveling to Orleans County,
which encompasses Newport. The other noted conditions were retained.
Subsequently, on two separate days, during defendant’s curfew hours, police officers
knocked on defendant’s hotel room door to check her compliance with the curfew, but defendant
did not open the door. The officers called the room telephone on one occasion and received no
answer. From a window, the officers saw that the television and lights were on and an unidentified
person was in bed, but the officers could not verify that defendant was in the room.
In consequence, the State charged defendant with two counts of violating the curfew
condition and moved the superior court to add a new condition requiring defendant to answer the
door to law enforcement. The court held an arraignment on the new charges on December 22,
2020. Defendant opposed the new condition at that hearing and filed a written memorandum. She
argued that there was no legal justification for the condition and that compelling her to open her
door would violate her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Chapter I,
Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. Defendant further maintained that the condition could

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expose her and her children to COVID-19 and to criminals impersonating police officers. At the
arraignment hearing, the court found probable cause on the new violations, but took the State’s
motion for a new condition under advisement without making any findings.
Without an additional hearing or any findings, on January 8, 2021, the court added
condition 37, which provides in relevant part that defendant “shall respond to law enforcement and
answer the door to the residence at all reasonable times.”
On appeal, defendant renews her constitutional arguments and maintains that condition 37
must be struck because it is not necessary to mitigate a risk of flight from prosecution or to ensure
protection of the public, as required by 13 V.S.A. § 7554(a)(1)-(2).
This Court affirms an order imposing conditions of release “if it is supported by the
proceedings below.” Id. § 7556(b); State v. Pratt, 2017 VT 9, ¶ 20, 204 Vt. 282.
Under 13 V.S.A. § 7554(a)(1), the court may impose “the least restrictive combination” of
several enumerated conditions “that will reasonably mitigate the risk of flight of the defendant.”
One such condition is “any other condition found reasonably necessary to mitigate the risk of
flight.” Id. § 7554(a)(1)(F). Under § 7554(a)(2), the court may also impose “the least restrictive
combination” of several listed conditions “that will reasonably ensure protection of the public.”
One of these is “any other condition found reasonably necessary to protect the public.” Id.
§ 7554(a)(2)(D). In deciding the conditions of release to impose under § 7554(a)(1) and (2), the
court “shall take into account,” based on “available information,” several considerations,
including:
[T]he nature and circumstances of the offense charged; the weight
of the evidence against the accused; and the accused’s family ties,
employment, character and mental condition, length of residence in
the community, record of convictions, and record of appearance at
court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to
appear at court proceedings.
Id. § 7554(b)(2); see also State v. Rougeau, 2019 VT 18, ¶ 13, 209 Vt. 535 (explaining that court
“must” take into account § 7554(b) factors).
Here, given the absence of any findings demonstrating that the superior court undertook
the analysis required under § 7554, this Court cannot find that the order imposing condition 37 is
supported by the proceedings below. Despite defendant’s opposition to the new requested
condition, the court failed to explain how condition 37 is reasonably necessary, as part of the least
restrictive combination of conditions, to mitigate defendant’s risk of flight or to protect the public.
There is also no indication in the record that the court examined the factors in § 7554(b) before
imposing condition 37. Accordingly, the order must be reversed and the matter remanded for the
court to engage in the appropriate analysis.
The following observations are offered to guide the superior court on remand. The record
indicates that the need for the condition arose from evidence that the police were unable to ensure
defendant’s compliance with the curfew. But the condition is silent as to the curfew and compels
defendant to “answer the door to the residence at all reasonable times.” If the reason behind the
condition is ensuring compliance with the curfew, it is not clear why compelling defendant to
answer the door at other times is necessary for that purpose. Additionally, it is not clear why
compelling defendant to answer the door is the least restrictive means to ensure compliance with

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the curfew when there may be technological alternatives, including a phone call to the room, that
may serve that purpose.
Finally, while this Court addresses issues likely to arise on remand, see, e.g., State v.
Tribble, 2012 VT 105, ¶ 1, 193 Vt. 194, it does not decide constitutional questions unnecessarily,
see, e.g., In re M.C., 2018 VT 139, ¶ 9, 209 Vt. 219; In re Picket Fence Preview, 173 Vt. 369, 375
(2002). On remand, after conducting the § 7554 analysis, the superior court may deny the State’s
request or impose an entirely different condition. Because resolving the constitutional questions
is not necessary for the disposition of this appeal, and because the questions may not arise after
remand under the present facts, it is inappropriate to consider defendant’s constitutional arguments
at this time.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FOR THE COURT:
William D. Cohen, Associate Justice